Isolationist States in an Interdependent World

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Isolationist States in an Interdependent World

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Isolationist States in an Interdependent World

Helga Turku Florida International University, USA

© Helga Turku 2009 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Helga Turku has asserted her right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the author of this work. Published by Ashgate Publishing Limited Ashgate Publishing Company Wey Court East Suite 420 Union Road 101 Cherry Street Farnham Burlington Surrey, GU9 7PT VT 05401-4405 England USA www.ashgate.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Turku, Helga. Isolationist states in an interdependent world. 1. Isolationism. 2. Isolationism--Albania. 3. Isolationism-Korea (North) 4. Isolationism--Burma. 5. Albania--Foreign relations. 6. Korea (North)--Foreign relations. 7. Burma-Foreign relations. I. Title 327.1-dc22 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Turku, Helga. Isolationist states in an interdependent world / by Helga Turku. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7546-7932-5 (hardback) -- ISBN 978-0-7546-9836-4 (ebook) 1. Isolationism. 2. International relations. I. Title. JZ1318.T82 2009 327.1'1--dc22 ISBN 978-0-7546-7932-5 (hbk) ISN

2009021821

Contents Preface   Dedication   Acknowledgments  

vii ix xi

1

Isolationist States in an Interdependent World   Introduction   Isolationism and the International System   Research Purpose and Significance   Isolationist States: Albania, North Korea and Burma   Theoretical Perspective   Isolationism: Competing Perspectives   Research Questions and Hypotheses   Study Plan, Design, and Instrumentation  

1 1 6 8 12 18 22 24 25

2

Isolationism in International Relations Theory   Introduction   The Modern State   The Modern States System   Trade and Communication: Pre and Post-WWI, Pre and Post-WWII  Isolationism Throughout History   Degrees and Manifestations of Isolationism  

27 27 27 32 38 44 53

3

Legitimacy of the State in Isolationist Regimes   Introduction   Albania   North Korea   Burma   Discussion  

59 59 60 66 77 80

4

Domestic Isolationism   Introduction   Albania   North Korea   Burma   Discussion  

81 81 82 90 96 103

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vi

5

International Isolationism   Introduction   Albania   North Korea   Burma   Discussion  

107 107 108 118 124 131

6

Conclusion: The Viability of Isolationist States   Introduction   Questions and Hypotheses   Discussion  

133 133 135 142

Bibliography   Index  

145 177

Preface Since Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Politics established the basis for Western political thought almost 2500 years ago, the discipline of international relations has evolved substantially. However, most of the literature has revolved around state interaction within the system, and there is little discussion of countries that opt out of the international states system and become isolationist. Given the interdependent nature of the modern international system, this study elaborates on the concept and practice of isolationism by expounding upon the reasons and consequences of states opting out of the international system. The empirical case studies utilized to explore isolationism are Albania, North Korea, and Burma. By empirically verifying the components, motivations, and consequences of isolationism in an interdependent world, this study provides insight into why and how states resist engagement with the global socioeconomic and political state system. Using historical, comparative, and inductive analysis, this study explains why states choose to isolate themselves both domestically and internationally. Specifically, comparative historical analysis highlights isolationism as a concept and practice. This study maintains that extreme forms of self-imposed isolation in an interdependent international system, while perhaps serving the immediate interests of a ruling regime, harms the long-term national interests of the state. Although the leadership in an isolationist state gains a significant amount of power and control over the people within its borders, the state as a whole experiences profound negative effects. In the long term, a state loses power, stability, prestige, and suffers a decline in overall economic prosperity. States that withdraw from the international system, therefore, provide insight into an unexplored area of international relations when considering notions of rationality, self-interest, power politics, cooperation, and alliances. In short, isolationism in an interdependent state system goes against the logic of the modern society/system of states, resulting in deleterious consequences to the wellbeing of the state.

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Dedication

First and foremost, I dedicate this book to my mother, Bali Turku. She is the most wonderful person I know; she is my most enthusiastic cheerleader and best friend. There is no doubt in my mind that without her continual love, support, strength, and determination, I would not have been able to produce this work. I also dedicate this book to my father, Ali Turku. He has, time and again, set the highest standards by which I measure personal and professional success and satisfaction. It is my hope that this book lives up to the standards of excellence that my father instilled in me from my earliest memories. I am appreciative for his encouragement and unyielding support. My sister, Megi Turku, provided comic relief and updates on what was transpiring in the world while I was engaged in researching and writing this book. I am indebted to Dr. Marvin L. Astrada, who graciously discussed, commented upon, reviewed, and edited the manuscript. He indefatigably read and reread every chapter, offering sound and invaluable advice throughout the research and writing process. He has been a wonderful listener and commentator, and I will always be grateful. Lastly, I would not have been able to produce this book without the help of Lily Paws and Dookie Paws. These two troublemakers and amateur singers (soprano and tenor, respectively) ensured that I exercised daily while also reminding me to turn in for the evening by 4:00 am while I researched and wrote this book.

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Acknowledgments First and foremost, I would like to thank Dr. Ralph S. Clem for providing me with the necessary guidance for writing this book. Dr. Clem proved indispensable in helping me get the project started, and offered invaluable help along the way. I would also like to acknowledge the efforts of Dr. Felix E. Martin for his in-depth comments, encouragement, and consistent support. He has been an incredible help in developing my ideas, fine-tuning my analysis, and challenging me to critically assess my progress. He is a great mentor and friend, and I am very grateful for his support. Dr. Harry D. Gould has also graciously shared his time and insight, especially in the field of international relations theory. Not only has he been a great help with my book, reviewing my text, referring me to various medieval and renaissance philosophers, and carefully reading through details of my chapters, but he has also listened to my many concerns throughout the life of this project. Lastly, I wish to acknowledge the generous support of Florida International University, which provided me with a generous fellowship for this book.

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Chapter 1

Isolationist States in an Interdependent World Introduction This study seeks to examine the concept and practice of isolationism in international affairs. Through in-depth analysis of the modern state and the international system of states it is possible to explain how and why isolationist states disengage from what is considered a cornerstone of the contemporary international system, that is, interaction, engagement, and interdependence among states. The conceptual approach adopted in this study concentrates on explaining the phenomenon of isolationism. Although the empirical case studies of communist Albania, North Korea and Burma are utilized to illuminate isolationism, the main emphasis is to probe and expound upon isolationism as a political concept, process, motive, and behavior. While there have been different degrees and political manifestations of isolationism throughout the annals of history, this study is concerned with explaining extreme forms of isolationism in the 20th century to present. This discussion of isolationism is especially important due to the complex and growing interactions that define state identity and behavior in an interdependent world. To explain isolationism, it is necessary to take into account the processes of global interaction among states that have been taking place on the world stage. Since the establishment of the contemporary international political and economic order at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in 1944, the United States (US), in cooperation with the United Kingdom (UK), France, and other allies, has defined and managed the global system. Since the end of World War II (WWII), the organization and management of world affairs have been premised on the integration of a global liberal-economic system of commerce and politics. The process that we now know as globalization involves the transformation of local states affairs (political, social, and economic) into global states of affairs. Increasingly, people around the world have integrated into a common society, based on a particular mode of global governance rooted in market economics and procedural democracy. In its most general definition, globalization involves the concentrated combination of social, economic, technological, socio-cultural, and political forces.  This study will use the term Burma as opposed to Myanmar because Myanmar is a political term associated with explicit support for the present government in power.  See Sheila L. Croucher, Globalization and Belonging: The Politics of Identity a Changing World (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004) 10.



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In the political analysis of globalization, the term is often utilized in a “doctrinal sense” to refer to neo/liberal economic globalization, the dominant process that integrates domestic economies into an overarching international economy by way of global trade, foreign direct investment, uninhibited capital flows and labor migration, and the dissemination of science and technology. Thomas L. Friedman, for example, examines the impact of globalization as a “flattening of the globe,” contending that integrated global trade, outsourcing, supply chaining, and political forces have produced immeasurable and permanent changes in the structure of the international economic system. Friedman contends that globalization is growing exponentially, that its pace is rapidly speeding up and will continue to do so, having a profound impact on economic organization and practices. In addition to an economic dimension, globalization also has a political dimension that works hand in hand with economic philosophy and policy. The term globalization, according to Noam Chomsky, has two meanings, that is, a literal meaning (economic) and a political meaning that impacts the totality of international society and not just a specific aspect of it, that is, the economy.   For discussions on globalization see: Jacques Baudot, Building a World Community: Globalization and the Common Good, Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copenhagen in association with the University of Washington Press Seattle and London, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001); Ino Rossi, ed., Frontiers of Globalization Research: Theoretical and Methodological Approaches (New York: Springer, 2007); Louis J. Halle, The Elements of World Order: Essays on International Politics, ed., Kenneth W. Thomson (Lanham: University Press of America, 1996); David A. Deese, World Trade Politics: Power, Principles, and Leadership (New York: Routledge, 2008); Marshall R. Singer, Weak States in a World of Powers: The Dynamics of International Relationships, (New York: Macmillan, 1972); John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization (New York: Routledge, 1998); John Gerard Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis,” World Politics 35 (1983): 261-285; David A. Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” Review of International Studies, 23.1 (1997): 5-26; Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991) 46-72; Ernst Haas, Where Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Joseph Nye, “Neorealism and Neoliberalism,” World Politics, 40 (1988): 235-51; Clive Jones and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe eds., International Security in a Global Age: Securing the Twentyfirst Century (Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000).  Noam Chomsky, interview with Sun Woo Lee, “Corporate Globalization: Korea and International Affairs” Monthly JoongAng, ZNET 22 February 2006; Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization: With a New Afterword (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).   Thomas L. Friedman,”The Dell Theory of Conflict Prevention.” Emerging: A Reader, ed. Barclay Barrios (Boston: Bedford, St. Martins, 2008) 49.  Noam Chomsky, “Noam Chomsky Chats with Washington Post Readers,” The Washington Post, March 24 2006, 11 April 2008 .

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Political predilections aside, it is the case that, in an age of globalization, the world has become more and more integrated, interactive, and interdependent. Indeed, the “intensification of worldwide social relations, which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring miles away, and vice versa,” has given rise to interdependence. Globalization, generally and theoretically speaking, is not necessarily a new phenomenon. In 1848, Karl Marx observed, in the Communist Manifesto, that, in “place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal interdependence of nations.” In the 21st century, Marx’s observation has proven clairvoyant: in the 21st century, the world has and continues to experience a full-blown globalization of culture, politics, regulation, economy, and security measures, among other things. Indeed, one can liken globalization to the status of the British Empire during the 19th century: that is, at the end of the 19th century “the sun never set on the British Empire,” and at the beginning of the 21st century, “there is always a major stock exchange open and ready to do business with buyers and sellers located anywhere in the world.”10 The nature of the post-Bretton Woods international system has produced high degrees of sociopolitical and economic interactivity and interdependence via extensive networks of state-to-state engagements and arrangements.11 Mass media communications, capital flows, environmental issues, international institutional regulations and arrangements, international treaties and legal policies, and international military relations and security policies, render state-tostate interaction and interdependence inevitable. Major changes in international monetary policy, such as the US abandonment of the gold standard on August 15, 1971,12 and substantial technological advancement, such as the mass dissemination of technology in the 1980s, helped fuel international financial flows.13 The liberalization of the London Stock Exchange in October 1986 (the “Big Bang”) quickly led a number of other stock exchanges in France, Germany,

 Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Cambridge: Polity, 1990) 64.  Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 3rd ed. (Upper Saddle River: Longman, 2001).  Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Communist Manifesto, A Modern Edition, (New York: Verso, 1998) 39. 10  Jane Jenson and Boaventura de Sousa Santos, “Introduction: Case Studies and Common Trends in Globalization,” Globalizing Institutions; Case Studies in Regulation and Innovation, eds., Jane Jenson and Boaventura de Sousa Santos (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000) 10. 11  Filippo Cesarano, Monetary Theory and Bretton Woods: The Construction of an International Monetary Order, Series: Historical Perspectives on Modern Economics, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 12 Steven W. Kohlhagen, “The Performance of the Foreign Exchange Markets: 19711974,” Journal of International Business Studies 6.2 (1975): 33-39. 13 Dash 52-54.



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the Netherlands, and Norway to follow the UK’s lead.14 The liberalization of the London Stock Exchange was a decisive step toward even greater interdependence among states’ financial markets, initiated by pragmatic governments, which “recognized that the globalization of financial markets was an irresistible force.”15 Although the process was difficult and it took a long time to put in motion, the deregulation of financial markets, greater integration of major nations’ economies, advances in communications as well as technology and production have initiated a “trend towards globalization that is irreversible.”16 Global communications, deregulation and liberalization of commerce have ushered in immense changes in the international system – developments that have profound consequences on the definition and conduct of international affairs. Such changes have made globalization a key driving force behind the rapid social, political and economic changes that are reshaping modern societies and world order.17 Contemporary processes of globalization are historically unprecedented; governments and societies across the globe are having to adjust to a world in which there is no longer a clear distinction between domestic and foreign affairs.18 Because of these changes, no individual state can eschew the effects of globalization and/or genuinely “opt-out” of the present international system without suffering the consequences. Globalization has changed the nature of economic policymaking and has contributed to redefining and/or undermining traditional ordering concepts of international relations and the role of the state and power in international relations.19 Globalization has ushered in the establishment of interdependent sociopolitical and economic processes such as non-state actors (transnational corporations and international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organization (WTO), World Bank,) global terrorism, arms trafficking, money laundering, human trafficking, intellectual property rights, environmental hazards and legislation, and international treaties, to name a few. These activities take place in context saturated in global interaction and exchange. 14  British Broadcasting Corporation, “London Insiders Remember Big Bang,” British Broadcasting Corporation, 26 October 2006, 15 April 2008, . 15 Peer C. Fiss and Paul M. Hirsch, “The Discourse of Globalization: Framing and Sensemaking of an Emerging Concept,” American Sociological Review 70 (2005): 42. 16  Fiss and Hirsch 42. 17 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). 18 David Held, Tony McGrew, Jonathan Perraton, and David Goldblatt, Global Transformations (Cambridge: Polity, 1999) 7. 19 Kennedy, Messner, Nuscheler, eds. Global Trends; Tony Porter, States, Markets and Regimes in Global Finance, (New York: St. Martins’s Press, 1993); Sol Piccotto, “Networks in International Economic Integration,” Northwestern Journal of Law and Business 17 (1996-97): 1014; Wolfgang H. Reinicke, “Global Public Policy.” Foreign Affairs 76 (1997): 137.

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Networks of interaction have formed and assumed a profound role in the conduct of international affairs. Networks of government agencies and officials, financial regulators, judges and legislators, police organizations, military and security policy, and the like, increasingly exchange information and coordinate activates to address different issues that transcend state borders.20 A globalized economy has been established via intense and intertwined networks of financial institutions and states, which have been and remain critical players in conducting the day-to-day affairs of global finance, and responding to international and national financial crises. The Group of Eight (G8), for instance, makes key decisions on how to respond to debt relief to indebted countries, and state ministers, international institutions, and bankers crafted joint policies to respond to the East Asian financial crisis of 1997, the Russian financial crisis of 1998, and the 2008 global credit crisis. Beyond national security and global economy, networks of state officials from different countries are working to improve environmental polices across borders, and within the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) the US, Mexico, and Canada, have established an environmental enforcement network. The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning, and Environment (VROM) have founded the International Network for Environmental Compliance and Enforcement (INECE), providing technical assistance to environmental agencies around the world. INECE also holds global conferences and sponsors training exercises while disseminating information via the global Internet.21 Globalization has spilled over into the realm of domestic law as well. For example, the US Supreme Court recently cited a decision by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) when overturning a Texas state sodomy law (2003).22 Countries have also shared knowledge of criminal law procedures, methods, and enforcement mechanisms between different agencies and departments that deal with law enforcement in their respective countries. The domestic legislative process has also been affected by globalization. International parliamentary organizations have advocated global awareness of and concentrated action concerning various causes and policies such as the death penalty, human rights, and environmental issues, working with one another across state boundaries to strengthen their respective agendas. Despite the diversity underlying the various types of networks functioning in the international system, global networking involves common functions, such as: the expansion of regulatory reach that allows national governments to keep up with transnational corporations, non-state actors, and transnational criminal enterprises, and building trust and establishing relationships among participants that create incentives to creating working relationships. 23 This development, in 20 Slaughter, A New World Order. 21 Slaughter, A New World Order. 22 Katherine M. Franke, “The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas,” Columbia Law Review 104.5 (2004): 1399-1426. 23 Slaughter, A New World Order 3.



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turn, provides a basis for long-term cooperation and the establishment of common sources of knowledge and information, and sustains the viability of the state in light of the centralization of information on a global level.24 Integral in this process has been the active role of international governmental organizations (IGOs) such as the IMF, the World Bank, the United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and WTO.25 These international arrangements have assumed significant roles in creating, implementing, and coordinating polices among states in all issue-areas, particularly in the realms of security and economy.26 High degrees of global interdependence have resulted in literally “mandating,” at the most basic level, the exchange of commodities (for example, natural resources, technology, arms, foodstuffs, and the marketing of such commodities) among states in order for them to maintain progressive satisfactory social, political, and economic development.27 Maintaining sufficient and sustainable levels of economic and political development is important to all states in the global system. Isolationism and the International System Given the increasingly interdependent nature of world affairs since 1945, it would seem that isolationism, in thought as well as in practice, is counterproductive. Such behavior is certainly at odds with the globalist posture of the current international system. Isolationist foreign policy, broadly defined, is a foreign policy that combines a non-interventionist military posture with an ideological, social, and political agenda of state-centric economic nationalism and protectionism. This concept involves a clear state policy of non-interventionism; states avoid entering into entangling alliances with other nations and avoid war not geared toward immediate territorial self-defense.28 The nationalist-protectionist aspect 24 See Slaughter, A New World Order. 25 Ray Kiely, The Clash of Globalizations: Neo-Liberalism, the Third Way and AntiGlobalization (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2005). 26 Stephen D. Krasner, International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). 27  For interdependence literature see: Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 3rd ed.; Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971); Kenneth Oye, ed., Cooperation; Helen Milner, “International Political Economy: Beyond Hegemonic Stability,” Foreign Policy 110 (1998): 112-123; David Lake, “Leadership, Hegemony and the International Economy,” International Studies Quarterly 37.4 (1993): 459-489; Charles W. Kegley Jr., and Gregory A. Raymond, Exorcising the Ghost of Westphalia: Building World Order in the New Millennium (Upper Saddle River: Pearson Education, 2002). 28  For analyses of isolationism, see Tom Barry, “A Global Affairs Commentary: The Terms of Power,” Foreign Policy in Focus, ed., John Gershman, 6 November 2002, 15 April 2008 ; Mary Elizabeth

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of isolationism bases economic policy on the assumption that barriers should be established to control trade and cultural exchange with other states in order to protect the integrity of the isolationist state. States “opting out” of the global system, then, would appear to engage in a self-defeating practice if one adheres to the current of globalization that has swept over the international system since 1944. Generally speaking, the practice of isolationism goes against the currents of contemporary state behavior of integration and interdependence within a specific regional context, for example, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), and the African Union (AU), or with the larger world community, for example, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), and the Group of Eight (G8). In light of growing interdependence, which can be traced back to medieval times, isolationism as a concept has been inadequately studied and understood in the literature of international relations, even though the notion of an “isolationist state” in international relations has had a significant impact on world affairs. Whether isolationism manifested itself in a city-state, nation-state, empire, monarchy, autocracy, authoritarian or totalitarian political system, dictatorship, communist, socialist, fascist, liberal, republican, or democratic regime, it has significantly impacted state-to-state engagement and relations in the international system. In particular, isolationism in modern times has severely limited the economic and political development and wellbeing of states. Although the principles remain constant, the concept of isolationism has assumed different modalities over the course of time, depending on the political unit being examined. In recent history, the term has been utilized to describe US foreign policy during the 19th and early 20th centuries, when the US adopted an isolationist foreign policy in order to maintain neutrality, stability, and noninterventionism in world affairs.29 In other cases, the notion of isolationism has been used to describe communist Albania under Enver Hoxha (1944-1992), North Korea under Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il (1948-1993, 1993-present, respectively), Berry, Information and Nation in the Early Modern Period (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006); Wayne S. Cole, Charles A. Lindbergh and the Battle against American Intervention in World War II (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974); Wayne S. Cole, America First: The Battle against Intervention, 1940-41 (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1953); Albert Craig, Chōshū in the Meiji Restoration (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961); Marius B. Jansen, Sakamoto Ryōma and the Meiji Restoration (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); Thomas C. Smith, The Agrarian Origins of Modern Japan, Stanford Studies in the Civilizations of Eastern Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959); Thomas C. Kennedy, Charles A. Beard and American Foreign Policy (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1975); Ronald P. Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan: Asia in the Development of the Tokugawa Bakufu (1984; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991). 29  Charles A. Beard, American Foreign Policy in the Making, 1932-1940: A Study in Responsibilities (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946).



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Burma under General Ne Win (1962-1988) and the current Burmese military regime (1988-present). Among the latter cases, isolationism has found expression via social, political, ideological, cultural, security, and economic policy. Indeed, unlike the modalities of isolationism manifested in the case of US foreign policy during the 19th and early 20th centuries, isolationism in the case of North Korea, Burma, and communist Albania formed the sociopolitical basis of the regimes in power. Isolationism, therefore, was and continues to be the essence of the regimes as opposed to merely informing the foreign policy of the state. In addition to using isolationism as a means to “protect” the state and its respective populace from external influences, extreme forms of social isolationism have also been utilized to create “pure” ideological regimes. Given the interdependent nature of the international system, this study seeks to expand upon the reasons why states continue to opt out of the international system, and the consequences that isolationist practices have for individual countries as well as international relations. To accomplish this goal, this study explores specific manifestations of isolationism in the following case studies: communist Albania (1944-1992), North Korea (1948-present), and socialist Burma (1962-present). By comparing and contrasting the domestic and foreign policies of these states, this study identifies how and why these three states opted for social, political, and economic isolationism despite profound differences among them, for example, geographic, ideological, cultural, historical, economic, and political.30 Research Purpose and Significance Utilizing the three case studies mentioned above, this study seeks to expand upon and clarify the notion of isolationism when used to describe self-imposed social, economic, and political separation from the society of states that comprises world order and international relations. By examining the case studies in question, this study will identify structural patterns and/or components that are present in all of the case studies’ histories and isolationist postures. This book aims to identify and discuss the commonalities, perceived benefits, and pitfalls of adopting isolationist policies in a globalized world. By empirically verifying the components, motivations, and consequences of isolationism in an interdependent world, this study will provide insight into why and how states resist engaging the global socioeconomic and political system that has been in place since 1944. By examining isolationism within the case studies in question, this study identifies the negative effects of isolationism, and how regimes can implode and then become incorporated into the international system of states. Self-imposed isolation carried out to an extreme degree in an interdependent international system merits analysis because isolationism is a practice that 30  Bernard Fensterwald, Jr., “The Anatomy of American ‘Isolationism’ and Expansionism, Part I” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 2.2 (1958): 111-139.

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weakens a regime/state. Although the leadership in an isolationist state gains a significant amount of power and control over a populace within its geopolitical borders, the state as a whole, especially in an economic sense, experiences very negative effects of subscribing to (extreme) isolation. In the long term, a state loses power, and with loss of power comes a loss of international prestige, potential for growth, material wellbeing, and benefits that attach from participation in an interdependent international system. Isolationism harms the totality of a state’s interests if a particular regime seeks to remain in power indefinitely at any cost, as in the case of Hoxha’s Albania, Ne Win’s Burma, and the Kims’ North Korea. These isolationist states, therefore, provide insight into an unexplored area of international relations. Isolationism goes against the logic of an interdependent international system when considering the dominant notions (liberal and realist) that order international affairs, such as rationality, self-interest, power politics, cooperation, and alliances. This study contends that, rather than being “rogue states” or part of an “axis of evil” (North Korea) or states that are irrational or simply absurd (Albania and Burma), the case studies in question provide examples of a distinct, self-contained state behavior and interests divorced from a globalized international system; the strategy, rationality, ideology, morality, and power-precepts utilized by isolationist regimes have their own internal logic.31 Simply being isolationist does not make these states part of an “axis of evil”; it their heightened sense of self-defense and aggressive propaganda that makes them a concern for the international community. Since instituting the foundations of the contemporary world system in 1944, the US has viewed states that do not engage the world economic system as being irrational, and sometimes threatening (North Korea). By choosing to opt out of the international system, states have historically been labeled a communist “threat” during the Cold War, and now are considered state sponsors of terror, part of an axis of evil, and a threat to international security. In short, non-engagement with the international system, based on democratization and economic globalization via a state-corporate-managed market system agenda, is viewed as inherently negative and self-defeating. However, this study will demonstrate that the reasons for isolationism (regardless of their long term negative effects) are highly rational from the isolationist state’s perspective. In other words, only because these states have a different utility function than that of the western world does not make them irrational. In fact, within their utility function their behavior/actions are consistent with their political and economic goals; thus, these states are in fact rational.

31 See William Jefferson Clinton, “Strengthening American Security Through World Leadership,” US Department of State Dispatch 6 (1995): 53; Seymon Brown, The Causes & Prevention of War (New York: St. Martin’s, 1987); Thomas H. Henriksen, “The Rise and Decline of Rogue States,” Journal of International Affairs 54.2 (2001): 349-373; Raymond Tanter. Rogue Regimes: Terrorism & Proliferation (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998).

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Individual leaders and regimes have the option to utilize isolationism to further their political agenda. This is the case because isolationism is a phenomenon that is part of the structural makeup of international relations, that is, states can either engage or opt out of international relations, as in the case of war and trade relations. Isolationism is an inherent part of international relations, as is the case with war and trade. States have a choice to practice isolationism, just as they have the choice to engage in war or trade. Granted, there will be instances where states involuntarily find themselves at war, cut off from trading partners, or subject to isolationism. Yet, structurally, states do have degrees of freedom when it comes to engaging in any of the aforementioned activities. When analyzing isolationism it must be noted that humankind resides in collectivities that can be classified as political units. A primary function of any group has been to regulate the behavior of its members. According to Aristotle, human beings are by nature political animals.32 The fact that humans are “political animals” implies that no one individual truly possesses or controls the mass; indeed, the mass or the group sets the standards for behavior of individuals. Individual leaders, administrations, and regimes are reflections of the group (in thought and practice). Although the group can be manipulated, for example, through propaganda, or coerced through the use of a state’s police powers, in the end there must be substantial support for a particular regime by a significant percentage of the population, both mass and elites. It is impossible to divorce an individual from the mass, to claim that a single individual or regime can dictate reality independent of the collectivity. That individual is part and an expression of the group. When reflecting on the relationship between an individual and a polity, E.H. Carr notes that, “man and society reacts to its fellow man in two opposite ways. Sometimes he displays egoism, or the will to assert himself at the expense of others. At other times he displays sociability, or the desire to cooperate with others, to enter into reciprocal relations … with them, and even to subordinate himself to them. In every society, these two qualities can be seen at work.”33 Generally speaking, leaders of isolationist states are egoistic as opposed to “irrational.” Leaders like Hoxha, Kim Jong Il, and Ne Win are expressions of their structural and systemic circumstances. The leader of a polity cannot be viewed in isolation from the state, population, and culture. The state, like any other political unit, is based on notions of general common interests and obligations among its members. Although coercion can be employed by particular governments to employ obedience, there is a common set of interests, obligations, and criteria that bind the ruler and the ruled.34 Regimes based on totalitarian dictatorship, that is, extreme forms of suppression, have not proven resilient, especially at the end of 32 Aristotle, Politics, ed. Trevor J. Saunders, trans. T. A. Sinclair (London: Penguin Classics, 1981). 33 E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (New York: Palgrave, 2001) 95. 34  Carr 96.

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the 20th century. The USSR, the Eastern Bloc, and various military juntas in Latin America have all failed to sustain themselves when surpassing the threshold of the point where the regime breaks from the masses. This immediate and simultaneous implosion of totalitarian dictatorships could be the direct result of conditions created by the new global order of international affairs, which highlights the inadequacy of such regimes. Although there are different interpretations of common interests and obligations among different groups, the interests and obligations nevertheless are created in common. Karl Marx notes, “men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directed, encountered, given, and transmitted from the past.”35 If we take E.H. Carr and Marx together, we find that there is a common and continuous base of thought and practice that governs the development of political units, and that various leaders and regimes do not appear outside that current of thought and practice. Particular individuals appear in history, and are byproducts of the currents of history. In the case of isolationism, it is an expression of intense and long periods of foreign invasion. Leaders of isolationist regimes are a product of historical, social, and economic circumstances. They are not unfortunate incidents in the history of a state, but genuine representatives of a people’s conditions. The most common characteristic of isolationism, that is, self-sufficiency, has a long history.36 Self-sufficiency is not only a necessity for these kinds of regimes but also an instrument of political power; “it is primarily a form of preparedness for war.”37 When leaders believe that they have no allies and a war of all against all is imminent, they usually resort to paranoid albeit rational interpretations of selfsufficiency. Thus, the regimes under examination in this study are not “irrational” or aberrant; they draw upon shared, “objective” notions of history, economics, and politics to justify draconian measures to ensure the viability and security of the state. The leaders in each country appeal to shared perceptions, values, and history when making the case for the legitimacy of their rule based on a state of siege. In order for these regimes to exist, there must be some correspondence between the leaders’ and the population’s views of reality, threat, security, and an objective enemy that threatens the very fabric of state-society relations. However, once there is a severe disconnection between the two, an isolationist regime will collapse due to a lack of correspondence between the professed enemies, state of siege, and empirical reality.

35 Karl Marx, The 18th Brumarie of Louis Bonaparte (New York: International Publishers 1963) 15. 36  Carr 120-121. 37  Carr 121.

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Isolationist States: Albania, North Korea and Burma Albania In explaining modern isolationism, communist Albania is a rich source of insight because of its variegated transitions: a state under foreign domination for most of its history; a communist dictatorship, initially closely allied with Stalin’s USSR and Mao’s China; a totalitarian state that severed all ties and relations with the USSR and China (1961 and 1979, respectively) and the rest of the world; and a state that has unconditionally embraced economic and political liberalization since 1992, is presently a member of NATO, and has applied for membership in the EU. Albania, immersed in total isolationism from the 1980’s onward, has become a democratized state that enthusiastically participates in the US-managed society of states, actively seeking close ties with the US and Europe. Communist Albania, therefore, provides a working context in which to examine the reasons why the leadership of that country chose to disengage from the democratic-capitalist world as well as the USSR/Eastern Bloc, with a clear understanding that such a move would be detrimental to Albania’s economy, prosperity, and security. Communist Albania (as in the case of North Korea and Burma) engaged in selfcontained rational, that is, cost/benefit, analysis when deciding to premise state policy on isolationist principles. It was the state’s strong belief that the Yugoslavs wanted Albania to become its republic, that the Soviets intended to turn Albania into an agricultural region of the Eastern Block, and that the Chinese viewed Albania as their gateway to Europe.38 The fact that major powers and regional enemies had attempted to overthrow the government numerous times directly impacted and supported Hoxha’s extreme and fervent belief in isolating the state from foreign interference and influence. Based on the absolute convictions of the First Secretary of the Party of Labor, Enver Hoxha, the logic of isolationism was articulated in official state rhetoric, policy, ideology, and political proselytization. The Albanian government utilized isolationism for political self-preservation, and focused state policy on a platform of ideological and political propaganda that touted self-reliance, self-sufficiency, fervent patriotism, unquestioned loyalty to nation, culture, party, state, and the leadership. Hoxha’s polices and rhetoric involved unqualified fidelity to a “pure” ideology and political program based on Albanian adherence to ideals of politics and society. Hoxha’s ultimate goal was to fashion an Albania based on the ideal Stalinist state, perhaps an ideal that surpassed Joseph Stalin himself, in the sense that it became hyper-totalitarian, 38 Daniel Tretiak, “The Founding of the Sino-Albanian Entente,” The China Quarterly, 10 (1962): 123-43; Donald S. Zagoria, “Krushchev’s Attack on Albania and Sino-Soviet Relations,” The China Quarterly, 8 (1961): 1-19; Greg O’Leary, “Chinese Foreign Policy Under Attack: Has China Abandoned Revolution?” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, 1 (1979): 49-67.

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paranoid, and puritanically ideological in its pursuit of the perfect society. State policies therefore involved justifications for Albania’s isolationist posture. Total isolation was justified by state edicts claiming that Albania, after Stalin’s USSR, was the only genuine communist state. Indeed, the Albanian leadership accused Stalin’s successor, Nikita Khrushchev, and Marshall Tito of Yugoslavia, of sabotaging and interfering with the establishment of true communist societies. During a speech given at the 81st Communist Parties Conference (November 1960) in Moscow, Hoxha formally accused the USSR of sabotage and utter disregard of Albania’s interests; in particular, Hoxha claimed that Khrushchev had aroused the hopes of the Greek leader Venizelos to territorial concessions from Albania. Furthermore, according to Hoxha, Khrushchev had promised aid (grain) to Albania that never materialized. In addition, he accused Khrushchev of betraying Marxist-Leninist ideals, the Soviet people, and the Communist Party.39 Such recriminations were puzzling, especially given the fact that the USSR had, until Hoxha’s remarks, provided substantial monetary, technological, and military aid to Albania. On February 13, 1961, during a speech at the Fourth Congress of the Albanian Party of Labor, Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu claimed that Albania was determined to maintain an unsullied ideology, autonomy, and viability in spite of domestic and foreign (Soviet) “revisionists”: “For those who stand in the way of Party unity: a spit in the face, a sock in the jaw, and, if necessary, a bullet in the head.”40 Albania took another seemingly catastrophic step for its economic wellbeing and security when it terminated its relations with China in 1979. Soon after, Albania’s already poorly managed agricultural collectives, outdated Chinese factories, cancelled projects, lack of foreign markets, and severely reduced trade put an immense strain on the population. Lack of sufficient food and shortage of goods and services were wide spread.41 Albania claimed that the reason for this break up was China’s deviance from Marxist-Leninist ideology. In a party editorial written in Zëri i Popullit (Voice of the People), Albania claimed that Mao Tse-Tung’s theory of Three Worlds was fundamentally flawed, because it claimed that: states in the second and third sectors of the world society had common interests; the US was less aggressive than the USSR; and that the non-aligned movement was truly independent.42 To make the point clear, the Albanian Embassy in Beijing distributed translated copies of the editorial to all foreign representatives in China. Hoxha re-affirmed his beliefs that the Chinese were blackmailing Albania into a military alliance 39 Enver Hoxha, The Party of Labor of Albania in Battle with Modern Revisionism, (Tirana: Shtepia Botuese “Naim Frasheri,” 1972) 63. 40  William E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1964) 71. 41 Neil Olsen, An Oxfam Country Profile: Albania (Oxford: Oxfam Publishing, 2000). 42  Owen Pearson, Albania as Dictatorship and Democracy: From Isolation to the Kosovo War 1946-1998 (New York: Center for Albanian Studies/I.B. Tauris, 2007).

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with Yugoslavia and Romania in order to pursue their goal of becoming a ThirdWorld super-power. Soon after the dissemination of the editorial, the Chinese withdrew all aid for Albania while making public the amount of aid supplied to Albania over a twenty-five year period.43 In addition to severing all relations with the two most powerful communist powers during the Cold War, which were absolutely necessary for its economic and strategic interests, Albania was also highly antagonistic toward lesser powers, most especially Greece and Tito’s Yugoslavia. Throughout his reign, Hoxha bitterly accused both neighboring countries of sabotage and imperialist aspirations toward Albania. By 1980, Albania had severed all relations with every country in the international system. During the Cold War and in its aftermath, it is clear that alliances, cooperation, balance of power, self-interest, rationality and the “security dilemma”44 should have dictated a different course of action for Albania. Indeed, the isolationist policy of the state resulted in rendering Albania underdeveloped compared to their neighboring countries by about 50 years. Similarly to the Kims, isolationism was utilized by Hoxha to construct a personalistic ideological framework of international relations and state-society relations, which to him was far more important than the economic wellbeing and prosperity, security, and political stability of the state. Hoxha’s Stalinist political system compensated for and buttressed itself against the globalizing international system by completely wrapping Albania within a suffocating mantle of excessive hyper-nationalism. This political development and its long-term consequences, therefore, is on-point for examining isolationism and isolationist regimes and classifying them as outliers within the modern international system/society of states. North Korea Although North Korea (and Burma) never practiced the acute degree of isolationism exhibited by communist Albania, each has practiced a high degree of isolationism, complementing the Albanian case. North Korea, a Confucian communist state ruled by Kim Il Sung and now his son Kim Jong Il, continues to pursue isolationist policies vis-à-vis the international system. However, North Korea differs from communist Albania in that it has and continues to engage the international community to some extent.45 North Korea, for instance, has maintained economic ties with China and has engaged in global arms trading. In addition, in the last ten years North Korea has developed offensive Weapons 43  Annual Register, Albania 1978. 44  John Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 20.2 (1950): 158-180. 45 Tim Beal, North Korea: The Struggle Against American Power, (Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, 2005); Young Whan Kihl and Hong Nack Kim, eds., North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2005).

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of Mass Destruction (WMD), forcing the US and its allies to engage it on a substantive level. North Korea is isolationist partly because it chooses to do so, and partly because the US-led international community strongly disagrees with its pedantic ideology and totalitarian political system. It is believed that when Kim Il Sung took control of the northern half of the peninsula, he reverted to ruling North Korea with a pre-modern isolationist ideology due, in large part, as a reaction to historical Japanese aggression and occupation of the peninsula.46 The North Korean leadership has been successful in achieving a high degree of isolationism through the implementation of Juche. This politico-philosophical ideology is a blend of communism and Confucianism, and has been successful in justifying and legitimizing the regime while concomitantly isolating the state from significant foreign contacts.47 Juche advocates nationalism, self-reliance, and self-sufficiency, and is consistent with “North Korea’s intended isolation from foreign influences.”48 Both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il have utilized Juche to evoke deep nationalistic feelings, and to justify self-denial in the face of extreme poverty.49 Juche is also used as a reference point from which to create/judge art, as well as provide a philosophical foundation for the state’s educational system. After a variety of natural disasters in the mid and late 1990s, North Korea invited and accepted humanitarian aid, indicating less rigid adherence to Juche.50 Still, ardent nationalism combined with Juche precepts continue to guide state policy in North Korea. North Korea, historically and presently, has had working relationships with both the USSR and China, yet it has never truly committed itself to either though it has accepted massive economic aid from both countries. Although Kim Il Sung personally detested the USSR and disapproved of the Soviets’ move toward peaceful co-existence with the US in the 1960s, he refrained from criticism, because North Korea was dependent on Soviet financial and military aid, and Kim strongly believed in Marxist-Leninist unity. Under a Juche framework, Kim Il Sung limited Chinese influence in his country by exhorting Korean devotion to the North Korean revolution as opposed to world-wide communist revolution. However, once the Soviet Union and China embraced reforms to 46 Grace Lee, “The Political Philosophy of Juche,” Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs 3.1 (2003): 105-112. 47 See Senator Craig Thomas, “The US-North Korea Agreed Framework,” Senate Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs 12 February 1995, 15 April 2008 . 48 Tanter 238; Chouki Ajami, Juche: Theory and Application (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1978); Kim Il Sung, On Juche in Our Revolution (New York: Weekly Guardian Associates, 1977). 49 Tai Sung An, North Korea in Transition: From Dictatorship to Dynasty (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1983) 58-59. 50  Jon Herskovitz, “Desperate North Korea Seeks Food Aid—UN official,” Reuters 11 April 2008, 15 April 2008 .

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engage and peacefully coexist with the US and the West, he accused them of supporting imperialism and corrupting Marxist-Leninist ideals to pursue paltry economic gains.51 After 1992, with the dissolution of the USSR, the relationship with post-communist Russia and North Korea became distant due to Russia’s “betrayal” of communism, its diplomatic relations with South Korea, and the abolishment of the “old barter-trade relationship between the two countries.”52 Despite state rhetoric against Chinese economic reforms, the current Sino-North Korean relationship continues to be stable. Burma In the case of Burma, it became isolationist by default, due in large part to the government’s poor economic planning and self-aggrandizing political program. By restricting foreign trade, freedom of movement, and speech, General Ne Win was successful in isolating Burma from the rest of the international community in order to preserve his regime. Ne Win was so successful in isolating Burma that for some time Burma was considered the “Albania of Asia.”53 By September 1979, Burma’s isolation was on par with Albania when Burma withdrew from the Non-Aligned Movement in protest against Fidel Castro’s decision to exclude the Khmer Rouge from representing Cambodia in the Havana Summit.54 Ne Win’s isolationist policies reduced Burma from a fairly prosperous country when he assumed power to an impoverished country.55 During his twenty-six year reign, Ne Win sought to implement the “Burmese Way To Socialism.”56 The “Burmese Way” was based on glorification of the Burmese people, puritanical notions of nationalism and cultural/racial identity, and socialism.57 Ne Win’s regime was actually quite at odds with itself politically because it “espouse[d] Marxism, but the Burma Communist Party [was] in active revolt; while it blend[ed] doctrinaire socialism with the Buddhist concept of impermanence of things, it reject[ed] 51 Dae-Ho Byun, North Korea’s Foreign Policy (Seul: Research Center for Peace and Unification of Korea, 1991) 55-56. 52  Bertil Lintner, Great Leader, Dear Leader: Demystifying North Korea Under the Kim Klan (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2005) 17. 53  Martin Smith, “Burmese Politics After 1988: An Era of New and Uncertain Change,” Burma: Political Economy Under Military Rule, ed. Robert H. Taylor (New York: Palgrave, 2001) 18. 54  Bertil Lintner. “The Rise and Fall of the Communists,” Far Eastern Economic Review 4 (1987): 1-22. 55  British Broadcasting Corporation, “Obituary: Ne Win,” British Broadcasting Corporation 5 December 2002, 24 August 2007 . 56  Mya Maung, “The Burmese Way to Socialism Beyond the Welfare State,” Asian Survey 10.6 (1970): 533-551. 57  Fred R. von der Mahden, “The Burmese Way to Socialism,” Asian Survey 3.3 (1963): 129-135.

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historical determinism.”58 Because Ne Win’s Burma had created a national policy antithetical to all foreigners, and was deeply rooted in religion, nationalism, and socialism, Burma placed itself outside of the international system of states. Isolationism as official state policy had already been articulated in the 1950s when Burma expelled all US influence from the country in order to maintain its non-aligned status.59 Burma further isolated and damaged its economy after the coup of 1962. The “Revolutionary Council” decided to forcibly nationalize businesses, of which Indians owned the large majority. Ne Win also expelled thousands of Indians, many of whom were highly educated and had lived in Burma for generations. Following this mass purge, the only substantive issue discussed between Burma and India was not trade and economic prosperity but establishing a clear common border. This strict isolationist posture was further reinforced when travel was greatly restricted domestically and internationally, thus rendering Burma an isolated state.60 Ne Win further isolated the country when the already tense relationship with China (due to border disputes) deteriorated rapidly in 1967. It is believed that Ne Win encouraged anti-Chinese riots in Rangoon.61 At the time, Sino-Burmese youth were wearing a red emblem, a symbol of support for the Chinese Cultural Revolution. These symbols were in violation of Burmese regulations; therefore, wearing them and supporting the Cultural Revolution made the Chinese population living in Burma an easy target for purging. During the riots that ensued, the Chinese embassy was also attacked, alienating Beijing.62 Immediately after the incident, China withdrew its ambassador, suspended its aid programs to Burma, and called Ne Win a fascist. Ne Win responded by expelling Chinese journalists and China’s diplomatic representation from the country. An examination of the case studies in question thus reveals that, despite the various differences that exist between and among isolationist states, there are constants across case studies that can be identified. Specifically, isolationism is not a permanent state of affairs. An isolationist state like communist Albania (1944-1992) opted out of the international system of states for 48 years and then returned to “normalcy,” that is, engagement with the system of states. Other states such as North Korea and Burma continue to retain isolationist postures on the world stage, but have “opened up” their economies. Given the fast-paced and 58 David I. Steinberg, Development Strategy for Burma (Washington DC: USAID 1978) 32. 59 David I. Steinberg, Burma: The State of Myanmar (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2001) 26. 60 Thant Myint-U, The River of Lost Footsteps: Histories of Burma (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006) 296. 61  Bertil Lintner, “Burma and its Neighbors,” Indian and Chinese Foreign Policies in Comparative Perspective, ed. Surjit Mansingh (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1998). 62  Joseph Silverstein, Burma: Military Rule and Politics of Stagnation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977).

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inexorable globalized nature of the world system, it is paradoxical that states would continue to pursue isolationism on any substantive level. Why do some states choose to dispense with isolationism and engage the international system while others maintain an isolationist posture? What do states like North Korea and Burma have to gain by maintaining isolationism as the basis for state policy? What do states like Albania have to gain by returning to “normalcy?” In order to answer these questions, this study will engage in a comprehensive analysis that explains the reasons states have for opting out of the international system as well as the reasons why states re-engage the international system. Theoretical Perspective The major schools of thought in the field of international relations, in particular political realism/neo-realism and liberalism/neo-liberalism, rely upon shared assumptions of international relations. The primacy of the nation-state in world politics is a foundational premise of the modern discipline of international relations, as is the assumption that states perpetually seek to maximize their wellbeing and interests through a variety of means, for example augmenting military power, perpetuating economic prosperity, maintaining and aggrandizing power capabilities, and engaging in cooperative arrangements with other states.63 Generally speaking, the schools of thought mentioned maintain that although the international system is permeated by an anarchic state of affairs, an international system exists based on structural components that define international relations, such as the role of force, the rational actor, self-interest, self-preservation, trade, security, balance of power, partnerships, cooperation, as well as economic and military alliances. Furthermore, within realist and liberal thought (generally speaking) states are viewed as being unitary, self-interested actors that seek to maximize gain and minimize loss (military, economic). Utilizing liberal concepts, in particular notions of the rational actor, self-interest, and economic power, this study examines empirical cases of isolationist states that retreat from 63  For a detailed discussion of some of these schools of thought see Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997). For examples of Realism see Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power & Peace, 4th ed. (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1967); Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis. For an example of liberalism see Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 3rd ed.; Olson, Collective Action; Kenneth Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); Milner 112-123; David Lake, “Leadership” 459-489. For an example of Marxism see Immanuel Wallerstein, World Systems Analysis: An Introduction (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004). For an example of Constructivism, see Nicholas Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules & Rule in Social Theory & International Relations (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989).

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the international system in order to understand why states choose to opt out of a globalized international system. This study utilizes assumptions and concepts from realist and liberal thought to explain the behavior of isolationist states. This study is premised on the notion that state-society relations, that is – the relationship of states to the domestic and transnational socio-economic context in which they are embedded – have a fundamental impact on state behavior in international relations. In particular, individuals/groups that wield power, rational self-interest, and interactive, interdependent institutions influence state behavior by shaping state preferences. In a liberal paradigm of international relations, the configuration of state preferences matters most in world politics as opposed to the configuration of military capabilities.64 Military capability is indeed important in shaping international relations, but it is not the singular influence on state behavior. This study utilizes the following assumptions of liberal theory to analyze the case studies in question. First, there is a causal relationship between state-society relations and domestic institutions, economic interdependence, and national political and socio-economic public goods. Second, the importance of state-society relations in explaining international relations and state behavior can be conceived in terms of three positive assumptions; that is, the rational, self-interested nature of fundamental social actors, the state as an institutionalized forum for competition among social actors vying for power and position, and the interdependent nature of the international system.65 Fundamentally, it is the case that actors in international politics are, generally speaking, rational, avoid risk, and organize exchange and collective action to promote different interests under constraints imposed by material scarcity, conflicting values and variation in influence and power.66 Third, there is no immanent harmony of interests among individuals/ groups in society. Scarcity and differentiation introduce competition, which by nature is not conducive to harmonious or homogenous interests on a global scale. Furthermore, the greater the expected benefits, the stronger the incentive to act. Differences in beliefs about the distribution of power and material resources create profound differences in what motivates social actors to act in a certain manner. 64  For more information on state preferences see: Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, “Bargaining, Influence Costs, and Organization,” Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, eds., James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Schepsle, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 86-87; Doyle 251-300; Douglass C. North and Robert Paul Thomas, The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973) 87; Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Law in a World of Liberal States,” European Journal of international Law 6 (1995): 503-538. 65 Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” International Organization 51.4 (1997): 513-553. 66  Moravcsik 516; See also Lee Ryan Miller, Confessions of a Recovering Realist: Toward a Neo-Liberal Theory of International Relations (Bloomington: AuthorHouse, 2004); Patrick J. McDonald, The Invisible Hand of Peace: Capitalism, The War Machine, and International Relations Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

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Fourth, regarding representation and state preferences, governments represent a select group of domestic society; therefore, the individual/group in power will determine the basic state interests and articulate state policy. In a liberal conception of domestic politics, the state is not a unitary actor but a representative institution that is constantly “subject to capture and recapture, construction and reconstruction of groups or coalition of groups.”67 Representative institutions and practices constitute a critical “transmision belt” by which preferences and power of individuals/groups translate into state policy.68 Taken together, the above assumptions imply that states do not automatically maximize static, homogenous conceptions of security, sovereignty, and/or wealth as realism and institutionalism assume. Rather, states pursue particular interpretations and combinations of security, welfare, and sovereignty that are preferred by the individual/groups that wield power in society. “As Arnold Wolfers, John Ruggie, and others have observed, the nature and intensity of national support for any state purpose – even apparently fundamentally concerns like the defense of political and legal sovereignty, territorial integrity, national security, or economic welfare – varies decisively with social contexts. It is not uncommon for states knowingly to surrender sovereignty, compromise security, or reduce aggregate welfare. In the liberal view, tradeoffs among such goals as well as transnational differences in their definition are inevitable, highly varied, and causally consequential.”69 The existence of interdependence and the configuration of state preferences determine state behavior. Liberal theory causally privileges variation in the configuration of state preferences while “treating configuration of capabilities and information as if they were either fixed constraints or external to state preferences.”70 In other words, liberal theory contends that all states do not behave in the exact same manner. State “policy interdependence” affects as well as links state preferences to actual state behavior. Policy interdependence is “the set of costs and benefits created for foreign societies when dominant social groups in a society seek to realize their preferences, that is, the pattern of transnational externalities resulting from attempts to pursue national purposes.”71 Generally speaking, liberal theory assumes that the pattern of interdependent state preferences imposes a binding constraint on state behavior. Preferences and policy can be defined as: (1) if preferences that are compatible with one another, and competing preferences are not relevant, then there are incentives for states to engage in behavior that produces/ sustains peaceful coexistence; (2) if state preferences are zero-sum, provide few 67  Moravcsik 516. 68  Moravcsik 518. 69  Moravcsik 520; See also John Gerard Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in Postwar Economic Order,” International Organization 36 (1982): 197-231; Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation” 261-285. 70  Moravcsik 520. 71  Moravcsik 520.

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mutual gains, or impose high costs on other states, then a state faces a high potential for conflictual relations with other states; (3) when there is a diffusion of power capabilities among several states, which produces inherent tensions, then there are incentives for states to work together in cooperative relationships.72 Within a liberal conception of international relations and power, there are incentives as well as willingness between states to expand resources or make concessions based on preferences of groups in power. Power is consistent with bargaining and negotiation as opposed to the pursuit of pure power politics. In particular, “commercial liberalism”73 explains the individual and collective behavior of states based on the patterns of market incentives facing domestic and international economic actors. At the most basic level, commercial liberalism is functionalist. That is, “changes in the structure of the domestic global economy alter the costs and benefits of transnational economic exchange creating pressure on domestic governments to facilitate or block such exchanges through appropriate foreign economic and security policies.”74 Commercial liberalism stresses the interaction between aggregate incentives for certain policies and obstacles presented by domestic and transnational distributional conflict. 75 In a liberal paradigm, advanced industrialization, technological and scientific evolution, procedural democracy, the rule of law, and international institutions have not only produced intense and intricate interdependence among states, but have also fostered bases for the development of trust, cooperation, and the expectation of stability via networks of trust and cooperation.76 High levels of trust and sophisticated networks of cooperation enable states to foster creative, engaging, and productive relationships with one another. This is the case because, due to the incentives for and institutionalization of cooperation as an alternative to power politics, rational actors have developed a store of social capital that can be utilized to ameliorate the negative effects of anarchy that permeates the

72  Moravcsik 521. 73  Moravcsik 528-530; see also McDonald The Invisible Hand. 74  Moravcsik 528. 75 Anne Marie Burley and Walter Mattli, “Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration,” International Organization 47 (1992): 1907-1996; John Gerard Ruggie, “At Home Abroad, Abroad at Home International Liberalization and Domestic Stability in the New World Economy,” Jean Monnet Chair Paper (Fiesole: European Institute, 1995). 76 Karl W. Deutsch, Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Kann, Maurice Lee, Jr., Martin Lichterman, Raymond E. Lindgren, Francis L. Lowenheim, and Richard W. VanRead Wagenen, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little Brown, 1989).

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international system.77 The emergence of a large expanding bloc of pacific, interdependent, normatively satisfied states is a precondition for interdependence to emerge in international relations. Isolationism: Competing Perspectives Not all international relations scholars and philosophers agree that isolationism is inherently negative for the wellbeing of a state. Jean Jacques Rousseau, for example, believed that once the basic needs of a people are met, it is against the interest of a state to expand because pursuing an “expansionist” policy necessarily involves entanglements, which result in the state weakening itself. In addition, Rousseau maintained that by opening up or expanding, a state increases its “competition, which arises from the right of each to everything. For the awareness of this right is no more natural to man than the war which it produces.”78 Others have subscribed to Rousseau’s notions when analyzing US foreign policy. Within the literature on isolationism, the US has been the basis for the majority of analyses of isolationism, and has structured the analysis and perception of isolationism in international affairs. Yet, some of the insights from the US experience can be applied to other isolationist states. Eric Nordlinger, for example, maintains that isolationism is in fact a viable security strategy. In his view, security can be maximized if a state limits its “foreign entanglements,” especially if they are undertaken for moral reasons.79 Regarding the US, he contends that the US should limit its securitycentered involvements beyond North America, with the exception of “protecting the international sea and air-lines to and from the water’s edge.”80 In the wake of the Vietnam War, US isolationist strategy regained some of the credibility it had lost after WWII. In A New Isolationism: Threat or Promise, Robert Tucker contends that the US was economically self-reliant and completely safe behind its nuclear arsenal.81 From an isolationist perspective, becoming involved in external issues has only served to decrease America’s security. However, Tucker immediately modified his argument after the 1970s Arab oil embargo; he expanded upon his political-military isolationism by providing instances where American military intervention should be used to secure oil in the Middle East.

77 See Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: Simon and Schuster 2001). 78  Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Rousseau on International Relations, eds., Stanley Hoffman and David P. Fidler, (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1991). 79 Eric A. Nordlinger, Isolationism Reconfigured: American Foreign Policy For a New Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). 80 Nordlinger 3. 81 Robert W. Turcker, A New Isolationism: Threat of Promise? (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Associates, 1972).

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The notion that the US would be safer through “self-reliance and waravoidance” instead of “deterrence and alliance” was further elaborated in Earl Ravenal’s, “The Case for Strategic Disengagement.”82 Ravenal claims that alliances are “transmission belts” for nuclear conflict; thus, it is advisable to “quarantine” regional conflicts. Although Ravenal is less forceful in his recommendations than Tucker, he acknowledges that the US must maintain an economic edge by becoming more self-reliant. By becoming more economically self-reliant, the US can afford to accept occasional embargos and the expropriation of American firms abroad. Self-reliance is a complex concept; depending on one’s political orientation, it can range from America’s pursuit of alternative energy in order to be independent of world oil prices or communist Albania’s notion of absolute selfreliance. Self-reliance should therefore be understood “as a process or a deliberate strategy for obtaining a set of objectives, rather than a condition or an end state.”83 This conceptualization of self-reliance is starkly opposed to the one utilized by communist Albania, where self-reliance was categorically implemented “on all levels and all branches of the economy.”84 Indeed, after severing all relations with the USSR in 1961, Enver Hoxha premised Albanian self-reliance on the following contention: “Even if we shall feed ourselves on grass we shall survive.”85 The negative and deleterious effects of pursuing absolute self-reliance is also evident in the case of North Korea, where self-reliance based on the principles of Juche resulted in 2.45 million people (10 percent of the population) dying of starvation in 1992.86 Furthermore, the 1998 North Korean famine demonstrates that selfreliance is truly the number one priority for an isolationist state.87 Although it has been argued that some degree of isolationism can benefit large economically and militarily advanced states such as the US, significant degrees of isolation for small, economically weak states (such as communist Albania, Burma, and North Korea) is deleterious to a state’s wellbeing. Utilizing an internationalist prism, this study contends that, in a constantly globalizing world, isolationism 82 Earl C. Ravenal, “The Case for Strategic Disengagement,” Foreign Affairs 51.3 (1973): 505-521. See also Earl C. Ravenal, Never Again: Learning from America’s Foreign Policy Failures (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978); Earl C. Ravenal, “Counterforce and Alliance: The Ultimate Connection,” International Security 6.4 (1982): 26-43; Earl C. Ravenal, “The Case for Adjustment,” Foreign Policy 81 (1990-91): 3-19. 83 Thomas J. Biersteker, “Self-Reliance in Theory and Practice in Tanzania Trade Relations,” International Organization 34.2 (1980): 229-264. 84 Akademia e Shkencave, Ekonomia Politike (Socializimi) (Tirana: Akademia e Shkencave, 1981). 85  Berti Backer, “Self-Reliance Under Socialism: The Case of Albania,” Journal of Peace Research 19.4 (1982): 355-367. 86 Andrew S. Natsios, The Great North Korean Famine: Famine, Politics, and Foreign Policy (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001). 87  British Broadcasting Corporation, “New North Korea Famine Warning,” British Broadcasting Corporation 13 March 1998, 23 October 2008 < http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ asia-pacific/65165.stm>.

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weakens states’ wellbeing and position in the international system, economically and politically.88 Adopting isolationism as the basis of state policy, all three case studies have emphasized and privileged their state’s political security at the expense of economic security and prosperity, which in the long run severely weakened the respective states economically. Of the three states, only North Korea has been able to use the threat of developing and using nuclear weapons to negotiate economic aid and sustain its political viability. Even though in all three cases the survival of the regime has been the impetus for isolationist policies, the inevitable weakening of the entire state occurs because of the damage sustained by the state’s economy. Two examples in particular support this contention. The Albanian regime totally collapsed soon after it became obvious to the leadership that resources had been exhausted and food banks were almost empty. In Burma, Ne Win resigned under intense pressure from his own regime in August 1988 after the economy collapsed; ten years later Ne Win, his three sons, and his son in law were tried and subsequently found guilty of treason. Consequently, Ne Win died under house arrest on December 5, 2002; none of his former comrades or current leaders of the country attended his funeral. These outcomes in both these isolationist regimes demonstrate that isolationist policies that weaken the economy beyond repair make regime survival and self-preservation challenging if not impossible. Research Questions and Hypotheses The following questions and hypothesis form the focus of this study. First, why do states self-impose isolationism and opt out of the international system, and what, if anything, do they gain by being isolationist? It would seem that if a sovereign state chooses to opt out of the international system, then the gain(s) of doing so (for that state) is greater than the loss of opting out. The state gains short-term internal political stability at the cost long-term economic stability and prosperity. An isolationist regime gains political and military power, overriding the losses incurred from participation in the international arena. Second, how are isolationist states able to justify and implement an isolationist policy? If an isolationist regime is able to exercise absolute control over the internal affairs of a given state, then that regime is able to create a sense of self-glorification and “purity” (nationalist, cultural, racial, political, social) which would be otherwise contaminated, diluted, and/or effaced by external influences and interference. Isolationist regimes proffer economic and political isolation as a priority for state survival. Third, what effects, if any, do isolationist state actors have on the conceptualization of international affairs? If the arrogation and the projection of power (internal/ 88  For more on internationalists see Charles W. Waynes, Jr., “Who Pays for Foreign Policy?” Foreign Policy 15 (1974): 152-168; Earl C. Ravenal, “Who Needs It?” Foreign Policy 18 (1975): 80-111.

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external projection) is a primary goal of states in the international system, then by opting out isolationist states will undermine their power rather than bolster it. Isolationism creates and perpetuates political and economic vulnerability by limiting outside interaction and involvement with the international community. However, if isolationist regimes choose isolation with full knowledge of the longterm negative consequences isolationism will have for their economies and their political power in the international arena, then the principles of power and state behavior in the international system need to be revised. Lastly, why and how do former isolationist states dispense with this practice and return to normalcy and international interdependence? If a sovereign state experiences profound socio-political and economic deterioration, then it will seek out the support of and engagement with the interdependent system and society of states. In an interdependent world rational, self-interested state behavior renders isolationism a counterproductive and detrimental policy for security and overall wellbeing. Study Plan, Design, and Instrumentation Methodologically, this analysis is historical and comparative, and seeks to provide an original contribution to the field of international relations. Utilizing a liberal international relations theory paradigm, this study uses government documents/ statements, legal documents, scholarly historical accounts, and news to articulate a new approach for explaining isolationism and develop a model for classifying degrees of isolationism vis-à-vis types of political regimes. Specifically, an historical matrix model based upon the three cases is utilized to understand isolationism as a concept and practice. In the following chapters, isolationism is discussed in its most “pure” manifestation and is further refined. Chapter 2 provides a summary of the literature pertaining to isolationism, addresses the need for ascertaining the importance of studying states that opt out of the international system, puts forth typologies of isolationism, and develops a model to explain variations of isolationism. This chapter also presents a history of states and the global states system to provide a working context within which to analyze isolationism. Chapter 3 examines the history and legitimacy of the state, and how specific regimes came to power, centralized power, and the justifications for imposing isolationism via hyper-nationalism, ideological, racial/ethnic, and political purity, and a cult of personality around the leaders of the “brave new worlds” embodied in the respective isolationist states. Chapter 4 examines isolationism as a domestic policy, and how it has impacted the wellbeing of the state’s economy and military. Chapter 5 examines isolationism as a form of foreign policy, diplomatic relations, participation or lack of it in world affairs through membership in international organizations, treaty signatures, and their relationship with the world’s great powers. Chapter 6 discusses what regimes gain by opting out of the international system of states, why they have a tendency to fail, and the conceptual as well as empirical significance of the findings.

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Chapter 2

Isolationism in International Relations Theory Introduction To make sense of isolationism in international relations we need to understand the international state system. The term system for the purposes of this study posits that an integrated set of concepts, principles, preferences and behaviors take place within an overarching interactive context. Relationships develop between dependent and independent variables in a systemic setting. Through dynamic interaction among states the international system of states allows for change. The state system provides the working context within which isolationism transpires. The state system context provides a backdrop for comprehending isolationism; in thought and practice, isolationism does not and cannot occur in a vacuum. Thus, on a general level, it is necessary to provide an explanation of individual state behavior within the larger state system. How a state chooses to define and implement its domestic and foreign policies is directly affected by systemic principles and a systemic context that encapsulates all states. This chapter will, therefore, provide a general and selective overview of the current literature on the state system in a political sense and in terms of economic evolution, and expound upon isolationism as it manifests itself in the modern state system. More specifically, this chapter will examine four types of isolationism, and will introduce a model to conceptualize varieties of isolationism. The Modern State As far as the discipline of international relations is concerned, it is generally agreed upon that the modern state and the state system date back (formally) to what is known as the Peace of Westphalia (1648). Ordering concepts such as balance of power, anarchy, legality, reason and logic, military capacity as a measurement of power and the very notion of a legal-rational state trace back to the history and the agreements of Westphalia. In the tradition of international relations, it is this specific Peace that formalized, legitimized, institutionalized, and codified notions

 Leo Gross, “The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948,” The American Journal of International Law 42.1 (1948): 20-41.

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of states and sovereignty. The Peace of Westphalia also formalized the principle of balance of power as a mechanism to prevent the consolidation of power within the purview of a single state. The balance of power principle would, in theory, prevent one state from initiating war and overtaking other states due to the formation of alliances, blocs, and strategic partnerships designed to check the power of any single state that accumulated too much power. This treaty acknowledged the right of the state to exercise its own will within its territory and over its subject populations, especially regarding the most important issue of the time, that is, religion, thus freeing states from previous justifications for external interferences in other states’ internal affairs. States agreed to end their support of international religious conflicts; this had the effect of altering the power-equilibrium between competing secular and religious actors in favor of the state. By limiting religious

  For discussions on sovereignty see: Jean Bodin, On Sovereignty: Four Chapters From the Six Books of the Commonwealth, ed. and trans. Julian H. Franklin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992); John Breuilly, “Sovereignty and Boundaries: Modern State Formation and National Identity in Germany,” National Histories and European History, ed. Mary Fulbrook (Boulder and San Francisco: Westview Press, 1993) 94-140; J.A. Hall, States in History (New York: Blackwell, 1986); Joseph R. Stayer, On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); Nicholas Onuf, “Sovereignty: Outline of a Conceptual History,” Alternatives 16.4 (1991): 425-446; Janice Thomson, “State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Empirical Research,” International Studies Quarterly 39.2 (1995): 213-233; F.H. Hinsley, Sovereignty, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); M.R. Fowler and J.M. Bunck, Law Power, and the Sovereign State: The Evolution and Application of the Concept of Sovereignty (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995); Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).  Andreas Osiander, “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth,” International Organization 55.2 (2001): 251-287; Andreas Osiander, The States System of Europe, 1640-1990: Peacemaking and the Conditions of International Stability (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).   Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995); Stephen D. Krasner, “Compromising Westphalian,” International Security 20. 3 (Winter, 1995-1996): 115-151; Stephen D. Krasner, “Westphalian and All That,” Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, eds. J. Goldsein and Robert Keohane (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); Stephen D. Krasner, “Abiding Sovereignty,” International Political Science Review 22.3 (2001): 229-251; Michael Sheehan, The Balance of Power: History and Theory (London: Routledge, 1996).  Roland Axtmann, “The State of the State: The Model of the Modern State and Its Contemporary Transformation,” International Political Science Review 25.3 (2004): 259279; Graeme Gill, The Nature and Development of the Modern State (London: Palgrave, 2003).

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influence over its domestic affairs, the state was better able to control and supervise its population. Another significant development that resulted from the agreements was the idea that a legitimate state is premised on being territorially fixed in space and time, comprised of internationally recognized territory. The geopolitical aspect of the state gave rise to what R.B.J Walker has termed the inside (domestic) and outside (international) dimension of international affairs. This is especially important to note when considering the fact that, before the Westphalia agreements and the creation of the modern state, the medieval world had very fluid notions of (state) borders. In the absence of the concept of the geopolitically and territorially fixed state, authorities (monarchs, clergy) viewed the world as a succession of places rather than definite concrete states of affairs.10 Governing a homogenized people (culturally, for example, through socialization and religion), territory, and resources within static geopolitical units thus enabled modern states to claim the “exclusive power of authoritative political rule making for a population with a continuous territory that has a clear internationally recognized boundary.”11 These concepts and principles, therefore, created a “new” and more ordered paradigm for the conduct of international relations, giving rise to the modern state and state system. More importantly, the legitimate, authoritative exercise of supreme and invariable political power became concentrated within the state.12 This situation varied markedly from pre-Peace of Westphalia Europe, where political authorities were divided and constantly in conflict.13 For example, monarchs, members of the nobility and clergy, wealthy landlords, and the developing entrepreneurial class often found themselves in a bitter fight over legitimate jurisdiction and political authority. The post-Westphalia system replaced these “overlapping and often debatable jurisdictions through the institutions of a centralized state.”14 Clearly, such an initiative could not have been possible without the establishment of the   Friedrich Kratochwil, “Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality: An Inquiry into the Formation of the State System,” World Politics 39.1 (1986): 27-52.   John Agnew, “The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory,” Review of International Political Economy 1.1 (1994): 53-80.  R.B.J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).   Michael Biggs, “Putting the State on the Map: Cartography, Territory, and European State Formation,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 41.2, (1999): 374-405. 10  John Hale, Renaissance Europe, 1480-1520 (Fontana History of Europe) (London: Fontana Press, 1971) 52. 11 Axtmann 259-279. 12  Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). 13  James A. Caporoso, “Changes in the Westphalian Order: Territory, Public Authority, and Sovereignty,” The International Studies Review 2. 2 (2000): 1-28. 14 Axtmann 259-279.

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principle of sovereignty. Establishing and recognizing state sovereignty as the core of an orderly and stable framework for the conduct of international relations made it imperative that the state have ultimate jurisdiction over its territory, its people, and all other actors within its legitimate borders. The principle of sovereignty could only work if the state had final authority within its domestic affairs. Thus, all other competing forces had to recognize the will of the state as legal and rightful without attempting to interject their will against the state and its newly acquired powers and prerogatives. The distinction and separation of states from one another made it possible for the modern state to do what appears now to be an “organic” task, that is, rationally define its goals and objectives in a unitary manner. The principle of sovereignty, therefore, “provided the ideological justification for ultimate control within a specific territory at the same time that it provided a basis for recognition from other states.”15 Having secured power and control in a legal sense, state interests trumped competing groups and individuals under the principle of state sovereignty. After the Peace of Westphalia, states could enter into agreements and treaties with other states, create laws, rules, and policies to govern within their territory, prevent other actors from interfering in state domestic affairs, concentrate power within fixed and recognized borders, and institute mass mechanisms for disseminating and indoctrinating a subject population with notions of citizenship and nationalism.16 In particular, the institutionalization of diplomacy, a cornerstone of the contemporary states system, became the means whereby agreements among states were discussed at length, formally and informally negotiated, and officially implemented. The utilization of diplomacy by states in conducting foreign policy has its roots in the Italian Renaissance. “Diplomacy in the modern style, permanent diplomacy was one of the creations of Italian Renaissance.”17 Given that the Italian Renaissance spanned over nearly five centuries (the 11th through the 16th centuries), it was a precursor to and had a formative impact on the agreements that constituted the Peace of Westphalia. “The new diplomacy [embodied in the Peace] was the functional expression of a new kind of state.”18 This “new kind of state” refers to what is viewed by the discipline of international relations as the contemporary state. The Italian Renaissance notion of diplomacy as a mode of behavior (and eventually as an institutionalized practice) contributed to defining the power of the new state. Based on the experience of the Italian princes and city15  Caporoso 1. 16  Caporoso 1; John Torpey, The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983); Charles Tilly ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). 17 Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy (Mineola: Dover Publications, 1988) 47. 18  Mattingly 47.

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states, it became necessary to find an alternative means of securing state power; the political universe articulated in Machiavelli’s Prince exemplifies the urgency for city-states to find less violent and more secure, predictable ways to deal with one another. The Italian city-states were constantly immersed in a state of warfare, surrounded by self-interested enemies that would not hesitate to annihilate them if given the opportunity. The contemporary state, reflected in the ordering principles of the Peace, would now have a very different means of dealing with security and stateto-state relations. Diplomacy could now be utilized by states to help alleviate the pervasive effects of power politics in the conduct of state behavior. “In Italy, power was temporal in the strictest sense of the term. It was naked and free.”19 Diplomacy developed in response to the blatant power politics that by its nature, for example, anarchy, balance of power, and military capacity as the ultimate measurement of state power, fomented instability and posed a threat to the longevity and overall wellbeing of the state. Before the institutionalization of diplomacy as a viable and legitimate form of resolving disputes, “the pragmatic and provisional nature of power made all temporal authority quite literally temporary authority.”20 Given this pre-diplomatic political context, the state, dependent on its very survival on sustaining its power, was compelled to perpetually seek and acquire more power; “the shortest way to these objectives was by war.”21 A gradual acceptance of the state’s claim to efficiently and effectively provide security, economic wellbeing, and establish a common cultural identity for its citizens, helped make the idea of the sovereign state successful, both in thought and practice.22 The modern state was able to deliver on its promise to provide security (domestically and internationally) through the consolidation of police powers and a monopoly over the institutions and use of force to provide order in society; thus the state was able to enforce law and order and at the same time establish its authority over its citizens.23 Internationally, the state delivered on its promise to uphold its interests vis-à-vis other states, ensuring the security of its borders and the safety of its citizens. The state’s success as the ultimate political power over its territory could not have been complete without nationalism.24 Throughout the process of preparing for war and waging war, the state was able to appeal to 19  Mattingly 48. 20  Mattingly 49. 21  Mattingly 49. 22 Axtmann 259-279. 23  Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Free Press, 1997). 24  For more detail on nationalism see: Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992); John G. Gagliardo, Reich and Nation: The Holy Roman Empire as Idea and Reality, 1763-1806 (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1980).

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the emotions of the populace thus generating as well as strengthening the loyalty of citizens, deepening the citizen’s sense of belonging to a geopolitical territory embodied by the state (for example, the notions of fatherland and motherland).25 It was Napoleon who perfected the art of fomenting nationalist feelings during the Napoleonic wars; he sowed the seeds of nationalism across Europe, which later, as the general phenomenon of nationalism saturated the face of Europe, gave rise to the unification of the German and Italian states. The rise of nationalism in the 18th and 19th centuries also highlighted the fact that, ideally, a state and a nation ought to be within the same impenetrable and indissoluble borders. National-self determination was the guiding principle of many new states at the time. Nationalism, within the context of domestic borders, brought people together and created a stronger bond between nation and state. Nationalism was able to “overcome local, ethno-cultural diversity and to produce standardized citizens, whose loyalty to the nation would be unchallenged by extra societal allegiances.”26 Nationalism was able to take root in the public consciousness because of the prior principles of sovereignty, absolute power, a monopoly of police powers and force, and control of all activities within state borders to disseminate and indoctrinate devotion, martyrdom, and “love” for the motherland. “The development of the modern state depended upon effectively distinguishing between citizens and subjects and possible intruders and regulating the physical movement of each.”27 Distinguishing between “us and them,” in the context of the states system, enabled the state to keep better account of citizens and non-citizens, and translated into more regulated systems of taxation and revenuegeneration for states. In the realm of economy, the elimination of internal trade barriers, introduction of tariffs for external goods and services, the building of infrastructure, and the creation of an organized police force all contributed to the formation and inviolability of what we have come to know as the modern state.28 The Modern States System The modern state emerged concomitantly with the modern states system. The Peace of Westphalia was not only part of the transition from a world comprised of medieval authorities vying for position, power, and control vis-à-vis one another (under a feudal system, tensions and conflicts had erupted between the Papacy and the monarchies, feudalism and Papacy), but also indicated the advent of the modern states system. Early definitions of this term are reflected in Montague 25 Axtmann 259-279. 26 Roland Robertson, “After Nostalgia? Willful Nostalgia and the Phases of Globalization,” Theories of Modernity and Postmodernity, ed. B.S. Turner (London: Sage, 1990) 49. 27 Axtmann 261. 28 Axtmann 259-279.

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Bernard’s notion that the states system is “a group of states having relations more or less permanent with one another.”29 Although this term was used by different philosophers to describe slightly different ideas (unions and confederation, for instance),30 eventually, the notion of a system of states “acquired the inclusive [modern] meaning it has for us of ‘the family of nations.’” 31 According to Martin Wight, in order to have orderly international relations there must be open channels of “communication” between states.32 Thus, states must establish ties among themselves of a diplomatic, economic, and strategic nature. In addition to diplomatic representation, states need to engage in international dialogue through conferences and the establishment of international institutions that can serve as forums for the exchange of information and affability. One of the more important and unvarying reasons for why states must take into account the ramifications of a states system pertains to economic wellbeing, especially in the form of trade relations. Martin Wight observes that the “Western state-system grew up round the coalescence of the two commercial worlds of the Mediterranean and of the Baltic and North Seas, and it seems that throughout its development the economic horizon has stretched beyond the limits of diplomacy.”33 International relations premised on the modern states system are, therefore, comprised of two central states of affairs, that is, communication and trade. The early definition of the states system has been refined over time. International relations scholars have sought to clarify what constitutes a states system as well as the dynamics and components of the system.34 George Klir notes that a system 29  Martin Wight, System of States (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977) 22. 30  For a discussion on the use of the term “system of states,” see Otto Geirke, Natural Law and the Theory of Society: 1500-1800, translated and introduced by Ernest Barker (Clark: Lawbook Exchange, 2001), 196-197 and 395-396; Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Political Writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, with introduction and notes by C.E. Vaughan, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962) 366; A.H.L. Heeren, A Manual of the History of the Political System of Europe and its Colonies (Oxford: D.A. Talboys, 1864). 31  M. Wight, System of States 21; for an in-depth analysis of nations vs. states see Walker Connor, “Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?” World Politics 24.3 (1972): 319355. 32  M. Wight, System of States 29. 33  M. Wight, System of States 33. 34  For a more detailed and modern understanding of system of states, see: Jack Snyder, “Introduction: New Thinking About the New International System,” Coping with Complexity in the International System, eds, Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993); Robert Jervis, “Systems and Interaction Effects,” Coping with Complexity in the International System, eds, Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993) 25-46; Keneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Readings: Addison-Wesley, 1979); John Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” International Security 15.1 (1990): 5-56; J.H. Milsum, “Mathematical

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is “an arrangement of certain components so interrelated as to [create] a whole,” and can be characterized as “sets of elements standing in interaction.”35 Barry Buzan contends that states are the individual units of the international system, and that interactions among the parts of the system include war, diplomacy, trade, migration, and the movement of ideas.36 Kenneth N. Waltz asserts that a “system is composed of a structure and of interacting units. The structure is the systemwide component that makes it possible to think of the system as a whole.”37 While Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye believe that we live in an interdependent world, they do not go into detail about what constitutes the system of states and how it functions. Instead, they focus on what they call “interdependence,” and define the character of the system of states as being rooted in “mutual dependence.” Thus, changes in one state will affect other states within the totality of the international system.38 Other definitions of a states system posit that that there is, in fact, a common understanding of various systemic rules and regulations that states follow within the system. Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s notion of General Systems Theory (GST)39 envisions a system of states as having “organic” and “holistic” properties, that is, properties that are not found separately in its parts (individual states), but rather individual parts interact within the framework of an overarching, holistic system. Individual parts do not give rise to the system: the two are inextricably linked, rendering individual parts sub-sets of a systemic whole. The states system, therefore, (as well as systems in general) are not fully comprehensible by investigation conducted of respective parts in isolation. In order to understand the parts, one needs to understand the (holistic) system. General Systems Theory, rooted in biological systems theory, claims that the parts are not a collection of isolated units; all phenomena are parts of “open systems” in which the components can be envisioned as sets of organized actions maintained by perpetual exchanges within the system.40 Introduction to General System Dynamics,” Positive Feedback: a General Systems Approach to Positive/Negative Feedback and Mutual Causality, ed. J. H. Milsum (Oxford: Pergamon, 1968); Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System (New York: Academic, 1974). 35 George Klir, “The Polyphonic General Systems Theory,” Trends in Generals Systems Theory, ed. George Klir (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1972) 1. 36  Barry Buzan, “From International System to International Society of States: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School,” International Organization 47.3 (1993): 327-352. 37  Waltz 79. 38 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 3rd ed. 7. 39  For an in-depth analysis of General Systems Theory see: Ludwig von Bertalanffy, General System Theory; Foundations, Development, Applications (New York: George Braziller, 1968); Ludwig von Bertalanffy, A Systems View of Man (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981); Richard B. Gray, International Security Systems; Concepts and Models of World Order (Itasca: Peacock Publishers, 1969). 40  Von Bertalanffy, General System Theory.

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Within the state system, international actors (states) do not function in isolation from one another, nor can state behavior be adequately understood without taking into account and subjecting states to some degree of comparative analysis. Comparative analysis can be legitimately utilized because, particular states of affairs and details aside, (for example, history, culture, language, and the like), states share common systemic assumptions. The modern states system is a dynamic system, wherein every part affects/effects and is affected/effected by interaction and interdependence. In the 1970s, the English School of International Relations advanced the notion that after the Bretton Woods agreement (1944), international affairs were evolving into what could be termed an international “society of states.”41 The notion of a society of states, however, preceded the English School by more than a century. Hugo Grotius had previously alluded to this concept.42 The idea of international society is rooted in the classical legal tradition, which is premised on the idea that international law exists because a bloc of states chooses to participate in an international legal order.43 Hedley Bull and Adam Watson contend that an international society of states is “a group of states (or more generally, a group of independent political communities) which not merely form a system, in the sense that the behavior of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognize their common interest in maintaining these arrangements.”44 According to this conceptualization, a system and society of states are different. Bull’s concept of international society implies that in a system, states merely interact with each other out of necessity; while in a society

41  For further discussion on society of states see: Ole Weaver, “International Society – Theoretical Promises Unfulfilled?” Cooperation and Conflict 27 (1992): 97-128; Martin Wight, “Western Values in International Relations,” Diplomatic Investigations, eds., Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (London: Allen and Unwin, 1966) 89-131; Buzan 327-352; Martin Wight, Power Politics (Harmonsworth: Penguin, 1979) 105-12; Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter, eds., International Theory: The Three Traditions—Martin Wight (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991); Adam Watson, “System of States,” Review of International Studies 16 (1990): 99-109; Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society (London: Routledge, 1992); Roy E. Jones, “The English School of International Relations: A Case for Closure,” Review of International Studies 7 (1981): 1-13. 42  Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, Including the Law of Nature and of Nations (New York: Cosimo Classics, 2007); Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsburty and Adam Roberts, eds, Hugo Grotius and International Relations (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1992); Claire A. Culter, “The Grotian Tradition in International Relations,” Review of International Studies 17 (1991): 41-65. 43  Buzan 328. 44  Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, “Introduction,” Expansion of International Society, eds. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) 1.

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of states, units are “self-conscious and self-regulating entities.”45 The Peace of Westphalia marked the beginning of the states system, while the conception and implementation of a society of states has been embryonic, immanent within the states system as a potentiality. The development of a society of states, built upon a states system framework, became more evident than not during the 19th century, with the advent of industrialization and the subsequent processes of “globalization” that took effect.46 A states system, therefore, is the more basic of the two concepts and precedes a society of states. A system, however, can only exist if there is significant interaction among units and an overarching ordering principle that guides interaction, with international order defined as “an arrangement of social life such that it promotes certain goals or values.”47 Given the fact that international relations take place within a states system, how do societies emerge? According to Ferdinand Tönnies, there are two explanations for the creation of society within states, that is, the gemeinschaft and gesellschaft.48 The gemeinschaft perceives society as an “organic” entity that has the capacity to grow, evolve through the common experiences, identity, and history of the individual parts. The gesellschaft, on the other hand, perceives society as a mechanical and contractual state of affairs. According to this explanation, societies are entities constructed according to human will.49 Wight subscribes to the gemeinschaft explanation, in that we “must assume that a state-system will not come into being without a degree of cultural unity among its members.”50 For example, ancient Greek city-states shared a common culture, language, and a set of beliefs about the world.51 The same was true for many European political units, in that they were under the dominion of the Roman Empire, and were heavily influenced by the Holy Roman Empire and the Catholic Church.52 The gesellschaft explanation of the evolution of a society of states maintains that a society is the result of a lengthy and gradual (rational) reaction to an increasingly dynamic and evolving international system. Buzan, who contends that the present society of states is both the result of a social and a functional evolution, claims that, despite the presence or absence of a common culture, consistent and substantial interaction 45  Buzan 331. 46  Hedley Bull, “The Emergence of a Universal International Society,” Expansion of International Society, eds., Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) 117-126. 47  Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (London: Macmillan, 1977) 4. 48  Ferdinand Tönnies, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (Leipzig: Fues’s Verlag, 1887). 49  Buzan 333. 50  M. Wight, System of States 33; see also James Rosenau, Along the DomesticForeign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 51  M. Wight, System of States 83-85; see also Andrew M. Scott, “The Logic of International Interaction,” International Studies Quarterly 21:3 (1977) 438. 52  M. Wight, System of States.

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(economic, social, political) among states will inevitably produce recognition and accommodation of overarching collective interests.53 In other words, ruling regimes will gradually recognize the indispensability of interdependent economic and security relationships, and in order to avoid conflict and to ensure prosperity, states will be forced to deal with one another in a less disruptive manner. Failure to recognize, accept and accommodate this state of affairs results in a significant loss of competitive advantage among all states involved. According to Bull, who leans toward a gesellschaft explanation of society, once elites realize that there are gains to be had from ordered, stable interstate relations, they are persuaded toward establishing greater channels and institutionalized means for the regulation of state-to-state relations.54 For Bull, there are three fundamental goals endemic to any form of society. First, all societies want to impose some rational, ordered restriction on the use of force; second, all societies are aware of the necessity of enforcing contracts and codifying rules of conduct; and third, societies require rules and regulations over the ownership/use of property.55 Selfpreservation and rational self-interest provide the motives for elites to pursue the previously enumerated goals in concert, thus creating a society of states. For Bull, units (states) have no real choice but to regularly interact, creating a necessity for international mechanisms to deal with each other in an ordered and peaceful manner. These mechanisms facilitate the exchange of information, the creation of agreements and alliances, and rules for property regulations and the definition and recognition of territorial borders. With time, states develop arrangements for a global implementation of rules to govern contracts and property rights. This situation, however, is only possible if states recognize each other as sovereign entities, and if states agree on common rules for conducting diplomacy and implementing treaties.56 Shared security and economic ties through contracts and interactions, and a sense of recognition among states is a turning point in the transformation of a states system into society of states. “In its most basic and essential form, international society is a legal construction.”57 The more states are in contact with one another and agree to the same principles, the more they homogenize. When a system of states and a society of states develop, a core bloc of states – through trade agreements, common culture, shared interests, institutions, norms and rules – become more and more attached.58 Yet, some states such as North Korea and Burma, which can be classified as isolationist, place 53  Buzan 334. 54  Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds., The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); Adam Watson, “Hedley Bull, State System, and International Studies,” Review of International Studies 13 (1987): 145-53; Bull, “Universal International Society” 117-126. 55  Bull, Anarchical Society (1977) 4-5. 56  Buzan 334. 57  Buzan 346. 58  Buzan 345-346.

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themselves at the “fringes of international society by accepting little more than the basics of diplomatic recognition and exchange.”59 Trade and Communication: Pre and Post-WWI, Pre and Post-WWII The states system did not emerge in a vacuum, but was the result of active interaction among different political units, that is, states. These units had to interact not only politically but also economically on a frequent and regular basis. States had to have substantive and significant contact with one another for economic reasons, especially trade. The evolution of trade and commerce, the origin of globalization, as discussed in the previous chapter, extends far back in history.60 When examining and accounting for the globalization of economy, anthropologists and other social scientists refer to centralized authority and control of economic production as “political economies.”61 Classical civilizations such as the Mesopotamian, Hindu, Chinese, Mesoamerican, and Andean civilizations are considered political units possessing “political economies” because each accumulated and centralized wealth (through religion), overextended the ability to maintain a particular lifestyle, and were unable to maintain the high cost of military expenditures to secure their dominion, which eventually led to their downfall.62 China is the only example where a civilization was able to survive a total collapse of its pre-state political organizations/system. Greek city-states, ancient and imperial Rome, classical Islamic civilization, the city-states of the early Middle Ages, and the commercial capitalist political units of the high Middle Ages are examples of the “proto-capitalistic” organization and management of civilizations under globalized economic interaction based on extensive market (commercial) relations.63 When considering commercial capitalism as the basis for a globalized states system, the earliest stages can be traced as far back as the 12th and 13th centuries.64 In Europe, there was a significant shift from the proto-capitalist nature of ancient civilizations to proto-industrialization and capitalism in the form of competitive enterprise spearheaded by the up-and-coming powerful merchant class.65 The 59  Buzan 349. 60  Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1990 (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990). 61  John H. Bodley, Cultural Anthropology: Tribes, States, and the Global System, 3rd ed. (Mountain View: Mayfield, 2000) 179. 62 Norman Yoffee and George L. Cowgill, The Collapse of Ancient States and Civilizations (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1988). 63 Rossi 32. 64  Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism: 15th-18th Century, Vol. II, The Wheels of Commerce (New York: Harper and Row, 1982); Rossi 32; A.G. Hopkins, ed., Globalization in History (New York: Norton, 2002). 65  John P. McKay, Bennett D. Hill, John Buckler, and Patricia Buckley, A History of World Societies, 6th ed., vol. 1 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2004) 387.

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intricate and extensive use of banks, letters of exchange, accounting firms, insurance firms, and credit indicates the implementation or rather utilization of economic rationality as the key characteristic informing business transactions, with capitalism, calculation, profit, self-interest, and utility assuming cardinal roles in the perpetuation, legitimation, and implementation of a “new” way of conducting business.66 According to Rossi, these developments were not only strictly economic, but also happened “way before the 15th-16th century capitalism that is usually considered the beginning of capitalism as a modern phenomena.”67 The rise of private ownership of economic resources by an emerging merchant class and mercantile elite led to profound and irrevocable changes in the political sphere. The new “bourgeoisie” began to contend for and share political power with the Church and the monarchy. The supremacy of land-based agricultural wealth that the Church, monarchy, and nobility had benefited from for centuries was swiftly challenged by commercial capitalism. The rise of a commercialbased society led to the emergence of commercial globalization, which over time changed the nature and practice of the political, social, and economic dynamics of European political units and societies. Hopkins notes that the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries mark the advent of early modern global society in Europe, Asia, and parts of Africa.68 During this time period, these regions went through intense and extensive political, economic, and cultural changes. After the Peace of Westphalia, the states system favored and eventually privileged national monarchies, such as England, France, and Spain. In addition, both the Christian and Muslim worlds experienced growth in services, finances, and pre-industrial manufacturing because they were now more entrenched in their “territory” through taxation and sovereignty. Starting in 1760, Britain became the pioneer of imperial and commercial expansion.69 Aided by vastly improved transportation technology, the British economy and overall level of power flourished in the trade of coffee, sugar, tobacco, opium, and gold.70 This period was particularly impressive because these commercial developments happened without the oversight of centralized political authorities that had dominated the political societies of the time.71 The expansion of trade and industry also allowed for a cultural awakening in Europe, notably, the Enlightenment and the idea of a universal market.72 66 Rossi 33. 67 Rossi 33. 68  Hopkins ed. 56. 69 Kevin H. O’Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, Globalization and History: The Evolution of a Nineteenth-Century Atlantic Economy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999). 70 A.G. Hopkins, ed., Globalization in History (New York: Norton, 2002) 56. 71  Wallerstein, The Modern World System. 72 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (New York: Norton, 1987); Isaac Kramnick, ed., The Portable Enlightenment Reader, ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 1995); David Ricardo, Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, (New York: Cosimo, 2006).

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The power of 18th and 19th century industrial England, the repeal of the English Corn Laws, and the economic developments that swept over the world from the mid-1800s to the early 1900s further expanded the reach of industrialization and global economic integration.73 During this time Europe experienced the first organization of a formal free trade region. In 1834, the north German states entered into a customs union, that is, the Zollverein. The Zollverein was an efficient and powerful customs organization, and has been compared to and is considered a precursor of the European Union as the model of an integrated and globalized economic and political institution.74 Marsh notes that, like “the twentieth-century [European] community, the nineteenth-century network embraced virtually all of Western and Central Europe. Both aspired to the creation of a common European market that would transcend the essentially national confines of customs unions such as the German Zollverein.”75 Although intra-European trade relations had boomed prior to 1914, the protectionist policies in all European states remained relatively high. Regardless of increased protectionism, throughout the pre-WWI period the labor migration levels in Europe were high, so much so that two-thirds of the workers in the mines of French Lorraine were Italian immigrants, and a considerable number of Polish immigrants worked at the Ruhr coalmines.76 This period of massive integration came to a complete halt from 1915-1945. This period of time, also known as the period of disintegration, witnessed European states focusing all of their energies in protecting and bolstering national economies and fostering internal development. German imperial aspirations in 1914 and 1939 forced European states to strongly consider the possibility of either joining Germany or forming blocs against the German war-machine – even turning to the US for aid and support in defeating the German military.77 The end of WWII brought about the integration of the states system that dominates present-day international affairs, especially the political and economic liberalization of capital flows between developed countries and developing countries. The society of states that we now know could not have been possible without the Bretton Woods agreement, which laid the groundwork for the 73 Rossi 38; Scott C. James and David A. Lake, “The Second Face of Hegemony: Britain’s Repeal of the Corn Laws and the American Walker Tariff of 1846,” International Organization 43.1 (1989): 1-29. 74 Peter Stirk, A History of European Integration Since 1914 (London: Pinter, 1996); Peter Stirk and David Weigall, eds., The Origins and Development of European Integration (London: Pinter, 1999). 75 Peter March, Bargaining on Europe: Britain and the First Common Market, 18601893 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999) 3. 76  Carl Strikwerda, “The Troubled Origins of European Economic Integration: International Iron and Steel and Labor Migration and the Era of World War I,” American Historical Review 98 (1993): 1106-1129. 77  Wilhem Ropke, The Solution of the German Problem (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Son, 1942); Wilhem Ropke, International Economic Disintegration (London: William Hodge, 1942).

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contemporary globalized states system. It was after this historic meeting that the current liberal economic structure and framework for the conduct of international relations was created. This agreement laid the basis for the development of a global capitalist system.78 This transformation continued from 1950-1960 with the implementation of the US Marshall Plan (1947) to rebuild Europe, intensified in 1970s with the liberalization of global finance, and became truly global in 1990s with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Soon after the implementation of the Marshall Plan, the global economy experienced what became known the Golden Age (1947-1973), which was marked by high rates of employment, production, and consumption rates. The Marshall Plan, and the Korean and Vietnam Wars brought about increased US spending and direct foreign investment, which in turn translated into increased foreign exchange of world reserves.79 International institutions such as the IMF and GATT were created to increase international trade, regulate the economy, foment free trade of goods and services, and effectuate tariff reductions. The very existence of these institutions created a gradual demand and need for openness and liberalization of national economies. In order to comply with IMF and GATT rules, states were compelled to lower their tariff barriers.80 Other major international institutions, such as the WTO, IMF, EU, and NAFTA, which play such a profound role in the articulation of global economic policies, can only exist if states interact, cooperate, and commit to the liberalization of their economies. During the 19th century, global commerce was a “unilateral and discretionary policy”;81 in the 20th century and beyond, global commerce has taken the form of “multilateral and institutional policy.”82 Rossi claims that the “survival of national economies heavily depends upon their successful link to the policies of IMF and other IGOs. More and more nations of the world share a common destiny, because of their economic interdependence.”83 Intricate and interactive economic activity, primarily in the form of transnational trade, has resulted in the need for developing complex systems of organization to administer and regulate economic activity. Integration is, therefore, an inevitable result of globalization and liberalization of national economies. “National economies cannot prosper without and are heavily conditioned by transnational capital and by a transnational capitalist class that does not know of national loyalties.”84 Economic structure, progressive and interactive technologies, for example, the Internet, and market opportunities are vital to the financial stability and health 78 Kiely 48-80. 79 Andrew Glyn, Arnold Hughes, Alain Lipietz and Ajit Singh, “The Rise and Fall of the Golden Age,” The Golden Age of Capitalism, eds. Stephen Marglin and Juliet Schor (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990) 69-70. 80 Kiely 56. 81 Rossi 40. 82 Rossi 40. 83 Rossi 40. 84 Rossi 40.

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of a state.85 In order to be competitive and thus survive in the world economy, a state needs to be innovative and/or adaptive to outside forces.86 These same principles apply to states and their competitiveness in the world market and their financial wellbeing. Robert Gilpin observes that there is a Malthusian element to international political economy.87 Thus, the rapid growth of international trade has created an environment that can best be described as “survival of the fittest.”88 In addition, Gilpin argues that competitiveness and technological innovation play a crucial role in the evolution of a state’s behavior and its prospects for longevity and power. He expands upon Chandler’s and Lasonick’s notion of the individual firm by making the claim that it is not necessarily only the firm that is responsible for its agility and ability to perform by adopting to changes, but it is the national system of political economy that needs to be able to adapt in order to be competitive in the international arena.89 Past success can further put a strain on the fitness of a particular economy because a state can become locked in stagnant practices and institutions that may have been successful in the past but become less competitive in an ever-changing and dynamic global market system. Powerful interests usually resist change, and a state runs the risk of becoming entrenched within a particular routine that becomes comfortable and harder to change. Evolution and innovation are key aspects to successfully obtaining economic efficiency and competitiveness, and ensuring the wellbeing of the state. Thus, states that resist change will suffer in the long run. This particular phenomenon is more visible in states where a pluralistic sociopolitical system is absent.90 Christopher Freedman uses the term “socio-technological system” to highlight the connection between technological advancement and vibrant, adaptive, flexible societal systems.91 For Nathan Rosernberg and L. E. Birdzell, the industrialized West and some Asian states have an upper hand when it comes to economic development largely because their systems allow for accommodation, adaptation, and growth.92 Although some trade is always vital for a state to prosper, glorification of trade is not always welcomed or viewed as unconditionally positive within the literature. One of the strongest criticisms of free trade comes from Marxist-based 85 Alfred D. Jr. Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (1977; Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1993). 86 Alfred D. Jr. Chandler, Strategy and Structure: Chapters in History of the Industrial Enterprise (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990). 87 Robert Gilpin, “The Politics of Transnational Economic Relations,” International Organization 25.3 (1971): 398-419. 88 Gilpin 398-419. 89 Gilpin 398-419. 90 Nathan Rosenberg and L.E. Birdzell, How the West Grew Rich: The Economic Transformation of the Industrial World (New York: Basic Books, 1986). 91  Christopher Freedman, Technology Policy and Economic Performance: Lessons from Japan (London: Pinter, 1987). 92 Rosenberg and Birdzell, How the West Grew Rich.

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perspectives, particularly the Dependencia school of thought.93 Interpretations of Marxist thought embodied in Dependencia theory and Immanuel Wallerstein’s “Modern World Systems” approach are theories that argue that economic isolationism and protectionism in less developed countries (LDCs) is focused on achieving political independence from core countries in the world capitalist system. According to Dependencia theory, free market economies create “dependency where the productive system [is] nationally controlled and dependency [occurs] in enclave situations.”94 Dependistas are also critical of the term “interdependence.” For them, a banker and a client have a relationship; however the position they hold in this “interdependence” is qualitatively different, and the same is true for world markets.95 Those with capital (power) are not “dependent” in the true sense of the word, and “capitalism is [considered] a world system” in and of itself.96 The meaning of international system and system of states is redefined under Dependista theory, which views the international system as a “structure of institutions, classes, […] power arrangements, [and]… a stratification system of power relations.”97 Unlike liberal/neo-liberal thought, which perceives international relations as being comprised of networks of communication and cooperation, dependistas believe that the system of states “strictly serve[s] the interests of the multinational corporations, exporters of the industrial nations, and the international financial markets.”98 In order to break their dependency on foreign donors, LDCs must develop stronger national economies, industrialize, and assert national control of an export system free of oversight and control from the developed world. However, in discussing dependency theory and the different efforts to prove it, Velasco notes that, “only North Korea and Albania tried the practical prescription of completely breaking away from the world economy, with predictable consequences.”99 Given the extent isolationism has impacted state 93  For discussions of Dependistas see: Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979); James D. Cockcroft, Andre Gunder Frank, and Dale L. Johnson, Development and Underdevelopment: Latin America’s Political Economy (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1972). For discussions of Marxism and state politics, see: Karl Marx, Capital (London: The World’s Manuals, 1925); Vladimir I. Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (San Francisco: China Books & Periodicals, 1989); Wallerstein, The Modern World-System; Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2001); Antonio Gramshi, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (New York: International Publishers, 1971). 94  Cardoso and Faletto xviii. 95  Cardoso and Faletto xxi. 96  Cardoso and Faletto xxi. 97  Cockcroft, Frank, and Johnson 91. 98  Cockcroft, Frank, and Johnson 95. 99 Andres Velasco, “Dependency Theory,” Foreign Policy 133 (2002): 45. For more information see: Peter Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State and Local Capital in Brazil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); Tulio Halperin-

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policy and political outcomes, it is appropriate to examine isolationism both in theory and practice. Isolationism Throughout History Although the sociopolitical as well as economic development of a states system and a society of states has been examined, it is the case that the modern state and the modern states system have given rise to as well as been impacted by the evolution of a world system that is inextricably linked by economic and political ties. In the field of international relations, a clear emphasis has been placed on the notion of system interconnectedness. Yet, modern states that have refused to embrace the tenets of globalization and free trade – by pursuing select foreign policy decisions that isolate as opposed to integrate and pursue an isolationist policy to “protect” the state by avoiding adulteration of a “pure” society through external contacts and infiltration – have not been fully addressed/developed in the literature. Although not well developed and documented, the concept and practice of isolationism can be traced throughout the history of autonomous political units. Isolationism has been practiced since at least the time of the ancient Greek citystates and the Roman Empire. The ancient Greek philosophers Plato and Aristotle discuss isolationism in their writings vis-à-vis the role of the state in human affairs. In The Republic, Plato contends that isolationism is essential to the vitality of the ideal state. Plato advocates a clear separation of state citizens from foreigners in a republic, and observes that unless rulers engage in “the exclusion of the other, [that is, foreigners,] cities will never have rest from their evils … and then only will [the] State have a possibility of life and behold the light of day.”100 For Plato, citizens of an ideal state will experience severe negative effects from exposure to foreigners and foreign cultures. Plato asserts that “the finest natures, when under alien condition, receive more injury than the inferior, because the contrast is greater.”101 Analogizing the health of citizens and the polity to seeds, Plato contends that if seeds are grown “in an alien soil” then they will become the most “poisonous of all weeds.”102 For Plato, foreigners interfere with the moral, political, social, and spiritual health of the polity. Foreign influences cause citizens to act in ways that cater to the standards of foreigners as opposed to what is in actuality intrinsically Donghi, “Dependency Theory and Latin American Historiography,” Latin American Research Review 17.1 (1992): 115-130; Stanley Stein and Barbara H. Stein, The Colonial Heritage of Latin America: Essays on Economic Dependence in Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970). 100 Plato, The Republic, trans. and intro. Desmond Lee (1955; London: Penguin Classics, 2003) 180. 101 Plato 199. 102 Plato 199.

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good or correct for the state. Foreigners will judge the citizen and compel him to produce whatever they feel is good and proper.103 Aristotle, on the other hand, disagrees with Plato on the question of foreigners and the influence that foreigners have on the wellbeing of the polity. Aristotle contends that foreigners are in fact a positive influence on the development of the state. In The Politics, Aristotle argues that the Spartans were perishing in large part because of their xenophobic posture toward outside influences. This, however, was not always the case. Sparta had what can be termed “flexible” policies during the Spartan city-state’s earlier period of development.104 In the 7th century B.C., Sparta had extensive trade relations with Egypt and Lydia (in today’s Anatolia region), and archeologists have discovered necklaces, bronze ornaments, vases, and pottery that indicate diversity within Spartan society.105 Aristotle claims that “in the days of earlier kings Sparta shared her citizenship with strangers, and consequently at the time there was no scarcity of soldiers for many years.”106 During the later period of Spartan civilization, Sparta became increasingly xenophobic; a closed society that eventually adopted a policy of maximum non-engagement (isolationism) with other political units. A strict policy of non-engagement with foreigners, coupled with the fact that Sparta had become a militarized society, contributed to Sparta’s decline and eventual disintegration.107 In addition, Aristotle argued that the granting of citizenship to talented and gifted foreigners could prove an invaluable asset to the state as opposed to a liability.108 With the decline of the ancient Greek city-states, Rome would eventually rise to prominence, wielding dominion over the Western world for many centuries. Haaroff argues that both the Greeks and the Romans had aspects of isolationism throughout their tenure; however, the Romans had somewhat of a more flexible policy toward the barbarians, that is, foreigners, which led to a longer and more productive reign. Unlike the Spartans, who spurned foreigners and foreign influences, Rome incorporated foreigners into its empire. Addressing the Senate in the first century A.D., the Emperor Claudius asked: “What else was the ruin of the Spartans and the Athenians but that, strong though they were in arms, they spurned the conquered as barbarians?”109 The Emperor Claudius praised Rome 103 Plato 201. 104 Theodore J. Haarhoff, The Stranger at the Gate; Aspects of Isolationism and Cooperation in Ancient Greece and Rome, with References to Modern Tensions Between Races and Nations (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1951) 49. 105 Guy Dickins, “The Art of Sparta,” The Burlignton Magazine for Connoisseurs 14.68 (1908): 66-64; Gerald P. Schaus, “A Foreign Vase Painter in Sparta,” American Journal of Archaeology 83.1 (1979): 102-106. 106 Aristotle 49. 107 Aristotle 49. 108 See Aristotle, Politics. 109 Tacitus, The Annals: Book XI, trans. Alfred John Church and William Jackson Brodribb 2000, Massachusetts Institute of Technology No Date, 29 April 2008 .

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for its ability to draw foreigners into service for the development of Rome: by “enrolling in our ranks the most vigorous of the provincials, we reinforced our exhausted empire.”110 Not only were the Romans more flexible toward foreigners but they elaborated and systematically applied “the law of the foreigner.”111 Although this idea was first developed under Stoic influence, the Romans refined it and eventually formed what we now know as “the law of the nations.”112 Rome was able to do this by superimposing select principles of natural law on the specific customary and positive laws of the various nationalities under their control. By doing so, Rome thought it would be able to make the empire coherent and stable, and provide a framework for imperial governance. Roman law was the law of Europe for centuries, not only the Roman Empire but the Holy Roman Empire as well. The Romans had two types of legal codes or law, that is, civil law (jus civile), which applied to legal relations among Roman citizens, and people’s law (jus gentium), which applied to dealings of non-citizens (non-Romans) residing in the empire. Jus gentium evolved with the passage of time into what is known (especially in the Anglo-Saxon world) as the common law.113 Jus civile was originally a species of tribal law. It had many features of tribal law, meaning it was a type of law that was harsh, inflexible, and mechanical in application. Misdemeanors and felonies were well defined, and there were precise punishments for each infraction of the law. No mitigating circumstances were allowed to bypass or ameliorate punishments enumerated in the law. On the other hand, jus gentium was the opposite; it was a very flexible system. It had to apply to peoples who were diverse in their culture, religions, beliefs, norms, habits, and customs. The Empire was composed of a large number of nationalities, and jus gentium, in principle, was to apply to the great diversity of people and hence it had to be flexible. It had to provide a legal framework that could take into the diversity of subjected peoples. The jus gentium law allowed peoples to have a great deal of latitude in the handling of their legal and social affairs.114 There are, then, three main differences between the ancient Greek and Roman systems: first, Roman internationalism allowed for a stronger state/empire than Greek xenophobia; second, the Roman Empire had more longevity than the Greek citystates because Rome was able to benefit from and incorporate foreigners; finally, Greek city-states were what today would be termed hyper-nationalist, which did not enable them to adapt to a changing distribution of power on the world stage. 110 Tacitus, The Annals: Book XI, trans. Alfred John Church and William Jackson Brodribb 2000, Massachusetts Institute of Technology No Date, 29 April 2008 . 111  Haarhoff 133. 112  Haarhoff 134. 113 David Johnston, Roman Law in Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999). 114  Justinian, The Digest of Roman Law: Theft, Rapine, Damage, and Insult, ed. trans. C.F. Kolbert (New York: Penguin Classics, 1979).

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Isolationism is, therefore, a concept that has manifested itself throughout history. In addition to the extreme case of Sparta in ancient Greece, we find more recent cases where isolationism has been a way of life for autonomous political units. Japan, for example, enforced a foreign policy of Sakoku for two hundred years, which translates to “country in chains” or “lock-up of country.” Generally speaking, Sakoku dictated that no Japanese persons could leave the country and no foreigner could enter the country under penalty of death.115 In addition, the Tokugawa shogunate created strict regulations that applied to commerce and foreign relations. Under these rules, the only trade partners that the Japanese were allowed to have were the Joseon Dynasty (Korea), the Dutch East India Company, and private Chinese traders.116 This policy came to an end in 1854, when the US forced Japan to open up its economy to free trade under the pressure of what became known as “gunboat diplomacy.” In his discussion of isolationism in the US during the 1930s and early 1940s, John C. Chalberg subjects Japan and the US to a comparative analysis, noting that a comparison of these two nations between 1630-1845 points to different strains of isolationism. While Japan, under the Tokugawa shogunate, “expelled or killed shipwrecked sailors and others who landed by accident on its shores,”117 the US was a nation that welcomed and incorporated immigrants. The Japanese vehemently prohibited foreign religions and its representatives; for example, Spanish and Portuguese missionaries, as well as foreign cultural influences, where prevented from infiltrating the country, while the US had no such comparable policy – in fact, the US was founded on freedom of religion. While Japan had reduced trade to three partners, the US aggressively sought to establish trade relations throughout the world. Interestingly, it was the US that forced Japan to enter into a trade agreement at the Convention of Kanagawa on March 31, 1854. The US was therefore neither culturally nor economically isolationist.118 Moreover, US isolationist policy was primarily focused on the US relationship with Europe while actively engaging Latin America. Furthermore, US foreign policy has fluctuated between isolationists, “who in the grand tradition of George Washington and the Founding Fathers eschew entangling relationships, and internationalists, who advocate cooperation and see security relationships as effective instruments for controlling the behavior of partners.”119 US foreign policy is a mixed strategy that blends isolationism and internationalism creating a utilitarian approach to foreign

115  Marius B. Jansen, The Making of Modern Japan (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000) 79. 116 Toby, State and Diplomacy. 117  John C. Chalberg, Ed. Isolationism: Opposing Views (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 1995) 15. 118  Chalberg 15. 119  Fraser Cameron, US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff? 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2005) 183.

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Isolationist States in an Interdependent World

affairs.120 This strategy promotes and consolidates “a new global political and economic order congenial to American state interests.”121 Yet, the US is described as pursuing an isolationist foreign policy agenda in the pre and post-WWI period; however, one can argue that the US had actually pursued a non-entanglement foreign policy since George Washington’s presidential administration. In his 1796 farewell speech, Washington advised Americans to “steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world.”122 Washington went on to assert that the “great rule for us, in regards to foreign nations, is in extending our commercial relations to have with them as little political connections as possible.”123 This policy was further reiterated from 1797-1917, especially with the establishment and implementation of the Monroe Doctrine. In December 1823, while warning Europe that the Western Hemisphere was now within the exclusive purview of a US sphere of influence, US President Monroe declared that, “our policy with regards to Europe, which has adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers.”124 Although throughout its early development the US did pursue an isolationist foreign policy, the term itself was first used in a political sense in 1922. Writing about what he called America’s negative attitude toward international cooperation, Edward Price Bell, a correspondent for the Chicago Daily News, observed that the country was gradually moving “from isolation into partnership [and that] her isolationism, such as it was, discovered that the strain of a [German] formidable advance against freedom was more than it could bear.”125 In the 1930s and 1940s, the term isolationism was utilized to describe American foreign policy of non-involvement in world (European) affairs. According to Wayne Cole, the term “isolationist” was used in the context of American politics to describe the opponents of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s foreign policies before the attack on Pearl Harbor.126 He also contends that isolationism as applied to the US during this period is unsatisfactory on two counts: first, isolationism does not accurately describe US policy and, second, since this is the case isolationism does not allow for 120 See Cameron 184. 121 Stephen Gill, Power & Resistance in the New World Order (New York: PalgraveMacMillan, 2003) 69. 122  James D. Richardson, ed., Compilation of Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol.1 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1907) 213. 123 Gleaves Whitney, ed., American Presidents: Farewell to the Nation 1796-2001 (Lanham: Lexton Books, 2003) 24. 124  InfoUSA, “President Monroe’s Seventh Annual Message to Congress, December 2, 1823,” InfoUSA No Date, 6 December 2007 . 125 Edward Price Bell, “America and Peace,” Nineteenth Century, November 1922. 126  Wayne S. Cole, “American Entry into World War II: A Historical Appraisal,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 43.4 (1957): 595-617.

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a clear analysis of pre-Pearl Harbor American politics.127 Indeed, the “isolationists” active in US politics never actually favored opting-out of the states system; in fact, they accepted the possibility of US territorial, commercial, financial, ideological and/or military expansionism.128 Cole’s account is contradicted by William A. Williams, who contends that those who opposed the League of Nations first used the term isolationism properly in the 1920’s.129 Historian Leroy N. Reiselbach describes American isolationism as a narrow perspective that advocated the avoidance of alliances. For Reiselbach, American isolationism is an “attitude of opposition to binding commitments by the United States government that would create new, or expand existing, obligations to foreign nations.”130 Walter LaFeber contends that isolationism pertaining to the US did not entail full “withdrawal from world affairs ([since] a people does not conquer a continent and become the world’s greatest power by withdrawal or by assuming it enjoys ‘free security’), but [by] maintaining a maximum amount of freedom of action. Americans who have professed to believe in individualism at home not surprisingly have often professed the same abroad.”131 Although, there is no definitive scholarly consensus as to when isolationism was “officially” implemented and what an isolationist state of affairs signifies, it is clear that the dissuasion of foreign entanglements was a key component of US foreign policy throughout its early development. This form of foreign policy was, for the most part, successful throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries; however, the US was not able to avoid participation in the major world wars. 132 Although US President Woodrow Wilson had won the 1916 presidential election with the slogan, “He kept us out of war,” he subsequently involved the US in the world war raging in Europe. US President Wilson faced a dilemma between supporting a long time ally and a democracy, that is, the UK, and breaking with isolationist policy or having a potentially overpowering military regime, that is, Germany, become the new “master” of Europe. In the end, the US joined the Allied powers

127  William A. Williams, “The Legend of Isolationism in the 1920’s,” Science and Society 18 (1954): 1-20. 128  For further discussion of Cole’s views on isolationism see: Cole, America First; Wayne S. Cole, Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932-1945 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983); Wayne S. Cole, Senator Gerald P. Nye and American Foreign Relations (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962). 129  Williams 1-20. 130 Leroy N. Reiselbach, The Roots of Isolationism: Congressional Voting and Presidential Leadership in Foreign Policy (Advanced Studies in Political Science) (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966). 131  Walter LaFeber, The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad, Vol. 2: Since 1896, 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1994). 132 Samuel Flagg Bemis, Guide to the Diplomatic History of the United States, 1775 - 1921 (Library of Congress: United States Government Printing Office, 1963).

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against Germany in WWI. It was at this point in history where the great debate between internationalists and isolationists became vivid.133 President Wilson tried to “make up” for involving the US in Europe’s affairs by touting a new world order that would be governed by a universal international law. Wilson’s “League of Nations” premised on US world leadership would “make the world safe for democracy.”134 Suspicion of foreign entanglements coupled with the Great Depression resulted in the eventual failure of Wilson’s vision, and an isolationist posture was once again assumed by the US. In Isolationism in America, Manfred Jonas notes that this sentiment “transcended socioeconomic divisions and was supported by Americans of widely divergent status.”135 These isolationist attitudes were further crystallized through the new restriction on immigration and increased tariffs. The 1917 immigration law ruled that immigrants must be able to read English and banned immigrants from China and Japan from entering the US on a permanent basis. In the 1921 Emergency Quota Act, the number of immigrants allowed from eastern and southern Europe was reduced to a maximum of 357,000, permitting each country to send 3 percent of immigrants already in America in 1910. These quotas were further reduced in 1924 in the Reed-Johnson Act. This law allowed for a maximum of 154,000 immigrants from eastern and southern Europe, allowing each country to send 2 percent of immigrants already present in the US from 1890.136 During the same time-period the Fordney-McCumber Act (1922) was passed, which raised tariffs on average to 40 percent, creating a new record for American economic protectionism.137 Franklin Delano Roosevelt himself “expressed isolationist attitudes during the mid-1930s, as did most [US] senators and congressmen.”138 According to Manfred Jonas, isolationism between 19351941 was not necessarily a political philosophy, but it had considerable weight in the articulation of US foreign policy.139 According to Fensterwald, by adhering to isolationism the US was bringing itself to the “brink of disaster.”140 Although Roosevelt had provided American aid to the Allies prior to the December 7, 1941, 133  John Milton Cooper, Breaking the Heart of the World: Woodrow Wilson and the Fight for the League of Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 134  Walter Russell Mead, Scott Erwin, and Eitan Goldstein, “The United States Inextricably Linked with Nations Across the Globe,” E-journal USA No Date, 6 December 2007 135  Manfred Jonas, Isolationism in America 1935-1941 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966). 136  Helen F. Eckerson, ”Immigration and National Origins,” Annals of the American Academy of Politics and Social Science 367 (1966): 4-14. 137 US Department of State, “Protectionism in the Interwar Period,” US Department of State No date, 29 April 2008 . 138 George Moss, America in the Twentieth Century, 4th ed. (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2000). 139  Jonas viii. 140  Bernard Fensterwal, Jr., “The anatomy of American “Isolationism” and Expansionism. Part I,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 2.2 (1958): 111-139.

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the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor marked America’s permanent abandonment of its isolationist course, thus ending a long political and ideological struggle among domestic elements in the US.141 In addition to the US case study, there is another instant where “non-entanglement foreign policy” has been addressed within the literature. Swiss neutrality is another example of a state choosing to opt-out of foreign entanglements. The Swiss case, as in the case of the US, represents a specific manifestation of a low degree of isolationism in foreign policy. These cases are exemplary of how a state may use and implement isolationist principles without necessarily incorporating the totality of an isolationist posture, as is the case in communist Albania, North Korea, and Burma. According to Gordon Sherman, “Swiss neutrality is an [historical and] essential element of the country’s governmental existence, and it is intended by the nature and sanctions of its origins to be as permanent as the nation itself.”142 The definition and implementation of present day Swiss neutrality or non-engagement can be traced both in domestic law (constitutions and policies) and international law (treaties, diplomatic agreements, and protocols). The establishment of such rules have allowed for the concept and practice of permanent Swiss neutrality to take root and become constitutive of the Swiss state. The earliest documentation that lays the basis for Swiss neutrality is the November 12, 1516 Permanent Peace Treaty with France. In this treaty, Switzerland was for the first time recognized as a federation that would not take part in any belligerent military activities. This principle was further reinforced in the Peace of Westphalia. In this agreement, Switzerland established that it would not allow foreign armies to transit its strategic territory, thereby firmly entrenching its neutrality. The principle of Swiss neutrality was further clarified in the March 18, 1668 Defensional document. This document, which can be compared to a modern constitutional document, allowed for Swiss armed neutrality (Wehrverfassung).143 German-speaking groups within the Swiss federation, in conjunction with pre-existing alliances, vowed to gather forces for “territorial protection.”144 The continuous threats by the French and the Habsburg Empire provided the impetus to develop a fundamentally neutral state, which guaranteed freedom and independence within Swiss borders. In retrospect, Swiss neutrality emerged as a historical, geographical, political, military, and economic necessity.145 Having a landlocked territory, Switzerland understood “the need of assured protection from outside aggression” if it were to remain a viable state. 146 On May 30, 1814, the Treaty of Paris enabled Switzerland to obtain internationally recognized neutrality 141  Jonas 2. 142 Gordon E. Sherman, “The Neutrality of Switzerland,” The American Journal of International Law 12. 2 (1918): 241-250. 143 Sherman 242. 144 Sherman 241-250. 145 Sherman 241-250. 146 Sherman 243.

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as the basis for the Swiss state. These principles were further reaffirmed on March 20, 1815, during the Congress of Vienna, where Swiss “perpetual neutrality” was recognized and guaranteed under the auspices of international law. The Swiss Assembly of Zurich (May 27, 1815) as well as the Vienna Congress Act (June 9, 1815) confirmed that the principle of permanent Swiss neutrality “received the approval and guarantee from the [Great] Powers,” thus giving Switzerland its unique international standing.147 The policy of neutrality is so important to Switzerland that only after an intense domestic debate and a national referendum did the country join the United Nations on September 10, 2002.148 In light of the historical and present American and Swiss foreign policies of non-engagement, it is interesting to note that the isolationist postures of North Korea, Burma, and communist Albania are very different in content and significance vis-à-vis the states system. As will be discussed in the following chapters, there are differences between the US and Swiss cases and the isolationist states of North Korea, Burma, and communist Albania. First, isolationist strategy in the cases of the US and the Swiss state has specifically involved a policy of foreign non-entanglement exclusively for the purpose of keeping the US and Switzerland from becoming involved in other nations’ conflicts. Unlike the case studies in question, isolationism did not encapsulate a form of political order, nor did it entail a philosophy of the ideal social, political, cultural, and economic life of the polity. Second, US and Swiss isolationist strategy did not entail cultural, economic, nor political separation from the rest of the world community. In the case studies under examination, isolationism on these particular levels is a primary aim of the state. Third, the US (Switzerland is truly in its own category when it comes to territory) was not opposed to territorial expansion (for example, in North and South America and the Pacific). North Korea, Burma, and Albania, on the other hand have not pursued expansionist policies beyond their perceived borders, and do not seek to extend their territory nor formally export their social, cultural, economic, and political perspectives abroad. In the case of North Korea, unification of the peninsula and expulsion of the US from the south is part of an eternal struggle to unite an “unnaturally” divided motherland as opposed to the pursuit of imperialistic polices. Classical American isolationist thought viewed the US “advantageously locate[ed] far from potential enemies, thus safe from direct attack,” while Switzerland guaranteed its territorial sovereignty through numerous international treaties based on Swiss neutrality, that is, selective nonengagement.149 The case studies in question utilize isolationism for the purpose of protecting themselves from perceived negative effects that contacts with foreigners

147 Sherman 248. 148 United Nations, “Switzerland Becomes the 190th State to Join the United Nations,” United Nations 10 September 2002, 16 June 2008 < http://www.un.org/av/photo/ unhq/switzerland.htm>. 149  Chalberg 18.

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can have on their societies; thus, the Platonic notion of isolationism informs the political posture of the case studies. Degrees and Manifestations of Isolationism Although the term isolationism has been primarily used to describe a specific period of US foreign policy, this definition does not apply the cases of North Korea, Burma, and communist Albania. American isolationism is far from being an unadulterated form of isolationism as used in the Platonic sense. At the high point of US isolationism in the 1930s, the US was far from being politically, geographically or economically isolated in the same sense that Japan had been for centuries. In addition, the US never practiced any type of cultural isolationism as is apparent in North Korea, Burma, and communist Albania. American isolationism, contrary to the three cases’ comprehensive isolationist practice, is myopically focused on and defined in terms of security concerns. Indeed this form of foreign policy can be compared to Britain’s 19th century “splendid isolation,” wherein Britain grew wary of European entanglements, positioning itself as the great power balancer while maintaining its economic viability.150 This form of foreign policy is consistent with economically integrated, politically liberal great powers that are suspicious of foreign entanglements. With the exception of American and Swiss isolationist foreign policy, the literature as it pertains to the states system does not explicitly examine and expound upon the notion of isolationism as a distinct form of state foreign and domestic policy. In these approaches, the notion of isolationism as a foreign policy practice to “protect” the state from foreign “contamination” (in the Platonic sense), and preserve a monopoly of domestic power wielded by a particular ruling individual, elite, and/or regime within a state is not explicitly articulated. This study, therefore, illuminates a largely unexplored area of international relations. The table below presents a general matrix of isolationism that highlights the various characteristics of isolationism. As a starting point for analysis, it is interesting to note that isolationism is a practice that has been implemented by both authoritarian regimes and liberal democracies in their domestic and international affairs. Although each type of political unit has practiced isolationism, the manifestations and the long/shortterm consequences have greatly varied. As noted above, there is a fundamental difference between isolationism in a liberal democracy and in an authoritarian regime. In authoritarian regimes, authority is highly centralized, thus leaving the decision-making process in the hands a few key players. In an authoritarian state, the regime is identified with a specific leadership; thus, Kim Il Sung and Kim Kong Il are the state in North Korea; Enver Hoxha was the state in communist 150 Gaynor Johnson, The Foreign Office and British Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, (New York: Routledge, 2005).

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Table 2.1

Authoritarian Rule

Liberal Democracy

Isolationist States in an Interdependent World

Types and Characteristics of Isolationism International Isolationism

Domestic Isolationism

(1)

(2)

-Disengagement with the world community -No foreign alliances -No foreign entanglements -No foreign economic commitments -Limited international agreements -Economically self-reliant -Politically self-reliant -Militarily self-reliant -Severe limitation of trade

-Severe limitation of travel abroad and within the country -Severe limitation of visiting foreigners -Propaganda limited within perceived borders -Cultural protectionism -Social protectionism -Economic protectionism

(3)

(4)

-Avoid alliances -Avoid foreign entanglements -Avoid international commitment -Avoid entering treaties -Avoid participation in IGOs

-Economic Protectionism

Albania; and Ne Win personified the Burmese state. In order to maintain power, authoritarian regimes create and/or identify a distinct, omnipresent enemy that threatens the very fabric of the society and the state, which, in turn, are embodied in the leadership. This practice involves premising state security, that is, domestic and foreign, on a paranoiac state of siege mentality, wherein mortal threats and enemies lie in any and every possible context, for example, foreign culture, politics, trade, and diplomacy are viewed a possible forms of malignant agitation and infiltration. By articulating an isolationist position, there is a basis for a sense of unity: an “us versus them” mentality can be used to buttress the leadership, society, and the state against the forces that threaten the establishment and perpetuation of an idealistic social arrangement. Propaganda is utilized – be it liberty from the imperialists, racial or cultural superiority, xenophobia, or ethnocentrism – to lend legitimacy and authenticity to the state’s cause, and to consolidate a cadre of “true

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believers.” These regimes identify themselves as being supreme, pure, and/or just, while referring to foreigners as the “evil other.” The stronger the line of division between the two groups (citizen/foreigner) the stronger the regime will be, and the more repressive and oppressive measures of security will be rationalized and justified, as well as the societal incentive for domestic/foreign isolationism to sustain the status quo. The theme of contamination, of sullying the unique and limpid qualities and principles that constitute an ideal sociopolitical identity, runs deep in the definition and implementation of isolationist polices in the cases under examination. In order for an isolationist regime to secure absolute power over a polity, it will utilize extreme measures; for example, the regime may incarcerate, torture and/or kill all those suspected of having contacts with the miasmic “pollutants” of the outside world. Any type of contact with foreigners is indicative of disingenuous citizens who could possibly sympathize with or hold different views (political, social, cultural, economic) from the official state line, which represents an objective and ultimate expression of morality, reality. The state will therefore go to extreme lengths and do anything necessary to restrict access to outside information while concomitantly retaining detailed information about its citizens, from political convictions down to minute details of their mundane and personal lives. Indeed, it is quite common in such regimes to blackmail individuals in order to gather information; no one is excluded from the list of informants and from the list of those under surveillance or being informed on. Such practices are based in a climate of paranoia, fear, and ubiquitous threat, all of which work effectively to impose silence on the masses and ensure their conformity to the dictates of the state. Having briefly described the type of political and social “ambiance” and characteristics of an authoritarian regime, the question then becomes, what distinguishes isolationism in a liberal democracy from isolationism in an authoritarian regime? If there are distinguishing characteristics, what are they? The following table summarizes some general and salient motives that drive isolationism within a liberal democracy and within an authoritarian regime. In the case of liberal democracies, there are three major goals that underlie an isolationist policy. First, liberal democracies isolate internationally for the purpose, among others, of maintaining peaceful relationships with other members of the world community; hence, the emphasis on not becoming involved in foreign entanglements. Second, avoiding alliances and international commitments frees such states from being accountable and being drawn into what are deemed “unnecessary” conflicts. Finally, domestic isolationism, in the case of liberal democracies, translates into economic protectionism, which enables the state to be

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Table 2.2 Motivation Individual Self-Interest

Group/StateInterest

Isolationist States in an Interdependent World

Motivation for Domestic and International Isolationism Liberal Democracy

Authoritarian Regime

-Please the public opinion and win the next election

-Undisputed power

-Avoid unnecessary conflict -Avoid foreign political pressures -Avoid foreign economic pressures

-Avoid unnecessary conflict -Avoid foreign political pressures -Avoid foreign economic pressure -Avoid information flow that could lead to mass unrest -Protect national integrity and unity -Protect language, religion, culture -Protect ideology/cause

economically independent so as to develop its domestic industry, agriculture, and technology free from foreign dependence to the extent that it is possible. In the case of authoritarian regimes, domestic and foreign isolationism has additional purposes. First, an isolationist posture permits the state to have free reign within the confines of its territory. The state is not constrained by international law, conventions, human rights, environmental regulations, and trade practices. For example, international law pertaining to the rights of children explicitly prohibits capital punishment for minors, yet in communist Albania children as young as eleven could be executed for treason.151 Authoritarian regimes flagrantly violate or explicitly disregard internationally established norms. Secluding and protecting the population from any exposure to world public opinion through severe limitation of communication allows for a relatively “peaceful” implementation of draconian measures of control (physical and psychological). Second, being economically and militarily self-reliant allows authoritarian states to exert better control of the country and the people. Not only do such states become free of foreign entanglements, pressures, and possibly unnecessary conflicts, but isolationism also provides a justification for authoritarian states to mobilize for “defense” against any type of intrusion or foreign influence deemed deleterious to the wellbeing of the polity. What liberal democracies might consider aggression (WMD proliferation), authoritarian states (for example, North Korea) view as necessary for discouraging foreign aggression and preserving the integrity of the state and society. Although domestic isolationism in either a liberal democracy or an authoritarian regime is at the discretion of the state, isolation can also be imposed from the outside. In the case of communist Albania, international and domestic isolationism was a purely internal decision; however, in states like Libya and Cuba international 151 US Library of Congress, “Country Study: Albania,” US Library of Congress April 1992, 15 March 2008, .

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isolation is enforced by the US for political purposes. The US has justified isolating these states in the interests of promoting a global agenda of political and economic liberalization. In addition to the US isolating states for political purposes, if the world community views particular human rights violations, state sponsored terrorism, or any other type of state behavior as unacceptable, it will then impose sanctions and prohibit a state from participating in the world community (socially, economically, militarily) by way of international institutions such as the UN. In addition, domestic and international isolationism does not have to occur simultaneously. A state, for instance, can opt for only one kind of isolationism. For example, Saudi Arabia opts for domestic isolationism while being an active participant in the world community both politically and economically. Switzerland, with its bona fide neutral status, chooses to be politically obscure in the world arena while at the same time is an active member of the world financial community. In most authoritarian regimes, however, domestic and international isolationism go hand in hand because each complements the other, serving the purposes of the political elites, that is, to maintain absolute power. In actuality, comprehensive domestic and international isolationism is damaging for a state and the leadership in any long-term calculations of self-interest and vitality because such policy is not sustainable. Complete isolationism, as manifested in authoritarian regimes, has led to mass poverty, overall and acute harm to the state’s political, social, and economic infrastructure, and the eventual demise of the authoritarian regime in power. In the next three chapters, isolationism as manifested in communist Albania, North Korea, and Burma will be analyzed in-depth. These three states have come the closet to emulating and putting into practice the Platonic notion of “pure isolationism.” To better understand and clarify the perceived interests of a state in pursuing both foreign and domestic isolationism, as well as the consequences that devolve from doing so, chapters 3, 4, and 5 will analyze select histories of the states in question to understand the sociopolitical relationship between isolationism and state behavior, motives, interests, and perceptions of legitimacy and justification.

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Chapter 3

Legitimacy of the State in Isolationist Regimes Introduction When considering the viability and legitimacy of isolationist states, it is interesting to note the degree to which such states are able to efficiently implement an isolationist policy and posture in an interactive and interdependent states system. Indeed, isolationist states have been able to obtain significant levels of domestic and international disconnection from international mechanisms (for example, institutions and treaties) that link the world community. In light of this seemingly anachronistic phenomenon, this chapter documents and analyzes how isolationism has manifested itself within the case studies in question. In particular, this chapter will focus on how political struggles for independence and recognition played a key role in the articulation of an isolationist posture. As will be discussed, all three of the states under examination were able to provide a justification for isolationism through the utilization of history. Hyper-nationalism, indigenous struggles for independence, and self-determination were skillfully used to provide a basis of legitimacy for isolationist regimes. Indeed, an historic tradition of resistance against outside interference, combined with antipathy or hostility toward foreigners and a profound regard for a particular culture, language, values, customs, and religion, has enabled isolationist regimes to obtain, secure, and perpetuate power. It is exactly this kind of technique, that is, co-opting nationalistic sentiment and loyalty to the idea of a people struggling to free themselves of foreign control, that allowed the three states in question, Albania, North Korea, and Burma, to establish and approximate idealistic forms of isolationism. In order to explain how they were able to withdraw from the international system of states, it is necessary to discuss the notion of legitimacy and its relationship to state viability, efficacy, stability, and longevity. Regardless of how the regimes under discussion came to power, whether power was seized through revolution or a coup d’état, each was compelled to make a serious attempt to legitimize their authority. Indeed, legitimacy assumes an immeasurable role in the ability of states to selectively segregate themselves from the world community. Legitimacy in a political sense implies that a political regime functions and perpetuates itself via subjective and objective components. Because legitimacy is complex and multidimensional, it functions as a subjective political category as well as an objective standard of measurement of political efficacy. In order to authoritatively articulate and implement an isolationist regime, the leadership

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must simultaneously create and appeal to abstract principles while providing some degree of tangible benefits. At its core, political legitimacy can be understood as mass moral approval of a regime combined with mass acceptance or resignation to the status quo as embodied in the leadership. In order for a regime to be “legitimate,” it must on some basic level be accepted or recognized as having the moral right to govern. Legitimacy, to a significant degree, depends on the people’s belief that the state has an ethical as well as material prerogative to be obeyed. Overall, legitimacy involves the ability of a regime to present, persuade, and sustain the belief that it not only possesses a moral or principled basis for rule, but that it is the only and best choice for society. “In the long run, government systems are not held together by the pressure of force, but rather by the belief on the quality and truthfulness with which they represent and promote the interests of the people.” Thus, legitimacy is able to sustain the institutional basis of the regime’s power and capacity to rule. Isolationist states use knowledge and common values to justify the existing social order and institutions. In order to understand the process of creating an isolationist state, its quest for power, and ultimately its ability to maintain control, one must pay special attention to the circumstances of regime’s creation. Specifically, the social, economic, and political conditions that precede and define a regime’s seizure of power, and the changes present in the ideological and political climate, contribute to our understanding of initial and later stages of isolationism. Albania Like North Korea and Burma, Albania has a long tradition of fending off foreign powers that have subjugated and occupied the country. Albania’s peoples, throughout their history, have consistently fought for land, independence, and political self-determination. Albania, as well as North Korea and Burma, developed and premised political self-determination, independence, and autonomy on hypernationalist resistance to foreigners and foreign influences. Communist Albania equated nationalism, loyalty, and the ideal of a free Albania with the regime in power. All three regimes utilized ideology, that is, distinct interpretations of communism/socialism, in conjunction with an indispensable need for isolation of   Fatos Tarifa, “The Quest for Legitimacy and the Withering Away of Utopia,” Social Forces 76:2 (1997): 439.  See Seymour Lipset, “The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited,” American Sociological Review 59 (1994): 1-22; Seymour Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics: Expanded Edition (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Anthony Giddens, Sociology (Stafford: Polity Press, 1990).  Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1941) 388.

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the state in order to prohibit foreign influences from infecting indigenous culture, language, and the political system. Similar to the Kims in North Korea and Ne Win in Burma, Albania’s Enver Hoxha, the “first among equals” in Albania’s “classless” society, made extensive and intensive use of history and a people’s collective memory of a perpetual nationalist struggle against foreign aggression; for example, the 1976 Albanian Constitution incorporated historical angst and violence into the fabric of the state, proclaiming that “The Albanian People have hacked their way through history, sword in hand.” Albanians are the descendents of one of the most ancient civilizations in Europe, that is, the Illyrians. It is believed that for about a millennium their territory stretched from the Adriatic Sea and Sar Mountains (a mountain range that lies between today’s Albania and Macedonia) to the Danube, Sava, and Morava rivers. This civilization is believed to have had significant trade relations and cultural exchanges with Greeks, Macedonians, and Thracians, among others. Often times the Illyrians found themselves at war or in serious conflicts with their various neighbors, but were able to maintain control of their territory until the Emperor Tiberius of Rome finally defeated them in A.D. 9. Once under Roman occupation, Illyria was divided into three provinces, that is, Macedonia, Dalmatia, and Epirus. With the breakup of the Roman Empire, the Illyrian territory became a theatre of war for Rome and Constantinople, which resulted in the northern part of Albania being Catholic and the south being Orthodox. After the fall of the Byzantine Empire, the Illyrians were gradually eliminated and/or assimilated by the incoming Serbs, Croats, and Bulgars. Only a few Illyrian tribes (one of them the Arbër, hence the name “Albania”) were able to endure and maintain their distinct cultural identity, especially the distinct Indo-European language spoken by the Illyrian tribes, through sheer pertinacity, a close-knit tribal society, and the mountainous terrain that made it difficult for foreigners to wholly subjugate them. Albania came under Ottoman control during the 14th century, remaining occupied for five subsequent centuries. For the next five hundred years, the Albanian peoples periodically fought the Ottomans, Greeks, and Serbs. The   Qëndra e Publikimeve Zyrtare, Kushtetuta e Republikës Popullore Socialiste të Shqipërisë 1976, No Date, 15 March 2008 .  Edwin E. Jacques, The Albanians; An Ethnic History from Prehistoric Times to the Present (Jefferson: McFarland Publishers, 1995); Frassari Adamidi, Les Pélasges et leurs Descendants les Albanais (Cairo: Imprimerie National, 1903); Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans, Vol. I: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, The Joint Committee on Eastern Europe Publication Series 12 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).   John Bagnell Bury, A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander the Great (London: Macmillan, 1956).  Kristo Frasheri, The History of Albania (Tiranë: Naim Frasheri, 1964).   Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Country Profile: Albania,” Foreign and Commonwealth Office 28 February 2008, 7 May 2008 ; Laonicus

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Ottoman occupation, combined with the compulsory conversion of Christians to Islam further divided Albanians, sowing seeds for future political, social, and religious issues that would appear later on in Albania’s history. While there was of course some degree of influence in Albanian affairs, Islam as a movement did not take deep roots in Albanian society. For example, as late as the 19th century, parents in central Albania continued to give boys both Muslim and Christian names, one for public use and the other for private use. In addition, many forced changes in Albanian society were also rejected. Most conspicuously, the Albanian people, despite 500 years of Ottoman domination, retained their indigenous language and culture. Although the remnants of the various Illyrian tribes resisted foreign occupation and aggression, the period termed the Albanian National Renaissance (Rilindja Kombëtare), spanning from 1878-1912, marks a clear break with what had been small-scale and inadequately organized resistances against foreign occupation. It was the first time since the rule of Skanderbeg (1444-1468) that Albanians had organized into a unified force to combat the foreign presence on Albanian soil.10 The National Renaissance began after the Ottoman Empire suffered a decisive loss during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878.11 After this defeat, the only Balkan territories that remained under Ottoman rule were the Albanian populated territories and Macedonia. With the defeat of the Turks, it became obvious to the Albanian peoples that with the downfall of Ottoman power and influence, Albanian territory would be divided among the states/peoples of Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece.12 As the Ottoman Empire steadily declined, the Albanian effort to repel foreigners from the homeland became infused with fervent nationalism. The various tribes conspired to work together, united by ties of selfinterest under-girded by a very strong sense of nationalism, organized themselves, politically and militarily. The post-war Treaty of San Stefano, signed on March 3, 1878 between the Ottoman Empire and Russia, proved the Albanian’s suspicions. Indeed, Albanian territory was to have been divided among other Balkan states, such as Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria.13 The United Kingdom (UK) and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, however, blocked the Treaty of San Stefano due to the fact that it provided Russia with a substantial presence in the Balkans, thus tipping (Nicola) Chalcondyles, L’Histoire de la Décadence de l’Empire et établissement de celui des Turcs, translated from Greek by Blaise de Vigenère (Paris: Augustin Courbe, 1662).  The Academy of Sciences of the People’s Socialist Republic of Albania, The Albanians and Their Territories (Tirana: “8 Nëntori,” 1985). 10 Noel Malcom, Kosovo: A Short History (New York: New York University Press, 1998). 11 Ramadan Marmullaku. Albania and the Albanians (Hamden: Archon Books, 1975). 12  Joseph Swire, Albania: The Rise of a Kingdom (New York: Arno Press & The New York Times, 1971). 13  “Treaty of San Stefano,” University of Oregon No Date, 15 March 2008 .

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the balance of power in the region. The Treaty also triggered profound anxiety among the Albanians, whose interests played little if any role in the calculations of the Great Powers, and emphasized the need for a culturally and geo-politically consolidated Albania. Local leaders began to organize to protect their lands and their nation. In the spring of 1878, the intellectual Albanian diaspora in Constantinople created a secret committee to organize Albanian resistance. In May of that year a general meeting for all leaders across the Albanian lands was called for. Accordingly, on June 10, 1878 clan chiefs, religious leaders, and other influential people came from all four Ottoman vilayets (Kosovo, Scutari, Janjevo, and Bitola) and Montenegro.14 There were two factors that dictated the outcome of this meeting. First, religious leaders, who sought to maintain solidarity in a Muslim front, were not opposed to Ottoman suzerainty. Second, the more progressive faction of the delegates and their leading figure, Abdul Frashri, demanded full autonomy of “Greater Albania.” Given that religious leaders made up the majority of the delegation, it was decreed that Albania remain under Ottoman control, and that no implementation of the Treaty of San Stefano be allowed to take place. In this meeting, the League of Prizren was created. The League was very important because it was the first Albanian organization that had the power to impose taxes and raise an army.15 In July 1878, the central committee of the League of Prizren sent a memorandum to the Congress of Berlin, requesting that all Albanian territories be unified and remain autonomous under Ottoman rule. The Congress ignored the League’s request, and Otto von Bismark has been quoted as decreeing that an Albanian nation simply did not and could not exist.16 As had been the case on numerous other occasions, the Great Powers drew legal, social, and geo-political borders to please the members of the Congress with no regard for the history, cultures, and peoples on the land. The Congress decided to give Montenegro the territories of Bar, Podgorica, Gusinje and Plav, which at the time were all areas heavily populated with Albanian peoples. Kosovo was given to Serbia, and the League of Prizren feared that Epirus would be given to Greece.17 These territorial loses were vehemently opposed by all Albanians, who took arms to defend their territory. In Plav, Gusinje, Ulqin (today part of Montenegro), Shkoder (today part of Albania), Prizren (today part of Kosovo), Prevese, and Janine (today part of Greece), the

14 Stavro Skendi, Albanian National Awakening 1878-1912 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967). 15 Stavro Skendi, “Beginnings of Albanian Nationalist and Autonomous Trends: The Albanian League, 1878-1881,” American Slavic and East European Review 12.2 (1953): 219-232. 16 Swire 3. 17 Erich Eyck, Bismarck and German Empire (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., New York, 1964).

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fighting was so intense that people described the borders as “floating in blood.”18 The conflict drew attention to the nation of Albania and made it clear that they would fight for their land. Under pressure from the Great Powers, the Ottoman Empire crushed the League of Prizren. However, in the three years it operated it was able to reduce the amount of Albanian territory that Montenegro and Greece received.19 In this intense fight for national survival, the Albanians realized that they needed to have an independent state that would provide central authority and security of borders and its citizens. Although the Albanians had been territorially (four vilayets) and religiously (Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholics, Sunni Muslims, Bektashi Shias Muslims and others) divided for five centuries, they had remained united through language and culture. The National Renaissance leaders made it clear that this would be a purely secularist movement, and they would create a written alphabet for their language, based in Latin scripts.20 One of the Renaissance poets of the time, Pashko Vasa writes, “do not look into churches and mosques, for the Albanian religion is Albanianism!”21 The Greeks and the Turks were so vehemently opposed to this movement that they supposedly told their people that God would not understand their prayers if they prayed in the Albanian language.22 After the Young Turks rose to power in April 1909, they denied the existence of an Albanian nation, closed down schools, disarmed regions, appealed to Muslim unity instead of nationalistic Albanian unity, and tried to impose the Arabic alphabet.23 These new “reforms” outraged the Albanian populations throughout the four vilayets, and initiated yet another revolt. Albanians were finally able to break away from the Ottoman Empire in November of 1912. The Great Powers decided to recognize an Albanian state, partly because they feared that all territory, including the port of Durres, annexed by Montenegro would eventually become a Russian access point to the Adriatic.24 However, Albania as recognized by the Great Powers after its independence in November 28, 1912, was severely truncated. Almost half of the nation was left outside the recognized borders, thus creating a deep and resilient resentment and hostility toward foreigners. In addition to military force and education, the National Renaissance utilized art and literature as a means to preserve and foment Albanian identity.25 The 18 US Library of Congress, “Country Study: Albania,” US Library of Congress April 1992, 15 March 2008 . 19 Skendi, “Beginnings of Albanian Nationalist and Autonomous Trends” 219-232. 20 Petro Nini Luarasi, Mallkimi I Shronjave Shqipe dhe çperfolja e Shqipëtarit (Manastir: Shtypshkronja Tregëtare Ndërkombëtare, 1911). 21 Pashko Vasa, “O Moj Shqypni,” Fajtori 2003, 15 March 2008 . 22 Luarasi, Mallkimi. 23 Luarasi 24-16; Jacques, The Albanians. 24 Swire, Albania. 25 Sami Frashri, Shqipëria, ç’ka Qënë, ç’është, e ç’do të Bëhet? 3rd ed. (1899; Bukuresht: Shoqëria Dituria; Tirana: Kristo Luarasi, 1924); Gjergj Fishta, The Highland

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main theme underlying the Renaissance was love for the country, romantically praising a “heroic” past, and the fight for national and social freedom. The historic circumstances that gave rise to Renaissance art and literature glorified uprisings against the Ottomans, the fight for independence, and advocated territorial integrity and steadfastness against foreigners. This emphasis on nationalism and the use of history to support a nationalistic agenda marked a new period in the development of Albanian literature, a fundamental change from a literature with religious overtones to a more artistic and nationalist literature that is the modern foundation of modern Albanian letters. Unfortunately, Enver Hoxha co-opted a very prominent theme and historical time in Albanian history where patriots fought for independence, unity, and progress, and used it to claim legitimacy for his reign based on idealism, hyper-nationalism, ideology, and isolationism as the basis for state policy. In a visit to Gjirokastra (Hoxha’s birthplace) he stated: Our country has treasures … the biggest treasuries are the people and the party. Our nation is eternal. It did not vanish in centuries and will not vanish in the coming centuries. Our people created a wonderful vitality, courage, bravery and firmness to resist nature’s transformations, to resist countless invasions, to create its culture, an ancient culture that shined in other neighboring cultures. This vitality of our nation became stronger as our nation remained united and attached to this land, to these mountains and these valleys. It did not lose its traditions, preserved its language and developed it; it preserved its culture and developed it. Our people could not be assimilated by the Roman culture, by the ancient Greeks, by the Ottomans, and the modern invasions. Then how did this nation make it through these agonies? It came out strong like Antaeus, in the Greek mythology, because he held his feet on the ground, on this land that he loved with all his heart. So it is our nation one of our biggest treasuries.26

Hoxa’s regime was able to use Albania’s history of a perpetual struggle for independence to such an extent that it was able to “legitimately” justify Communist Albania’s profound distrust of foreigners as a basis for state policy. The resentment of territorial loss was institutionalized and elaborated upon by the Hoxha regime. Hoxha shrewdly utilized Albania’s ancient and inexorable national struggle for independence, thus making the case that the nation-state would be much better off as self-sufficient and united against any and all outside forces.27 Hoxha utilized Albania’s extensive history of occupation, glorifying the struggle Lute (London: L.B. Tauris & Co., 2005); Fan Noli, Poezi të Zgjedhura (Tirana: Shtëpia Botuese Dituria, 1998); Naim Frashri, “Bagëti dhe Bujqësi,” Fajtori 2003, 15 March 2008 . 26 Radio Televizioni Shqipëtar “Enver Hoxha në Gjirokastër,” YouTube 6 November 2006, 7 May 2008 . 27 Peter R. Prifti, Socialist Albania Since 1944: Domestic and Foreign Developments (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978).

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for independence and national identity, and making each congruent with his regime and the establishment of a communist utopia. Hoxha’s regime stressed the need for a closed-political system based on ardent nationalism, unity, self-determination, and self-reliance. The timing of Hoxha’s rise on the national scene was important regarding the establishment of a paranoiac, xenophobic, isolationist state. The Albanian peoples had experienced five centuries of continuous Ottoman domination, and subsequent fascist rule. Albania also experienced centuries of strife fighting the Greeks in the south, the Serbs in the north, and by 1939, the Italian fascists in the west. During the five centuries of Ottoman rule, Albania had become a severely underdeveloped, illiterate, impoverished country. Hoxha’s regime benefited from the passionate and deep desire of Albanians to take their destiny in their own hands, without occupying powers exploiting them, dictating how Albanians would lead their lives, practice their culture, language, religion, and traditions. The Albanian peoples felt betrayed after King Leka Zog fled Albania before the Italian occupation (19391944).28 Albanians were, therefore, amenable to following someone who would demonstrate loyalty to the Albanian people, the country, and the nation. Because foreign invaders had made Albania a theatre of war for over two thousand years, Albanians were quite ready to accept a regime premised on anti-foreign sentiments steeped in aggressive repulsion of any foreign presence within their territory. The time when the Ottoman Empire had periodically and forcibly recruited young boys to be raised in military camps and used for the glory of the Empire were over. Throughout the Common Era, Albanians had to pay duties and taxes to the Romans, Ottomans, fascists, and wealthy landowners. Many generations had fought and died for a time when the motherland would be defined as autonomous, self-determined, and have borders that were internationally recognized. Albania’s freedom and independence, gained in 1944, in conjunction with the country’s long history of foreign occupation enabled Hoxha to exploit an opportunity for political supremacy premised on hyper-nationalism, security, stability, and isolationism. North Korea The case for isolationism has also found powerful and sustained expression on the North Korean state. Today’s North Korea is a product of both historic seclusion of the Koreans and the Korean War. North Korea is the descendent of the “Hermit Kingdom”29 and a bloody war that left much of the country devastated. Isolation and seclusion, in addition to foreign aggression and occupation, are significant features of the peninsula’s history; indeed, North Korea is the progeny of this 28  James Pettifer and Miranda Vickers, The Albanian Question: Reshaping the Balkans (London: L.B. Tauris & Co., 2007). 29 R.R. Krishnan, “Early History of U.S. Imperialism in Korea,” Social Scientist 12.1 (1984): 3-18.

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historical legacy rooted in colonization, exploitation, brutality, occupation, and perpetual warfare waged against foreign aggressors. Korean society, generally speaking, has been an inwardly-based society, an “isolated society for most of its history; its contacts with its East Asia neighbors were often restricted, and those with the rest of the world limited and sporadic.”30 What makes this case interesting is that both North and South Korea share the same history, yet the South31 has embraced globalization and the states system/society of states, while the North categorically rejects the ideology, politics, precepts and assumptions of globalization and a society of states. One part of the Korean peninsula (the South) has internalized the principles of private corporate power, procedural democracy, economic interdependence, interaction, and the like, while the other part of the peninsula (the North) despite the passage of nearly half a century, continues to premise the North Korean state and society on fervent hyper-nationalism and protectionist polices (social, economic, political). While South Korea has abandoned most of its isolationist past, present-day North Korea resembles its ancestor, the “Hermit Kingdom.” The Chosun Dynasty (1392-1910) was known as the “Hermit Kingdom” among the European explorers because of its strict isolationist policies. During the latter stage of its reign, the Chosun Dynasty displayed an intensely negative attitude to foreigners and external influences, and clearly “expressed its national self-sufficiency, [and] its achievement of virtual economic autarky.”32 After steadfastly refusing to open up Korea to trade with other countries, for example, the Chosun turned down several offers of trade with the Dutch and the British,33 it became the case that “no traveler thought that Korea was a commercial country.”34 Throughout the 17th century, European explorers, missionaries, and entrepreneurs had attempted to penetrate Korea unsuccessfully, until 1784, when the first missionaries finally settled the peninsula.35 Soon after, the first Catholic Church was established on the Korean peninsula. The Chosun Court decreed in 1785 a prohibition against the “wrong religion and wrong doctrine”36 on the peninsula. In light of developments taking place in China, 30  Michael J. Seth, A Concise History of Korea: From the Neolithic Period through the Nineteenth Century (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006) 4. 31 The June 2008 protests in Seoul against US beef demonstrates that even South Korea continues to maintain some resemblance of its isolationist past; for more information on South Korean demonstrations see British Broadcasting Corporation, “South Koreans Rally Against US Beef,” British Broadcasting Corporation 10 June 2008, 17 June 2008 . 32  Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2005) 88. 33 Gari Ledyard, The Dutch Come to Korea (Seoul: Royal Asiatic Society, 1971). 34  Cumings 80. 35  Walter B. Jung, Nation Building: the Geopolitical History of Korea (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 1998) 115. 36  Jung 115.

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the Chosun Court grew even more suspicious of foreign influence on the peninsula – the West in particular and its missionaries – and in 1839 prosecuted three French missionaries for corrupting Korean culture, values, and religion.37 The French responded by sending three warships to Korea, and demanded an explanation for the prosecution of its citizens. This was the first direct encounter with a Western power, and the Court decided to not respond to the French inquiry. Although this incident was later resolved without resorting to military force, the Chosun Court initiated a new wave of harsh persecutions against the Catholic Church, executing Korea’s first ordained priest, Father Kim Tae-gon (Andrew Kim).38 The Catholic Church, however, persisted in its efforts to infiltrate and transplant indigenous Korean culture and religion. It is believed that the numbers of Korean Catholics increased from 11,000 in 1850 to about 23,000 in 1865. By this time Taewongoon, the leader of the late Chosun period, took power in 1865, a time when the Catholic Church was at the height of its power and influence. Initially he displayed tolerance toward the Church, but soon after he “concluded that the Western doctrine was incompatible with the kingdom’s way of traditional way of life.”39 He developed a simple policy throughout his reign: “no treaties, no trade, no Catholics, no West, no Japan.”40 In 1866, a severe wave of anti-Catholic persecution commenced and lasted for about three years. During this period, the Catholic Church in Korea was successfully demolished; most major Korean Catholic figures, nine French missionaries, and approximately 8,000 converts were executed. Such a thorough demolition of the Catholic Church proved that Korea had no intention of allowing foreign influences to take root on the peninsula. France responded to this slaughter by sending seven warships to Korea. The Chosun Court rejected any compromise and insisted on a policy of non-engagement; Taewongoon’s foremost concern was to maintain Korea’s traditional policy and principle of seclusion, that is, “its isolation from [the] non-Chinese world at any cost.”41 Korea rejected all French requests including formal diplomatic relations between the two countries. The French expanded their offensive by blockading the Han River, thus cutting off civilian supplies to Seoul. The blockade, however, produced no results and hardened Korean resistance. The French then resorted to attacking Korea’s coastal areas with naval artillery. The decisive battle between the small but well equipped French forces and large but outdated Korean military took place on Kanghwa Island. It is here that Korea was able to defeat the French, thus putting an end to the first military crisis provoked by a Western

37 Key-Hiuk Kim, The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980). 38  Jung 118. 39  Jung 118. 40  Cumings 100. 41  Jung 119.

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power.42 Although the conflict can be classified as being of a minor scale and well contained, the consequences were profound. The Chosun Court became convinced that Christianity, an outside influence “infecting” the spirit of Korean identity and culture, was a direct consequence of French aggression and interference. Taewongoon ordered a renewed effort against the Catholics, and in the process became “extreme anti-Western.”43 He categorically rejected any and all relations with the West. Indeed, he believed that his victory over the seven French warships was proof that Korea could effectively resist the West. What became an iconic moment in Korea was a relatively insignificant incident for the French. Napoleon III at the time was involved with Prussian power politics and had little if any interest in Korea.44 Ironically, the seven ships were not ordered to engage Korean forces by Napoleon III; the warships were ordered to engage by the French minister stationed in China. For Korea, however, this incident would prove to be one of countless attempts by foreign powers to control, occupy, colonize, and/or subjugate the Korean people. After the Kanghwa episode, Taewongoon was eager to return Korea to complete seclusion. The Western powers, however, were not about to leave Korea to its own devices. In the case of Korea’s initial relations with the state that would become its modern arch-nemesis, that is, the US, the Chosun Court had no idea that the US had a “Perry Tradition,”45 or gunboat diplomacy, and that the US was about to engage in very similar conduct/relations with Korea as it had done with Japan. At the time, Taewongoon knew even less about America than he knew about Europe. On August 16, 1866 the American warship USS General Sherman entered Korea territorial waters, with the intention of meeting with Korean officials and “negotiating” a trade treaty. In accordance with their country’s policy of seclusion, the Korean authorities made repeated attempts to stop the ship. After a hostile confrontation, Korean troops burned the ship, killing the entire crew on board.46 It is believed that, at the time, the Chosun Dynasty did not understand the nature of the ship’s nationality and that the armed forces had acted in accordance with the laws decreeing that foreigners were not to set foot on Korean soil. Through its Chinese contacts, the US tried to find out what happened to its ship, but the Chosun Court gave a vague answer. Unsatisfied with the explanation, the US sent a naval squadron. Officially, the US Navy was there to inquire about the General Sherman, and unofficially the US was interested in signing a formal treaty with Korea to establish diplomatic relations to allow for the safe stay of shipwrecked 42  James B. Palais, Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975) 178. 43  Jung 121. 44 E. Ann Pottinger, Napoleon III and the German Crisis, 1865-1866 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968). 45  Jansen, Modern Japan 91. 46  James Scarth Gale, Korean Sketches (Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1898) 310311.

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American seamen in Korean waters. The US hoped that this would be the first step toward establishing a commercial relationship with Korea. The US forces were made up of five warships and entered Korean territorial waters on May 21, 1871.47 Similarly to the previous French expedition, the US demanded a peaceful resolution of the conflict. However, Taewongoon was not about to change his non-negotiation policy that had (according to him) proven quite successful. The Chosun Court formally charged the US Navy with unlawful intrusion into Korean waters and unilaterally rejected all American demands. Taewongoon’s reasoning was based on the notion that the kingdom’s economy was too poor and any outflow of domestic products would worsen its condition.48 Thus, Korea was not able to engage in any kind of meaningful trade with the outside world. The two parties engaged in similar military conflicts, as had been the case between the French and the Koreans a few years earlier. After a few military confrontations, the US decided to retreat.49 The “impulsive” mission of the US had given the Hermit Kingdom its second victory against the West, and provided Taewongoon with evidence that his non-engagement, isolationist policy was viable.50 Arguably, the Chosun Court had missed an opportunity to allow the country to engage with the rest of the world, which could have enabled Korea to elevate itself to more equal footing with its neighbors China, Japan and Russia. Celebrating the victory, Taewongoon put up engraved stones throughout the country known as Chuckhwa Bi, declaring that: “Not to fight back when invaded by the Western barbarians is to invite further attacks, and selling out the country in peace negotiations is the greatest danger to be guarded against.”51 Korea’s isolationist policy was only curbed when Taewongoon’s daughter-in-law ousted him from power. Queen Min, the new ruler of Korea, was somewhat less rigid in her approach to foreign relations. Japan viewed Korea’s political instability as an opportune time to engage in diplomatic relations with Korea.52 Until that time, Korea-Japan relations had been strained since Taewongoon had rejected Japan’s request to “upgrade their already strained relations in 1868.”53 Taking advantage of Korea’s political 47  John Feffer, North Korea, South Korea: US Policy at Times of Crisis (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2003). 48  Han Woo-keun, The History of Korea, trans. Lee Kyung-shik (Honolulu: EastWest Center Press, 1971) 364-370. 49  William Ellit Griffs, Corea: The Hermit Nation, 3rd ed. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1889) 412-418. 50 Gale Korean Sketches. 51  Woo-keun 368; In a different translation this motto is translated like this: “Western Barbarians are attacking us: should we not fight, and accommodation must be made. To accommodate the enemies is to betray the enemy,” in Ki-baik Lee, A New History of Korea, trans. Edward W. Wagner and Edward J. Shulz (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984) 266. 52 Toby, State and Diplomacy. 53  Jung 143.

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situation, Japan sent armed vessels in 1875 on the pretext of surveying the area; however, the actual reason was to initiate a military confrontation with Korea.54 Korea reacted accordingly based on its no-entry policy; however, this gave the Japanese the justification to engage Korea militarily. Unlike the US and France, the Japanese were well acquainted with the Korean defense system, and thus easily broke through Korean defenses. The Japanese were also aided by the fact that the Chinese, Korea’s traditional ally, were unable to support Korea because China was dealing with the decline of its empire and a growing foreign presence as well. Korea was forced to enter into a treaty with Japan. In 1876, Korea and Japan signed the Treaty of Kanghwa, the first of its kind for Korea. This treaty officially ended the long isolationist policy that had given rise to the Hermit Kingdom. Although official state policy had been modified, the general attitude toward foreigners remained the same. European accounts in 1880 describes the Hermit Kingdom as: a ‘forbidden land’ a land which no foreigners dare to enter without running the risk of paying for his hardihood with his life … within a day’s stream from the nearest Chinese coast … we do not venture to demand admission because a semi-barbarous Government, against the wishes of its own people, chooses to write ‘no entrance’ over its doors, and bids defiance to the whole civilized world.55

Interestingly, and as will be discussed at length in subsequent chapters, North Korea (like Albania and Burma) utilized history to buttress and perpetuate an isolationist regime. In the 1960s, for example, North Korean historians began to look to the historical record to support the Kim Il Sung’s regime. State propagandists claimed that the attack on the USS General Sherman was led by a direct ancestor of Kim Il Sung. These assertions are part of official textbooks in North Korea, and have helped construct the argument that the Kim clan has an involved tradition of defending the liberty and sovereignty of Korea. Hence, this long tradition of leadership and courage is passed from father to son, from generation to generation, as Kim Il Song passed it to Kim Jong Il. The regime claims that: [Kim Il Sung’s] great-grandfather was involved in this incident. Historical fabrications in the North go so far as to portray Kim Il Sung’s great grandfather Kim Ung-u as a brave fighter against the ‘US imperialists,’ maintaining that he destroyed the USS General Sherman, and that Korean anti-American struggles began as early as the 1880s. Kim’s father Kim Hyong-jik and his mother Kang 54  Hilary Conroy, The Japanese Seizure of Korea: 1868-1910; A Study of Realism and Idealism in International Relations (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960). 55 Ernest Oppert, A Forbidden Land: Voyages to Corea (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle and Rivington, 1880) 1, 5-7.

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Isolationist States in an Interdependent World Ban-sok are depicted as ‘indefatigable fighters’ who led the anti-Japanese civilian movement of ‘March 1, 1919,’ which are historical fabrications.56

Religion and Isolationism: Confucianism Unlike Albania and Burma, Korea’s protracted struggle against foreign influence is complimented by its indigenous religious/cultural tradition, that is, Confucianism. The Kim’s (father and son) have articulated this philosophy in a context-specific manner and internalized it to solidify the legitimacy and viability of the North Korean state. In addition to a “well documented” (or imaginary, depending on who writes history) family tradition of fighting for their motherland, the Kims have appropriated the nation’s strong belief in Confucianism to support the regime.57 The Kims have interpreted the teachings of this philosophy to provide a “natural” legitimacy for their absolute control of the state: In Confucianism, the father receives unquestioned filial devotion from his children and unconditional respect from his wife. As founding father [of the pure Korean state], Kim Il Sung commanded respect from his ‘children’ (the people) and his ‘wife’ (the Korean Worker’s Party). The official trinity of Father, Son (Kim Jong Il), and Holy Ghost (party) … [is complemented by] a version of political corporatism best understood through biological metaphors: Kim Il Sung as the brain [(now Kim Jong Il)] the party as the body or veins, and the masses as cells. North Korean society is thus [treated as] an organic whole in which division and disagreement are unthinkable.58

This philosophy has deep roots in Korea’s history and experience. It was first introduced during the Three Kingdoms of Korea period (57 B.C.–668 A.D.) as a means to transform Korean society along the lines of China’s “progressive” culture.59 Confucianism had proven itself useful in times of political turmoil. Using a sophisticated political philosophy, political leaders were able to centralize power and provide legitimacy for a strict code of conduct. The ruling strata of society became devoted to the teachings of Confucianism. This philosophy, religion, 56 Global Security, “Military: USS General Sherman Incident,” Global Security No Date, 1 May 2008 . 57  Chu Chai and Winberg Chai, Confucianism (New York: Barron’s Educational Series, Inc., 1973). 58  Feffer, North Korea 37; James E. Hoare and Susan Pares, North Korea in the 21st Century: An Interpretative Guide (Kent: Global Oriental, 2005) 5-8; Ian Jeffries, North Korea A Guide to Economic and Political Developments: Guides to Economic and Political Developments in Asia (New York: Routledge, 2006); Samuel S. Kim, ed., The North Korean System in the Post-Cold War Era (New York: Palgrave, 2001). 59 Kenneth H. J. Gardiner, The Early History of Korea: The Historical Development of the Peninsula Up to the Introduction of Buddhism in the Fourth Century A. D. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1969) 49.

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and code of conduct emphasized the importance of order and the essential role that legitimate royal succession played in the maintenance of order. The Chosun Dynasty found this element of Confucianism to be an effective mechanism to promote stability and order. Legitimate succession made uprisings and revolutions very difficult because illegitimate succession was very hard to accept by both the gentry and the masses.60 Confucianism also regulated the role and responsibilities of each member within the nuclear family and extended clan. This philosophy gave specific guidelines for each individual and their duties and roles as mothers, fathers, brothers, sisters, wives, and so on. Politically, Confucianism emphasized the importance of loyalty, hierarchy, and authority. The strategy worked so well that it made obedience to a ruler a moral duty, and the carrying out of orders a moral obligation.61 In addition, the adoption of Confucianism as the core philosophical base of state policy heavily influenced growing nationalism in Korea, especially in the latter part of the Chosun Dynasty. Eventually, this religion/philosophy formed the intellectual, political, moral, and philosophical cornerstones of the country.62 Basing governance on the building blocks of Confucianism had profound effects on Korea as a whole, economically and politically. In the realm of economy, these teachings emphasized that enlightenment could be reached without material gain, production, and possessions. James Gale contends that Confucianism’s stratification of classes with particular roles in society, for example, scholars, farmers, artisans, and merchants, had a serious effect on economic wellbeing and development. The merchant was a lowly entity in the hierarchy. Stratification and discrimination toward the merchant class “not only killed manufactures of all kinds, but … put the merchant in a class little better than a pariah. [The merchant, though] rolling in wealth … [In the ancient times, a merchant could] not lift up his eyes to the lettered sage, who, deeply steeped in the classic lore, knows not where tomorrow’s meal will come from.”63 The Chosun dynasty had such a chronic dislike of non-farming economic activities that the merchant class was viewed as the lowest social stratum among free citizens. The Chosun dynasty placed tight controls throughout the country to try and limit the proliferation of non-agrarian activities. The consequences were so profound that by the time the West, China and Japan had engaged in substantial trading with each other, Korea still relied on rice and textiles as the principal media of exchange.64

60 Gilbert Rozman, ed., The East Asian Region: Confucian Heritage and Its Modern Adaptation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991) 37. 61  Chai-sik Chung, “Chong Tojon: ‘Architect’ of Yi Dynasty Government and Ideology,” The Rise of Neo-Confucianism in Korea, ed., William Theodore De Bary and Jahyun Kim Haboush (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985). 62  Jung 108. 63 Gale 108. 64  Jung 105.

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In addition, the sense of legitimacy of rigid and unquestioned order found in Confucianism did not allow for reforms within the system, and there was a general sense of stagnation throughout the Chosun dynasty. Walter Jung believes that “Confucian ideology taught Koreans no universal solution but bequeathed a cultural legacy rampant with pernicious elements: veneration of China, factionalism, classism, class conflict, literary effeminacy, discouragement of commerce, reverence for titles, and excessive reverence for the past.”65 Indeed, historians believe that Korea’s defeat at the hands of Japan in Kanghwa was not due to lack of strength on Korea’s part but to feeble leadership. The Chosun Court’s lack of efficacious leadership was a result of heavy reliance on Confucian beliefs. Advisors and officials were selected only from the noble class. In addition, the ability to demonstrate knowledge of Confucian teachings and of ancient China was key to obtaining powerful political positions, regardless of the practical and mundane issues facing the country.66 This doctrine did not allow for intellectual pluralism or compromise. Often the Court found itself preoccupied with philosophical debates on universal truths, and any deviations from established norms were highly criticized. The winners of such debates were rewarded with more political power within the Court and the losers were characterized as (socio-political) heretics. In the long run, such single-minded reliance on Confucianism produced stagnation, and left the country inadequately prepared for an ever-changing world.67 US Intrusion in Korean Affairs Korea’s extensive history of isolation and its embracing of Confucianism are not the only elements that the Kims have utilized to exercise absolute control of the state. The struggle against the US and its modern-day imperialist “occupation” of the south provides an explanatory context for the domestic and international isolationist posture of North Korea. Unlike Albania and Burma, where state policies of international isolationism were mostly an internal decision by political elites, North Korea has both perpetuated isolationism from within, but has also been the target of imposed isolationism from without. In the case of compulsory isolationism, the US’s disapproval of the North Korean regimes of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, the unresolved legal status of a divided Korea, the fact that the US 65  Jung 103. 66  Cumings 51. 67  For a more detailed history of Confucianism in Korea see: Hyon San Yun, Chosun Yuhaksa; A History of Korean Confucianism (Seul: Mingjung Sogwan, 1949); Jacques Garnet, A History of Chinese Civilization, trans. J.R. Foster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Kaji Nobuyuki, “Confucianism, the Forgotten Religion,” Japan Quarterly (January-March 1991); Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970); Jahyun Kim Haboush, “The Confucianization of Korean Society,” The East Asia Region: Confucian Heritage and Its Modern Adaptation, ed. Gilbert Rozman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Seth A Concise History of Korea.

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and North Korea technically remain at war, and the incompatible political, social and economic ideology of North Korea vis-à-vis the US have all contributed to USimposed international isolationism as a strategy to destabilize the North Korean state. Because the regime has persistently followed a path deemed antithetical to international norms, such as pursuing WMD technologies, trafficking in arms and illegal narcotics, counterfeiting, and the proliferation of military technologies, it has further distanced itself from the norms of the world community. In addition, the regime prefers not to become legally bound through international agreements and treaties, and throughout its 55 year history has followed a path of nonalignment while maintaining friendly relations with USSR (now Russia), China, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. The occupation of the Korean peninsula in the wake of WWII by the US and the USSR effectively prevented the emergence of an independent Korea. This state of affairs provided an overarching justification for the establishment of Kim Il Sung’s communist-Confucianist North Korea. The transplantation of two conflicting political ideologies south and north of the 38th parallel intensified a national split, contributing to increasing military tensions between the two regions.68 The US and Soviet representatives met in Moscow on December 15, 1945, placing Korea under a trusteeship organized by the US, the USSR, the UK, and China as a temporary step to ultimately unite the peninsula. Being in the “care” of foreign powers was viewed by many Koreans as a continuation of what Japan had done when it annexed the peninsula forty years earlier.69 The US, viewed as a neocolonial power that previously sought to control the peninsula, dashed hopes for an independent unified Korean nation-state, fueling the determination of the North to aggressively resist and defy foreign domination.70 The Republic of Korea (ROK) was proclaimed in the southern zone on August 15, 1948, and Syngman Rhee was declared the ROK president. North Korea, formally the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), was proclaimed on September 9, 1948, ruled by Kim Il Sung. Between 1948-1950, tensions increased as each of the new “Koreas” declared sovereignty over the entire peninsula and began building up military presences along the border.71 The governments of Kim 68  Michael Hickey, “The Korean War: An Overview,” British Broadcasting Corporation 8 January 2001, 8 May 2008 . 69 Pitman B. Potter, “Legal Aspects of the Situation in Korea,” The American Journal of International Law 44.4 (1950): 709-712. 70 See James Brady, The Coldest War: A Memoir of Korea (New York: St. Martin’s Press/Thomas Dunne Books, 1990); Stanley Sandler, The Korean War: An Interpretative History (No Victors, No Vanquished) (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999); T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: The Classic Korean War History - Fiftieth Anniversary Edition (Dulles: Potomac Books Inc., 2001). 71  Hoare and Pares 25-27; Library of Congress, “Country Study: North Korea,” Library of Congress 9 November 2005, 27 May 2007 .

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Il Sung and Syngman Rhee were distinct forms of government, “each armed and supplied by one of the two contestants in the Cold War, each claiming authority over the territory ruled over by the other.”72 The fissure along ideological lines produced profound consequences for the governments and peoples residing on both sides of the divide. “Division led to social upheaval in the North, a migration of the politically disposed … to the South, and in the South fierce repression as the unpopular Syngman Rhee established his power. The division led to the Korean War, with some three million casualties and immense destruction, followed by half a century of contested legitimacy.”73 On June 25, 1950 the North invaded the ROK and proceeded to capture Seoul. The US responded by sending troops and securing a UN Security Council vote to legitimize US military action. US forces managed to drive the North back, capturing Pyongyang. The US advance resulted in Chinese and North Korean troops pushing US forces back to the south, recapturing Pyongyang and then Seoul.74 An armistice was eventually signed on July 27, 1953, creating a demilitarized zone along a redrawn boundary: The undersigned, the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, on the other hand, in the interest of stopping the Korean conflict, with its great toil of suffering and bloodshed on both sides, and with the objective of establishing an armistice which will insure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved, do individually, collectively, and mutually agree to accept and to be bound and governed by the conditions and terms of armistice set forth in the following articles and paragraphs, which said conditions and terms are intended to be purely military in character and to pertain solely to the belligerents in Korea. 75

Although 55 years have passed since the armistice was signed, tensions, acrimony, and explicit hostilities have never subsided on the 38th Parallel. Because the North remains technically at war with the South and its US ally (since no formal peace treaty concluding hostilities was ever signed/enacted), the Kims have had a 72  William R. Keylor, The 20th Century World: An International History 3rd ed. (Oxford: New York, 1996) 353; Beal 46. 73  Beal 46. 74  Cumings 290-295; Richard C. Thornton, Odd Man Out: Truman, Stalin, Mao and the Origins of Korean War (Dulles: Brassey’s, 2000) 316-347; US Department of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs “Background Note: North Korea,” US Department of State April 2007, 28 May 2007 . 75  Find-Law Legal News and Commentary, “Korean War Armistice Agreement, 27 July 1953,” Find-Law Legal News and Commentary 26 May 2007, 7 May 2008 ; Feffer, North Korea 3133; Cumings 251; Charles Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution: 1945-1950 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003) 238-240.

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constant justification for a militaristic and isolationist approach to both domestic and foreign affairs. Expounding upon the idea that the North remains at war, that the DPRK embodies an authentic and pure Korean identity, and that the DPRK is ideologically and physically threatened by foreigners, has provided justification for the regime to remain in power for nearly six decades. The US presence in the southern border and its continued hostility against the North Korean regime provides “evidence,” legitimizing the regime’s iron grip on the country. Burma Similar to the cases of Albania and North Korea, Burma also has an extensive history of struggle for national independence, self-determination, and self-preservation. Because of its very diverse ethnic/racial makeup, however it also has a record of various internal struggles for power and control. Modern day Burma was an independent Buddhist kingdom during the Bagan Dynasty (11th–13th centuries). The Mongols invaded the kingdom, which eventually became a satellite of China until the British Raj took over in 1885. From the 13th–18th centuries, Burma experienced prolonged and ferocious contestations for power among different groups and dynasties, such as the Shans (13th century), the Taungoo Dynasty (1486-1752), the Konbaung Dynasty (1752–1885), as well as experiencing four Chinese invasions and three armed conflicts with the UK.76 From the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824–1826) onward, the UK had taken advantage of Burma’s various internal struggles for power and fragile political infrastructure. This war ended with the Treaty of Yandabo and the conquest of Assam, Manipur, Arakan, and Tenasserim. Because of minor disagreements with the conditions of the Treaty, in 1852 the British initiated another military offensive against Burma (the Second Anglo-Burmese War 1852), occupying the Pegu province, also known as Lower Burma. During the Third Anglo-Burmese War (1885) the British, who knew that China would not defend its tributary due to its recent defeat at the hands of the French, were able to completely conquer Burma. British rule (1885-1948) re-organized the political and economic direction of Burma; however, it wasn’t until 1937 that the British changed Burma’s status from a province of British India to a self-governing protectorate. As a result of 63 years of foreign occupation/rule, Burma was subjected to drastic, substantive cultural impositions and changes. The British introduced alien elements into Burma’s ancient culture; indeed, indigenous customs were often weakened by the forceful imposition of British traditions.77 The separation of state and church, in particular, drastically altered traditional Burmese society. Although, 76 US Department of State, “Background Note: Burma,” US Department of State December 2007, 3 May 2008 . 77 See John Leroy Christian, Modern Burma: A Survey of Political and Economic Development (Berkeley: University of California, 1942).

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the Third Anglo-Burmese War only lasted a few weeks, grass roots resistance in northern Burma continued until 1890, when the British military finally put an end to the movement through systematic destruction of villages and replacement of local officials. In addition, the UK’s policy of favoring one group over another, giving key positions in the military and in the administration to ethnic groups like Karen, further alienated and fragmented the numerous ethnicities in Burma.78 Economically, however, Burma experienced a real boom. Indeed, in the late 1930s through the early 1940s Burma was a leading regional economic power. The British transformed Burma’s economy into an export oriented economy, and in 1939 Burma was one of if not the world’s largest exporter of rice.79 This economic boom, however, came with a price. In order to prepare new land for the cultivation of rice, many farmers borrowed money at high interest rates from wealthy Indians. Since farmers were not always able to pay back their loans, they lost substantial amounts of land and livestock to Indian creditors. As Burma’s economy grew, wealth and power became more and more concentrated in the hands of British and Indian businesses.80 In addition, the Burmese were largely excluded from the military, and Indians filled most positions in the political administration of the state. Thus, as the economy boomed, indigenous Burmese farmers saw little of the benefits.81 Buddhist monks were the first to voice their objections to the British occupation beginning in the 1920s. Later, in 1935, students at Rangoon University also became involved in the movement for national independence. In this movement, a young student named Aung San, emerged as a leader of the movement. During his years at the university, he successfully organized a series of protests earning him national support and recognition. In 1936, his expulsion from the university, for supposedly writing a critical article on the school administrators, caused major unrest within the student body. The movement spread to Mandalay, and the All Burma Student Union was created. Aung San consequently joined the Thakin movement, and at the outbreak of the WWII he officially led the national fight for independence. Aung San, in cooperation with 29 other people known as the “Thirty Comrades,” joined the Japanese to train against the British occupiers. The Japanese had promised to help Burma become independent; however, when it became obvious that the Japanese had their own imperial intentions, Aung San switched allegience to the Allies in mid 1945. For his help, he demanded complete 78 See Martin Smith, Burma—Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity (London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1991). Today the Karen ethnic group is highly discriminated against. They have struggled for independence since the formation of modern Burma. 79  Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Country Profiles: Burma,” Foreign and Commonwealth Office 21 December 2997, 20 January 2008 . 80  Walter Sadgun Desai, History of the British Residency in Burma (London: Gregg International, 1968). 81 Godfrey Harvey, British Rule in Burma 1824–1942 (London: Ams Press, 1992).

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political and economic independence from the UK. The two parties agreed to a constitution in 1947, and independence was granted in January 1948. Because the Burmese deeply resented the British, they opted out of membership in the British Commonwealth. In July 1947, General Aung San, who is considered the father of the Burmese nation, and almost all his cabinet were assassinated before the establishment of a reconciled, united, and free Burma. 82 U Nu, one of the few members of Aung San’s cabinet to survive, became prime minister. Burma’s post-independence period was very difficult one because there was great political turmoil between conflicting ethnic groups and political ideologies fomented by poor economic conditions. The country had taken a severe economic blow when the Japanese invaded during WWII, and Burma became a theater of war between the Allied Forces and the Japanese Empire, which had the effect of leaving the country in utter ruins.83 For the following ten years, Burma was a “tormented” parliamentary democracy. The communists (for example, the Red Flag Communists, the White Flag Communists, the Revolutionary Burmese Army, and the Koumintang forces) and competing ethnic groups (for example, Arakanese Muslims, the Karen National Union, and others), who felt unfairly treated in the 1948 constitution, challenged Prime Minister U Nu. At the time, national unity in Burma was difficult if not impossible because like many other post-colonial states, Burma had inherited a diverse population, “some 130 ethnic groups spreading over fourteen states and divisions,”84 and there were violent struggles between those who advocated communism and others who advocated a parliamentary democracy. The continuous multi-front civil war and the weakening economy destabilized the state. Amidst these internal fights, following a political paralysis and a split in the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) party, U Nu invited Army Chief of Staff General Ne Win to take over the government. General Ne Win formed a caretaker government (1958-1959), and in order to bring back law and order forcibly took control of the country, including minority states/regions. He stepped down eighteen months later and allowed the country to conduct free elections. In 1960, U Nu and his party decisively won the general election, but this victory proved to be short lived. Two years later General Ne Win would expel the legitimate government in a military coup and solidify his position as the country’s leader. The justification for this action was U Nu’s promotion of Buddhism as a state religion and tolerance toward ethnic separatism. In his view, Ne Win was compelled to resort to a coup d’état because parliamentary democracy was not suited for Burma, and more importantly the integrity of the Burma union was in danger by fully engaging the world community. Being a strong nationalist and an 82  Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Country Profiles: Burma,” Foreign and Commonwealth Office 21 December 1997, 20 January 2008 . 83  Myat Thein, Economic Development of Myanmar (Pasir Panjang: The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 2004) 2. 84 Thein 2.

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original member of the “Thirty Comrades,” he intended to unify the country, deter any separatist movements, rout the communists, and preserve an idealistic vision of an unadulterated Burma protected by a fiercely nationalist Burmese state. Ne Win’s immediate and greatest fear at the time was that the Chinese-backed communist groups fighting in the north would eventually succeed, placing Burma once again under the Chinese rule and ending what had been a long and arduous path to a semblance of Burmese independence. Through callous authoritarian military rule, Ne Win envisioned a Burma wherein all of the country’s various ethnicities would be homogenized under a unity banner of patriotism and nationalism, free from foreign interference, and most importantly the state would be a sovereign and selfsufficient entity serving Burmese interests, goals, and perpetuating the wellbeing of the people. Discussion In all three cases, whether the movement for freedom, independence, autonomy, and self-determination is described as a top-down or bottom-up movement, the regimes in each of the respective case studies have generated legitimacy and justification for claiming and consolidating absolute power premised on isolationist and hypernationalist precepts. Whether it was continuous foreign invasions and occupations (Albania), an intensive and extensive history of seclusion and combating ubiquitous “enemies” (North Korea), or the integrity and unity of the state (Burma), the argument for isolationism had been (in the case of Albania) and continues to be (in the cases of North Korea and Burma) justified and find a measure of acceptance by the peoples of the these states. The regimes in question have been able to successfully achieve complex levels of domestic and international isolationism by using their country’s political struggles for independence, recognition, and unity to rationalize and perpetuate a regime’s power. It is the long national fights for independence, self-determination, and national unity that isolationist regimes have skillfully manipulated that have enabled them to retain and concentrate absolute power, and consequently draw the country into complete isolation. The particular characteristics of each state, such as nationalism, antagonism toward foreigners, xenophobia, and self-determination, have been important in the rise to power, monopoly of power, premising state policy on isolationism, and the dissemination of ideological, social, political, and economic agendas of the regimes. It is precisely this kind of modus operandi that has facilitated the postulation of “pure” Platonic idealistic manifestations of isolationism. Having provided a context for the rise of isolationist regimes in the three case studies in question, the following two chapters will discuss each regime’s reasons and methods for both domestic and international isolationism.

Chapter 4

Domestic Isolationism Introduction At the height of self-imposed isolation from the international state system, Albania, North Korea, and Burma attained a very high degree of domestic isolationism; that is, each state cultivated and implemented state policies that were culturally, politically, geographically, and economically isolationist. For each state, strict and unadulterated levels of domestic isolationism have been viewed as absolutely necessary to “protect” the state from foreign “contamination” (in the Platonic sense), and to effectively monopolize and perpetuate the ruling regime’s power and control over the state and populace. In order to obtain absolute power, however, the state must control all aspects of the polity’s affairs. Such control is enhanced and amplified by severely or completely limiting external influence, interference, information, and contacts that the populace has with foreigners. This level of control has the effect of enabling a regime to more effectively and efficiently create state policy while exercising control over the public mind. These states’ adroitness in manipulating historical facts and circumstances, while employing draconian measures of control backed by brute force, has been proven to be effective in the absence of or in light of foreign influences being strictly regulated or prevented. Meyer employs Karl Marx’s notion of the “primitive accumulation of legitimacy,” used to describe Russia’s sociopolitical condition in the 1920s, to analyze the goals of communist political systems in the 1940s and 1950s. The “primitive accumulation of legitimacy” accurately describes the isolationist postures of communist Albania, North Korea, and socialist Burma, wherein political legitimacy involved a “desperate attempt to transform power into authority as quickly as possible, and against great obstacles [by using] all the traditional [and non-traditional] means at the disposal of usurpers – coercion, socialization, organization, and rewards.” These regimes were “impelled by a desperate urge … to seal the societies off from any alternative ideas … coordinating all organizational and associational life under the guidance of the party.” In order to implement domestic isolationism in an authoritarian regime, there must be a “pure” ideal that guides the state, and an easily identifiable enemy to justify state policy, both abroad and within domestic borders. Isolationist states vigorously identity, define, and  See Alfred G. Meyer, “Legitimacy of Power in East Central Europe,” Eastern Europe in the 1970s, ed. S. Sinanian, I. Deak, and P.C. Ludz (New York: Praeger, 1972) 56-57.   Meyer 56-57.

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articulate the principle that the very existence of the state depends on heightened and expansive security measures, continual vigilance, and military preparedness. “Enemies” perpetually and relentlessly threaten the identity and wellbeing of an isolationist state, especially its ideology, culture, and the integrity of its borders. The isolationist state has a paranoiac view of others states, in that they are not viewed as trading partners, allies, security partners, and the like, but as actual or potential adversaries that can wreak havoc on the ideal society embodied in the isolationist state. “True believers” that defend the state, the party, and the leadership are recruited on the grounds of puritanical ideology, rabid ethnocentrism, racial superiority, xenophobia, and fear. A plurality of thought and independent action are strictly prohibited, for any thought and action that is not devoted to and in line with state policy is deleterious to the establishment of a pure society that is the paragon of morality and ideology. The citizen should always be ready to assiduously work, struggle, sacrifice, fight, starve, and die for the regime’s ideals, the leadership, and the homeland. Anything less is considered treason, a deliberate attempt to overthrow the regime and destabilize the state. Once an authoritarian state has unconditional control of a population by way of monopolizing the apparatuses of force and through isolating the populace from the rest of the system and society of states, the leadership is able to wield absolute power over all affairs of state. The “truth,” teachings, and ideology disseminated by the state are unquestionable, to be followed with fervency, fealty, and unqualified obedience. Absolute power and total isolation, in theory, provide an effective means of guaranteeing the integrity of a people’s indigenous language, culture, purpose, and identity, ensuring a unitary political, social, and economic framework for ruling the country. Thus, a domestically isolated society facilitates the state’s promise to protect the populace from all foreign and internal threats, and it guarantees (for a short time at least) the wellbeing of the regime. Considering these general characteristics of domestic isolationism as practiced by authoritarian isolationist states, this chapter will further clarify domestic isolationism, how it has been implemented in Albania, North Korea, and Burma, and the reasons and apparent benefits for both the leadership and the state. Albania Although Albania’s experiment with international isolationism did not fully come into being until 1978, domestic isolationism in the country began to take root shortly after the communist conquest in 1945. Once Hoxha came to power he sought to: secure and maintain the new regime’s power base; preserve Albania’s independence; and reshape the country, ideologically, socially, politically, economically, and culturally, in the image of orthodox Stalinism. By 1945, the  Nicholas Pano, The People’s Republic of Albania (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1968).

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communists had executed, imprisoned, or forced into exile most of the country’s intellectuals and entrepreneurs. In a relatively brief span of time, thousands of opposition politicians, moderates within the Party, clan chiefs, and assorted members of past governments were summarily charged, arrested, tried, found guilty, and imprisoned or executed for treason. The family members of those who had been imprisoned/executed were sent to work camps, imprisoned, and/or exiled to remote parts of the country or state farms. The communist regime took swift and severe measures to centralize the economy following an orthodox Stalinist model. Throughout 1946, the state nationalized all industries, placed trade under government control, and banned the private sale of land. For the next four decades Hoxha isolated Albania in an attempt to carry out one of the most ambitious, far-reaching experiments in socialist orthodoxy. He became obsessed with creating what he termed a pure Stalinist state. Although Hoxha claimed to be a faithful adherent to the Marxist canon, in practice he initiated his own version of Marxist/Leninist/Stalinist ideology. In thought and practice, he emptied Marxism of its initial or actual content, replacing it with his own personal philosophy. Hoxha was a fierce Stalinist rather than a Marxist or Leninist. For him, it was actually Stalin who had discovered the true purpose of the state, and its manner of rule over the populace. In his book, With Stalin, Hoxha lauds Stalin for “his stern and principled struggle for the defense, consistent implementation and further development of the ideas of Marx, Engels and Lenin … his great work without precedent [in] history.” Hoxha would often highlight Stalin’s “brilliant mind and pure soul … his … exhilarating laugh that went right to one’s heart … his voice so warm and inspiring.”  As was the case when Stalin, in the presence of Lenin’s tomb, swore an oath to carry out Lenin’s work, when Stalin died, Hoxha, in the name of the Albanian people, “sign[ed] the Oath … to… carry out [Stalin’s] instructions” on the good of the state and how it was to govern the people and for what purpose. According to Anton Logoreci, Hoxha imitated and surpassed Stalin to such an extent that it destroyed the very fabric of Albanian society. He created: A situation in which no recognizable sanctions of any kind – moral, ethical, religious, political or judicial – were allowed to function. Following the example of his master Stalin, his own embodiment of the party’s will became the supreme law of the land, and absolute raison d’état. All moral and human values, including the code of personal honor and fidelity which lay at the heart of the ethics of

 US Library of Congress, “Country Study: Albania,” US Library of Congress April 1992, 15 March 2008 .  Enver Hoxha, With Stalin (Tirana: “8Nentori,” 1979) 14.  Enver Hoxha, With Stalin 146.  Enver Hoxha, With Stalin 216.

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Early indoctrination allowed Hoxha to perpetuate his message of national unity, party ideals, and hyper-nationalism as the basis of Albanian identity. According to him, the schools must be guided by the ideas and principles of the Party, and its tasks and aims for the masses of workers; it must instill the new socialist principles of education; must educate children of all strata of the entire population to fight against every foreign ideology and against foreign influence upon the children.

Literature, especially from the Albanian Renaissance period, played a vital role in “the Communist education of children and … youth, in the education of love for the Motherland and Party.”10 Pedagogical textbooks clearly developed themes “of Albania’s national liberation struggles, [and] historical-patriotic topics.”11 By 1969, the regime confidently proclaimed that the “schools, in our entire educational system, have been permeated by the ideology and politics of the Party.”12 Schools and textbooks were not the only medium for articulating Greater Albania’s necessity for self-reliance and continuing struggle against foreign aggression. The country was inundated with propagandistic slogans – displayed on everything from mountains and billboards to classrooms, factories, and buildings – that all citizens were expected to internalize. Indeed, the regime utilized domestic terror to “encourage” the populace to embrace and internalize slogans such as: We will break the imperialist-revisionist blockade! (Te çajmë bllokadën imperialiste-revisioniste!); Albania a granite rock in the Adriatic! (Shqipëria shkëmb graniti buzë Adreatikut!); Albania a lighthouse of socialism in Europe! (Shqipëria fener ndriçues socialismi ne Evropë!); The whole nation is a soldier! (Gjithë populli ushtar!); On one hand the mattock and on the other the gun! (Në njërën dore kazmën në tjetrën pushkën!); Glory to the Albanian Party of Labor!  Anton Logoreci, The Albanians: Europe’s Forgotten Survivors (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978) 200.  Enver Hoxha, “Arsimi Fillestar dhe Shtatëvjecar në Vendin Tonë,” Bashkimi 4 March 1949: 3. Address to the Delegates of the First Congress of the Albanian Communist Party, November 1948. 10 Thoma Deljana, “Fjala e zv. Ministrit të Arsimit dhe Kultures, Shokut Thoma Deljana” Arsimi Popullor (May-June 1964): 52; For further discussion on Albanian nationalism see: Stavro Skendi, “Skenderbeg and Albanian Nationalism Consciousness,” Südost-Forschungen (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1968). 11  John Thomas, Education for Communism: School and State in the People’s Republic of Albania (Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1969). 12  Ylli Kahreman, “Shkolla Jone e Lartë Para Detyrave të Medha për Revolucionarizimin e Mëtejshem të Saj,” Zëri i Popullit 23 March 1968: 2.

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(Lavdi Partisë së Punës së Shqipërisë!); Party, Enver we are always ready! (Parti Enver jemi gati kurdoher!); and, What the people asks the party delivers, what the party asks the people deliver! (ç’thotë populli bën partia, ç’thotë partia bën populli!).

Indoctrination also involved extensive and intensive use of television, radio, and the arts. The regime efficiently and effectively targeted and “neutralized” all dissident (that is, independently-minded, non-conformist) writers and artists, and scrupulously reinforced Albania’s isolation from foreign culture in an effort to keep out foreign influences.13 In the Albanian Party of Labor (APL) Fifth Congress (1966), Hoxha decreed that art and literature had to “become a powerful weapon in the Party’s hands for educating the workers in the spirit of socialism and communism.”14 He ordered that all forms of art and artistic institutions “be guided by the ideo-political demands of the party,”15 and that artists must be guarded against revisionist and bourgeois cultural values. The rigorous and zealous preservation of Albanian culture went to extremes; for example, performers and organizers of the 11th Albanian Song Festival (1972) were executed or imprisoned for 25 years for singing songs with “Western tones.”16 Hoxha convened a Party Conference on June 26, 1973, where he again warned against the insidious and ominous threat of “alien influences and liberal attitudes.”17 He made it very clear that it was the duty of each Party member to fight against any influence from “bourgeois and revisionist ideologies” as well as “modern revisionism.” Due to the “capitalist and revisionist encirclement of the country,”18 and internal exhibitions (such as, wearing tight pants or singing foreign songs) of modernist aesthetics “dilute and degenerate the society,”19 these manifestations were absolutely forbidden. Because of continuous “threats” to the unadulterated socialist state of Albania, the regime encouraged an incessant class war against internal and external enemies. According to Hoxha, a Party member had to “be [a] ruthless and courageous fighter against the class enemy, to wage the class struggle unhesitatingly and uninterruptedly.”20 In addition, white-collar workers were warned to maintain vigilance because being divorced from the people “provide[s] a fertile terrain for the spread of individualism and careerism, arrogance and conceit … intellectualism 13 Arshi Pipa, Albanian Stalinism: Ideo-Political Aspects, East European Monographs No. CCLXXXVII (New York: University of Columbia Press, 1990). 14  Kongresi i IV-të i Partisë së Punës të Shqipërisë (Tirana: Naim Frashri, 1967) 146. 15  Kongresi i IV-të 141. 16 See Skifter Këllici, Festivali i Njëmbëdhjetë (Tirana: Botimet Toena, 1998). 17 Enver Hoxha, “Intensify the Ideological Struggle Against Alien Manifestations and Liberal Attitudes Toward Them,” Speeches, 1971-1973 (Tirana: “8 Nëntori,” 1974) 309-406. 18 Prifti 188. 19 Kudret Velça, “Ideologji dhe Shije,” Zëri i Popullit 25 May 1973. 20  The Statute of the Party of Labor of Albania (Tirana: “8 Nëntori,” 1977).

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and scorn of the masses.”21 The 1976 Constitution legally legitimated and strengthened Hoxha’s hold on the Albanian state and society declaring the country “as a state of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which expresses and defends the interests of the working people.”22 Hence, peasants and blue-collar workers were the “ruling class.” To make the point absolutely clear, Hoxha lowered the wages of professionals to make the distinction between the working class and the elite minimal.23 Proletarian power was implemented through the party apparatus and unions. According to Hoxha, because the Party served the proletariat it was completely unnecessary, and therefore illegal, to have any other political parties. The “dictatorship of the proletariat” could only be secured if Albania was utterly self-reliant. Albania’s definition of “self-reliance” was so extreme that it exceeded North Korea’s and Burma’s isolation from the state system; both of these countries, for instance, have engaged in and/or permitted (illegal) trade in narcotics and arms, and Burma has “ignored” extensive informal trade carried out near its borders. Hoxha touted national self-reliance to such an extent that it made economic autarky the primary principle of his economic policy. He was able to cement this policy by explicitly banning foreign credit, aid, and investment (Albanian Constitution 1976), claiming that, “we will build socialism with our own strength!”24 Article 28 of 1976 Constitution decreed that: The granting of concessions to, and the creation of foreign economic and financial companies and other institutions or ones formed jointly with bourgeois and revisionist capitalist monopolies and states as well as obtaining credits from them are prohibited in the People’s Socialist Republic of Albania.25

Limitations on trade and foreign investment were to be made up by the people’s unceasing hard labor. All citizens were required to work from Monday to Saturday, and Sunday was the day when citizens “volunteered” their time to work in order to compensate for low productivity and the effect of economic isolationism. “Volunteering” after a six-day workweek became especially needed 21  Kongresi i IV-të 141. 22  Qëndra a Publikimeve Zyrtare, Kushtetuta e Republikës Popullore Socialiste të Shqipërisë 1976, No Date, 15 March 2008 . 23  Mario I. Blejer, Mauro Mecagni, Ratna Sahay, Richard Hides, Barry Johnson, Prioska Nagy, Roy Pepper, “Albania From Isolationism Toward Reform,” Occasional Paper 98 (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, September 1992). 24  For further discussion on Albanian industrialization see Raymond Hutchings, “Albanian Industrialization: Widening Divergence from Stalinism,” Industrialisierung und gesellschaftlicher Wandel in Südosteuropa, ed. Roland Schonfeld (Munich: SüdosteuropaGesellschaft, 1989). 25  Qëndra a Publikimeve Zyrtare, Kushtetuta e Republikës Popullore Socialiste të Shqipërisë 1976, No Date, 15 March 2008 .

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during times of harvest, where the youth were sent to work in the fields. According to Hoxha’s teachings, Albania’s youth had to be prepared through a triangular prism or framework, that is, education, labor, and physical and military training/ preparation. Thus, during the academic year students were required to spend time mastering all three elements in order to faithfully and effectively serve the country and the Party. Oftentimes students would be sent to military training camps and/or various projects around the country.26 According to Hoxha, poor performance or underachievement was the result of inadequate indoctrination of the people, and never due to a lack of financial opportunities and incentives. After 1978, when Hoxha officially broke all relations with China, Albania was obligated to engage in what may be the most extreme form of social, political, and economic isolationism since the ancient Spartans, thus devastating the economy and causing massive suffering to the people. With the exception of the apparent answer that Hoxha desired to wield absolute power, it is poorly understood why he did not follow China’s example in opening up Albania’s economy while retaining an authoritarian/communist political system. Party officials claimed that the “Albanians would eat grass” before asking for any aid from the imperialists and revisionists.27 Hoxha imposed strict food rations, which did not provide a sufficient amount of food for the average family. Because the state was deteriorating from economic deprivation due to isolationism, and the fact that the state remained in a continuous state of war with internal as well as external enemies, anyone who expressed any type of “frustration” with the economic situation in Albania would be tried for “agitation and propaganda.” Claiming that Albania was self-sufficient in grain production,28 well on its way to becoming a model of socialism throughout the world, the regime also maintained that: Albania is the only country in the world without external or internal debts, without price rises and unemployment, with health services and education free of charge, with the dictatorship of the proletariat and genuine socialist democracy, where the Party and the people are in steel unity, where everything is done only for the benefit of the people, where the working masses are masters of their own fate.29

26 Kozma Grillo, “Për harmonizimin e Tri Komponentëve të Shkollës Sonë,” Revista Pedagogige 4 (1973): 21. 27 Ana Lalaj, Christian F. Ostermann, and Ryan Gage, eds., ‘“Albania is not Cuba.’ Sino-Albanian Summits and the Sino-Soviet Split,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin 16 No Date, 13 May 2008 . 28 Elez Biberaj, Albania: A Socialist Maverick (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990) 69. 29  Mehmet Shehu, Report on the 7th Five-Year Plan (London: Worker’s Publishing House, 1981).

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In the 1970s self-reliance became a catchword, and informed an ideal type of development though not necessarily a strategy.30 For Albania, self-reliance became both a goal and a strategy. The Party had strict control of the army and the economy. Through numerous limitations placed on private property, and through the policy of “Tufëzimi” (collection of live stock), by the 1980s any semblance of a free market was completely non-existent and restrictions on private property were so severe that villagers could not even own chickens.31 For this isolationist state, self-reliance was a “permanent revolutionary Marxist-Leninist principle in socialist construction.”32 Although self-reliance had become a de facto state policy since the severing relations with the USSR, it was not an official state policy until the 1970’s. After the 1978 break with China, Albania was forced to engage in the most extreme form of self-reliance.33 For the next decade, Albania exemplified the Platonic notion of isolationism and self-reliance. The explanation for such policy was that Albania had “learned from bitter experience;”34 therefore, this was not merely an ideal but a necessity. This vision was further integrated in state policy through propaganda pamphlets and other texts published by the Party. The official textbook on socialist political economy described self-reliance as: driven by internal forces; compatible with fair commercial exchanges with other countries (even though, Hoxha rarely found any exchange fair); able to accept “sincere” socialist aid if such aid impacts the economy through “internal factors”; practiced on all levels of the economy; dictated a policy of savings in order to limit waste of manpower, energy, financial resources and/or raw materials; and required Albanians to focus their energies on developing their own research, development, and technology.35 Additionally, Hoxha’s heightened paranoia drove him to spend most of the state budget to produce and/or import arms, even though the majority of the populace did not have enough to eat, and construct miles of underground tunnels while neglecting the country’s infrastructure, and build hundreds of thousands of fortified military bunkers while families lived in cramped one bedroom apartments.36 His paranoia and fear of invasion from external aggressors went so far that he had engineers remain inside the bunkers while the military would fire upon them to test 30  Johan Galtung, Peter O’Brien, and Roy Preiswerk, “Self-reliance; Concepts and Practice,” Self-Reliance: A Strategy for Development, ed. Johan Galtung (London: BogleL’Ouverture Publications, 1980). 31  Ilia Telo, “Pasqyrimi i Qeshtejeve Sociale ne Zhvillimin Ekonomi si Domosdoshmeri per Koregjeme,” Instituti i Punës BSPSH January 2006, 16 March 2008. 32  Hekuran Mara, “Mbështetja tek Forcat Tona,” Shqiperia Sot (Shkurt 1973): 13. 33 Akademia e Shkencave, 35 Vjet Shqipëri Socialiste (Tirana: “8 Nëntori,” 1979). 34 Akademia e Shkencave, Njohuri për Ekonominë Socialiste (Tirana: “8 Nëntori,” 1981). 35 Akademia e Shkencave, Economia Politike (Socialismi) (Tirana: “8 Nëntori,” 1981). 36 Pipa, Albanian Stalinism.

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the sturdiness of the construction. During 1975-1976, Albania was spending 11.5 percent of its GNP on defense, whereas most European countries were spending considerably less. At the same time, a reported 65,000 troops were armed at all times (military, internal security, border security) and an additional 100,000 civilians were in the active reserves. The military had pledged its loyalty to Hoxha and to the Party “because [the] officers and army cadres have sprung from the fire of battle … and because it was created and grew in a spirit of loyalty to the people, to the Party.”37 Since communist Albania was in constant “struggles against foreign and domestic enemies…[the military] will always be ready…to fight enemies, whenever the Party and Comrade Enver give the word.”38 Hoxha’s supreme power could not have been complete if any and alternative sources of legitimate authority had not been suppressed. For Hoxha, religion was simply incompatible with a “pure” socialist/communist state ideology. In 1967 the state conducted a brutal campaign to extinguish religion in Albania. The government claimed that religion had divided the nation, prevented the state from evolving, progressing to the ideal state. The state security apparatuses scrutinized every city and every village in search of any groups or individuals who practiced any type of religion. Due to intense state scrutiny, Albanians stopped practicing their respective faiths. Despite complaints within the Party, all churches, mosques, synagogues, monasteries and other religious institutions/edifices were closed and converted into warehouses, gymnasiums, youth centers, and workshops by the end of 1967. In the 1976 Constitution, Hoxha proclaimed Albania the world’s first atheist state, an achievement touted as one of his greatest feats.39 Hoxha’s regime tested the limits of Stalinism and isolationism, with a very poor outcome. While in power, Hoxha eliminated religion, distanced his communist system from all others around the world, inundated people with a strict work ethic and ideology, profoundly limited the country’s economic capabilities by excluding it from the international system, and created a state that was and remains decades behind all of its former communist counterparts (for example, socially, economically, and politically). Hoxha’s ideology, state policies, and “restrictions and controls on the population … made Albania one of the most closed countries in Europe, with a dismal record on human rights. He created a system that attempted to close to its citizens every access to thought that was out of tune with official liturgy.”40 Through coercion, terror, immense sacrifices, and factual distortions Hoxha created one of the most isolationist states, domestically and internationally, in the annals of history. Hoxha, via extreme isolationist policies, was able to enjoy absolute power throughout his reign, while the communist

37  609. 38  39  40 

Kongresi i I-rë i Partisë Komuniste të Shqipërisë (Tirana: M. Duri, 1950) 608Kongresi i II-të i Partisë së Punës të Shqipërisë (Tirana: M. Duri, 1952) 267. Biberaj, Albania a Socialist Maverick. Biberaj, Albania: A Socialist Maverick 30-31.

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state successfully achieved its goals of supreme domestic sovereignty, political independence, national integrity, unity, and self-reliance. North Korea North Korea, that is, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), has also utilized the arts, history, and (hyper) nationalism to perpetuate a significant degree of domestic isolationism. Unlike the case of Albania, however, the DPRK’s isolationist agenda was facilitated and legitimated by an aggressive US military presence along its southern border. Indeed, the interminable “occupation” of the southern half of the peninsula by the US since the 1940s has enabled the regime to articulate and legitimate the need to “defend” the country via isolation. For Kim Il-Sung, “[f]ifteen years’ occupation of south Korea by the US imperialists since liberation has ruined south Korea’s economy and driven its people into the mire of hunger and poverty.”41 Such intentional factual distortion can only be credible if there is no contradictory information entering the country. A singular and constrained dissemination of “true” (factual) information can be effectuated when the state has control of and a monopoly over communications, information flow, and domestic and foreign travel of citizens. This has been the case in the DPRK since its establishment. The messages of national unity, south Korea’s oppression at the hands of the imperialist occupier, the DPRK as the embodiment of an “authentic” Korea, and North Korea’s indispensable need for self-reliance to protect itself from the US and reunify the peninsula were effectively disseminated via the arts, education (indoctrination), and brute force. Underlying the message, Kim Il-Sung contended that all Koreans had to establish an “iron will … under which the whole Party acts as one body under the leadership of the Party central committee. It is a fixed practice in our Party that all its organizations move like an organism according to the principle of democratic centralism.”42 The Kim clan (Kim Il Sung and his son and successor Kim Jong Il) has utilized the arts as a means of eternally perpetuating the legitimacy, inevitability, and longevity of the Kim clan and the DPRK, which are presented as one and the same.43 Immediately after assuming power, Kim Il Sung put forward “the proposal of a fifty-fifty ratio between the creative works of the socialistic construction and the revolutionary struggle.”44 This policy indicated that 50 percent of the subjects of works of art were required 41 Kim Il Sung, For the Independent Peaceful Unification of Korea, revised edition (New York: Guardian Associates, 1976) 1. 42  Cumings 427. 43 See Jane Portal, Art Under Control in North Korea (London: Reaktion Books, 2005) 10-13. 44 Kim Il-Sung, Kim Il-Sung Chunjip, vol. 4 (Pyungyang: Chosun Nodong Choolpansa, 1960) 157.

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to portray and address the revolutionary struggle of the DPRK. Works of art had to depict the heroic and revolutionary activities of Kim Il-Sung during the period of his anti-Japanese struggles, and the other 50 percent had to depict the positive and necessary socialist dimension of his activities as Korea’s leader.45 As in the case of communist Albania, the Kims articulated specific guidelines concerning what and how artists should write and paint. In the case of writing, biographies of the Great (Kim Il Sung) and Dear (Kim Jong Il) Leaders “should be novelized with vivid materials and should stimulate interest,”46 and artwork must be geared toward promoting “patriotism, [and] heighten[ing] the national pride and confidence of the public in living in a socialist country.”47 The Kims have adroitly appropriated Korean history, national heritage, and culture, fusing them with religion (Confucianism) and select communist principles to create Juche, that is, Korean self-reliance steeped in hyper-nationalism, to legitimize the regime. North Korea replaced formal religion and churches and temples with Juche, which can be viewed as an institutionalized state religion. Many of the world’s major organized religions sermonize that humans have an intimate and transcendental relationship with God, Jesus, Mohammed, Nirvana, and the like. In North Korea, the followers of Juche have no valid reason to either contemplate life after death or seek a means by which to access the transcendental because they have already have attained the right, provided by the ‘Certificate Card of Residence,’ to live in an earthly paradise where the ‘Sun’ of Suryongnim [honorably referring to the Great Leader Kim Il-Song] shines, by swearing loyalty to ‘Suryong’ [the Great Leader Kim Il-Song] and his son, called by the name of ‘the Center of the Party.’ They wear the badge of Kim Il-Song instead of the cross in their breasts, and they are under an obligation to loudly read the ‘Creative’ doctrine night and day.48

Kim Il-Sung eradicated competing organized religions in order to eliminate alternative sources of legitimate authority. “There are nearly two hundred countries on the globe where four billion people live. The one and only country where there is no religion and no superstition is our glorious fatherland, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.”49 This statement is, of course, factually incorrect because at the time Albania was constitutionally (legally and in practice) atheist. Such statements leads one to think that North Korea had isolated itself to such an extent that even news from fellow communist states was blocked from the people and the leadership. 45 Lim Un, The Founding of a Dynasty in North Korea; An Authentic Biography of Kim Il-Song (Tokyo: Jiyu-sha, 1982) 9. 46 Kim Il-Sung, Comrade (Pyongyang: Social Science Press, 1973) 160. 47 Portal 124. 48 Un 8. 49  Choson Manhak 4 (1980): 4, quoted in Un 9.

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According to Juche, the Kims serve as the divine force guiding the Korean people on a path to purpose, fulfillment, liberation, and peace. The ideology of Kim Il Sung is embodied in Juche. According to Kim Il Sung, Juche signifies “‘the independent stance of rejecting dependence on others and of using one’s own powers, believing in one’s own strength and displaying the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance.’ Juche is an ideology geared to address North Korea’s contemporary goals – an independent foreign policy, a self-sufficient economy, and a self-reliant defense posture. Kim Il Sung’s enunciation of Juche in 1955 was aimed at developing a monolithic and effective system of authority under his exclusive leadership.”50 Juche reaches into every aspect of state affairs; the economy (Korean self-reliance, autonomy, independence, and self-sufficiency), and family life and social structures reflect a very particular concept of national life.51 According to Kim Il-Sung: Juche means that the masters of the revolution and the work of construction are the masses of the people and that they are also the motive force of the revolution and the work of construction. In other words, one is responsible for one’s own destiny and one has also the capacity for hewing out one’s destiny.52

In practice, Juche involves an incessant reiteration of select cultural themes to impact the public mind, filling the polity’s thoughts with “reiterate images and sentiments reminding the people of the permissible boundaries of reaction and emotion. Particular subjects – any depiction of the Kims or their immediate family, celebrations of the benefits of socialism and the collective spirit, expressions of national pride, calls to step up production [and maintaining eternal vigilance against enemies of the state (in particular Japan and the US)] – demand a positive response.”53 Loyalty and obedience to the Kims is thoroughly embedded in Juche. Kim Jong Il has declared: “Juche in ideology, independence in politics, self-sufficiency in the economy, and self-reliance in defense as the principles of realizing Chajusong [(an attribute of social man who wants to live and develop in an independent way as the master of the world and his own destiny)]. The principles of Juche, independence, self-sufficiency, and self-reliant defense are the

50 US Library of Congress, “Country Study: North Korea,” US Library of Congress June 1993, 12 February 2007 . 51 See Kim Cheang-ha, The Immortal Juche Idea (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1984); H.S Park, The Development Strategy of Self-Reliance (Juche) and Rural Development in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (New York: Routledge, 2002); Adrian Buzo, The Guerilla Dynasty: Politics and Leadership in North Korea (Boulder: Westview, 1999). 52 Kim Il-Sung, Peaceful Reunification 117. 53  Hoare and Pares 92.

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guiding principles of realizing Chajusong in the spheres of ideology, politics, the economy and defense.”54 The Kims, via an incontestable “cult of personality,” represent a bona fide Korea, and they and their progeny are the only rightful conduits for attaining Juche. Both the Great and the Dear Leaders have become pure, idealistic representations tendered by the North Korean regime as the embodiments of an authentic Korea. The Great Leader is the wellspring from which liberation from imperial masters was attained. His image and the meaning those images contain a safeguard against the imperialist power of the US, while the Dear Leader carries on the interminable struggle of perpetuating an authentic Korea through resistance to US power. Kim Il Sung emerged during the Korean struggle against Japanese imperialism, and then continued the struggle against US imperialism during the 20th century on a program of military resistance to foreign aggression and occupation of Korea.55 Although supported by the USSR in establishing the DPRK, Kim did not import a Soviet-style system into North Korean society.56 To distinguish and distance his regime from the Soviets and the Chinese, Kim Il Sung established a “communist” state based on a blend of Korean history, nationalism, communism, and Confucian principles.57 Indeed, Confucianism is a cornerstone of Juche philosophy because it calls for absolute obedience and submission to the ruler. Despite the goal of reversing the traditional class order of society, Kim Il Sung drew on “conservative Korean tradition to bolster his regime’s legitimacy … [He also] successfully styled himself as a father to the country, drawing on the Confucian tradition of respect for paternal authority. Workers and peasants were exhorted to toil on behalf of the Korean nation rather than abstract principles from books by German and Russian theorists.”58 The “drink no soup movement” is an example of extreme devotion to the leadership and national pride. The movement, which consisted of workers consciously refraining from using the restroom more than necessary in order to improve productive capacity, and donating 3-4 hours to work in addition to the standard 8 hours, was part of demonstrating devotion

54 Kim Jong Il, On the Juche Idea. “Treaties Sent to the National Seminar on the Juche Idea Held to Mark the 70th birthday of the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung,” 31 March 1982, 15 Jan. 2007 . 55 See Beal 42-44; Masashi Fujimoto, “Capability Analysis of North Korean Special Forces,” Defense Research Center 8 March 2007 . 56 US Department of State, “Background Note: North Korea,” US Department of State April 2007, 3 February 2007 . 57 US Library of Congress, “Country Study: North Korea,” US Library of Congress June 1993, 2 February 2007 . 58  John Feffer, The Future of US-Korean Relations: The Imbalance of Power (New York: Routledge, 2006) 28.

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to the state.59 Although a simple example, it is this type of fanatical devotion that permeates the North Korean moral, cultural, and political landscape via the perpetuation of political cults of personality. Cult of personality structures the socioeconomic and political stratum in North Korea. The populace is divided into three groups, that is, the (1) core, (2) wavering, and (3) incorrigible classes. Juche is actively supported by 20-30 percent of the population, which provides unqualified support for the leadership. These “true believers” have exclusive opportunities to join the Party and state administrative structure, have access to most sought-after locations and schools, have the chance to travel within and outside of the country, and form the foundation of the state bureaucracy, military leadership, and institutionalized support for the leadership.60 The cults of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il are ingrained in society; the core population explicitly equates devotion to Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il as part of “service” to the people and the state. North Korean society and the state under the Kims involves: “a deep-seated attachment to Confucian principles, above all, the mutual relationship between ruler and ruled with its exchange of benevolence against loyalty; and an acceptance of the values of order, and hierarchy in the interests of stability.”61 Utilizing Confucian principles in conjunction with a communist/socialist sociopolitical and economic agenda, Kim Il Sung fashioned a state that resembled a familial unit, with himself at the head. The use of historical and mythological symbols support and energize the cult of the Dear Leader, Kim Jong Il. North Korea is thoroughly steeped in an everpresent past in order to maintain the present and future of the regime.62 Isolationism, as the basis for state policy, enables the Kim cults of personality to remain viable. Hence, exposure to alternative information, frameworks, philosophies, political systems, and economic conditions that would occur if the DPRK engaged the society of states, would weaken the Kims’ hold on society. Personality, it seems, in conjunction with isolationism and a history of aggressive foreign interference that is channeled to meet the needs of the regime, successfully complements and generates the absolute power the Kims wield over the DPRK, in life (Kim Jong Il) and in death (Kim Il Sung).

59 See Andrea Matles Savada, ed., North Korea: A Country Study (Washington D.C.: Library of Congress, 1994) 70; Balazs Szalontai, “You Have No Political Line of Your Own: Kim Il Sung and the Soviets, 1953-1964,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin 14 (2003); Korea Institute for National Unification KINU, “The Impact of Personality Cult in North Korea: Studies Series 04-03,” Korea Institute for National Unification KINU 2004, 17 August 2007 . 60  Hy-Sang Lee, North Korea: A Strange Socialist Fortress (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2001). 61  Hoare and Pares 17. 62 Lintner, Great Leader, Dear Leader 79.

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Despite being a poor nation, there is no stinting of resources … when it comes to making obeisance to Kim Il Sung, ‘the lodestar of human emancipation.’ Although Kim died in 1994, the city is filled with formidable billboards emblazoned with his smiling countenance and bearing such inscriptions as ‘The Respected Great Leader Kim Il Sung Is As Indelibly Engraved on the Memory of Our People as the Eternal Sun.’ Everywhere there are public statues of Kim standing in an overcoat, saluting his adoring subjects (one South Korean report claims that there are some 35,000 large-scale Kim statues in the DPRK), while another source claims that there are no less than thirty four thousand statues and memorials dedicated to Kim Il Sung, at least one in every town and village.63

Myth and history are therefore utilized to support the cult of personality, an institutionalized cultural value, and play an integral role in maintaining the regime’s domestic legitimacy and control.64 “The extraordinary devotion to Kim Il Sung in his lifetime and now to his memory, and the continuing respect paid to Kim Jong Il, are not just products of caution and regimentation.”65 The use of cult of personality was so extensive during Kim Il Sung’s reign that the USSR chastised Kim Il Sung in his deviation from the Marxist/Leninist teachings by emphasizing his cult of personality over the works of Marx and Lenin.66 When considering the relationship between the DPRK and isolationism, the Kim Dynasty relies upon domestic isolationism to retain power over the state. Without self-marginalization and seclusion of the populace from the world community, the regime would rapidly lose the legitimacy it draws from its selective past, from the “threat” posed by its enemies, and Juche. For example, in what may be a fictitious conversation in the mid 1980s between Deng Xia Ping and Kim Il Sung, the former was showing the Korean leader the bountiful Chinese fields and vibrant factories and asks Kim: “See what you can accomplish if you just open the window a little bit?” Kim Il Sung replies, “Yes, but when you open the window, flies come in.”67 Only through isolationism has the Kim regime been able to maintain a “pure” society and ideology. Self-imposed isolationism has enabled the regime to retain absolute power. Through elaborate fabrications and a selective use of Korea’s past, the US presence on the southern border (allowing the regime to build a strong case of impending invasion, comparing the US with the Japanese invaders and drawing similarities between the two), hyper-nationalism, and brute force, the DPRK has

63 Orville Schell, “In the Land of the Dear Leader,” Harper’s 293 (1996): 58-66. 64 Schell 60; Hoare and Pares 35-37. 65  Hoare and Pares 10; Asian Info, “Establishment of the Republic of Korea,” Asian Info, 20 June 2007 . 66 Un 224. 67 Sang-hun Choe, “Documents: South Koreans Shot 2,000” The Associated Press 20 April 2000.

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been able isolate its society in the interests of the ruling regime retaining supreme power. Burma As is the case with Hoxha in Albania and the Kims in the DPRK, the Burmese General Ne Win also found domestic isolationism to be a viable policy for his regime because it was premised on national unity, hyper-nationalism, and the implementation of what he termed the “Burmese Way to Socialism.” This state policy combined humanism, Buddhism, and Marxism to obtain an ideal state and society. To set the stage for a political context wherein the Burmese Way to Socialism could flourish, Ne Win abolished the previous constitution, dismissed both the elected assembly and the chamber of nationalities, substituted the Supreme Court and the high court with military tribunals, and completely abolished the federal system of government in place before his ascent to power. The Burmese Way to Socialism nationalized the economy, established the only legal political party in Burma, that is, the Burmese Socialist Program Party, and banned all independent media.68 The Burmese Way to Socialism was a form of social justice designed (in theory) to free people from all material preoccupations, for example, food, shelter, clothing, and employment. The state and a group of cooperatives functioning under government supervision would eventually direct and equally distribute the means and fruits of production. Because the plan would eventually erase the drive for profit and selfish, egotistical interests, the state would achieve a balanced development of all available resources including labor, raw materials, technical abilities, and the means of production. Under this Burmese socialist plan, the state would promote traditional teachings of morality, and would restrain individuals from any acts of spurious or hypocritical charity.69 These reforms would be accelerated and enforced by the only legal political organization, the Burmese Socialist Program Party. The Party would implement the new directive, while the armed forces would support and defend the new regime. The problem with this policy was that the Burmese Socialist Program Party was a mirror image of the military government itself. Given that this Party did not have independent financial or popular support, the government decided to extend state funds to cover both party expenses and the personal needs of key party leaders/officials. This decision was justified on the basis that party leaders were dedicating their lives to improving the lives of the people, especially workers; therefore, they should not worry about making a living, providing food and shelter 68  British Broadcasting Corporation, “Timeline: Burma,” British Broadcasting Corporation 12 October 2007, 22 January 2008 . 69  Fred R. von der Mehden, “The Burmese Way to Socialism,” Asian Survey 3.3 (1963): 129-135.

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for themselves, and the like.70 Burma’s socialism was clearly very different from the rest of the leftist propaganda in Eastern Europe, China, and elsewhere because the official rhetoric was very selective. In Burma, the military government lacked the capacity to draw popular support/cooperation, improve the state bureaucracy, and implement new economic reforms that would result in a stronger economy. Ne Win drew his support among the military on the promise that he would hold the country together and deter any separatist movements. He devoted full attention to defeating ethnic-minority separatists groups and the Chinese-backed communists in the north. Once Ne Win consolidated power the country was closed off from the outside world as the new despot promoted an isolation ideology based on what he called the Burmese Way to Socialism. Superstitious, xenophobic, and ruthless, for the next three decades Ne Win set a thriving nation on a disastrous path of cultural, environmental and economic ruin. Outside visitors were few and restricted to Rangoon, Mandalay and a handful of other tightly controlled towns close to the central plains. Insurgency remained endemic and in many areas of Burma armed struggle became a way of life.71

Legitimacy was and still is one of the greatest challenges for the military junta in Burma. Ne Win himself was not by any means a Marxist nor a theoretical ideologist.72 When he assumed power, it was clear that he and his army commanders had a distinct anti-democratic bent regarding the state’s political orientation. Given the fact that Ne Win had clear antagonistic feelings toward the West and liberal democratic forms of government, he utilized Marxism as a means to legitimize the authoritarian government Ne Win was instituting in Burma. Ne Win’s regime, which took final form in 1963, was ideologically premised on Marxism, yet it lacked key elements for it to be a true communist/socialist state or have a genuine communist party or be based on a “people’s” revolution.73 Indeed, the Communist Party in Burma was in constant revolt against Ne Wins’ military regime. According to John Caddy, “[t]he Marxist dichotomy of class struggle, once it was divorced from hatred of foreign economic domination, became largely artificial and alien to the Burmese scene.”74 Although Ne Win’s regime was in actuality wholly based on pure military rule, Ne Win could not explicitly acknowledge this because doing 70 Union of Burma, The National Ideology and the Role of the Defense Services (Rangoon: Information Ministry, 1959) 5. 71  Canadian Friends of Burma, “The History of Burma,” Canadian Friends of Burma 2008, 9 May 2008 . 72  John Cady, The United States and Burma (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976) 238. 73  Cady 231. 74  Cady 254.

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so would characterize his regime as a dictatorship. Thus, the government created a form of legitimacy rooted in isolationism, neutrality, and nationalism. Since this particular regime lacked “creative initiative,”75 it quickly reverted to Burma’s xenophobic past and made it the basis of state policy. In a speech given in 1979, Ne Win emphasized his xenophobic views pertaining to foreigners but also regarding the Burmese people: Today you can see that even people of pure blood are being disloyal to the race of our country but are being loyal to others. If people of pure blood act this way, we must carefully watch people of mixed blood. Some people are of pure blood, pure Burmese heritage and descendents of pure citizens. Karen, Kachin and so fourth are of genuine pure blood. But we must consider whether these people are completely for our race, our Burmese people: Our country, our Burma.76

The divisive politics of ethnic difference were taken to the next level in Burma under Ne Win’s regime. For the military government, hyper-nationalism translates into power and use of violence to retain power.77 Although Burma desperately needed foreign investment, the military junta constantly used vituperative language against all of the “evil” foreigners who sought nothing more than to divide the country, destroy the Burmese people and their culture, exploit the people, and seduce their women.78 The opposition leader to the military junta, Aung San Suu Kyi, her (now deceased) British husband, and her “mixed race” children, were all accused of seeking to destroy Burma because of Suu Kyi’s desire to have Burma be a democratic state (she remains under house arrest since the 1990s).79 The Burmese government legitimized racial discrimination in 1982, when the state officially designated non-indigenous people as “associate citizens,” and banned such individuals from holding any public office.80 Lack of popular support, nepotism, fierce militancy, and a very poor understanding of economics brought Burma economic ruin. Despite suffering economically, Rangoon was cautiously wary of accepting any substantial aid from any outside source. Since self-sufficiency was the ultimate long-term goal of the Burmese state, economic hardship was justified by privileging the “greater” good of the country over the specific hardship posed by economic ruin. Financial 75  Cady 231. 76 Smith, Burma 37. 77  Mikael Gravers, Nationalism as Political Paranoia in Burma: An Essay on the Historical Practice of Power (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1999) 79. 78 Robert H. Taylor, The State in Burma (London: C. Hurst, 1987) 250. 79 Robert H. Taylor, “Perceptions of Ethnicity in the Politics of Burma,” The Asian Journal of Social Science 10. 1 (1982): 7-22. 80  British Broadcasting Corporation, “Timeline: Burma,” British Broadcasting Corporation 26 January 2008, 9 February 2008 .

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hardship was the price that the Burmese had to pay to stay clear of foreign entanglements and manage their own destiny. Ironically, this policy of excessive concern for self-sufficiency and neutralism actually profoundly weakened and impoverished the state and the military, thus making Burma even more vulnerable to outside interference. Under Burma’s interpretation of “socialist” principles farmers and entrepreneurs took a direct hit. They disapproved of Ne Win’s price and wage limitation, and stopped producing for export, failed to repay government crop loans, and disregarded state rules for retail trade. Ne Win declared war on “economic insurgents,” that is, the “alien” and “malevolent” bourgeois middle and upper classes and all “working class enemies” moneylenders and traders. David Steinberg explains the Burmese economy in the following manner: Burma is an anomaly – a unique nation dominated by a highly centralized singleparty dictatorship, yet composed of over sixty-five thousand village economies only loosely tied to the central government. Burma’s political ideology ostensibly enforces a rigid socialist system, but economically it openly tolerates, and indeed is depended on, an informal, and often illegal, parallel market.81

The military junta did not have a good understating of economics, and even a poorer understanding of socialist economics, and it wasn’t long before they recognized that they required outside assistance if the state was to survive. After the June–July 1971 BSPP Congress, the government decided to ask the World Bank into the country.82 Interestingly, regardless of state propaganda emphasizing independence from foreigners, the national debt went from a negligible sum in the 1962 to over $4 billion at the end of Ne Win’s reign in 1988. Export levels fell from $260 million in 1962 to $217 million in 1988.83 A major consequence of severely limiting trade within and outside the country was the growth of illegal trade with Thailand, China, and Bangladesh. Burmese merchants were selling goods at a much better price across the borders then the very low, artificial prices imposed by the military government. Although official state policy was against such a practice, the government did recognize that this illegal trade was keeping the economy from collapsing. In conjunction with the export of narcotics, the illegal trade markets kept and continue to sustain the country.84

81 Steinberg, Development Strategy for Burma. 82 Steinberg, Burma 21. 83 These numbers should be taken with a grain of salt because the military government was/is notorious for distorting numbers and data to fit a more pleasant picture of the country’s economic status. 84  M. Jeganthesan, “Golden Triangle Nations Claim Success in Drug Eradication,” BurmaNet News, no. 1922, 18 November 2001.

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Revival of Religion in Burma Ne Win’s Burmese Way to Socialism forced religion to be in line with the state’s socialist objectives. Accordingly, destiny was not determined by Karma, as traditional teachings and cultural values had previously dictated in Burma, but by knowledge and industrialization. However, Ne Win abandoned this line of thought a short time later because it proved counterproductive to his efforts to garner popular support. Additionally, in the late 1960’s Burma underwent a renewed wave of Buddhist sentiment, particularly as a form of expressing discontent toward the government. Given the fact that political expression was severely limited after Ne Win assumed power, Burmese youth became increasingly involved in religious ceremonies, services, practices, and celebrations.85 Ne Win viewed this development as an opportunity to generate legitimacy for the regime; eventually, he himself embraced the teachings of Buddhism, making a visit to India where he visited the shrine of Gaya and brought back a Bodhi tree. This return to more traditional Buddhist values had little, if anything, to do with the earlier version of the Burmese Way to Socialism. By the late 1970’s, Burma had blended doctrinaire socialism with Buddhist teachings of the impermanence of things, while at the same time rejecting historical determinism.86 Ne Win was able to incorporate Buddhism into a template for state governance policies and make it a national religion. For him, there was no longer a distinction between Buddhism as a religion and Buddhism as an instrument for attaining superior ethics/morality in government. With the passage of time, Ne Win became more and more involved with mysticism and numerology. Folklore contends that Ne Win became so enamored with mysticism that he bathed in dolphin’s blood to maintain and regain his youth, and that his belief in numerology was so profound that had the national currency, the kyat, issued in 45s and 90s because his lucky number 9 could evenly divide into these amounts. He left office on August 8, 1988 (8/8/88, 8 being a harmonious number in Eastern philosophy).87 Believing that this would be a good time to overthrow the junta, due to growing unrest and disapprobation of Ne Win’s regime and the country being in deep economic crisis, thousands of protesters took to the streets of Rangoon. The date of Ne Win’s leaving office is now known to be the bloodiest day in recent Burmese history because the state security forces killed about 10,000 demonstrators.88 85 Donald E. Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965) 235-269. 86 Steinberg, Development Strategy for Burma. 87 This version of history is disputed by some sources that believe Ne Win was ousted from power because of the popular unrest. 88  British Broadcasting Corporation, “Obituary: Ne Win,” British Broadcasting Corporation 5 December 2002, 6 February 6 2008 ; British Broadcasting Corporation, “Burma: Your questions

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The Regime Today In the light of these events, and on the verge of collapse, the government reinvented itself under a new name, that is, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). SLORC declared martial law, arrested thousands of people, renamed Burma the state of Myanmar, and the capital89 Rangoon to Yangon, and put the National League for Democracy (NLD) leader Aung San Suu Kyi under indefinite house arrest.90 Under intense internal pressure to legitimize the regime, the junta held an open election in 1990 that was overwhelmingly won by the NLD. However, the results were completely ignored by the military, which did not relinquish power and continued its repression against all dissidents. It was not until 1997, when Burma was admitted to the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) that SLORC changed its name to the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). These events were part of a more general goal of presenting a more positive image of the regime abroad, place human rights and democracy as viable concerns of the Burmese government. The internal situation in Burma remained the same for much of the decade, until August 2007. What started as a protest against high fuel prices sparked mass protests against the government; thousands of Buddhist monks took the streets of Rangoon, and most were brutally beaten, imprisoned and/or killed by state security forces.91 Presently, the government is making little, if any, effort to assert some form of legitimacy in the country. Although the military junta controls most of Burma, the junta does not exercise the same degree of domestic isolationism and international isolationism as was the case in pre-1988 levels. Burma, in essence, is ruled by a pure military dictatorship, without any internal legitimacy. After the 1988-1989 events of political and financial turmoil, the military has been receptive to allowing some business, tourism and a very limited number of non-governmental organizations to operate legally within the country.92 The principles of isolationism, self-sufficiency answered,” British Broadcasting Corporation 12 October 2007, 9 February 2008 . 89  In November 2005, the Burmese junta confirmed that it begun to relocate part of its government to a new jungle location. For more information see British Broadcasting Corporation, “Burma Confirms Capital to Move,” British Broadcasting Corporation 7 November 2005, 17 June 2008 < http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4413728.stm>. 90  Maureen Aung-Thwin, Thant Myint-U, “The Burmese Ways to Socialism,” Third World Quarterly 13.1 (1992) 67. 91 Robert I. Rotberg, ed., Burma: Prospects for a Democratic Future (Washington: Brookings Institute Press, 1998); Peter Carey, ed., The Challenge of change in a Divided Society (London: MacMillan Press, 1997); Mya Maung, The Burma Road to Capitalism; Economic Growth Versus Democracy (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1998). 92 Gustaaf Houtman, Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics; Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy, Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa (ILCAA) Monograph Series No. 33 (Tokyo: Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, 1999) 2.

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and socialism that Ne Win so carefully created have been destroyed. Since 1988, Burma has experienced a rapidly increasing balance of trade deficit and a large net foreign debt. Its main creditors are Japan, Germany, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank.93 Although there are some changes in Burma since Ne Win, the military continues to run the economy, is riddled with corruption and severe mismanagement, and a black-market driven economy has reduced Burma from what was once of the more prosperous countries in the region to one of the top ten least developed countries in the world94 with one of the world’s most corrupt governments.95 Indeed, during the last decade, the United Nations has continuously classified Burma as a “least developed” country.96 Change in Burma will be difficult if not impossible under the current regime. According to Gustaaf Houtman, the regime is aware of the changing international norms on human rights abusers. The junta can no longer hide behind excuses of culture and traditions.97 The leadership is aware of what happened to General Pinochet of Chile, and “some of the things some generals have done in Burma … may well put them into a similar predicament”98 according to one of the regime’s strongest supporters, Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, during an interview with CNN.99 In addition, the junta has recognized that they have a loyal ally, that is, China. Despite Ne Win’s elaborate plans to keep China at arm’s length and far from its internal affairs since 1988, Sino-Burmese relations have grown closer, both economically and strategically. Domestic isolationism in Burma is the product of Ne Win’s belief that Burma needed to unify and become self-sufficient in order to prosper. For this purpose he “clos[ed] the doors to foreigners and foreign influences, […] borrow[ed] from the dictums and methods of Marxism-Leninism, [and] became one of Asia’s most durable and enigmatic dictators.”100 He preferred to be called Chairman of the 93 Allen L. Clark, “Myanmar’s Present Development and Future Options,” Asian Survey 39.5 (1999). 94  J.F. Guyot, “Burma in 1988: Perestroika with a Military Face,” Southeast Asia in 1989 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989). 95  Mark Tran, “Burma is World’s Most Corrupt Country,” The Guardian 26 September, 9 May 2008 . 96 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, “UN List of LDSs After the 2006 Triennial Review,” United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 1 January 2006, 9 February 2008 . 97  Houtman iv. 98 Agence France-Press, “Singapore’s Lee says Burmese generals face Pinochet-like situation.” Agence France-Press 12 November 1998. 99  New York Times, “World Briefing,” New York Times 12 December 1998, 13 May 2008 . 100  Barbara Crossette, “Exhausted Burma Struggles in Isolation,” New York Times 23 March 1987, 10 May 2008 . 101  Barbara Crossette, “Exhausted Burma Struggles in Isolation,” New York Times 23 March 1987, 10 May 2008 . 102 See Taylor, The State in Burma. 103 See Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, “Special Report to the 20th Congress Of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union - Krushchev’s Secret Speech, Closed Session, February 24-25, 1956, First Secretary Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev: The Cult of the Person,” 16 August 2007, May 23 2008 R. S., “Pravda on the Role of the Party and of the Individual,” Soviet Studies 5.2 (Oct. 1953) 208-212. 104 Albert Einstein, Ideas & Opinions, ed., Carl Seelig, intro. Alan Lightman, trans. Sonja Bargmann (New York: Random House, 1994) 4.

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and foundational factor in consolidating, perpetuating, and legitimizing the regime’s power. By skillfully and sophisticatedly melding intelligence, charisma, rhetoric, affability, history, nationalism, identity, self-determination, struggle, culture, the state, and the wellbeing of the people with himself – his image, identity, and person – Hoxha, Kim Il Sung, and Kim Jong Il were able to generate national appeal as genuine popular leaders and national heroes. In the case of Albania, Hoxha crafted a cult of personality based on the view that he was the hero responsible for saving the Albanian people from the fascists, and in the case of North Korea Kim Il Sung was responsible for freeing Korea from Japanese and later US imperialism. Hoxha was able to capitalize on his cult of personality by providing tangible benefits to the people, such as, considerable achievements in education, social equality, housing, literacy, and healthcare. Both Hoxha and Kim, in and of themselves, became and remained (in life and death) a legitimating factor for the regimes. Although Hoxha and Kim Il-Sung came to power through a Marxist agenda, they personalized Marxist ideology to fit their specific agendas and personalities. In North Korea, for example, the Kims have created “a resume of everything that exists officially, and this is usually concentrated in a single individual[;]” therefore, they are “the guarantor of the system’s … cohesiveness. Everyone must identify … with the this absolute [leadership].”105 Similarly Enver Hoxha encouraged art that praised the Party and the leadership. Although he claimed to be divorced from cults, he clearly encouraged and fomented a cult of personality. For example, poems, songs, and books that worshiped Comrade Enver sounded like this: I first heard those five dear letters at the dawn of my life. Ever since, your name is dear to me as my paternal home, As precious as socialism, As lofty as the mountains, As vital as the light … We shout ENVER! And the sky seems to us loftier than ever, The space around us vaster, The sun bigger, And our perspectives ever more magnificent. We shout ENVER! And our days take on color and meaning As they fall in like soldiers Into the great ranks of the revolution.106

Domestic isolationism is a means by which the states under examination were and have continued to be able to retain political viability, power, capacity, and 105 Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York: Zone Books, 1995) 42. 106 Sujleman Mato, “Enver,” (excerpts), Revista Nentori 18.9 (1971): 10-11.

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some semblance of legitimacy. Indeed, in addition to brute force, isolationist states must have a degree of domestic and international political legitimacy and viability to sustain them. Literature, music, sculpture, paintings, movies, the theater, education, history, organizations, politics, symbols, and myth, among a plethora of means and media, are utilized to legitimize, justify domestic isolationism via “mind-scaping,” that is, taming the public mind by controlling and manufacturing information.107 By completely blocking information, contact, communication, and travel with the outside world, these regimes were and have been able to create favorable circumstances for mind-scaping, especially in the cases of Albania and North Korea. Through this process of mind-scaping, isolationist regimes infiltrate their population via socialization processes, producing facts, history, enemies, and threats that conform to the state’s interests and prerogatives. Molding the minds of the subjects through this “closed” process has proven itself successful enough that the masses (at least in public) equate the wellbeing of the leader and the Party with that of the state and the people. “Any state’s exercise of authority is deeply bound up in a range of symbolic practices. Although states appear to be materially real” – for example, states possess internationally recognized borders – “states’ sovereignty and their coercive power … become real and meaningful through [images,] symbol and performance.”108 Despite substantive differences among these isolationist regimes, they have to some significant degree premised themselves on anti-imperialism/colonialism and a looming threat or fear of foreign invasion (economically, culturally, politically, militarily) based on historic records of foreign aggressions and a nation’s struggle for self-determination. “In an intricate framework of emotions and experiences, a drive for power, and a willingness to use violence to accomplish goals,”109 these regimes have isolated their populations to “protect” and provide them with a wealth of “benefits” that range from perceived “freedom and prosperity,” to “happiness and harmony.”

107 See Kenneth Robert Olwig, Landscape, Nature, and the Body Politic: From Britain’s Renaissance to America’s New World (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2002). Although Olwig uses the notion of “mind-scaping” in the context of landscape and political propaganda, this concept can apply to state efforts to exercise control over the public consciousness. 108  Carol Medlicott, “Symbol and Sovereignty in North Korea,” SAIS Review 25.2 (2005): 69-79. 109 Tanter 6. For analyses pertaining to personality and the conduct of foreign policy see Robert Jervis, “Hypotheses on Misperception,” World Politics 20.3 (April, 1968), Philip E. Tetlock and Charles B. McGuire, Jr., “Cognitive Perspectives on Foreign Policy,” Political Behavior Annual, ed., S. Long (Boulder: Westview, 1985), Yuen Foong Khong, “Seduction by Analogy in Vietnam: The Malaya & Korea Analogies,” American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays 3rd ed., ed. G. John Ikenberry (New York: Longman, 1999) 523533.

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Chapter 5

International Isolationism Introduction International isolationism in authoritarian regimes is largely an unexplored concept in international relations. As discussed in Chapter 2, the post-Bretton Woods system of states, characterized by state interactivity, inter-dependence, high degrees of trade, strategic and economic partnerships, alliances, and information exchange within regional blocks and/or with the larger world community have created a global environment where international isolationism has no place, or at the very least is damaging to a state’s long-term interests. Although limited and concentrated efforts to effectuate an isolationist posture in order to advance a particular goal can be rationalized by a state, (for example, avoidance of armed conflict and subscribing to international norms to advance a domestic political agenda, or limit foreign trade so as to limit external pressures and influences on domestic politics), lengthy periods of international isolationism, combined with draconian measures to enforce isolationism, has devastating long-term consequences for the state and its people. Due to the nature of isolationist regimes, their insatiable appetite for wielding absolute power, and the use of brute force to sustain control and secure the viability of the regime, any notion of individual or “human” rights are generally nonexistent. The primary means by which an isolationist state exercises power, that is, absolute control over law, information in any form, travel, economic policy and dispensation and allocation of benefits, the armed forces, unrestrained power to arrest, adjudge, and imprison citizen, and communication within the state, which are fundamental tools by which a state controls its population, lie in sharp contrast to ideas advanced by the modern system of states and notions of international human rights, norms, treaties, and conventions. Such state-related notions of “security” and “defense” also differ greatly from the current international norms; for instance, the accumulation of WMD was viewed by Albanian, Burma and is viewed by North Korea as effectively contributing to the defense of the state from foreign aggression. All three states accumulated chemical weapons, and in the case of North Korea, WMD capacity in the form of a nuclear weapon has become a reality. Such notions of “defense” stand in sharp contrast to the US’s and the international community’s notions of what are proper defensive measures. By refusing to enter into international agreements these states free themselves from external obligations, and exercise supreme sovereignty within their borders. Avoiding foreign entanglements and obligations thus allows isolationists states

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to further solidify their hold on the population, domestic affairs, defense, and ultimately the nation and its geo-political territory. An isolationist regime’s apathy to involvement in world affairs brings about flagrant violations and disregard for international norms and laws. Economic, military, and political self-sufficiency further enhances a regime’s self-articulated impression of its supremacy, inevitability, and security. Partnerships with the outside world are therefore counterproductive to their domestic and international agendas. For an authoritarian regime, international isolationism and domestic isolationism go hand in hand because the two complement each other in serving the purposes of domestic political elites to maintain absolute power. Although these regimes believe that international isolationism and self-sufficiency preserve their national and territorial integrity, isolationism as a permanent policy weakens and ultimately undermines the regime and the state. Due to lack of extensive trade and strategic alliances, the economy is not able to sustain the demands of security, military, economic, and social needs of the polity. Albania By completely isolating Albania, internationally, Hoxha had three specific goals in mind, that is, autocratic rule of the polity; creating and maintaining a pure MarxistLeninist ideology, and exercising supreme sovereignty over Albanian territory. Hoxha defined Albania’s national interests purely “in terms of national affirmation, with a view to assuring identity, economic development, and the survival of the … regime.” Hoxha’s foreign policy was myopically obsessed with preserving national integrity and sovereignty “at all costs.” He implemented an aggressive and militant foreign policy that was un-compromising, and he fundamentally rejected doctrines of peaceful transition to socialism, peaceful competition, and peaceful coexistence between East and West, that is, socialism and capitalism. His regime’s raison d’être was armed struggle against capitalism and revisionism. “International détente [was] the greatest external enemy of the Albanian regime,” due to the fact that any form of cooperation or openness in the international political arena would weaken Hoxha’s quest to obtain a “pure” Marxist-Leninist state. The easing of tensions between the US, USSR, and China brought further ideological isolation for the Hoxha regime. He categorically denounced all treaties  See Enver Hoxha, Laying the Foundations of the New Albania: Memoirs and Historical Notes (Tirana: “8 Nëntori” Publishing House, 1984).  Prifti 241.   Marmullaku 129; S. Peters, “Communist Seizure of Power and Nationalism in Eastern Europe,” Koha Jonë 9.5-8 (May-August, 1970): 5-11, 22.  See Sulo Gradeci, 30 Vjet Pranë Shokut Enver (Tirana: “8 Nëntori,” 1986); Enver Hoxha, Vite të Rinisë (Tirana: “8 Nëntori” 1988).  Prifti 241.

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between East and West, such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT I and II), the Treaty on Basic Relations between East and West Germany (1973), and the Helsinki Conference on European Security and Cooperation (1975), because these initiatives were implemented by and served the interests and purposes of the malevolent “revisionists” and “imperialists” as opposed to the “people.” He forcefully objected to the USSR’s behavior in the Cuban Missile Crisis as bowing to the US imperialists and jeopardizing Cuba’s security. Albania was one of two countries (the US being the other) to vote against the UN 35/154 declaration of non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. Hoxha was also against treaties on limitations concerning the use of or the banning of weapons of mass destructions. In fact, Albania accumulated various chemical weapons such as mustard agent, adamsite, and lewisite, among others. Moreover, Hoxha was deeply offended at the normalization of relations between the US and China indicated by Henry Kissinger’s visit to Beijing (1972). He believed China was placing itself under the American “defensive umbrella,” which would threaten China’s sovereignty. He denounced economic treaties within East and West blocs, such as the European Economic Community, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), because such agreements served the “aggressive and exploitative” agendas of the USSR and US. Furthermore, he disapproved of terms such as “third world,” “non-aligned states,” and “developing countries” because they created the false illusion that the masses were somehow protected from the superpowers. Hoxha was especially critical of the Non-Aligned Movement because its members were former colonies that had political, economic, and ideological ties with the “revisionists” and “imperialists”; thus, the alliance lacked political significance. In light of Hoxha’s disdain for everything that involved Western and capitalist states’ involvement in the affairs of socialist states, there were two main reasons that brought about Albania’s total isolationism in 1978. First, Hoxha believed that Albania was perpetually threatened, territorially and ideologically, by the “vicious capitalist-revisionist encirclement.” And second, his allies, that is, Yugoslavia, the USSR, and China, failed to live up to true Marxist-Leninist teachings. These developments required Albania to pursue a forlorn yet valiant path to maintain a purist ideological state. For Hoxha, any negotiations, treaties, and agreements with superpowers were extremely dangerous because, by definition, superpowers are aggressive and greedy; thus, they oppress, manipulate, blackmail, and  See United Nations Security Council, “Documents/Resolutions,” United Nations Security Council No Date, 3 August 2007 .  Kerry Boyd, “Albania has Chemical Arms: CWC Review Conference Meets,” Arms Control Today June 2003, 16 May 2008 < http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_06/ cwc_june03.asp>; Joby Warrick, “Albania’s Chemical Cache Raises Fears About Others,” The Washington Post 10 January 2005, 15 May 2008 .  Prifti 252.

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exploit weaker states for their insatiable appetites for power and control. These uncompromising principles, in conjunction with Hoxha’s fanatical nationalism, as previously discussed, created one of the most pronounced cases of foreign isolationism in modern history. Albania’s Relations with the West Albania’s relations with the West rapidly deteriorated after December 1945, when Hoxha refused to allow free elections. From the time he assumed power, Hoxha despised the US, and for most of his reign was expecting and preparing for a massive US attack. 10 Blinded by his Stalinist lenses, he was not able to accept that it was US President Woodrow Wilson who stood before the Great Powers at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and dismissed any plans to divide Albania among its neighbors.11 Hoxha charged the British and the American diplomatic missions with instigating anti-communist uprisings in the northern mountains, and thus placed strict restrictions on their personnel’s movement. In April 1946, Britain announced that it would break off diplomatic relations with Albania, while the US did so in November of that year. Relations with the UK and the US further deteriorated when the US Senate, in an attempt to please anticommunist forces in the Greek civil war, voted for a resolution that backed Greek territorial demands on southern Albanian borders.12 Albania’s relations with the West became acrimonious and overtly hostile when, in 1946, when Hoxha claimed jurisdiction over the Corfu Channel. Britain defied Albania’s claim by sending four destroyers into the channel. Two of its ships struck mines on October 22 1946, and forty-six navy personnel died.13 Soon after these events, Britain and the US attempted to overthrow Albania’s communist regime by recruiting and training nationals living abroad. These units (or diversants as they were known in Albania) infiltrated the country in 1950 and 1952. However, due to an English defector, Kim Philby, a Soviet double agent working as a liaison between the CIA and British intelligence, the diversants were all captured and executed.14 These failed attempts by the CIA and British Intelligence to overthrow the regime combined with the March 1951 bombing of  Prifti 247. 10 Enver Hoxha, Rreziku Anglo-American për Shqipërinë, Kujtime nga Lufta Nacional-çlirimtare (Tirana: “8 Nëntori,” 1982). 11 US Department of State, “Background Notes: Albania,” US Department of State January 2008, 15 March 2008 . 12 Pearson, Albania in the Twentieth Century. 13  International Court of Justice, “Corfu Channel Case,” International Organization 3.2 (1949): 334-338. 14 Kim Philby, My Silent War (New York: Modern Library, 2002); S. J. Hamrick, Deceiving the Deceivers: Kim Philby, Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004).

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the Soviet embassy in Tirana gave Hoxha justification to foment hatred toward the US and UK imperialists, and implement severe domestic security measures. As a result, the penal code of 1952 required that anyone above the age of eleven found guilty of conspiring against the state, or sabotaging the economy and/or state property in any way, be executed.15 Albania’s Relations with Yugoslavia16 After successful cooperation between Hoxha and Tito during WWII, in July 1946 Albania and Yugoslavia entered into a treaty of cooperation. This document called for the creation of an agency that would coordinate the two countries’ economic plans, the creation of a customs union, and the standardization of monetary and pricing systems.17 In November 1946, Tito and Hoxha agreed to create joint companies. This fruitful alliance, however, was short lived. Hoxha changed his mind on these agreements, and did not want Albania to be perceived as somehow being a “part” of Yugoslavia. In early 1947, the Hoxha government accused Belgrade of unfairly calculating the value of Albanian exports to Yugoslavia, and not treating Albania as an equal in the joint companies.18 The two countries also had disagreements about how Albania should develop its economy. Belgrade believed Albania should concentrate on agriculture and raw-material extraction, while Tirana wanted to develop light industries and an oil refinery.19 Tito also accused Hoxha of following “independent” policies and fomenting anti-Yugoslav feelings among the Albanian nation.20 Belgrade offered generous aid ($48 million or 58 percent of Albania’s 1947 state budget) in attempts to appease Tirana.21 Plans for further military and economic integration of the two states were well under way until June 28, 1948 when Yugoslavia was expelled from the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform). Hoxha used this event as an excuse to end Albania’s relationship with Yugoslavia. Three days later, he gave all Yugoslav 15 US Library of Congress, “Country Study: Albania,” US Library of Congress April 1992, 15 March 2008 . 16  For Hoxha’s personal view of Albanian-Yugoslav relations see: Enver Hoxha, Titistet: Shënime Historike (Tirana: “8 Nëntori,” 1982). 17  Jacques 461-464. 18  Vladimir Dedijer, Yugoslav-Albanian Relations 1939-1948 (Washington DC: Joint Publication Research Service, Office of Technical Service, US Department of Commerce 1962). 19 Secretariat of State for Foreign Affairs of the FPRY, Livre blanc sur la politique hostile du gouvernement de la République Populaire d’Albanie envers la République Populaire Fédérative de Yougoslavie (Beograde: Secretariat of State for Foreign Affairs of the FPRY, 1961). 20  Vladimir Dedijer, Tito (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1953) 272-273. 21 Stavro Skendi, Albania, 1st ed. (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1956); Instituti Historisë së Partisë pranë K.Q. të PPSH, Dokumenta Kryesore të Partisë së Punës të Shqipërisë, vol. 2 (Tirana: “8 Nëntori,” 1961).

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personnel two days to leave the country, annulled all agreements with Belgrade, and launched a powerful anti-Yugoslav campaign within Albania. 22 In a note to the Yugoslav embassy in Tirana, the Albanian foreign ministry gave the following reasons for annulment of all twenty-five agreements: The Yugoslav government has tried to take over the administration of our country’s economy, with the result that the political administration has been taken over; in other words, the People’s Republic of Albania has lost its independence and autonomy. While hiding behind such demagogic phrases as “transition to socialism,” “our two countries’ alliance,” and while taking advantage of the great faith the Albanian people and their government have had for their brothers, the people of Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav government has changed both the principles and the practice of coordinating economic planning and has brutally carried through a policy of domination in our country, and economic policy of colonial exploitation. 23

On July 3, 1948, Yugoslavia responded as follows: In the history of diplomacy there is nothing to correspond to such a brutal and one-sided breach of some of its treaties by a country that is acting totally against its own interests while churlishly insulting the other party. Our military specialists are thrown out of Albania in a hostile manner and our army and its leaders are insulted in the most vulgar fashion.24

Tito responded to Hoxha’s accusations with intensified propaganda, accused him of being a tool of the Soviets,25 annulled the treaty of friendship with Albania, and in 1950 broke diplomatic relations with Tirana.26 Hoxha quickly replaced Yugoslavia with the USSR in September 1948. This alliance proved to be more beneficial to Albania because the Soviets had more aid to offer, and, more importantly, they were geographically removed from Albanian territory and could not exercise as much pressure on the Albanian government as Belgrade.

22 Pearson 287. 23  Jan Myrdal and Gun Kessle, Albania Defiant, trans. Paul Britten Austin (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976) 153. 24  Myrdal and Kessle 153. 25  Myrdal and Kessle 154. 26 Robert Owen Freedman, Economic Warfare in the Communist Bloc: A Study of Soviet Economic Pressure Against Yugoslavia, Albania, and Communist China (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970); Enver Hoxha, Selected Works: November 1948-November 1960, vol. 2 (Tirana: “8 Nëntori,” 1975).

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Albania’s Relations with the Soviet Union The Albanian-USSR relationship had not always been characterized as being friendly. For example, in September 1947 Albania’s Party of Labor was not invited to participate in the founding meeting of the Cominform; Albania was formally represented by Yugoslavia. It has been reported that at this meeting, Stalin told Milovan Djilas, a high level member of the Yugoslav communist party: “We have no special interest in Albania. We agree to Yugoslavia swallowing Albania!”27 Hence, when the USSR took Albania under its wing, it came as a surprise. Skeptics of this alliance were proven right because this partnership lasted only for a few years. Once Albania broke off diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia in 1948, it quickly gained membership in the Comecon. Tirana also entered into trade agreements with Poland, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR. Shortly after these agreements, Soviet and East European technical advisors were sent to Albania. Moscow also sent military technicians to start building a submarine installation on Sazan Island. This special attention to Albania was partly due to its strategic position. Once Yugoslavia broke away from direct Soviet control, Albania and Bulgaria were the only countries that could effectively smuggle supplies to the communists in Greece, but this strategic advantage greatly diminished once the Soviets developed nuclear technology.28 Although Albania had been an economic liability for Moscow, during Stalin’s last years Soviet-Albanian relations were close. 29 The relationship changed after Stalin’s death in March 1953.30 Despite cordial rhetoric in public, Hoxha mistrusted Khrushchev’s policies of “peaceful coexistence,” “different roads to socialism,” and above all his amicable views on Yugoslavia. Given that Khrushchev’s style of governing was quite different from that of Stalin, Hoxha worried that he might prefer a less doctrinaire ruler in Albania. Moscow encouraged the Albanians to renew their diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia and in December 1953 the two countries were on talking terms again. Fears of Yugoslav aggression did not come to rest even after Albania joined the Warsaw Treaty Organization in 1955. Even though this pact reassured its 27  Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (Orlando: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1962) 143. 28 US Library of Congress, “Country Study: Albania,” US Library of Congress April 1992, 15 March 2008 . 29 Darko Bekich, “Soviet Goals in Yugoslavia and the Balkans,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 481, Soviet Polity in an Uncertain World (September 1985): 81-91. 30 US Library of Congress, “Country Study: Albania,” US Library of Congress April 1992, 15 March 2008 ; Pano 111-112; Vjetari Statistikor i Republikes Popullore Socialiste të Shqiperise (Tirana:1953); Drejtoria e Statistikës, Komisioni i Planit të Shtetit, 1953(Tirana: 1953); Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956) 492-493.

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members that an attack on one is an attack on all, Hoxha’s rhetoric remained highly skeptical of Tito.31 The renewed relationship between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union was troublesome for Hoxha. He believed their alliance could weaken his hold on the Party, on the people, and above all that the Soviets were compromising Marxist-Leninist ideology. Hoxha took the chance to express his frustration with this new style of leadership at the Twentieth Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956. After Khrushchev denounced Stalin’s crimes in his “secret speech,”32 Hoxha rose to defend Stalin and blamed the Titoist heresy for the disturbances within the communist world. He believed that Tito’s messages had something to do with uprisings in Poland and Hungary in 1956. Although he was very critical of Khrushchev, Hoxha was able to receive substantial aid fro the USSR. In an effort to ease Albanian-Yugoslav relations, the USSR cancelled about $105 million in outstanding loans and an additional $7.8 million in food assistance.33 This helped ease the anti-Tito rhetoric until 1958, when Hoxha again accused Yugoslavia of genocide against the Kosovar Albanians.34 He became increasingly unhappy with the Comecon’s plans calling for Albania to produce more agricultural goods and raw materials instead of Hoxha’s preferred emphasis on heavy industry. Khrushchev himself tried to convince Hoxha that Albania should be socialism’s “orchard.” 35 The moment of truth, so to speak, that exposed Albanian angst toward the USSR, came when Khrushchev attempted to secure a condemnation of Beijing during a Romanian Worker’s Party congress in June 1960. Only Albania, among all European delegates, supported the Chinese. Moscow immediately retaliated, organizing campaigns to oust Hoxha. The Soviets also canceled promised grain deliveries to Albania during a drought, and openly encouraged pro-Soviet Party members to speak out against the pro-Chinese stand. 36 However, just like the previous Yugoslavian, American, and British attempts, Soviet attempts to topple

27.

31  William Griffith, Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1963)

32  For more information on Khrushchev’s “secret speech” see: Bernard S. Morris, “Continuity of Communist Strategic Doctrine Since the Twentieth Party Congress,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 317 (May 1958): 130-137. 33 US Library of Congress, “Country Study: Albania,” US Library of Congress April 1992, 15 March 2008 . 34 Enver Hoxha, Kosova është Shqipëri: Nga Ditari Politik, Përmbledhje Dokumentash, ed. Ilir Hoxha (Tirana: Shtëpia Botuese Neraida, 1999). 35  Marmullaku 71; Paul Lendvai, One Day that Shook the Communist World: The 1956 Hungarian Uprising and Its Legacy, trans. Ann Major (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008) 193-194; Vjetari Statistikor i Republikës Popullore Socialiste të Shqiperisë (Tirana: 1960-1961); Komisioni i Planit të Shtetit, Drejtoria e Statistikës, 19601961 (Tirana: 1960-1961); Prifti 79. 36 Donald Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Rift 1956-1961 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969); T. Zavalani, “The Importance of Being Albania,” Problems of Communism 10.4 (July –August 1961): 1-8.

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the Hoxha regime failed. This was mainly due to Hoxha’s iron grip on the Party, the military, and the state secret police (Sigurimi i Shtetit).37 At the 1960 international communist movement conference in Moscow, Hoxha launched an attack that would contribute to the further and irreparable deterioration of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Albania. While speaking in front of 81 delegations, he heatedly denounced Khrushchev for encouraging Greek territorial claims toward southern Albania, for encouraging conflict within the Albanian communist party, and more importantly for utilizing economic blackmail against the Albanian government. ”Soviet rats were able to eat while the Albanian people were dying of hunger,”38 Hoxha said, referring to the purposely-delayed grain shipments. Soviet loyalists throughout the communist world denounced these remarks, claiming that they were “gangsterish,” “infantile,” and only served to set the two states further apart. On the other hand, China praised Albania’s stand against the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, which Hoxha called a “socialist hell.”39 Hoxha continued his tirade against the Soviet Union and against Yugoslavia at the Party congress held in February 1961. At this meeting the government announced the Third Five-Year Plan (1961-1966), which disregarded Soviet advice to concentrate on agriculture. This five-year plan placed over 54 percent of all investments toward industry.40 Khrushchev responded by withdrawing all aid and lines of credit to Albania.41 Using human rights norms and condemning the Albanians for executing a pregnant, pro-Soviet member of the Albanian Politburo, Khrushchev ended Albanian-Soviet relations.42 In December 1961, Moscow formally broke diplomatic relations with Albania, withdrew all economic advisers and technicians, and halted all projects including the naval installation on Sazan Island.

37 US Library of Congress, “Country Study: Albania,” US Library of Congress April 1992, 15 March 2008 . 38 Enver Hoxha, Selected Works vol. 2, 796-869; Enver Hoxha, Selected Works: December 1960-November 1980, vol. 3 (Tirana: “8 Nëntori,” 1980) 93-163. 39  Zëri i Popullit, “Let the Plotters and Revisionists of Belgrade be Unmasked Through and Through,” Zëri I Popullit 17 July 1962; Enver Hoxha, “Vetadministrimi” Jugoslav: Teori dhe Praktikë Kapitaliste, (Kunder Pikepamjeve antisocialist të E. Kardelit, të shprehura në librin: Drejtimet e Zhvillimit te Sistemit Politik të Vetadministrimit Socialist) (Tirana: Instituti I Studimeve Marxiste-Leniniste Pranë KQ te PPSH, Shtëpia Botuese “8 Nëntori,” 1980) 72. 40  Mehmet Shehu, The Government of the People’s Republic of Albania will be Guided in all its Activity by the Marxist-Leninist General Line of the Party, Speech delivered at the First Session of the Seventh Legislature of the People’s Assembly of the People’s Republic of Albania on November 21, 1970 (Tirana: “Naim Frashri,” 1971). 41  Griffith, Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift. 42  William Griffith, “Albania: Footnotes on a Conflict,” East Europe 11.9 (September 1962): 14-23.

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Albania’s Relations with China As promised, China was there to support Albania after its break with the USSR. Beijing provided Albania with loans at very favorable rates – rates on much more favorable terms than those previously provided by Moscow. As far as personnel stationed in Albania, Chinese technicians were paid and lived the same as the Albanians, unlike the Soviets who lived in luxury compared to Albanians while being paid a much higher wage than Albanian professionals and workers. China also installed a powerful radio transmission station in Albania, through which the regime could broadcast to the masses the duty to respect, adore, and emulate the Party, Stalin, Hoxha, and Mao Tse-Tung. Albania, on the other hand, offered China a foothold in Europe, and advocated on behalf of China in the communist world and at the UN.43 Although Hoxha did not break relations with the rest of the pro-Soviet world, Albania withdrew its membership from the Warsaw Pact and the Comecon in 1961. The permanent break with the Soviet Union had a profound negative effect on the Albanian economy. Given that over half of its imports-exports were geared toward Soviet suppliers and markets, the severing of trade relations with the USSR almost brought Albania’s economy to collapse, profoundly lowering the volume of trade that Albania enjoyed with the USSR. At the same time, China struggled to deliver promised machinery and equipment; China was still in process as far as developing into a major world and regional power. Albania’s poor management, productivity, preparation, and planning became painfully obvious once Soviet and Eastern European assistance was terminated.44 Faithful to his Marxist-Leninist ideology and his passionate belief in class warfare, Hoxha – as he had done in the case of every other communist/socialist country – maintained a critical view of Chinese internal affairs. In History of the Party of Labor of Albania, Tirana categorically rejected Mao’s doctrine of non-antagonistic disagreements within the party and the resolution of differences and conflicts in a peaceful manner.45 In his Reflections on China, Hoxha further highlighted his disagreement with Chinese policy vis-à-vis the notion of eternal class warfare:

43  Harry Ham, Albania, China’s Beachhead in Europe, trans. Victor Anderson (New York: Praeger, 1963). 44 US Library of Congress, “Country Study: Albania,” US Library of Congress April 1992, 15 March 2008 . 45  History of the Party of Labor of Albania (Tirana: Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the Central Committee of the PLA, “8 Nentori,” 1981) 530.

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The Chinese comrades talk a great deal about the class struggle in the Party, but in fact they are not purging the Party, which is the fortress of the revolution, from within, but are encircling it from outside with people who are not organized in a party of the vanguard … The working class and the peasantry do not appear anywhere in this experiment.46

Albanian-Chinese relations leveled off by the early 1970s, when China began to come out of isolation. Hoxha believed China’s new direction to be opportunistic, that is, its regional and global interaction with the world community, and this policy was fundamentally antagonistic to the pure ideals of communism. China’s engagement with the US was especially “counter-revolutionary,” a “flagrant departure from the teachings of Marxism-Leninism,” and an attempt to “sabotage” world communist revolution.” In an article Zëri i Popullit, the Hoxha regime criticizes China’s notion of the “third world”: To speak about the so-called ‘third-world’ as the principle force of the struggle against imperialism, as do the supporters of the theory of the ‘three worlds,’ without making any distinction between true anti-imperialist and revolutionary forces and the pro-imperialist, reactionary and fascist forces currently in power in a number of developing countries, means to depart in a flagrant manner from the teachings of Marxism-Leninism and to preach typically opportunistic viewpoints, thus causing confusion and disorientation among revolutionary forces. In essence, according to the theory of the ‘three worlds’ the peoples in these countries must not struggle, for example, against bloody fascists dictatorships of Geisel in Brazil and of Pinochet in Chile.47

The Chinese responded by having Tito (one of Albania’s nemeses, according to Hoxha) visit Beijing in 1977, while completely ending aid to Albania in 1978. This break left Albania with no great power support or military bloc allies.48 Hoxha completely ignored calls by the US and the USSR to normalize relations, thus losing out on a monumental opportunity to remove Albania from the ruinous path on which Hoxha was leading the Party, the state, and ultimately the people. Indeed, Albania would suffer massive deprivation, impoverishment, and debilitating underdevelopment as a result of Hoxha’s policies. Hoxha also lost out on a significant opportunity to join China in limited opening up of the economy and in building a mixed economy while maintaining supreme control of the country. Although Hoxha professed intense “loyalty to proletarian internationalism and the 46 Enver Hoxha, “Notes on the Cultural Revolution in China. The Party is not Purged from Outside but from Within,” Reflections on China, vol. 1 (Tirana: “8 Nentori,” 1979) 366. 47  Zëri i Popullit, “Teoria dhe Praktika e Revolucionit,” Zëri i Popullit 7 July 1977. 48 Peking Review, “On China’s Forced Cessation of Aid to Albania,” Peking Review 21 July 1978: 20.

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interests of socialism and world revolution,”49 when these ideals were in conflict with his personal interests, he chose the latter. His foreign policy was strictly designed to serve his short-term interests, his power, and his vision of an idealistic version of Marxism-Leninism that was simply incompatible with the reality of the state system. North Korea Unlike Albania, which conducted its international affairs strictly adhering to Hoxha’s ideology and interests, North Korea’s foreign policy is more complex. North Korean foreign policy, generally speaking, is the result of “a political construct especially and particularly built for three entwined purposes: [that is,] to conduct a war, to settle a historical grievance, and to fulfill a grand ideological vision.”50 The division of Korea at the 38th parallel, the perpetual US political and military presence in the south, and a long history of seclusion have fueled and justified a more “legitimate” isolationist posture. In particular, North Korea’s relations with South Korea have dictated much of the North’s conduct of foreign policy. The two states have had tense and volatile relations which have resulted in loss of life on both sides of the parallel since 1948 and as recently as 2002.51 The North accuses the South, among other things, of being a “puppet”52 of the US, “conspiring with the foreign aggressors,”53 and as being “anti-national.”54 Throughout his reign, Kim Il-Sung called on the South Korean people to unite and initiate a revolution against the “fascist military dictatorship” of the US. Only through armed struggle could the South liberate itself from the “oppressors” and the “colonizers.”55 According to Kim Il-Sung, peaceful unification was possible because the people of South Korea “inspired by the achievements in socialist revolution and construction in the northern half”56 would fight for the reunification of the nation.

49 Prifti 241. 50 Nicholas Eberstadt, “What Surprise? The Nuclear Core of North Korea’s Strategy,” Washington Post 1 March 2005. 51  Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Country Profile: North Korea,” Foreign and Commonwealth Office 21 April 2008, 13 May 2008 . 52 Kim Il Sung, For the Independent Peaceful Reunification of Korea (New York: International Publishers, 1975) 29. 53 Kim Il Sung, Peaceful Reunification 99. 54 Kim Il Sung, Peaceful Reunification 153. 55 Kim Il Sung, Peaceful Reunification 126. 56 Kim Il Sung, Peaceful Reunification 127.

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Although the rhetoric has been harsh, both governments agreed to talks on normalizing relations beginning in August 1971.57 The most significant progress between the two states took place at the June 13-15, 2000, and October 2-4, 2007 inter-Korean summits held in Pyongyang. In the first summit, the two Koreas “produced a joint declaration [to] serve as the basic document guiding peaceful coexistence and national unification on the Korean peninsula.”58 Both historic summits were a result of South Korea’s “sunshine policy,” which articulates three basic principles: that is, (1) engage the North on economic terms; (2) respect North Korea’s sovereignty; and (3) zero tolerance for North Korean aggression.59 Although the term “sunshine policy” was abandoned by the subsequent South Korean administration, the principles of engagement, dialogue, and cooperation are still very much part of South Korea’s policy toward the DPRK. The June 15, 2000 summit is historic because technically the two Koreas are still at war, and until that time a visit from the president of South Korea to Pyongyang was unthinkable. The “sunshine policy” created a plan for unification and peaceful co-existence by dismantling the Cold War structure of the two Koreas, which was based on mistrust and suspicion, and often sparked military confrontations.60 South Korea’s then-President Kim Dae-jung noted that, “the ‘Sunshine Policy’ … proved to be the only effective way to deal with isolated countries like North Korea.”61 This policy seeks to create incremental, and voluntary changes in North Korea for peace through reforms, reconciliation, exchanges, and cooperation. The policy goes beyond simple engagement; it also involves military deterrence, international collaboration, and domestic consensuses to unify the peninsula. North Korea has also given up on the idea of exclusive negotiations between North and South without foreign influence. After the June 15, 2000 declaration, North Korea has agreed to allow foreigners participate in their negotiations.

57 US Department of State, “Background Note: North Korea,” US Department of State February 2008, 15 May 2008 . 58  Chung-in Moon, “The Sunshine Policy and the Korean Summit: Assessments and Prospects,” The Future of North Korea, ed. Tsuneo Akaha (New York: Routledge, 2002) 26. 59  Chung-in Moon 26-46; Dae-Won Koh, “Dynamics of Inter-Korean Conflict and North Korea’s Recent Policy Changes: An Inter-Systemic View,” Asian Survey 44.3 (2004) 422-441; Hong Yung Lee, “South Korea in 2002: Multiple Political Dramas,” Asian Survey 43.1 (2003) 64-77; US Department of State, “Background Note: North Korea,” US Department of State February 2008, 15 May 2008 . 60 See Soon-young Hong, “Thawing Korea’s Cold War: The Path to Peace on Korean Peninsula,” Foreign Affairs (May-June, 1999): 8-12. 61 Kim Dae-jung, Korea and Asia: A Collection of Essays, Speeches of President Kim Dae-jung (Seul: The Kim Dae-jung Peace Foundation, 1994) 33.

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North Korea’s Relations with the Communist World While Albania’s foreign policy was very much determined by the Sino-Soviet split, North Korea was able to avoid becoming embroiled in this ideological conflict. Instead, the North maintained an equilibrium of sorts between China and the USSR, with minimum political risk and high economic advantages. Under the guise of Juche, Kim Il-Sung was able to keep his distance from both China and Soviet Union, while at the same time receiving aid from both of them. He strengthened these relationships by signing a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with both countries in July 1961.62 More specifically, between 1948-1984 the USSR provided $2.2 billion and China provided $900 million to North Korea.63 North Korea’s strategic and political significance between capitalism (the US and its allies) and socialism explains China’s and USSR’s desire to counterbalance US influence on the Korean peninsula by appealing to the North. However, like Hoxha, “Kim Il-Sung did not hide his dislike for the anti-Stalinization process of the 1950s, and relations between North Korea and the Soviet Union deteriorated markedly when Gorbachev launched his policies of glasnost and perestroika in the mid-1980s.”64 However, the Soviet Union continued to support Kim Il-Sung until its collapse because North Korea “[was] the most important bastion in the Far East in [Soviet Union’s] struggle against American and Japanese imperialism and Chinese revisionism.”65 North Korea also strongly believed in the principle of self-sufficiency because according to Kim IlSung, “Korean independence had been too hard won to simply hand over the reins of power to Beijing or Moscow.”66 The relationship between North Korea and its allies underwent serious reconfigurations when the Soviet Union (1990) and China (1992) established diplomatic relations. China’s new economic path was especially troublesome to North Korea, which claimed that, “the Chinese are no longer real communists. For them, money means everything, and money can be found in the South, so Beijing is ready to bow to the South.”67 Russia’s reforms toward democracy and a capitalist economy “made the North Korean leadership believe that every Russian 62  Ilpyong Kim, Historical Dictionary of North Korea (Lanham: The Scarecrow Press Inc., 2003) 115. 63 Samuel Kim, “North Korea and North East Asia in World Politics,” North Korea and Northeast Asia, ed. Samuel Kim and Tai Hwan Lee (Lanham: Rowman &Littlefield, 2002) 41. 64 Lintner, Great Leader, Dear Leader 82. 65 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, revised and updated (New York: Basic Books, 2001) 154. 66  Feffer, North Korea 35. Also see Buzo, The Guerilla Dynasty. 67  Monterey Institute of International Studies, “The DPRK Report 16,” Monterey Institute of International Studies January-February 1999, 15 May 2008 .

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step in bilateral relations was virtually anti-DPRK and was aimed at subverting the regime and introducing Russian-style reforms into that country.”68 With the end of Cold War, China took a more pragmatic approach to North Korea’s status and importance in calculating its foreign policy costs and benefits. Beijing began to formally support a strategy for peaceful reunification of the two Koreas, but as a confederation without changes in their domestic political regimes. China is particularly interested in maintaining the status quo, through financial aid, trade relations, and loans in order to avoid a regime collapse in the DPRK because it lies on its borders. Beijing has made it very clear to all of the major players involved (that is, South Korea, Japan, Russia, and the US) that an abrupt collapse of North Korea is in no one’s best interest because it would cause major chaos, turmoil, and a massive exodus of refugees.69 Chen Qimao explains China’s position as follows: China supports President Kim Il-Sung’s plan to reunify North Korea and South Korea in a Confederal republic of Koryo under the principle of ‘one country, one nation; two systems, two governments.’ This is not only because of China’s traditional friendship with North Korea but also because the Chinese leadership believes this policy meets the current situation of Korea and supports Korea’s national interest as well as the peace and stability of the region. By contrast, a dramatic change – which would be very dangerous and could easily turn into a conflict, even a war – would be a disaster for the Korean nation. Further it would threaten not only China’s security but the security of the entire Asia-Pacific region and even the world as well.70

Similar to China, Russia has also preferred a status quo policy toward North Korea. Although Russia has strongly disapproved of North Korea’s nuclear weapons development program, Russia has agreed with the Chinese position that any efforts to effectuate an abrupt regime change in the DPRK would destabilize the entire region. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Pyongyang in the summer of 2000 further reiterated Russia’s belief that gradual normalization of diplomatic relations between all of the players involved would be the most feasible policy to pursue.

68 Georgi Toloraya, “Russia and North Korea: Ten Years Later,” The Future of North Korea, ed. Tsuneo Akaha (New York: Routledge, 2002) 148. 69 Samuel S. Kim, “China and the Future of the Korean Peninsula,” The Future of North Korea, ed. Tsuneo Akaha (New York: Routledge, 2002) 125. 70  Chen Qimao, “The Role of the Great Powers in the Process of Korean Reunification,” Korean Unification: Implications for Northeast Asia, ed. Amos A. Jordan (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993) 70.

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North Korea’s Relations with the US Relations between the US and North Korea have historically been based on acrimony, conflict, military confrontation, extreme hostility, aggression, and suspicion. Since the onset of the Korean War in the 1950s, North Korea has been an explicit and perpetual target of US efforts to destabilize and topple the North Korean government. Indeed, US aggression toward the North ultimately contributed to the establishment of two separate Koreas, divided at the 38th parallel. The division created the modern state that has been labeled a pariah, rogue state, sponsor of terror, and more recently a constituent component of an “Axis of Evil.” The DPRK has always perceived the US as a mortal threat to its sovereignty, identity, nationhood, ideology, and political system. Throughout the duration of the Cold War, there were no substantive, cooperative, diplomatic “relations” between the US and North Korea. After the fall of the Soviet Union and dissolution of the communist bloc in the early 1990s, as well as the termination of communism as a viable template for world order, North Korea had to alter its traditional policies and relations with the state system. From 1948-1991 North Korea had been both domestically and internationally isolationist; with the end of the Cold War and the death of Kim Il-Sung in the mid 1990s, North Korea had to readjust to the new global order. The North’s willingness to have a dialogue with the US and its other major nemeses, that is South Korea and Japan, can be found in the Agreed Framework of 1994, which was seen as a laying the groundwork for détente between the North and its enemies.71 This agreement called for North Korea to suspend its offensive nuclear program in exchange for two light water nuclear reactors for civilian purposes. In addition, the North was to receive up to half a million tons of heavy fuel oil from the US, South Korea, and Japan. Although the US delivered the heavy fuel oil, it did not deliver the two light water nuclear reactors due to the US Republican-dominated Congress’s refusal. Other aspects of the Agreement that the Bush administration subsequently disregarded after categorizing North Korea as part of an “Axis of Evil” were: normalization of political and economic relations between the US and North Korea, opening liaison offices in country, and upgrading their diplomatic relations to the ambassadorial level. The US had also promised, in the Agreed Framework, not to employ nuclear weapons against the DPRK; however, both the Clinton and Bush administrations made overt threats of employing nuclear weapons against North Korea. The relations between the two countries further deteriorated in 2002, when the Bush administration categorized North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism. This classification has effectively prevented North Korea from engaging the world economy because of the various

71 Arms Control Association, “Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” Arms Control Association 21 October, 1994, 15 May 2008 < http://www.armscontrol.org/documents/af.asp>.

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sanctions that attach to being labeled a terrorist rogue state, and part of “axis of evil” by the reigning hegemonic superpower.72 North Korea’s Relations With Other State and Non-State Actors The EU-North Korea relationship has grown since 2000, after a number of European states established diplomatic relationships with North Korea. Since then the EU has provided substantial humanitarian aid to the DPRK and to the Korean Peninsula Development Organization. In May 2001, EU representatives visited the DPRK in an effort to ease tensions between the US, South Korea, and North Korea. In this meeting with EU representatives, Kim Jong-Il promised to halt nuclear testing, to visit South Korea, and agreed to a formal declaration that the EU and North Korea would establish diplomatic relations.73 However, none of the promises became reality. Another attempt to normalize relations was carried out by Japan. On September 17 2002, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi visited Pyongyang in an effort to try and normalize relations. During their meeting, Kim Jong Il publicly apologized for the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea, and promised to release any remaining survivors in North Korea. The Japanese promised to lift sanctions on trade and investment, apologized for brutal Japanese colonialism, and offered to provide reparations for Japanese colonialism in the amount of $10-12 billion.74 Although numerous states and entities have approached North Korea in an attempt to normalize relations, the results have proven negligible. North Korea has a pronounced policy of promising a range of changes in exchange for aid and international recognition while at the same time pursuing its own agendas – in particular its development of offensive nuclear weapons capacity and maintaining an isolationist posture (domestically). In addition, the regime systematically avoids being part of the society of states by not signing, flagrantly violating, and/ or withdrawing from international treaties and protocols. For example, the DPRK is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime, Chemical Weapons Convention,75 and the majority of Human Rights Conventions that have been established by the international community.76 Also, North Korea has withdrawn 72  Beal 80-83. 73 Reinhard Drifte, “The European Union and North Korea,” The Future of North Korea, ed. Tsuneo Akaha (New York: Routledge, 2002) 157-170. 74  For an in-depth discussion of North Korean-Japanese relationship see: Tsuneo Akaha, “Japan’s Policy Toward North Korea: Interests and Options,” The Future of North Korea, ed. Tsuneo Akaha (New York: Routledge, 2002) 77-94. 75 US Department of State, “Background Note: North Korea,” February 2008, 15 May 2008 . 76  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties,” 9 June 2004, 15 May 2008 < http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf>.

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from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (January 11, 2003) and once again pursued the development of offensive nuclear weapons, successfully detonating a nuclear device in 2006. Furthermore, the regime has been accused of committing profound human rights violations, for example, “slave” labor, experimentation on prisoners, torture, and public executions, among other behaviors and practices condemned by the international community.77 Such flagrant violations of international norms can only be possible when a particular state is completely uninterested in being part of the society of states. Although dictated by different circumstances, as in the case of the Hoxha regime, foreign isolationism enables the North Korean regime to maintain absolute control of its population and dictate foreign policy to suit its personal interests and needs. Burma Unlike Albania and North Korea, Ne Win’s “Burmese Way to Socialism” largely promoted independence and neutrality toward the West, the USSR, the communist bloc, and China.78 Ne Win’s foreign policy suggested that he was more political rather than ideological in his approach to international affairs. He had deep-seated antagonism toward the West and its support for Koumintang (KMT) troops in Burma, distrusted India, and feared China’s communist influence in his country. Such intense and suspicious feelings toward his neighbors and the West did not allow for dialogue, cooperation, trade and/or economic development. Because the junta in Burma never had legitimacy or a clear ideology, it adopted a stance of cautious neutrality in its foreign relations and policy.79 The groundwork for this posture was initiated in the mid-1950s when U Nu, in conjunction with Indian Prime Minister Nehru, Indonesian President Sukarno, Yugoslav President Tito, and Egyptian President Nasser founded the Movement of Non-Aligned States.80 Once in power, Ne Win was guardedly responsive to both China and the USSR, maintaining a balance in order to avoid providing China with legitimate excuses to intervene. Although China had expressed sympathy for communist rebels in Burma, and actively worked to persuade Burma “to abandon its strict nonaligned

77 See British Broadcasting Corporation, “Minister discusses North Korea rights,” 11 September 2004, 15 May 2008 ; British Broadcasting Corporation, “Country Profile: North Korea,” 18 April 2008, 15 May 2008 < http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/country_profiles/1131421.stm>. 78 Robert A. Holmes, “Burmese Domestic Policy: The Politics of Burmanization,” Asian Survey 7.3 (March 1967): 188-197. 79  M. Aung-Thwin, “Burma’s Myth of Independence,” Independent Burma at Forty Years, ed. Josef Silversein (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1989). 80  British Broadcasting Corporation, “Timeline: Burma” 12 October 2007, 22 January 2008 .

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policy in international affairs,”81 Soviet influence and support for Rangoon helped balance the power struggle. The junta had been outspokenly against the West, but at the same time Ne Win accepted small arms deliveries from the US until 1971. The official explanation for such transaction was a balance from old loans. Although neutrality was a wise choice for Burma at the time, Ne Win’s heightened xenophobia transformed neutrality into profound fear, wariness, and animosity toward all foreigners, and consequently these sentiments laid the groundwork for Burma’s isolationism and militarization. In the realm of WMD, it is suspected that Ne Win acquired chemical weapons, and even today the junta has not ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention.82 The military regime’s true political substance, meaning, identity has become more apparent in the postcyclone events in Burma; that is, the junta will stop at nothing to remain in power. Domestic and foreign isolationism has been and remains absolutely necessary for the junta to retain its grip on power. Indeed, the regime has made it quite clear that it will remain isolationist at all cost, including the unnecessary loss of life and suffering that the people of Burma are subjected to because of Burma’s refusal to substantively engage the state system.83 Burma’s Relations with the West and India Once the junta destroyed all domestic political opponents in 1962, Ne Win set his sights on foreign philanthropic organizations, aid organizations, and foreigners working in Burma. Ne Win asked the Ford and Asia foundations, and all teachers associated with these philanthropic organizations, to leave Burma within six months. He also discontinued the Fulbright and British Council programs, which had provided exchange of students and teachers. He limited the teaching of English to middle school and above, which was a sharp difference with the past where learning English was encouraged and started in kindergarten. He also suspended all Peace Corps and British information libraries activities; and in 1964 discontinued an $84 million highway project that was being financed by the US. In addition the government severely limited travel within and outside the country. With the exception of sending some students and scholars to receive training in the USSR, all other scholarly exchanges became practically non-existent. Western organizations and influence were not the only targets of expulsion. During the 1960s Chinese, Indian, and any other foreign influences on the country were expelled. For example, 200 Chinese shoe factory workers were told to leave 81 Robert A. Holmes, “The Sino-Burmese Rift: A Failure for China,” Orbis 16.1 (Spring 1972): 17. 82 Global Security, “Myanmar Special Weapons,” Global Security No Date, 15 May 2008 . 83  British Broadcasting Corporation, “Burma ‘guilty of inhuman action,’” British Broadcasting Corporation 17 May 2008, 18 May 2008 .

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immediately because the Burmese were able to handle the work themselves, and in February 1963, the new socialist government passed the “Enterprise Nationalization Law,” which basically nationalized all major industries. Over the summer this law was completely implemented, and all private industries were prohibited to set up new factories. Since English and Indian nationals owned most of these businesses, they were the ones hit hardest by this new state policy. The nationalization process did not stop there; by August 1963, Burma had nationalized all consumer industries such as small stores, wholesale stores, and warehouses. Because of the British occupation of Burma, Indians had enjoyed a privileged status, dominating large businesses and agriculture; these drastic changes in state policy significantly harmed their position. Although after independence the Indian influence over Burma diminished, Indian businessmen remained the most successful entrepreneurs in the country. Louis Walinsky explained the situation as follows: Because the Indians and, to a lesser extent, the Chinese find it difficult to win acceptance and status in Burmese society, their motivation to achievement in the economic world is far stronger than that of the Burmese and has spurred them to innovation and enterprise as well as hard work. These resident alien groups have made a contribution to Burma’s economic development out of all proportion to their numbers (in 1960 there were 500,000 Indians and 300,000 Chinese in a population of 20,000,000) and they possess the potential for even greater contribution. This potential they have not been permitted to realize. Indians particularly have been discriminated against, even harassed, at every turn, whether in citizenship, in government employment, in the application of regulations, in the issuance of licenses, in the extension of loans, in permission to make remittances abroad, and in the repatriation of capital assets.84

These discriminatory practices were made legal under the Revolutionary Council’s “Burmanization” program in the 1950’s. Under this policy, efforts were made to place private foreign owned enterprises in the hands of the Burmese people. More specifically, foreigners could no longer own land and were prohibited from sending money home, even though this had been a practice for many years before the junta. In fact, by the time Ne Win begun purging Indians and Pakistani nationals in 1963, every precaution was taken to prevent foreigners from taking their savings, including x-raying their stomachs at the airport.85 Licenses for business and practicing professionals, including doctors, were severely limited. It did not take long before foreigners were expunged en masse from Burma. Although in the summer of 1963 the foreign migration was low, by 1964 the numbers reached close to 2,500 foreigners leaving weekly. The repatriation of foreigners, most of 84 Louis Walinsky, Economic Development in Burma, 1951-1960 (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1962) 393-394. 85  Cady 242.

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them Indians, but a good portion of them also of Chinese and Pakistani descent, was so intense that India had to charter ships to bring its citizens home. Many others foreigners had to leave Burma on foot across the difficult terrain of the Burmese-Indian border. This massive exodus to their country of origin was not only a result of Burmese nationalist policies but also state deportation. Many of these repatriated individuals were at one time successful entrepreneurs whose businesses were nationalized and licenses revoked.86 After 100,000 Indian nationals had left the country by September 1964, Foreign Minister Swaran Singh met with General Ne Win to discuss the situation. They agreed to adhere to the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” which would coordinate their respective state policies. In this meeting Ne Win maintained that, “his government was pursuing domestic goals based on a socialism that was not discriminatory against foreigners, but applied equally to all.”87 After the meeting the two parties agreed that the nationals wishing to remain in Burma “must merge themselves with the common people in building a socialist economy.”88 In the same year, the socialist/military government moved to restrict the entry of foreign reporters and visitors. The justification for this new policy was to avoid doing “housecleaning” in the public eye. Most visas were limited to 24 hours, and visitors who did gain visas were limited to Rangoon, while journalists who wrote unfavorable articles about the regime were denied reentry. Limitations were also placed on citizens as well. Burmese nationals who corresponded with foreigners were declared suspect. Foreign diplomats were subject to very strict rules; for example, they had to receive special permission from the state if they wished to leave Rangoon, and they had to declare the purpose as well as the specific people they would meet outside the capital. Party officials were also subject to a very strict set of rules. If Party officials sought to speak to a foreign national or issue/ accept an invitation from a foreigner they had to seek specific permission from the Party, and upon return they had to give specific details on the conversations they had with foreigners. Sino-Burmese Relations Although the process of nationalization in Burma seemed to be heavily against Indian/Western influences, the Chinese were also negatively affected. According to Robert Holmes, the Chinese entrepreneurs living in Burma did not leave at the same rate as Indians and the Westerners because they did not want to live in Communist China. In addition, during the nationalization of private owned business 86  The New York Times, July 24, 1964 cited in Holmes, “Burmese Domestic Policy” 192. 87  Holmes, “Burmese Domestic Policy” 192. 88  India News, September 6, 1964, quoted in Holmes, “Burmese Domestic Policy” 192.

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two Chinese banks were taken over by the Burmese government—the Bank of Communication and the Bank of China.89 According to Burmese government, the Chinese had exercised excessive control of Burmese affairs by Chinese control of loans and business practices. The authorities in Beijing were faced with a clear dilemma. They could either choose to voice their discontent with the Burmese annexation of their state-owned banks or remain quiet and be content with the fact that the West no longer had a decisive influence in Burmese affairs. Beijing decided to opt for the latter, and chose to offer the two banks as a “gift” from the Chinese people. Burma profusely thanked China for this great gift, but it also made it quite clear that it had no intention of unconditionally supporting Chinese foreign policy in the international arena or allowing it to spread its influence within Burmese borders. Indeed, Burma set up strict standards of school curriculum throughout the country, thus making it illegal for pro-Chinese schools to teach about Mao TseTung or offer courses in Marxism-Leninism. At the same time that Ne Win was busy clearing up any foreign influence in Burma, the communist insurgency in the country was gaining momentum and support from China. In April 1963, the Burmese government approved legislation that would give amnesty to rebels who gave themselves up before July 1963. This program was supposed to “speed socialist construction and solidarity of the country.”90 The problem was that the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) was split between the “Red Flag” and “White Flag” factions. Neither of these two factions had Beijing’s support until the two factions settled their differences. Upon the inauguration of the amnesty program, China encouraged both factions of the communist party to enter into negotiations with the Burmese government. Indeed, Beijing sent about 30 exiled “White Flag” rebels to negotiate with Rangoon. The negotiations were brief and unsuccessful. The government proceeded by arresting the four representatives and an additional 400 members of the pro-China party, the National United Front. Rangoon was well aware of the affinity between the BCP and Peking, but opted to not voice its disapproval of this relationship. The BCP lacked unity and organization; therefore, Rangoon tolerated it because at best BCP was a minor irritation.91 There was one incident in Sino-Burmese relations over this issue that threatened to destabilize relations between the countries; on a broadcast by Peking radio, both in English and Burmese, the Chinese read a letter sent by the BCP, which highlighted the following: We shall continue to support, as we have always done in the past government’s [Burma’s] foreign policy of peace and neutrality … Furthermore the Communist 89  Martin Wilbur, “Southeast Asia Between India and China,” Journal of International Affairs, 10.1 (October 1956) 95. 90  Holmes, “Burmese Domestic Policy” 193. 91  Brian Crozier, “The Communist Struggle for Power in Burma,” The World Today, 20.3 (March 1964): 105-106.

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Party of Burma … will strive for the establishment of a new Burma of real independence.92

Through a government-controlled newspaper, the Burmese government was quick to respond, stressing that: The Red Chinese broadcast of a message sent from the illegal organization in Burma is most unjustified. A matter of this kind, which could bring about a situation calling for termination of diplomatic relations between two countries, should not be taken with complacency. It is therefore desirable that Red China give up its dirty game of fire in one hand and water in the other.93

Although both governments did not take an official stance on this issue, it became obvious that China was not pleased with Ne Win’s Socialism and that Burma certainly did not welcome any Chinese interference in its internal affairs.94 Burma’s Neutrality in Foreign Affairs While Ne Win contained the Chinese influence in Burma and fought the communists in the north, at the same time he tried to remain impartial toward the USSR. Burma’s relations with the USSR, which had been far from friendly during the caretaker regime, had improved substantially after 1963. Soviet technicians were permitted to return to Burma and finish projects (for example, a stadium, a luxury hotel, and the Rangoon Technical institute) promised by Khrushchev (19561957). However, six other Soviet “gifts” to the Burmese people were canceled. The USSR’s renewed affability with Burma was only partially based on Ne Win’s sympathy for Marxism. Moscow believed that Burma could provide a gateway for Soviet influence to Southeast Asia and, more importantly, would counterbalance Chinese attempts to increase its influence in the region. Soviet abandonment of the BCP demonstrated that in this particular case religious adherence to Marxism was secondary, and that containing the Chinese was essential. The increased American presence in Southeast Asia in the mid-1960s convinced Ne Win that a nonalignment posture was the safest foreign policy strategy: the US military was rapidly becoming involved in South Vietnam, the entry of South Korean forces into the conflict, and the use of Thailand’s territory as military base to bomb North Vietnamese forces prompted Rangoon to believe that a third world war was rapidly approaching. Due to this belief, Ne Win sought to distance his 92  New China Agency, September 30, 1964, quoted in Holmes, “Burmese Domestic Policy” 195. 93  The New York Times, No 1, 1965, quoted in Holmes, “Burmese Domestic Policy” 195. 94 Robert A. Holmes, “China-Burma Relations since the Rift,” Asian Survey 12.8 (August 1972): 686-700.

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government as much as possible from all players, including regional groups in Southeast Asia. For example, Burma declined to participate in a completely nonpolitical Asian agricultural conference because it did not want to associate with other players. In addition, Burma refused to take out a $3 million interest-free agricultural Chinese loan. The reasoning for this decline was to prove that Burma was neutral and would not allow Chinese experts to enter its territory to implement the project.95 In his efforts to appear as balanced as possible, Ne Win accepted an invitation to visit Washington in September 1966, with the intent to replicate his visits to Moscow and Peking. Ne Win’s visit to the US was not greeted with any type of overt enthusiasm; Washington had no elaborate reception, and no serious economic or political talks were scheduled. At the dinner reception, US President Johnson praised Burma’s neutralism based on nationalistic purposes, and tried to link Burma’s stance with other Southeast Asian countries’ quest for freedom and the fight against foreign interference and aggression. A very prudent Ne Win had little to say in return, but highlighted the fact that his visit would contribute to a better understanding between the US and Asian countries. With the exception of some renewed tentative contacts with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, this visit did not visibly alter US-Burmese relations.96 Current Allies of the Junta Present-day Burma has made some progress in opening up the economy to foreign investment and trade. Cross-border trade with China has grown substantially. China has financed renovations to upgrade Burma’s infrastructure (for example, roads and railroad connections), and has been a strong supporter of the SLORC and SPDC, even though subjected to intense pressure not to do so from the US and its allies. China has also been active militarily in helping the junta; from 19901995, China provided more than $1.6 billion in arms to the Burmese government, and helped the Burmese modernize their Hianggyi naval base.97 Such actions are perceived by many observers as part of a larger Chinese security strategy to establish a strong presence in the Indian Ocean region, specifically gaining access to the Strait of Malacca.98 China has also been a great source of financial assistance. In 1998 it was reported that China helped Burma pay some of its foreign debt after external state reserves 95 Robert A. Holmes, “Burma’s Foreign Policy Toward China Since 1962,” Pacific Affairs 45.2 (1972): 240-254. 96 The American Presidency Project, “Joint Statement Following Discussions with General Ne Win of Burma,” The American Presidency Project 9 September 1966, 15 May 2008 . 97 Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, “Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean Region,” Maritime Studies (Red Hill: ACT, 1996) 21-22. 98  Yosef Bodansky, Beijing’s Surge for the Straits of Malacca, Special Strategic Studies Supplement (Huston: Freeman Center for Strategic Studies, 1995) 12-13.

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had hit $90 million. Beijing was quick to give a $150 million loan to Burma, regardless of the fact that it was the Chinese that suffered the most financial losses when the Burmese government had halted imports and nationalized Chinese banks and deported Chinese workers, businessmen, and professionals. These funds were given in addition to other smaller loans and aid packages targeted for specific state projects.99 In a broader sense, such aid has made possible the relative stability of the SPDC government. Burma’s close political, military, and economic ties with Beijing serve to reassure the SPDC that, when faced with intense international pressure against human rights abuses, in the worst case scenario China will support the Burmese government, and in the best case scenario China will help Burma develop and prosper. Today, the Sino-Burmese financial relationship is significant, with trade worth over $209 billion in 2005. China has significant investments in gas and oil, and is working to build gas pipelines stretching across Burma into the southern border of China. In addition, there are over 3000 Chinese firms working in Burma. Ironically, relations with India have also gained momentum. Although they are mainly focused on the exploration and extraction of natural gas, this is a major break with “The Burmese Way to Socialism” which expelled all Indian influence form the country in the 1960s and 1970s. There is a general sense that Burma’s neighbors would like to see a more liberalized and cooperative regime. In 2003, the ASEAN countries claimed that they would expel Burma from the organization if it did not free Aung San Suu Kyi.100 While most Southeast Asian states would like to see progress in Burma, China’s main concern is to maintain a stable state. If Burma were to become unstable or worse a failed state, China would be faced with hundreds of thousands of immigrants crossing its borders (as in the case of the collapse of the North Korean state). The fact that Burma is made up of highly diverse groups of people, many of them separatists, would make the situation even more volatile. Thus, although China is facing strong pressure from the international community to put pressure on Burma to open up and liberalize, their main priority is to have a stable and unified neighbor. Discussion In light of the three case studies, it appears that foreign isolationism enables a regime to remain intact in face of external pressures to conform, liberalize, and engage. Whether it is ideology, foreign aggression, or avoiding conflict, foreign isolationism in authoritarian states serves to reinforce the regime’s legitimacy, 99 Economist Intelligence Unit, “Country Report: Myanmar (Burma),” Economist Intelligence Unit 2nd Quarter (1999): 18-19. 100  British Broadcasting Corporation, “Burma Faces ASEAN Expulsion,” British Broadcasting Corporation 20 July 2003, 15 May 2008 .

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viability, and power, both domestically and internationally. While short-term, concentrated efforts serve to preserve the integrity of the state, long-term seclusion from the world community produces long-term negative consequences. As it has become obvious in all three cases, long-term seclusion and limitation of trade impoverishes a state, causing immense suffering to the population on a social, economic, and political level. All three regimes in question required that their populations practice extreme forms of self-denial and “heroism” instead of seeking material progress, comfort, wealth, and political freedom. While political independence and self-sufficiency can be positive for a state’s wellbeing, permanently and religiously subscribing to such policy can have deleterious consequences for the people. In isolationist states, seclusion is so vital to the existence of the regime that its foreign isolationist policy will not be altered, even in face of massive human tragedy as in the case of cyclone victims in Burma and starvation in North Korea and Albania. Because of the very nature of the regimes, that is, their appetite for control and absolute power, it becomes imperative that regimes employ brute force to maintain control. The draconian measures enforced in all three states to control information, communication, and dissent lie in sharp contrast to international norms of human freedom and rights, and this is one of the major reasons why isolationist states prefer to avoid entering into treaties and agreements with a society of states. Another reason why these particular states avoid international agreements is their defense strategy. Due to their militant foreign policy, these countries resort to extreme forms of defense, especially in acquiring offensive WMD capacity. All three isolationist regimes are believed to have accumulated considerable amounts of chemical weapons (although democratic Albania declared and destroyed its chemical weapons stockpile), and North Korea has detonated a nuclear device in addition to stockpiling vast quantities of chemical weapons. These regimes do not subscribe to collective security; they lack clear allies, cherish political independence, and constantly fear foreign invasion and aggression. Because of their revolutionary stance, polemical warfare, and militant ideology, these regimes become isolated, secluded, and deeply distrust anyone outside their borders. Through military, economic, and political self-sufficiency these isolated states believe they are better able to control the population and ultimately prolong and strengthen their power. Although this is true to a certain extent, the heavy demands that self-sufficiency puts on the budget, their lack of trade, foreign investment, and alliances creates a situation that is difficult if not impossible to sustain in the longterm. Foreign isolationism weakens the state politically and economically, which in turn is detrimental to the regime itself.

Chapter 6

Conclusion: The Viability of Isolationist States Introduction As illustrated by the case studies under examination, isolationism as the basis of a state’s policy becomes a liability and undermines the wellbeing of the state when it is implemented as a long-term strategy. Due to the fact that authoritarian regimes are comprised of a small cadre of individuals (the military junta in Burma) or a single individual (Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il in North Korea, Enver Hoxha in Albania) that have the potential to unilaterally impose state policies that are divorced from the larger social, political, and economic realities that exist outside of the state – that is, a globalized, interdependent system of states in process of developing into a society of states – such regimes run the risk of seriously damaging their capacity to maintain a viable state. In particular, the economy is significantly and negatively impacted when a state does not engage the system of states. In addition, a globalized world that is immersed in information sharing, humanitarian aid, international cooperation, development, human rights, and individualism and freedom is utterly incompatible with an isolationist as well as authoritarian form of governance. Economic deprivation, impoverishment, famine, lack of healthcare and political freedom, poor infrastructure, no or limited access to material goods (basic and luxury), no individual freedoms, and the like, will gradually take a detrimental toll on isolationist states. The case of Albania in 1992 has proven, and the present cases of Burma and North Korea, support this contention. While isolationism (in theory) enables states to perhaps avoid the devastating effects of international conflict and war, the extreme stress that it imposes on the state, and the economy eventually destroys the bases power and legitimacy of the regime. Isolationism, in limited form, could perhaps be beneficial for a liberal democracy, for example, the US and Switzerland, to protect their interests in not becoming involved in foreign entanglements such as wars, restrictive treaties, and international obligations while remaining focused on their own economic health and prosperity. Isolationism along these lines, which, in reality is more along the lines of neutrality, is an informed decision made in an open forum where all sides of the issue are voiced and the decision is made through a democratic process. Most importantly, limited isolationism/neutrality as practiced by liberal democracies does not have a subtext that involves perpetuating the absolute and unlimited power of a particular person or group; when liberal democracies have engaged in isolationist tendencies, it has been done for the benefit of the state

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and the people. Foreign isolationism in the case of liberal democracies is flexible. Depending on the circumstances, for example, international events and domestic needs, liberal democracies adopt their foreign policies to suit particular needs. For example, the US did in fact become involved in both WWI and WWII, despite domestic actors calling for non-entanglement because participation was in the long-term interests of the state. In the case of authoritarian regimes, isolationism is rigid, and only in extreme, absolute necessity (such as in the case of overwhelming natural disasters in Burma) will such regimes allow any type of foreign intervention within or outside of its borders. In authoritarian regimes, because of the very nature of the political system, that is, closed, rigid, absolute, a police state, domestic and foreign isolationism is carried out simultaneously. The combined effect of longterm isolationism can be quite damaging to the self-interest of the leadership, and is detrimental to their societies because comprehensive isolationism is simply not sustainable. Complete isolationism, as manifested in authoritarian regimes such as Hoxha’s Albania, has led to mass poverty and underdevelopment, overall and acute harm to the state’s political, social, and economic infrastructure, and the eventual demise of the authoritarian regime in power. Isolationist states are, therefore, almost “primitive” states in their relationship to the international system of states. That is, unlike the Italian Renaissance city states that were engaged in “learning” from their experience with perpetual warfare, pervasive distrust, and resort to violence as the singular means to arrogate, preserve, and augment state power, isolationist regimes remain locked in what can be termed a pre-modern, pre-diplomatic political context, wherein a society of states cannot develop because isolationist states in the true sense of the term do not engage in a system of states. The rulers of all forms of political organization zealously seek longevity and stability. Longevity and stability buttress the legitimacy of regimes; yet in the case of isolationist states, longevity and stability surpass legitimacy, becoming the prominent values and ends that define the state. Loss of legitimacy results in gradual undermining of the very thing that isolationist regimes seek out that is, to maintain and perpetuate power. Stability, longevity, and legitimacy become institutionalized when political forms of organization from which power is exercised and obeyed are standardized and made routine. When this transpires, the political system becomes so ingrained in the lives of the populace that it becomes a formative component of individual and collective identity. The regime and the political ideology that underlies the political system become “normal,” “natural,” and “correct.” Once the system is accepted, the regime in power is able to mobilize large sectors of the population to participate in the system.

 See British Broadcasting Corporation, “Burma Policy Costs Lives, says US,” British Broadcasting Corporation 31 May 2008, 17 June 2008 < http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ hi/asia-pacific/7428916.stm>.  Tarifa 441.

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In the case of isolationist states, the basis of legitimacy, that is, cult of personality, authoritarianism, absolutism, autarky, xenophobia, puritanical ideological posture, non or limited engagement with others, to name a few, are constructed on fragile, temporal, and negative bases. Authoritarian isolationist regimes are, in general, only able to temporarily convert raw power to legitimate authority, if at all. This conversion happened in the case of communist Albania, has remained the case in North Korea, and did not occur in Burma. Rule through fear, force, unconditional submission, over-indoctrination, sociopolitical and economic isolation, and other totalitarian methods of rule have the effect of undermining legitimacy, stability, and longevity by fomenting mass alienation, deep disappointment, and agitation. If we compare the three regimes, we find, to differing degrees, that each believer of utopia, that is, Hoxha, Kim Il Sung, and Ne Win, premised legitimacy (and by default authority, stability, and longevity) on being the singular representatives of faith in the utopian vision to be implemented in the respective states. Having faith in utopia was equivalent to having faith in the leader, regime, state, leadership, and cult of personality. Utopia was premised on inaugurating a brave new world defined by ideals of freedom, justice and happiness for all. The ideals embodied in the utopian promise to free people from oppression and exploitation, and to guarantee every individual the opportunity to be a part of something larger than themselves, while effective in the short term do not provide a long term basis for stability and prosperity. Due to the fact that the regimes simply could not deliver on the utopian promise, legitimacy had to find alternative and somewhat more stable (though temporal) bases of authority. Faith is based on ignorance; by keeping the populace isolated regimes were able to prolong their viability, and in the case of Albania survive longer than should have been the case given the devastating effects that isolationism had on the state’s and polity’s wellbeing. By proffering a puritanical ideology isolated from comparison or critique from the outside, ideology becomes not only the language of political discourse, but it also becomes a potent legitimating device utilized to persuade the polity that the system of power embodied in the regime and the leader is legitimate. Within the context of isolationism, ideology thus seeks to persuade the people that the system in place is the best and the only option for society. State action thus becomes legitimate to the extent that it reflects the will of the ruler, because the ruler becomes the source of legitimacy. Instead of the leadership reflecting the state and the people, the state reflects and becomes an instrument of the leadership. Questions and Hypotheses As discussed in Chapter 1, this study views isolationism through a liberal theoretical lens. While political realism contends that security and military power/capacity are  See Alfred G. Meyer, “The Functions of Ideology in the Soviet Political System,” Soviet Studies 17 (1966): 273-85.

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the main driving forces of state policy, liberalism contends that it is the preferences of the elites in power (as well as security concerns and military capacity) that drives state behavior and informs domestic and foreign policy. This study maintains that states do not necessarily and rationally strive for maximum security and power as realism assumes, but rather that states seek to pursue particular interpretations and variations of security, power, and welfare, as defined by a particular ruling group or individual. Because coercive power in authoritarian regimes lies in the hands of a group of people or an individual, it becomes the prerogative of the group or individual in power to define and implement state policy. State interests, therefore, are subject to a particular group/individual in power; in the case of Hoxha, the Kims, and Ne Win isolationism was perceived to be a viable and effective means to sustain state power and identity even though immured in an inescapable interactive, interdependent, globalized world (economically, politically, socially) already in place. What is clearly irrational under a pure power politics rubric did in fact occur in the cases of North Korea, Burma and Albania; that is, states pursued polices that were inherently and unalterably harmful to their security and power interests. In light of the case studies examined, the initial questions and hypotheses posed can be addressed. First, why do states self-impose isolationism and opt out of the international system, and what, if anything, do they gain by being isolationist? The hypothesis held that if a sovereign state chooses to opt out of the international system, then the gain of doing so (for that state) is greater than the loss of opting out. The state gains short-term internal political stability at the cost long-term economic stability and prosperity. An isolationist regime gains political and military power, overriding the losses incurred from participation in the international arena. After examining domestic and international isolationism in authoritarian regimes, it appears that isolationist states value short-term domestic stability at the expense of long-term economic and political gains for the state and the ruling elite. A particular regime chooses to opt-out of the international system because doing so allows for the necessary conditions to obtain in order for a regime to exercise absolute power within the state. Isolationism not only provides a regime with supreme domestic military and political power, but not having to abide by established and agreed upon international norms pertaining to human rights, proliferation, militarization, and the like renders the regime’s authority absolute. In regards to foreign isolationism in authoritarian regimes, the explanation is more complicated. In the case of Albania it was not security that drove state policy toward isolationism, but it was ideology and a fanatical belief in unadulterated sovereignty and hyper-nationalism. After terminating diplomatic and strategic relationships with it allies and trading partners, especially Yugoslavia, the USSR, and China, Hoxha accused them of trying to exploit Albania, to use, for instance, Albania as a military base to further other states’ interest that were not in line with best interests of Albania and pure Marxist-Leninist thought. Hoxha decreed that severing ties

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with faux allies and other non-Marxist-Leninist states was necessary in order to preserve the communist revolution/ cause from foreign revisionism. In order to implement both domestic and foreign isolationism, Hoxha opted to base the regime on self-reliance as the fundamental principle of the country’s strategy for survival and economic development. At the same time, by disengaging from all major allies, Albania made itself quite vulnerable in terms of security and economy. Without major allies and without being part of a particular group of collective security and trading states, Albania could have been easily invaded and occupied if any of the “imperialists” or “revisionists” decided to do so. Moreover, Hoxha’s wish to make Albania a perfect socialist state failed miserably due to poor planning, paranoia, limited and later on virtually non-existent trade, and lack of investments (foreign and domestic). In the case of North Korea, regime survival is the most important guiding principle when conducting domestic and foreign policy. To attain this goal, North Korea has demonstrated that it will not stop at nothing, including, among other things, famine/starvation, imprisonment, exile, and/or execution of dissidents, rampant human rights violations, and breaking international law in order to possess weapons of mass destruction, to maintain the absolute power of the state. At the end of the Cold War, North Korea has become even more politically isolated because of its pursuit of nuclear capabilities and international sanctions against the regime. On the other hand, the regime has become more economically open because it has diversified both legal and illegal trade in order to remain economically and politically viable. Kim Il Sung and then Kim Jong Il have not been as myopic and fundamental in their belief of absolute isolationism as in the case of Hoxha’s Albania. While the North’s domestic isolationism is one of the most absolute in modern history, second perhaps to Albania, complete international isolationism is not pursued by North Korea. Due to its strategic, political, and geographical significance, the regime has enjoyed the support of both China and the USSR/ Russia. The Burmese state isolated because of strategic reasons and the junta’s desire for absolute control of the country. At the time when Ne Win took over the country, he believed that Burma was being subjected to Chinese aggression and influence, and that Burma would eventually become a Maoist country. In addition, he believed that a strong national government would halt the vast Indian influence in Burma’s domestic affairs. Burma had already chosen to be part of the Non-Alignment Movement under U Nu because of its powerful neighbors and competing forces within and outside the country. Once Ne Win took power, dedication to neutralism and extreme xenophobia combined with the junta’s determinism to stay in power at any and all costs created an isolated and deeply impoverished state. In addition to pursuing isolationism for strategic purposes in the region, the regime also aimed at keeping the country together and controlling all separatist movements. Ne Win was determined to stop any attempts to break up Burma, eliminate foreign middlemen in the commercial sphere, and establish state control over the economy for nationalistic purposes. Burma’s policies, however, proved deleterious to

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the state’s wellbeing and power. First, members of the Burmese Revolutionary Council, headed by General Ne Win, displayed a high level of nationalism and xenophobia. Second, while “the Burmese Way to Socialism” intended to create an independent and economically viable Burma, at least in the official rhetoric, in reality this policy created the blueprint for an economically and politically isolated Burma. The socialist nuance that the Burmese economy eventually took coupled with complete isolationism was more a result of unplanned circumstances and the junta’s desire for plenary control of the country. The second question that this book posed was, how are isolationist states able to justify and implement isolationist policy? The hypothesis was that if an isolationist regime is able to exercise absolute control over the internal affairs of a given state, then that regime is able to create a sense of self-glorification and “purity” (nationalism, cultural, racial, political, social) which would be otherwise contaminated, diluted, and/or effaced by external influences and interference. Isolationist regimes make economic and political isolation a priority for state survival. All three regimes under examination in this study came to power at a time when each country was facing extreme external and internal turmoil. The regimes used hyper-nationalism, indigenous struggles for independence, and self-determination as a basis of legitimacy for their isolationist policies. These three states’ historical traditions of occupation and national determination, in conjunction with antipathy or hostility toward foreigners and a profound regard for their particular culture, language, religion, and traditions, enabled isolationist regimes to obtain, secure, and perpetuate power. The use of these ideas and practices has enabled the three regimes in question to implement almost complete forms of domestic and international isolationism. They have generated legitimacy and justification for claiming and consolidating absolute power premised on isolationist and hypernationalist precepts. Yet the Albanian, North Korean, and Burmese people are not organically predisposed to being isolationist. Rather, isolationism has proven to be an effective means of asserting political control over the masses. Leaders find legitimacy by reaching into a period of the past (or present turmoil) to use for their own political ambitions. In other words, they take advantage of past events to justify the present. The skillful use and manipulation of long national fights for independence, self-determination, and national unity has enabled these regimes to retain and concentrate absolute power, and consequently draw the country into complete isolation. According to these regimes, domestic isolationism is absolutely necessary to “protect” the state from foreign “contamination” of their ideology, culture, and language. These regimes are able to isolate their societies from the rest of the world community through propaganda, brute force, and restriction of movement and information. Isolationist regimes deliberately spread distorted information pertaining to all foreigners and their influence on indigenous culture and people. For example, Hoxha claimed that in his conversations with Khrushchev, the latter showed great insensitivity toward Albania’s culture and heritage. Hoxha quotes him saying:

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“Why do you spend all this money over dead things? Leave the Greeks and Romans in their antiquity. These old things ought to be excavated and thrown in the sea.” According to Hoxha, Khrushchev thought that Butrinti (one of Albania’s most renown archeological sights) was a tactical location for a submarine base. In his book, Hrushovianet, Hoxha claims that it was his deep interest in preserving Albania’s historic treasures and his eventual termination of relations with the USSR that preserved invaluable sources of Albanian identity embodied in archeological and historical sights such as Butrinti. Isolationist regimes also find internal enemies that perpetually seek to “infect” society. In a CNN interview, a DPRK defector claims that while living under the regime North Koreans were only allowed to sing songs worshiping the system and the Kims. She believes that such tactics are used to indoctrinate the population at a very young age; she had been interrogated for five months, starved, and tortured for three years for singing a South Korean song at home. The state had officially charged her with “spreading punk ideology to a healthy society.” Another North Korean piano prodigy was forced to write a 10-page letter of apology for practicing a few notes of jazz. In the case of Burma, the fact that the media is able to use post-cyclone (2008) images and footage on international internet news sites and television stations illustrates that the regime does not have the degree of control of information than it did under Ne Win, and it certainly does not compare to the domestic isolationism that defines North Korea or Hoxha’s Albania. Yet, after a devastating cyclone where more than 134,000 people died, the Burmese junta left people for weeks without water and food, and reduced international aid and humanitarian relief efforts to a minimum because of the regime’s fear that such intervention would create the necessary conditions for a massive uprising of the people against the junta. It was only after a major outcry of the international community and intense pressure from its neighbors and the UN that the regime agreed to allow foreign aid workers in the territory. The third question in this study was on the effects of isolationist states have on the conceptualization of international affairs. The hypothesis was that if the concentration and the projection of power (internal/external) is a primary goal of states in the international system, then by opting out isolationist states will undermine their power rather than bolstering it. Isolationism creates and perpetuates political and economic vulnerability by limiting outside interaction and involvement with the international community. However, if isolationist regimes choose isolation with full knowledge of the negative consequences isolationism will have for their economies and their political power in the international arena, then the principles of power and state behavior in the international system need to be revised.  Enver Hoxha, Hrushovianët (Tirana: “8 Nëntori,” 1982).   Christiane Amanpour, “Notes from North Korea,” CNN 10 May 2008.   British Broadcasting Corporation, “Burma ‘to let in all aid workers,’” British Broadcasting Corporation 23 May 2008, 24 May 2008 .

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This study reinforces a premise that all major international relations theories promote, that is, a state cannot escape interaction with other states. The underlying assumption that these theories, generally speaking, utilize is that states have to contend with other state actors on a variety of different levels. Whether one utilizes a post modern/constructivist (ideas), neo/liberal (institutions and economy), neo/realist (power, security, and military capacity), and/or Marxist (politics of distribution of wealth and power) lens to analyze international affairs and politics, the notion that states do not function in a vacuum, that they are not self-contained units that can ignore other state actors within a system of states, supports this study’s contention that states that do not engage the international system of states on some substantive level will fail. Complete isolationism is alien to the modern system of states, and has no place in the system of states, much less in an interdependent global economy. Isolationism can be used as a strategy, but it is detrimental if it is utilized as an end goal. Isolationism in pure form at the domestic and international level is destructive, and if a state implements this policy for too long it will simply wither away as in the case of Hoxha’s Albania. The negative effects of isolationism as documented in the three case studies supports a liberal global perspective of the modern states system. A state that practices an isolationist policy for an indefinite or extended period of time deteriorates politically, economically, and socially. Isolationism could help a state prosper during a particular time in a state’s history, but extended periods can be detrimental to the regime and the people. A state must accept certain degrees of international trade, interdependence, political alliances, security and other forms of cooperative partnerships in order to secure its interests in light of how the world is currently structured. Perhaps, intuitively, one would think that isolationism would in fact protect the economy, independence, sovereignty, and security of a state. Ironically, a state best protects these interests by engaging the world system rather than by disengaging from it. This does not imply that a state must surrender its identity by having open borders and complete interdependence at every level. Rather, that moderate degrees of engagement provide for stability as opposed to a closed state. Isolationism can be used strategically and temporarily for a specific purpose, but not as a permanent state of affairs. Isolationist policies will bring the very thing states try to protect against; they become weak, vulnerable to foreign attacks, natural disasters, and they eventually implode. The last question of this study focused on why and how do former isolationist states dispense with this practice and return to normalcy and international interdependence? The hypothesis held that if a sovereign state experiences profound socio-political and economic deterioration, then it will seek out support and engagement with the interdependent system of states. In an interdependent world rational, self-interested state behavior renders isolationism a counterproductive and detrimental policy for security and overall wellbeing. Out of the three case studies, only post-communist Albania has engaged the world community on a substantial level. The communist regime in Albania was compelled to give up power because the economy had deteriorated to such an

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extent that it became impossible to keep the country functioning. After the break with China in 1978, Albania’s economy was put under extreme stress. During the 1980s, foreign trade was only 5 percent of Albania’s GNP. Between 1986-1990, GNP had fallen by an average of 1.6 percent every year. The economic crisis became even more acute during the last two years of the communist regime, where inflation increased by more than 300 percent. In addition to a severe drop in real GDP in the late 1980s, during the regime’s last year (1992) the GDP fell by 25 percent. The budget deficit increased to 15 percent in 1990 and reached almost 50 percent in 1991. Additionally, agricultural and industrial production in 1991 were about half of the 1989 level. The regime tried to reform, but these efforts were superficial and lacked cohesiveness. In September 1990, the government abolished Article 28 of the 1974 Constitution. Within a year, Albania accumulated $400 million in debt. The government was reduced to selling food aid provided by G-24 donors, which became the second highest state revenue after taxes. These tremendous difficulties, combined with the events in the surrounding countries, fomented social unrest. Although troops were sent to quash demonstrations, the Albanian military defected and joined the protestors, demanding reforms and the abolition of the communist regime. The economic situation in North Korea and Burma in the late 1980s was not much better; however, these two regimes were more ruthless in their determination to retain power. For example, even though Ne Win left the political scene in 1988, the junta killed thousands of protestors, and after a disingenuous election continues to maintain power. Without the help of China and these two regimes’ limited engagement with their neighbors and humanitarian groups, they would for all intents and purposes simply decline into oblivion. Indeed, North Korea learned its lesson after severe famine in the early 1990s. The North began to build substantive trade relations (both legal and illegal) with foreign actors. The same was true of Burma. For example, in December 2008 the junta signed a $2.5 billion deal with a consortium of four foreign firms to pipe natural gas and oil into neighboring China. In the case of Albania, the regime did waste away, disappearing in 1992 – not only because the USSR and the communist bloc fell, but also because it lacked allies. Since the regime had no direct connection to the Eastern Bloc, it could have survived the fall of USSR, but the fact that the economy could no longer sustain the regime made collapse inevitable. In order to preserve itself, a state must engage foreign countries and the world community. Although, it does not have to be absolute engagement in the form of globalization, some degree of trade and exchange is necessary for the economy and infrastructure. Hence, North Korea and Burma were able to survive the fall of the USSR and communist bloc.  Gramoz Pashko, “Obstacles to Economic Reform in Albania,” Europe-Asia Studies 45.5 (1993): 907-921.  Sudha Ramachandran, “China Secures Myanmar Energy Route,” Asia Times Online April 3 2009, May 18 2009 .

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Discussion Regimes assume power based on the specific circumstances of a state. The particular characteristics of their state, such as, nationalism, antagonism toward foreigners, xenophobia, a history of imperialism and/or occupation, and selfdetermination, have enabled isolationist regimes to rise to power, monopolize power, premise state policy on isolationism, and disseminate the ideological, social, political, and economic agendas of the regime. It is precisely this kind of modus operandi that has facilitated the creation of “pure” Platonic idealistic manifestations of isolationism. Isolationism is reflective of a pure state, and in the pursuit of an utopian ideal, ideology destroys people, destroys the economy, destroys the political system – in short, it decimates the lives of the very people who are supposed to be the beneficiaries of the ideal. The isolationism described and discussed in this study has proven to be counter-productive, bringing about the attenuation and the eventual annihilation of the regime and the wretchedness of the people who must live under the destructive mandate/dictate of the regime. Although initially based on what can be considered valid or positive circumstances, that is, history, nationalism, and justice, such notions are perverted and become destructive as opposed to productive. They serve to destroy the wellbeing of the people, upon which the state depends for its very existence. Isolationism, therefore, fails as a state policy in the long term because it cannot address the comprehensive needs of the people nor the state. Such states obsess on ideology, politics, militarization, and governance at the expense of equally crucial factors such as the economy, trade relations, and cooperative institutional and informal alliances. Isolationist regimes need to engage the world community to some significant degree if they want to survive. Furthermore, preserving a state’s identity, security (for instance, nation, language, ethnic identity, ideology) and engagement with the world community are not antithetical; a state can pursue both agendas at the same time. States need to collaborate with major, minor and regional powers in order to further the security interests of all states involved. This middle ground could help isolationist states engage IOs such as the IMF, World Bank, Asia Development Bank, and attract private investments, while at the same time keeping a hold on the “purity” of their ideology, nation, culture, and language. Flexibility in foreign relations is very important in the modern states system because if North Korea and Burma did not open up to international relations each would follow the path of the Hoxha regime. These two states’ somewhat flexible foreign policy has enabled them (at least for the time being) to survive. Unlike Burma and North Korea, the Hoxha regime strictly adhered to ideology and refused to cooperate with other states unless they subscribed to similar views or at least were sympathetic to Hoxha’s cause. In sum, isolationism is self-defeating because it is incompatible with maintaining and developing commercial ties with the other states that comprise the international system. Isolationism causes states to forfeit valuable foreign aid and assistance, making the state vulnerable, domestically and internationally. Isolationism may be

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generated from an (universal) aspiration for unhampered sovereignty and national self-determination. Indeed, freedom of state action is an ideal emboldened in the Peace of Westphalia. However, absolute freedom, absolute preservation of identity and power, is not possible in an interdependent, globalized world. Alliances, no matter how desirable or necessary, inevitably limit state freedom. Yet, they have proven indispensable to the stability and conduct of international affairs. The avoidance of entanglements and the maintenance of neutrality are perhaps universally appealing; but they do not comport with the actuality of the states system as it is presently configured. Isolationism, however, is a phenomenon that has manifested itself since the earliest moments when humankind formed political units. Could isolationism, as it manifested in Albania, North Korea, and Burma, happen today? Does globalization mean the end of isolationism, or is there a realistic chance that there will be more isolationist regimes? Most likely, the global structural changes are now of such a magnitude that it would be difficult to create and maintain an isolationist regime. However, despite the powerful challenges that globalization presents to actors that either wish to sustain or implement isolationist policies, it would be premature to ring the death knell on isolationism as a strategy for obtaining and maintaining political power.

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Index

acceptance 60, 80 Albania 1, 7, 8, 9, 12–14, 23, 24, 43, 52, 53–7 passim, 60–66, 80, 133–43 passim domestic isolationism in 81, 82–90, 104–5 international isolationism in 107, 108–18, 132 alliances 18, 23, 28, 37 and Albania 14, 111–18 and isolationism 6–7, 9, 23, 48, 49, 53–7 passim, 107, 132, 140, 142 Anglo-Burmese War I, II, III 77–8 Arakan 77 Arber 61 Aristotle 10, 44, 45 ASEAN, see Association of South East Asian Nations Assam 77 Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 7, 101, 131 Athens 45 autarky 67, 86, 135 authoritarianism 7, 53–7, 81–2, 107, 108, 133, 135 in Albania 87 in Burma 80, 97 authority 29–31, 38, 54, 73, 81–2, 92, 93, 103, 105, 135 Axis of Evil 122–3 Beijing 13, 109, 117 Bretton Woods 1, 35, 40, 107 British Empire 3, 39, 77–8, 126 British India 77–8 British rule 77–9, 126 Buddhist monks 78, 101 Bulgaria 62, 113 Bull, Hedley 35, 37

Burma 1, 8, 9, 16–18, 23, 24, 52, 53, 57, 77–80, 133–43 passim domestic isolationism in 81, 96–103, 104–5 international isolationism in 107, 124–31, 132 Burmese Communist Party 16, 97, 128–9 Burmese Way to Socialism 16, 96–7, 100, 124, 131, 138 Carr, E.H. 10, 11 Catholic Church 36, 39, 67–9 chemical weapons 107, 109, 123, 125, 132 China 38, 97, 99, 108, 109 Albania’s relations with 12, 13, 87, 88, 109, 114, 115, 116–18, 136, 141 Burma’s relations with 17, 77, 97, 102, 124, 127–9, 130–31, 137, 141 North Korea’s relations with 14, 15–16, 75, 93, 120–21, 137, 141 Claudius 45–6 Cold War 9, 14, 76, 119, 121, 122, 137 collective action 19 Comecon, see Council for Mutual Economic Assistance Cominform, see Communist Information Bureau commercial capitalism 38–44 passim communication 4, 33–8 passim, 38–44, 56, 105, 107, 132 Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) 111, 113 Confucianism 14, 15, 72–4, 91, 93, 94 Congress of Vienna 52 constructivism 140 cooperation 18, 21–2, 41, 43, 47, 48 and Albania 14, 108, 111 and Burma 124, 131 in globalization 6 and isolationism 9, 140

178

Isolationist States in an Interdependent World

and North Korea 119, 120 Corfu Channel 110 cost benefit analysis 12, 20–21 Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) 109, 113, 114, 116 coup d’état 17, 59, 79 Cuba 57, 109 Cuban Missile Crisis 109 cult of personality 93–5, 103–4, 135 Cultural Revolution 17 Dear Leader 91–5 see also Kim Jong-Il Defensional 51 demilitarized zone 76 dependency theory 43 development 6, 7, 40, 42 in Albania 88, 108, 117, 137 in Burma 124, 126 dictatorship 7, 11, 12, 98, 99, 101 of the proletariat 86, 87 diplomacy 30–31, 33, 34, 37, 38 see also gunboat diplomacy domestic isolationism 53–7, 80, 81–2, 103–5 in Albania 81, 82–90, 104–5 in Burma 81, 96–103, 104–5 in North Korea 81, 90–96, 104–5 domination 97 and Albania 12, 60–66 passim and North Korea 75 Eastern Bloc 11, 12, 109, 122, 124, 141 economy 18–22 passim Albania’s 12–14 passim, 24, 86–8, 117, 137, 140–41 Burma’s 16–17 passim, 24, 78, 79, 97, 98–9, 102, 124, 126, 130–31, 138, 141 and globalization 1–6 passim in isolationism 6–11 passim, 24, 56, 108, 132, 139, 142 and the modern state system 37, 38–44 North Korea’s 14, 24, 92, 120–21, 137, 141 Enterprise Nationalization Law 126 Epirus 61, 63 ethnicity 16, 77–80 passim, 97, 98, 103

ethnocentrism 54, 82, 97, 98, 103 European Union (EU) 12, 40, 41, 123 fascism 7, 66, 104, 117, 118 Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence 127 Five Year Plans 115 foreign entanglement 6, 22, 49–57 passim, 99, 107, 133–4, 135, 143 foreign isolationism, see international isolationism Founding Fathers 47 French-Korean conflict 68–9 GATT, see General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade gemeinschaft 36 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 41 General Systems Theory 34 Germany 3, 32, 40, 49–50, 102 gesellschaft 36, 37 globalization 1–6, 36, 38–44 passim, 141, 143 Great Leader 91–5 see also Kim Il-Sung Greater Albania 63, 84 Greece 13, 14, 61–6 passim, 110, 113, 115, 138 Greek city-states 36, 38, 44–5, 46–7 Grotius, Hugo 35 gunboat diplomacy 47, 69 Hermit Kingdom 66–71 Hoxha, Enver 7, 10, 12–14, 23, 54, 61, 65–6, 133–42 passim and domestic isolationism 82–90, 104 and international isolationism 108–18 ideology 6, 8, 9, 56, 82, 103, 131, 135, 138, 142 in Albania 12–14, 65, 82–90 passim, 104, 108, 109, 114, 116, 136 in Burma 79, 96–9 passim, 103, 124 in North Korea 15, 74, 75, 90–95 passim, 104, 118, 120 Illyria 61–2 immigration 50

Index imperialism 52, 105, 142 and Albania 14, 60–66 passim, 84, 87, 109, 111, 117, 137 British 39, 111 and Burma 78, 79 German 40 Japanese 78, 79, 93, 104, 120, 123 and North Korea 16, 74, 90, 93, 104, 118, 120, 123 Roman 46, 61 US 74, 90, 93, 104, 109, 111, 118, 120 see also British Empire, Ottoman Empire, Rome India, Burma’s relations with 17, 77, 78, 124, 125–7, 131, 137 industrialization 21, 36, 38, 40, 43, 100 interdependence 1–6 passim, 18–22, 34–8, 41, 43 isolationism despite 6–11, 107–8, 136, 140, 143 return to 140–41 International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) 6, 41, 54, 142 international isolationism 53–7, 80, 107–8, 131–2 in Albania 107, 108–18 in Burma 107, 124–31 in North Korea 107, 118–24 international law 5, 35, 50, 51, 52, 56, 108–9, 123–4, 137 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 4, 6, 41, 130, 142 internationalism 23, 46, 47–8, 50, 117 isolationism 1, 6–11, 17–18, 22–4 degrees and manifestations of 53–7 through history 44–53 Italian city-states 30–31, 134 Italian Renaissance 30, 134 Italy 30–31, 32, 66 Japan Burma’s relations with 78–9, 102 isolationism in 47, 53 North Korea’s relations with 15, 68, 70–71, 74, 75, 91, 93, 95, 104, 120–23 passim US relations with 47, 48–9, 50–51, 69 Johnson, Lyndon 130

179

Joseon Dynasty 47 Juche 15, 23, 91–5, 120 junta 11, 97–103, 124–31, 133, 137–41 jus civile 46 jus gentium 46 Khmer Rouge 16 Khrushchev, Nikita 13, 113–15, 129, 138–9 Kim Il-Sung 8, 14, 15, 54, 71–7 passim, 133–9 passim and domestic isolationism 90–95, 104 and international isolationism 118, 120, 121, 122 Kim Jong-Il 8, 10, 14, 15, 71–7 passim, 133, 137, 139 and domestic isolationism 90–95, 104 and international isolationism 123 Kissinger, Henry 109 Konbaung Dynasty 77 Korean War 41, 66, 76, 122 Kosovo 63 leadership 9, 54, 59–60, 71, 74, 82, 92–5 passim, 103–5, 135 League of Prizren 63–4 legitimacy 11, 55, 59–60, 80, 81–2, 103–5, 131, 134–5, 138 in Albania 65, 86, 104 in Burma 97–8, 100, 101, 104, 124 and the modern state 29–30 in North Korea 15, 72–4, 76, 90–95 passim, 104 Leka Zog, King 66 Lenin, Vladimir 83, 95 Leninism, see Marxism-Leninism less developed states 43 liberal democracy 21, 53–7, 133–4 liberal economic theory 18–22, 43, 135–6, 140 longevity 31, 42, 46, 90, 134–5 Macedonia 61, 62 Machiavelli, Niccolò 31 Mandalay 78, 97 Manipur 77 Mao Tse-Tung 13, 116, 128 Marshall Plan 41

180

Isolationist States in an Interdependent World

Marx, Karl 3, 11, 81, 83, 95, 103 Marxism, see Marxism-Leninism Marxism-Leninism 42–3, 104, 140 and Albania 13, 83, 88, 108, 109, 114, 116, 117–18, 136–7 and Burma 96, 97, 102, 128, 129 and North Korea 15–16, 95 modern states 1, 27–38 Monroe Doctrine 48 Montenegro 62, 63, 64 Moscow 13, 75, 115, 130 Movement of Non-Aligned States 7, 13, 16, 109, 124, 137 Myanmar, see Burma NAFTA, see North American Free Trade Agreement Napoleon 32 Napoleon III 69 National League for Democracy (NLD) 101 national security 18–22 passim, 135–6 Albania’s 12–14 passim, 64, 66, 88–9, 137 and globalization 3, 5, 6 in isolationism 8, 11, 22–3, 103, 108, 132, 140, 142 and the modern state system 31–2, 37 nationalism 6, 30, 31–2, 47, 59, 80, 103, 138, 142 in Albania 14, 60–66 passim, 84, 110, 136 in Burma 16–17, 79–80, 96, 98, 127, 130, 137–8 in North Korea 15, 67, 73, 90–95 passim NATO, see North Atlantic Treaty Organization neo-liberalism 2, 18, 43, 140 neo-realism 18, 140 NGOs, see Non-Governmental Organizations NLD, see National League for Democracy Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 101 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 5, 41

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 6, 12 North Korea 1, 7–8, 9, 14–16, 23, 24, 43, 52, 53–7 passim, 66–77, 80, 133–43 passim domestic isolationism in 81, 90–96, 104–5 international isolationism in 107, 118–21, 132 Nu, U 79, 124, 137 occupation 80, 138, 142 and Albania 60–66 passim and Burma 77–9 passim, 126 and North Korea 15, 66, 67, 69, 74–7 passim, 90, 93 Ottoman Empire 61–6 Party of Labor 12, 13, 83–90 passim, 104, 113–17 passim Peace of Westphalia 27–32 passim, 36, 39, 51, 143 Pearl Harbor 48–9, 51 Pegu province 77 Permanent Peace Treaty 51 Perry Tradition 69 Plato 44–5, 53, 142 political units 10–11, 34–7 passim, 38–9 power politics 9, 21, 31, 136 primitive accumulation of capital 81 primitive states 134 protectionism 6, 40, 43, 50, 54, 56, 67 Rangoon University 78 rationality 18–22 passim, 37, 39, 140 and Albania 14 and isolationism 9–11 realism 18–20, 135–6, 140 regimes 24, 53–7 religion 28–9, 38, 47 in Albania 62–6 passim, 83, 89 in Burma 17, 79, 100 in North Korea 67, 68, 72–4, 91 revisionism and Albania 13, 84–7 passim, 108, 109, 137 and North Korea 120 revolution 59, 132

Index a nd Albania 117–18, 137 and Burma 97 and North Korea 15, 90–91, 92 see also Cultural Revolution Revolutionary Council 17, 126, 137–8 Rhee, Syngman 75–6 Romania 14, 113 Rome 36, 38, 45–6, 61, 65, 66, 139 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano 50 Russia 5, 62, 64, 81, 121 relations with North Korea 16, 120–21, 137 see also USSR Sakoku 47 San, Aung 78–9, 98 Saudi Arabia 57 self-denial 15, 132 self-interest 18–22, 37, 39, 140 Albania’s 12, 14 and isolationism 9–11, 55–6, 57 self-reliance 23, 54, 56, 108, 132 in Albania 12, 23, 66, 84, 86–90, 137 in Burma 98–9 in North Korea 15, 23, 90–95 passim in US 22–3 Shehu, Mehmet 13 Sigurimi 15 Skanderbeg 62 society of states 25, 35–8, 40, 44 isolationism and 8, 132, 133, 134 South Korea 16, 67, 74–7, 90, 93, 95, 118–23 passim, 129, 139 Soviet Union, see USSR Sparta 45, 47, 87 splendid isolationism 53 Stalin, Josef 12, 13, 83, 113–14, 116 Stalinism 82–3, 89, 110 state 18–22, 27–32, 38–9, 41–4 state preferences 18–22 state-society relations 19, 30–33, 53–7 passim, 59–60, 81–2, 138–9 in Albania 10–11, 14, 82–90, 138–9 in Burma 96–103, 139 in North Korea 72–4, 90–96, 139 Suu Kyi, Aung San 98, 101, 131 Swiss neutrality 51–3, 57, 133 symbol and performance 94–5, 105

181

system of states 1, 18–22, 27–32 passim, 32–8, 38–44 isolationism and 8, 107–8, 133–5, 140, 143 return to 140–41 Taewongoon Dynasty 68–70 Taungoo Dynasty 77 Tenasserim 77 Thakin movement 78 theory of the three worlds 13, 117 Tito, Marshall 13, 111–12, 114, 117, 124 Tokugawa shogunate 47 Tönnies, Ferdinand 36 totalitarian regimes 7, 11, 12, 15, 135 trade 18 Albania and 13, 86, 111, 113, 116, 137, 141 Burma and 16, 17, 99, 102, 124, 130–31, 141 and globalization 2 and isolationism 7, 10, 54, 56, 107, 108, 132, 140, 142 and the modern state system 32, 33–8 passim, 38–44 North Korea and 14, 67, 68, 69–70, 121, 123, 137, 141 Treaty of San Stefano 62–3 Treaty of Yandabo 77 true believers 55, 82, 94 UN Security Council 76 US 16, 40, 108, 117, 121 Albania’s relations with 12, 109, 110–11, 117 Burma’s relations with 17, 125, 130 and Japan 47, 48–9, 50–51 North Korea’s relations with 15, 69–70, 74–7, 90, 93, 95, 104, 118–23 passim US isolationism 7–8, 22–3, 47–51, 52, 53, 133–4 USSR 11, 13, 41, 57, 108, 141 Albania’s relations with 12, 13, 23, 88, 109–17 passim, 136, 138–9, 141 Burma’s relations with 124, 125, 129, 141

182

Isolationist States in an Interdependent World

North Korea’s relations with 15–16, 75, 93, 95, 120, 122, 137, 141 see also Russia utopia 66, 103, 135, 142 Vietnam War 22, 41, 129 vilayet 63–4 Wallerstein, Immanuel 43 Warsaw Pact 113, 116 Washington, George 47–8 weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) 56 in Albania 107, 109, 132 in Burma 107, 125, 132 in North Korea 15, 56, 75, 107, 121, 123–4, 132, 137 Wilson, Woodrow 49–50, 110 Win, Ne 8, 9, 10, 16–17, 24, 54, 79–80, 135–41 passim and domestic isolationism 96–103

and international isolationism 124–30 WMDs, see weapons of mass destruction World Bank 4, 6, 99, 102, 130, 142 World Trade Organization (WTO) 4, 6, 7, 41 World War I 40, 49–50, 134 World War II 1, 22, 40, 48–9, 50–51, 75, 78–9, 111, 134 WTO, see World Trade Organization xenophobia 54, 82, 135, 142 in Albania 66 in Burma 97, 98, 103, 125, 137, 138 in Sparta/Greece 45, 46 Young Turks 64 Yugoslavia 13–14, 109, 111–12, 113–15, 136 Zollverein 40