Order by Accident: The Origins and Consequences of Conformity in Contemporary Japan

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Order by Accident

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Order by Accident The Origins and Consequences of Conformity in Contemporary

Alan S. Miller Satoshi Kanazawa

,

A Member of the Perseus Books Cixaup

All righl-s reserved. PrinQd in the United States of America. No part of tl~ispublication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form ar by any means, electronic or mecl~anical,including phokow"~,~cclrding,or any informatior-rstorage and retrieval system wit.l~out permission in wri-itingfrom tl-republisher. Crjpyright O 241CNl by Westview Press, A Member of the Perseus Books Group hblisl~edin 2W0 in the United States of girnerica bp West-iiiew Press, 5500 Central Avenue, Boulder, Colorado 90301-287'7, and in the United Kingdom bp Westview Press, 12 Hid's Copse Road, C u m o r Hill, 0xfol.b OX2 9JJ Find us on the Wt?rId Wide Web at ww~~.westviewpirt3ssScom Library of Crjngress Cataloging-in-Publicat.ionData A CIP catatog record for tl~isbook is avail&le from the Library of Crjngress. lSDN 0-8133-3921-9

The gaper used ir-r this publication meets the requirements of t11e American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for PI-inteQLibrary Materials Z39.48-19%.

This book is dedicated to my parents, Joscph and Thelmn Miller, wllo never discoclraged me fvom pursuing my interests, even though, in retrospect, they aften should have.-A.S.M. To Michael Hechter, without wl~um I would not be intevested in japan in the slightest.-S.K.

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Contents List of T~blesand iciyzres Achtowledpen ls Part One: Theoretical Orientation 1

Social Order m d Social Co~~trol: An Introduction Ironies of Social Structure, 4 Social Order, 5 Informal Social Control, B The Organization of the Book, 11

2

The SsZidaristic:Theory of Social Order Wow Social Qrder Emerges as an Unilltmded Consequence of Croup Solidarity, 14 Wow Groups Produce Solidarity, 16 Conclusion, 19

Part Two: Social Xnstittxlions 3

The Education System: Social Irlitiation Depedcrxnce m d NormaGve Obligations, 24 Visibility, Monitoring, and Sanctioning, 34 Conclusio~~, 37

4

Work: A Continuation Bpendence cvld Normati:vc (17bligations,40 Visibility, Monitoring, and Sanctioning, 46 Conclusio~~, 49

5

The Family Division of Labor, 51 Family Patterns, 56 Relationship ta Social Control, 58 Conclusio~~, 59

6

Crime Theories of Crime, 63 The Japanese Social Stucturcl and Its Relationship to C r h e , 68 Conclusio~~, 77

Part Three: Nonintuitive Consequences

7

Crime Revisited: White-Collar Crimes Refinfng Our Concept of Mlhite-CotZar Crime, 82 Companies as Subcultt~res,85 Examples of Whitcl-Collar C r b e inJapan, tS8 Conclusion, 91

8

The Religious LJmdseapeof Japan Religion in Japan,93 The Japmese Social Strudure and Its Impact on Religion, 98 Empirical Support, 100 Conclusio~~, 103

9

Trust Are Japanese Gmup-Oriented? 105 Generalized Trust, 107' kdefjning a Culture of Collectivism, 114 Conclusion, 116

Part Four: Speculations and Conclusions

10

The Emergmee of Cooperatiw Social Institutions M a t Are Cooperative Social Institutions? 121. How Do Cooperative Social hstitutions Emerge? 124 I-low Did the Unique Coopmathe I ~ ~ s t i t u t h s Emerge Chly inJapan? 129 Conclusion, 231

11

Conclusion

Tables and Figures Tables 11 Total nurnber of Nobel Prizes wo11 (afnmgh 1995) 1.2 Hmicide rate per 100,000 populatjon 3.1 3.2

Juvenile suspects per 180,000 population Petaent of students who studied in after-school programs while in elementary school and junior high school

4.1 42

.A cornparism of annual working hours, 1995 A comparison of lahor productivity 1994

5.1 5.2 5.3

Mothers' attitudes toward their sons m d daughters Attitudes toward traditional gender roles Japanese at;litudes toward a gende~haseddivision of )ahor

6.1 6.2

Cross-national crime rates per 100,000 population Uncmployxn,ent rates for the United States, United Kingdom, and Japan, 196&1998 Percent of eportclld homicides and assaults cleared by arrest %verity o f sentencing practicrs

6.3 6.4 7,1 72 7.3 7,4

Cross-nationai comparison of fraud and embezzfement rates hternational comparison of perceived corruption Pet~entwho must be convinced before fnlIowing questionable orders H w much control do you have over yow own life (0-1U)T

8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4

Percent answering ""yes typical religion w s t i o n s Percent answerhg ""yes" to other questions on religiosity The relationship between job involvement and religiosiw The ~lationshipbetwen social suppcrrt and affiliation in New Religions

9,1

A Japan-U.S. comparison of generatized tmst

T~blesand Figure

X

9.2a Befief that peopae are trustworfiy by religious denmjnation 11.3 9,2h Befief that people are fair by religious denomination 113 l13 9 . 2 ~ BeEef that- people are helpful by religious dcnombation t-irguues

2.1 l . 10.2

Solidaristic theory of social order

Payoff matrix of Prisoncc's Dilemma How cooperation evolve through muiltilevel: selection

123 127

Acknowledgments A number of peoplc helped with this book, eit3ner by providzng useful comments and suggestions, or m e ~ l by y providing us with the ir^ltt.fl~tuaX tools necessary to undertake sttch. a pmject, AlphabeticalSy, thcy are: Herbert Costner, Michael Hechter, Miyoko Hiramine, Christisle Home, Tatsuya Kameda, Atsushi Naoi, Fred Nick, Fumiaki Qima, Elfiott Sober, 8odn.c.yStark, Y o r k Watanabe, Davi,d SIoan Wason, Toslkio Yamagishi, and Masaki h k i , Special thanks to the graduate students in the department of behavicrral sciences at Wokkaido Unfversiq for @hering information, m d to the lnstitLlte of Statistical Mathematics for providing data. Alsa, we thank Takashi Uoshiwa and the peopk at Recruit. Corporation's Sapporo Branch for permissitm tc:,take the photograph used m the cover. Finally, the support of the people at Westview, eqecialfy Andrew Day, made the process of publishing this manuscript easy and enjoyable.

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PART ONE

Theoretical Orientation

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Social Order and Social Control: An Introduction

For many Westerners, Japanese socict). has often provided an hteresting area of study. Althcrugh Japan is a modern industrialized country, in many ways it djffers dramatically fmm Western, and even other East-cm, modern industrialized sodeties, Japan's differences horn Western societies are esgeciatly evident when comparing Japan with the United States. Both Japnn and the Unjted States are techologicdy advanced and h i e l y urban countries with democratic political systems and capitalist economies. They are also the two leading world economic powers, as w c H as strong m a t a y alfi,es. Rut they are also fundantentay djfferent, The differences are not merely cultural, by-products, based on difkrences in race, language, and religion. The differences are specifically related to the stmctures of each sociev-to the relationships among people and between people and social hstitutims, and as such, represent an explicit desire to orgmize their societies differently. This book explores how social order is produ,ced and maintained in Japan, By socid order we mean the degree to whicfn people follow explicit and hplicit mles of behavbr. That is, a society where the great majority of citizens obey l a w and cctnform to social norms can be described as havi.ng a high degree oi social order. Japan is such a socjcty. This boaks seeks to explain vvhy social orcler is high inJapan (anli,by implication, vvhy it is relatively low in m n y o t k r countries, part.icmIarly in the tlni,ted Slates), However, rather than rclyjllg on ill-defined concepts of cuilturc or tradition, the focus is primarily on understanding specific social psychological prwesscs that weur in small groups, and how these social control mechanisms produce both desirable and under;irabit consequences at higher levels of social aggregation. In doing W, this book attempb to integrate a wide range of scholarship m Japan, rangilng from stud-ies by crinninologiists to religious studlers to the most curmnt social psychological studks.

Social Order R P ZSocinl ~ Control: An Infrudzrctiorz

Ironies of Social Sfru~lfure 'The way a society is organized, both in terms of the characteristics of its institutions and the interaction patterns that emerge at the smail-group level, has profound effects that are often unintentional and ncminkitiwe. Consider Tables 1.1and 1.2. They list the nunber of Nobel Prizes won by various countries and the homicide rate of various countries, respectively As can be seen, the United States has produced mare Nobel Prize winners than any other country. (This is true even when we remove scholars who were born in other countrks.) 7'heUnited States also has the highest holnicide rate of any modern industriaiizccf country. Conversely, Japan has produced very few fdobel Prize winners, despite having a technologically advanced society and highly educated citizemy, It also has the Lowest homicide rate of any modern iadustrialized country 'These facts m not unrelated. Rather, they are related to fundamental differences in how the societies are organized and how social order is produced and mains differences. Peofle interested in undertained. This book e x p l o ~ those standing why Japanese society mns so smooth@with as little crime and social problems as it does will find tl-te answer here. However, these answers do not necessarily translate into "lessons" for other colmtries, particularly for the United States. SnfeQ and security comes with a price, a price that people in other ccnantries might find too high. Of course, societies that arc low in social order, such as American sockty have their own price tag, a price many Japanese w d d not be willing to pay Rere are no simple ansmrers. This introduction likely strikes the reader as overly pessimistic. One can surei); lower the crixne rate in the United States wi.thout paying too high a price. Of course this is possible. Other countries that arc! far mom similar to the Uni,ted States than Japan is, such as Canada, havc ~latively low crime rates. But there is something unique about American society that makes the task darning, just as there is something unique about Japmese society Ihat makes the task rcllali.veiy easy. That is also wfnat this book is about. Safety is a two-edged sword: The line between ''orderf" and "obedience" is ver)i thin. Freedam is also a two-edged sbvord: The Ine between '"liberq" m d '"anarchy" i s isalso very thin.At issue are the concepts of social order a d social control. What type d order do people want in their society, and what means of control are acceptaklle? Al"Ehough the main task of this book is to present a general theory of social order and tbrn use it to explain how order is maintained in modern Japanese society, it is also meant as a comparative work. By highlighting how social order is maintained in Japan, one can also gain some insight into wby Japanese society differs sipificantly from many other

TABLE 1.1 Total Number of Nct'crel Prizes 'vt7cm (Thmugh 19951 coflllfty

Unrtcd States

U.K. Germany France Scvedrn

SWiti.erland Former USSR Vetherlands Austria Denmark ItaJy Canada

Belgium japan

4 W[?rds l SO h7 hi

25 15 13 10 10 9

8

7 7 5

5

societies. The difficulty will be in d e t e r h i n g whether those differences are for the best.

Social Order For thc purpose of this book, we will use a very simple defhition of social order. Following Kanazawa (1997)wc prcjpose that social order exists to the degree that people in a society follow the rules. By rules, we mean

Q

Social Order R P ZSocinl ~ Control: An Infrudzrctiorz

both exglici"tles (i.e., laws) and implicit rules of appmpriate conduct (i.e., norms a d mores). Thus, order is a continuum. It exists to some exsi,ncc it tent halX societies, even those undergohg turbdent revolutio~~s, is always the case that most people will still. follow the basic rules of society However, orcier exists at differing levels. It is ~lativelyeasy to com~ sexplicit rule follouring since we can c o w a r e pare societies in t e r ~ of crime rates cross-nationally (Actually, this is a rather difficult task because of different defh~itionsof e es, reporting of crimes, and ability of the police to enforce crimes in each society) However, even if one is able to construct compara:hle crime data and compare the data across societies, mly one aspect of social orcler hhas been addressed. An eguatly import& aspect of order is informd rule following?which is even more difficuilt to measure and comparc, Thus the dearth of empirical comparative studies of social order. Nevertheless, there are few people who would disagree that- fapan has a high level of social order, especially when compared to a country such as the United States (see Rohlen E19891and Hechter m d Kanazawa 119931 for a good overall discussion of this point). Whellher too much order is as undesirable as too little order is a question we will cmsider throughout this book. :ill general, most people would agree that order is desirable. It in a socjiety where people do not folwould be difficult to imagine lilow basic rules of conduct. Whether the issue is laws or merely behavioral norms, interaction with others would be very difficult without such order. However, behavioral conformity, wfien pusihed too far, becomes oppressive, Thus, as mentioned above, social order is a two-edtged sword. Although most people would agree that low crime rates are a highly ~ralued social characteristic, it is less char that nornative behavior is equally valued. Most people prefer to live in a society where they know what is approp"&" social behavior (though one might also prefer Che freedom to not cump):y). Anyone who has traveled to another country where the norms and mores are different h o w s how stressful it c m be to not know how to act in a given situation. Peaple also appreciate it when others act as they expect them to act, Most people pxlefer to live in a society where things are pwdictable: The newspaper wil) he delivered on time each morning, the train will arrive on time, our coworkers will do their jobs responsi)Jly, and so on,Perhaps h an ideal world, everyone else wodd conform to social norms. Of course, that is not how social order works. 'The same constraints placed on ot:hers that ensurc behavioral conformity are also placed, on each person, Thus, whereas li\ring in a society with low socid order can be frustrating and stressful, living in a society that has mechanjs~~s of control that do not pemit deviat-im from the norms can be equally stressful. Therefore, although social order is generally pos-

Suchl Order and Social Co~ztmt:An lntroductiotz

7

itive, the issue is complex, nere is always a price to be paid for incrclasing the degree of order in a society. There are a variety of theoretical approaelnes possible for understanding social order. The majorily of past studies on Asia in general, and Japan specifiealiy, were cmducted by anthropologists (see, for example, Benedict E1946J; Smith [lSaW5]; Ben-Ari, Moerm, and Valentine [199Q]; Hendry 119931). Most of these studies are excellent in their own right, but in terns of wderstanding order, they are of limited use. Social characteristics are often described as ei.t;her cultural or normative manifestations rather than continuously created and maintained patterns of interaction. Thus, cultural cl-raracteristicssuch as Japan%Confucian past, or normative characteristics such as ""goup-oriented," """dependemt,'hand '"hadworking" arc often invoked as explanations of order. These explanations may be technicaily cormt, but they are incomplete as explanations. Culhral explanations su&r from two shortcomings. First, they do not tend to be sufficient. There artr 0th- societies with Confucian orighs that djfer significantly kern Japan. Confucian teael-cings, which emphasize political stabiliw and respect for the established rulers, did. not prevent a Communist revolution in China. M m important, it is often forgotten that much olJapants hislory is one of regional confXict and peasant uprisings. ft is unclear why Confucimism, or any other cultural ckraracteristic, promotes order better now than in t-he past. This does m t mean that relithat they are gious and cdturd vdnes are unirngortant, but it s~~gf;("sts not suficient explanations. The other limitation of cultural explanations is that they are not specific. Although there is such a thing as ""cultural lags," where cultural characteristics continue to exert an hfiuence on modern societies without any supportive social stmcturc., it is more commcm for cultural characteristics to be maintained &rough col~tinuingpatterns ol social inkraction (Murakarni and b h l e n [1992]; Mouer and Sugimoto [1986]; Harris 119801; Nakanc; [ W O ] ) . Thus, the degree to which Confucianism promotes order in Japan is likely related to the conlinllcd teaehjngs of Conh d a n principles in schuols and through other m e d i m s (such as children's stories and so on). If this is the case, then a more direct explanation of how order is promoted in modern Jayan would be through educationaI materials, There is no reason to invoke the broad and nonspeciiic term "culture" or even ""rligion.'" Normative explanatio~~s also are of limited use, although like cultural explanations, they might be technically correct. Normative explmations tend to overlap with cultural explanations, explaining social order in terms of shared morals and valucs, and strong group s,lda,rity (see, fos exmple, Gordon 119851; Masaini [1975]; Doi 119731; or more generafly

8

Social Order R P ZSocinl ~ Control: An Infrudzrctiorz

Parsons [1937]). The main difference is that normative explanations focus on the internalization of social norms and values &rough the socialization process. The main problem, as with cultural explanations, is that they do not provide suflficicnt or pmcise explanations. Normative explanations am also sometkes tautological. Of course, order ertists in Japan because Chc Japanese people behave nomtati.\rely. That is, after all, how one measures order. It is akin to claimixrg the crjme rate in Japan is low because people have been socidized to be law abiding. I l o w does one know they are socialjzed to be law abiding? Because nnnst Japanese do not break the taw. :Paormati,.e explanations also suffer in that they cannot account for variations in social order from one society to another?nor can they account for situational variations in an ind.vidual's behavim (Kanazawa [1997]), If behavior is baxd prirmarily m internalized norms and values, it shlruld be cmsistent acnrss a variety of social settings. Yet it is well known that people's behavior is greatly affected by the socjal context, (See Mouer and Sugimnto F19861 for an excellent critique of these theoretical perspctives.) A more satisQing explanation asslrmes that order is continudly created and maintained through very specific social processes. An excellent paper that proposed just such an orientation to explain social order in Japan was Thornas lioh,lemrs"Order inJapanese Society: Attxhment, Authority, and Routine" "(1989). It was followed by a more formal model proposed first by Hechter, Friedman, a d Kanazawa (1992), then by Heck\ter and Kanazakva (1993), and finally by Kanazawa (1997) that they called the solidaristic theory of social. order. This perspective focuses on the interaction of individuals irr small groups and proposes that order is an uni,nteWional by-product of this type of inksaction. Its oricntatim is social psycholagical in nature and focuses on group monitoring and sanctioning. Sirnply put, each social group (e.g., family, work group, cllab, and so on) carefully controls the behavior of its members. The pup pose is to maintain control over the mernbers9ehavior and achieve group goals, but the uninf;entionalcclnsepence is &er for the entire society. AIlhough this perspective, too, has some limihtions, it propses a very specific and compelling explanation of social order, and the concept of group monitorinl; and sanctioning is one important aspect of what we call informal social control. We will now turn to that sub~ect,

Informal Social Gontral We use the term social control to refer to whatever methods are used to maintain sociai order. Zn the field of criminology, an ilnportant distinction is between informal and formal methods of social control (Stark [1998];Shoham and Hoff~nam[199P]).Informal social control has a wide

Suchl Order and Social Co~ztmt:An lntroductiotz

9

variety of components that run from basic socialization at home and in school to peer pressm and informal group mcmitming and sanctionkg. 'The focus is on ways that normative (socialfy approved) bekavior is taught and reinforced in a variew of Vpical social settings, Fomal social control, on the other hand, ~ f e r specifically s tc:,the criminal justice systern, and a snciety's more hrmal ways of enfoxing social norms that are seen as important enough to have been codified into laws, Although we will discuss format social control in some detail in Chapter G,, the focus of this book is on informal meirhods of social control. We focus on informal social, control because it is primarily through this method that social order is produced and maintah~edin Japan. It is also in this area that Japanese and American sodeties difkr the most. That is not to imply that informal social control does not exist or is not effective in the LInited States. Despite a very high c r i m rate, the owerwheln?ing percentage of people follow both the explicit and impf,icitrules of smiety They do so because of informal social contmI. That is, people have been socialized to follow society-%rules, and they interact in social situaticms wfiere behaviorat conforxnity is rewarded. However, few countries use informal social control methods more effectively than Japan, and throughout this book we will focus on how and why this is the case. Informal social cmtrol hvolves all of the informal, and sometimes unintentional, ways in whirh normative behavior is taught and maintained, Nornative behavior is typicalIy taught throul;h traditional social instihttions such as the falnily and the education system (Turnbull 119833; EIIcin and Handel [19781; Abell and. Gecas 119977) and peer influences (McCandless [l9691; Mussen, Conger, and Kagan [197rjl]), and involves both operant conditiming (i.e., learning through rccvards and punishments) and the imitating of others. Normative behavior is typically maintained through gmup monitorint; processes (Willer and Anderson [19811). 'This can also involve opermt conditioning and imitatlive bebavior, but the emphasis is on how closely and effective3iy the group c m &serve and sanctim (pranish) h~appropriatebehavior (Hechter 119871). Informal social contrnl is a very effective way of prornotjng order in any society, because through the socialization process, social norms and moms art. fnternaiizd. People obey the rutes not because they are foxed to, but: because they want to. 'They have accepted many of society's values as their own, Further, through informal group monitoring, inappmgriate behavior is quickly detected and punished. W ~ e these n gmups artr impmtant social groups (such as a work or social group), i~~dividttals tend, to comply with group nurms shce noncompliance might jeopard jze their standing in the gmup. (There artr times when gmup norms and social norms are in conflict, but this is a topic we will discuss Later.) Even in a country such as the United States, where individual behavior is fairly

10

Social Order R P ZSocinl ~ Control: An Infrudzrctiorz

heterogeneous, the overwhelming pescentage of people follow social norms. Of course, informal social control is not dways effective. There is always variation in the socialization process as well as vanation in the ability of groups to monitor and sanctim inappopriate behavicrr. Zn gmeral, the closer the group, the more effective it is both in instilling group values and in cmtrollirng the behavior of its memberrj. That is, when people spend a great deal of time toge'Cher and group membership is highly valued, behavinral conformity is more easily produced m d mintained, We will explore in fctturc chapters how Japan has produced a social: stmcture that does just that. Finallyr we note that: &though the focus of this book is somew:hat different t:han other b o o k an Japmese society in that it focuses an social psychological principles of small group dynamics, it shares much in common wi& classic sludjes of Japanese society For example, one of the earliest discussions of Japanese society was provided by Ruth Benedict in her classic hook 7'ke Chrysu~thenzz41n am! the Smord (1946). In it, she characterizes bpan as a "shante culture," while the U'nit-ed Sht:es is an example af a '"guilt culture." This characterization attracted a fair amount of criticism sitnce the terms appear tc:,be vatue-laeien a d someMihat simplistic. However, this early observation is very m c h consistent hvilh the theoretical mndel presented in this paper. Benedict" main contention is that behavior in Japan is gowemed Zly a fear of being embarrassed or disgraced.; that: is, a k m that one" bbetnaior rnight reflect poorly on fiemselves or on their group. People in the United States, an the other band, rely more heavily m teachhg universal principles (values and noms), and tbrrefore, individual conscience is the main guide for beha~rior.Thus, when Japanese people behave inappmpriatctfy they feel shame, whereas Americans are more likely to feel guilt. This concept has been controversial since it was first written, with mmy Westerners using it to brand Japanese as having "situational morality." h fairness to Benedict, she did not appea to attach any values to these terms, and a variety- of Japan scholars have defended her crlnaracterization (Reischauer fl9781; Lebra [l976]; Tasker [1989]; TayXsr 119831). Reischauer succinctly characterizes this cross-national diaference in behavioritl restrictions by stating that "To the Westerner the Japanese may seem weak or even lacking prhciples; to the Japanese the Westerner may seem harsh and. self-righteous in his judgments and lacicing in human feelings" (l978,141). Thc lmguage of social anthropology and social psychology differ,but Benedict's m a k ~pmposition can be restated. (we believe a bit more precisely) in terms cJf small-group interactions. h Japan, behavior is regulated primarily by group monitoring and smdionhg. Give11 the ubiquitous nature of social groups in Japan and the relative lack of alternative

Suchl Order and Social Co~ztmt:An lntroductiotz

21

venues of behavioral expression, behavioral conformity is less a product of individual decisions than it is a product of the social strucbre. 'f'his concept will be dwctoped im p a t e r detail in the following Chapter. What this book adds to Benedict's originaI premise is not only a discussion of the specific mechanism that produces behaviorai codormity, but also a discussi.on of the greater social consequences that flow from this type of group dynarrrics.

The Organization of the Bouk This book is liivided into four parts. The first part intrtduces the themtical orientation used to understand how social order is produced and mahtained. As menthed. above, the focus will be social psychological in nature, exploring those characteristics of small-group interactions that szxccessf ully promote conformhg behavior and discowage nonconfoming behavior. V3e will propose that small-group interaction patterns that emerge within institutions are ultimately ~sponsible,arbeit unintentionally for high social order. That is, as these groups pursue their own goals, they cmtml their members%behavior to the extent that high order at the societal level naturdly emerges. part presents cmcrete examples of how this all occz~rs.'The The secro~~dl fcxrus is on how small gmups are formed within basic social institutions, and how these institutions encourage certain patterns of interaction within the groups that rnake it relatively easy for the group to control Ihe behavior of its mmbers, The specific institutions we will, discuss are education, work, the fmily, and the criminal justice system. The above perspeclve claims that social order is not i,ntentionaily produced in Japan, but naturally arises as an unintended, conseveme of behavicrral conformity at the small-group level. However, high social order is not the only unin.t.endcd consequel-rceof this form of social structure, The third, part discusses other unintended consequences that the Japanese social structure and the natram of social interactions produce. These consequences tend to not only be unintentional, but in mmy regards, counterinl.uitive. For example, we will propose that because of the closed n a t m of smatl groups and their intcnse foms of social interartion, Japanese tend to be less trusting of others thnn are people in m y other countries, particularly Ameriems. This, in turn, has serious political and economic ~percussions.We will also claim that the same social structural conditio~~s strongly influence the way religious organizations have developed in Japan, and explajn why the Japanese religious landscape is so different horn that of the West. sectio~~, Part Four, we speculate on how and Finally; in our co~~cluding why Japmex mciet)s. and in particular social institutions, developed the

12

Social Order R P ZSocinl ~ Control: An Infrudzrctiorz

way they did, In this regard, we atteznpt to answer two questions: how institrttions in general emerge, m d why fapanese institutions seem to differ in severd key characteristics fmm similar institutions in other countries. As with our theory of social,order, we attempt to sbow that instihtions can emerge spontaneously through indi~ridual cooperative behavior, We then suggest that Japanese institutions differ from institutions in other countries because of a combination of adaptive processes m d historical events.

The Solidaristic Theory of Social Order

Mihy do some swieties have higher levels cJf orcter than others? The problem of order is one of the most fundarnentd questions in the social sciences, and there has been a renewed hterest in the study of social order. Many thoughtful exegeses on the topic (Binmm 11994,19981; Elster 11,9891; H a m p t o ~[19136]; ~ Wrong [1,994]),however, fail to offer explanations of social order in the form of ernpiricafiy testable theory. Moreover, social scientists vvha do off-erempirically testabte thernries (Ellickson [1,99tf; Kotltock [1,(393a, 1993,1994j; Macy 11989, 1,990, 1,9%a, 199Pbj; Orbell and Dawes [1"31, 199931; Ostrom [1990]; Ostram, Walker, and Garciner [1992]) only purport to expain cooperatinn in dyads and smallgroups, not order t?l. the societal Icvel. Tn this chapter, we pxlesent a theory of social order based on the earlier work of Michael Hechter and his associates (Chai m d Hechter 119981; Hechter 119887, 1989, 19931; Hechter, Friedman, and Kanazawa 119921; Hechter and Manazawa [1993]; Kmazawa f19971; Kanazawa and Friedman [19991). To our k~owledge,it is the only lieducthe theory that explains the empirical variations in the levels of social order in large and complex national societies with multiple groups with conflicting and competing goals (which encmpass all nation states today, including Japan). Rroughout this book, we will use this solidaristic theory of sociaI order to explain how Japanese social groups unintentimlly produce a high level of social order in their attempts to irrcrease their own group solidariq. From the perspective of this theory, social order at Ihc societal leveX is an ranintmded by-pmduct of the grczupskttempts to control their members~ehaviorin order to achieve their idiosyncratic goals, and of the rclsultant conformity of members to group norms. We will trherefore first present the key elements of this tEteory in this chapter before we go

l4

The Sulidar-istic TIzeoiy of Social Oudcr

on in subsequent chapters to demonstrate how the theory explahs how J q m e x social groupdfunction.

Haw Social Ordrtr Emerges as an Unintended Consequence of Group Solidarity We &fine svcial order as the extent to which hdkiduals comply with important n o m s of society (Important norms are those that the state attempts to enforce.) Social order is therefore a societal (macro) lcvel phenomenon, a characteristicof a society, not of indkiduals or groups withh a society However, mechmisms operative at lower levels of aggregation can generate and then maintain social order. In a sense, the state can delegate the task of generating and maintaining social order to its constibent groups (Hechter, Friedmn, and Kanazawa 119921; Posner 11996). The state itself can producer gXobal order if it can monitor the behavior of every single individual at all tilnes in order to induce compliance to norms. Withh any large and coolplex society, however, monitoring and sanctioning all citizens effectively becomes increasingly difficult, and citizens will not necessarily comply with norms voluntarily in the absence of social control. That means that smaller groups in sodety such as families, schools, and work organizations, must bear the responsibility of monitoring and sanctionfng their rc;lspect.ivemembers in order to induce group me~nberskomplianceto norms. When social cmtp.ol at the group (meso) level is efficient, the resdt at the societal (macrcr) level is essentidly the s a w as though the society acted as a s i n e group. If groups are effective as agents of social control and their respective members have higher probabifiv of compliance to group n o r m as a result, then thr society as a whole will consist of indivi,duafs who have a higher probability of compliance, regadlcss offhe acilrnl coatmts of the U I I Y ~ Y Ewith S nlhfci.~ t k y are m p l y i ~ z gTheir . higher probaZliIities of compliance are not owing to their membership in the society but to their membership in the groups, which function as the actual agents of social control. We define groap solidarlfy as the extent to which a group achieves its goals (Kanazacva 11997, 85, def. 21). 'The more successful a group is in achieving its goals, the higher its solidarity, .A group" norms are designed to k~ducc;members to behave in w~ that hcrease its solidarity; whatever the group's goals are, its norms dictate that mentbers contribute toward the attainment of its goals. Thus, the more corrrpfiant members are to group norms, the higher the gmup solidarity, It foliows fsom thjs logic: that macrolevel social order is a futlction of: mesolcvel group solidarities, Ceteris paribus, social order is higher in societies

where groups have higher levels of solidarity than in societies where the average level of group solidarity is lower, because more individuals artr in compliance with gmup norms whe13 the average level oE solidarity in society is higher. Not all groups are the same, however. The goals that groups pursue, and thus the type of behavior that compliant ind,i\iidu,als exhjbit, vary widely. Some groups are productive with respect to social order while others are similarly cozatterprtldz~etz'ue(Kanazawa 119971). Productive gmups require their m e ~ ~ b eto r sbehave in ways that do not violate the important norms of sodety, whereas counterproductive groups demand that their members comply with group n o m s that violate the important narms. Productive, in this sense, means that the group increases social order; countevroductive similarly means that the group decreases sociai order. "The Yomg RepLlblicans, the Boy Scouts, and the Episcopalians artr examples of productive groups. Sheet gangs, separatist mititias, and ext m m religious cufts are examples of cwnterpmductive grczugs, Since social order is the extent to which individuais comply with important norms of society, higher solidarities m o n g connterpr8ductive groups produce individual behavior that threatens social order, and thus reduce rather than enhance order. (Imagine what would happen to sodal, order if street gangs become more smccessf~tl.)M y fiigher solidarities among productive groups promote social order. Sociai order must then also bo a function of group prtductkmess. Therefore, (holding constant the average level of:group solidarity in society), social ordcr is higher ixr societies with mnre productive and fetwer counterproductive groups. It therefore follows that scxjai ordcr is a mdtiplicative fulletion of two mesolovel properties of the group: solidarity and productiveness. Figure 2.1 presents the entire theory. Although social order in the sdidaristic in this theory is a j0in.t. fumtion of grnup solidarity and productive~~ess, book we will deal only with bow the production of group solidarityr groupsf attempts to cmtml tbr behavior of their members, produce social order as an unintended consequence. We will not explain social order as a function of g r o q productiveness in this hook (except to note that some productiwe groups have both productive and cclunterprductke norms; see our discussion ol how Japanese corporations fostw \zrhitecoltar crime in Chapters 7 and 8). Therefore, we will cmcmtrate only on the gmup solidarity-submodel in the remainder of this chapter and in the book. For our prescnt purposes, it will be sufficient to point out that group producti~messi s the extent to which the group" goals are conducive to the production of social order. VV41 will refer readers interested in group productivelless to Hechter, Friedman, and Kanazawa (1992), Manazawa (1997), and Kanazawa and Friedman (1999).

The Sulidar-istic TIzeoiy of Social Oudcr

I6

r

Croup Solidarity Submade1

FIGURE 2.1 Solidaristic n e o r y of Social Order

If social order is a partial function of the soliidarity of constituent groups, as Figure 2.1 derncmstrate~~ then the next questicm is: m a t determines group solidarity? How Groups Produce Solidariv

:In his classic book, Ol.son (1965) points out that individuals arc rational and self-interested. They will therefore not voluntarily sacrifice themselves and work fnr the good of lhe group, that is, toward Lhe production of collective goods (goods that benefit all meHlbers of the group). Ollson argue"hat if a gmup is to produce cdlective goods, its indivictual members must somehow be induced to cmtribute toward them.,CJ)~SOII% solution to this problem (known as the collective action problem) is to offer individual members selective incentives, rewards only for tl~osewho cmtribute toward the group" goals. He argues that even rational, selfinterested, individuals will be motivated to contribute to the g r w p if they value the selective incentives. However, this solution has been shown to be logically flawed. Selective incelnfjves to encourage contribulion toward, the group are themselves couective goods that must be produced or paid for (hohlich and 0ppenlzeitnt.r [197C1, 12111). Thus the Olsonian solution of the cofective action probkm through Che usc of"selective

incentives assumes a prior solution, and merely regresses the theoretical problem. In order to induce ratimal, self-kterested indjviduals to comply wiCh group n o m s and incrcase solidarity, there must be effective socrial control mechmisms that monitor i~~dividual behavior in order to detect and punish noncompliance as well as reward compliance. Hechter (1987) argues that one mechanism that simultmeously hcreases both the efficiency of monitoring and the efficiency of sanctiming is visibility. The more ~fisible individual behavior is with$ the group, the easier it is to detect nmompIiance. At the same tirne, higher visibility also h c ~ a s e the s efficiency cJf sanctioning because sanctionillg one individuai has a ripple effect on oCher members when the sanetionillg is easily visjble to others, Thus higher visibiliw obviates duplication of sanctioning, and the group can economize on the sanctioning costs. Consider the typical work environments of white-collar workers in the United States and Japan. In the United States, many white-collar workers have their own offices, with four walls and a door, These workers have complete privacy in Cheir offices whetn Chey close their doors. Workers withvut offices often have cubicles that afford some measure of privacy Behawior in oflices and cubicles is largely undetectable and therefore unaccountabk. Workers m y not always be in compliance with the company rules (as attested by the number of people who play Solitaire and other computer games on company time). In contrast, cvhite-collar workers in Japan do not have their own olfices. They usually have desks next to each other in a large room. Their supervisors"esks are only a few feet away. The cower photo for this book depicts a typical w o r f i g environment, Workers are h full view of their colleagues during the entire workday. Colleagues can watch their every mwe; w r k e r s have absdutefy no privacy or opportunity to mfsb e h r e . If a worker wants to play Solitaire on company time, he xnust do so in front of all of his colleagues and husses, Further, if the supervisor wert. to call one of the workers to rttprimand him (possibly for playing Solitaire on company time), the supervisor must do so in front of all of the other workers, Everyone in the large room wibcsses the supervisor reprimmding tbe subordinate. Not only does this negative sanction i,n public view mdtiply the hmiliation for the subordinak, it more than likely deters other workers from m a h g the same mistake. The same outcome would not happen in the Unjted States, where supervisors are more likely to call definquent employees into their own office to reprimand them, Other workers usually do not witness a coworker's pullishment and therefore miss the vpclrh;lnity to learn the pOfential consequences of noncomp1,imce.

l8

The Sulidar-istic TIzeoiy of Social Oudcr

Sine monitoring and sanctjonhg are the two pillars of social control, and since effective social coMrol mechanisms induce compliance to norms, the gseat-er efficiency of monitoring and sanetiming, the higher the probabjliw that hdividuals will comply with the group norms. And since visibility of group members simultaneously hereases the efficiency of both monitoring and sanctionj,ng, it fnllocvs that vi,sjbility increases group solidarity by increasing the probab3i.Q oi compliance (as Figure 21. shows). Another way to increase group solidarity is to increase the extensiveness of n o r m t h e oblligatims: the proportion of individual behavim that group n o m attempt to ~ g u l a t eFor . any given kvel of compliance, the higher the extensivmess of normative obligations, the more i n d i v i d u d s am d o e to promote the g r w p goals. A group can thus h c ~ a s its e solidarity by repiring its members to do more towarcl its goals. How might a group do this? Hechter (1.987) argues that th depmdence of members on their g r o q increases the extensiveness of ncrrmatke ololigations. The more dependent the hdividuals are on their group for the collective goads it provides, the more ablligations it can safely irnpose on them without risking the members leav% the group. The dependence of members set the upof normathe obligations baatnse, if the latper limit to the extensive~~ess ter exceeds the former, individuals will simply leave the group and join similar groups in the envircmment. Once agah, compare the typical white-collar workers in the Ulzited States and Japan, Americm firms cannot make extraordinary dernands on their workers, especially off tbr compmy clock, because if they did, the workers wodd simply quit the firm and work for another firm that would make fewer demands on them, The free labor market allows wcrrkers to swiach jobs and simultaneously prwents firm from increasing the ext.ensivenessof normtive obligations on the part of cvorkers beyond a certain point. Workers are not very heavily dependent on any given firm. This is especially tme of highly valued employees since they tend to be the most marketable and can easily change jobs. Thus, if an American firm demands too much from its workers, it tends to drive away the best employees and ~ t a i the n worst. In contrast, mmy white-collar workers in Japan have lifetime employment. Althougtn this system provides unparalleled job security, it simultaneously means that workers camot switch jobs easily once their career begjns at m e firm. Because most major companies have the lifetime ernployment system in place, few wouZd hire those h midcarees. That means that Japanese white-collar workers sfmply c ot quit their job, no matter how much they hate it, because they hvould not be able to find

another job if they did. This total: dependence of Japanese white-collar wcrrkers on their johs allows the companies to place extensive normative ohjgations on their workers, often beyond their normal working hours" And, in sharp cmtrast to the United States, highly-valued workers h Japan are more dependent on their company, rather than less, because they have achieved their M h e r statlls within their firm m d would forkit that status by quitling (since startirtg a new job, if at al.l passfile, usually means stating over within the corporate hierarchy). Athough both the probability of compliance and the externsiveness of normative obligations are innportant &terminants of group solidarity, either one alone is insufficlient. If the fnrmer is high and the latter is il~dividualswill be complyillg with the very few obligations that the group imposes on them, I f the former is low and the latter is high, then the group imposes many normative obligations on its mernbers, but they need not connply with &em. Under either sceniirio, the group is not likely to achieve many of its goals, and solidarity remains low. The production of p u p solidarity repires that both the probaZliIity of complimce and the extensiveness of normative obligatio~~s be high. The group solidarity submodel of the solidaristk theor). of social order therefore explains group solidarity as a multiplicat.ive (joint) function of visibility and dependence of p u p mem:bers. 'The more visible gmup memhers are within the group, and the more dependent they are on the group for the collective benefits it provides for the members, the high""he solidarity of the group. men, as lo~tgus the grozips are prodacfive (i.e., cmventional in their goals), their higher solidarities have the unintended consequence of inc~asint;the overall level of social order. 'The group attempts to control the behavior of its mernbers, not to increase the level of social: order, but to increase its solidarity, so that the group c m induce more of its members to comply with group norms more of the time, and hence achieve more of its goals. But social order at the macro level nonetheless emerges from this process of group conformity.

'The salidaristic theory explalns social order at the macro (societal) level as a partial function of group solidarities at the meso level. The higher the levels oE group solidarity in society the higher the level of social order. Thus groups unintem.t.ionally contribute toward the production of: social order when they monitor and contml the behavios of their members to make sure that they comply with group norm.. h Part Two, we wilS explore how the higher visibility of the Japanese within their gmups

20

The Sulidar-istic TIzeoiy of Social Oudcr

and their greater dependence an their gmupqproduce hi&er levels of solidarity for tl~eirgroups, and hence the higher level of social order. 'Then, in Part mree, we wilt argue that the s m institutions of higher visibility and dependence also produce other unintended consequences quite umlated (or even cmtrary) tcr social order.

PART TWO

Social Institutions

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The Education System: Social Initiation

Much has been written, both positive and negative, about the Japmese education syskm. Ironically much p"';" of the education system comes fsoan abroad, kvhereas the hpanese themselves have been very selfcritical. We will not =view the pluses and. mjnuses of the education system, as they are well hewn (see, for exan-tple, Rohlen 119831 for t-he best overall discussion of the topic). Suffice it to say that the Japanese education system differs in many regards f r m the American education system, and the diffewnces cannot he easily described as better or worse. At the kindergarten and elementary school level, Japanese schools emphasize overall socialization more than their Americm counterparts, and at the middle school and high school level the Japanese emphasize m m rote memorization, m d acquising test-Caking skills than t k i r k e r i c a n counterparts. Neverheless, the purpose of this chapter is not to give a complek description of the Japanese education system, nor is it to assess the system in terms of its accomplishmezzb or .failings. We are primarily concerned with how the education system contributes to social order. nerefare, we focus exclusively on the characteristics related to the model presented in the previous ehapter; that is, we will discuss iss~tesof dependence and visibility, and how they lead to normative obligations and an effective monitoring and sanctioning system. Before turning to this discussian, though, we should note that juvezzile delinquency, particularly juvenile crlminal behavior, has recently been on the rise in Japan and has generated a great deal of attention in the popular press. E-fokvever, colnpared to other countries, juverlile c r i m and delinquency is still quite low. Table 3.1 displays recent statistics provided. Zly the United Nationri m the number of juveniles a r ~ s t e don suspicion of commi.trtinga crirne. It is difficu,lt to compare any type of csime statistics cross-nationally because of differences in definitions, enforcement

The Edrrcaliorz System: Socinl Initiatiorz

24

TABLE 3.3 Juvenile Suspects per 308,000 Population

fuverzife SuspecltS

C~lglzlry

United Stakes Canada Austria Sweden Republic of Korea France Denmark Russian Federation Japan

848 435 321 247 244 189 150 136; 105

SOURCE: Fifth United Nations Sumey of Crime Trends and q e r a t i o n s of Criminal Justice Systems (1995).

patterns, and record keeping. However, assuming that these figures pmvide a rou@ estirn&e of juvenile problems in each country, it is clear that Japan enjoys a relatively low number of juvenile offenbers per capita, We will now turn to a discussion of MIhy so many yowg people in Japan co-tlform to social norms and behaviord expectations, and how the school system contributes to this coniormity.

Dependence and Normative Obligations We can conceiw of depertdence as arising from twlr very different sources. First, dependence can be taught and fostered through socialization pmctices that encourage m d reward. dependent behavior. Scond, dependence can be fie nahtral outcome of a system fiat provilies no alternative mans of achieving a desired goal. Both are applicable to Japan, and we wi11 discuss each separately

Psychologists and social scientists have observed that fie goal of early chifdhood sociaiization difjFers in Japan m d the United States. Americans tend to view children as born totally dependent and the sodalization process is aimed at promoting indc?pendence. Japanese, howevw, view children as born independent, and the socia,lizatim process is ajmed at gradually drawing the child into the social group (Doi [1973]; Lebra. 11.9761).Thus, it is mted by these scholars, a centrd part: of the sociaiiza~on prncess inJapanis to foster a sense of group depmdence. 'This certainly appears to be true, even if most =searchers misundet.stand its cause. There is

The Edrrctkliorz System: Socinl Inikialit?rz

25

a general. s m e , largely based on the work of Doi, that this desire to iclster a sense of dependence is somehow deeply rooted in the psychological makeup of the Japanese. However, scxializatim of children in any scxiety is done with, the explicit purpose of preparing children for e n t v into society. The fact that J a p m wcializatim ~ fmters depmdmce while American socialization fosters indepaldence ir;because these characteristics will ulthately aid them in their respective socjcties. :ln other words, it is a bit misleading to state that Japanme adults are depmdmt on social groups because they were socialized to be Chat way. lt is m r e accurate to slate Chat children are soL-ialized to be dependent on social groups because the Japanese social stmcturcl is desiped to =ward that behavior in adults. Nevertheless, it is true that dependence is fostered from a very early t h e in the sociallizatim process. FurUlermom, this emphasis is not only seen in parenting strategies (e.g., putting a chitd in a crib or separate room as opposed to sleeping in the s m e bed with a ch,ild), but: can also be seen in early schooling practices (Lewis lf988f; Hendry C1.9861; Peak l consistently 119871). Peak (11389, 13987) reports that p ~ s c h o t l teachers consider nonparticipatim in group activities the most serious behavioral problern a preschaoler can have. Indeed, preschool and kindergarten teachers see heir prinlary task as socializhg c h i l d ~ ninto group actiwities. A survey of kindergartell teachers jn the U'nited States and Japan illustrates this goal, as well as points to an important difference inearly socialization practices in the two countries. U.S. teachers consiskntly list as their p r h a r y objective jncreasing a cl?ildrsself-esteem and self-reliance. Japanese teachers, on the other hand, consistently list concern for others and enjoying activities with frit.nds as t-he prilnary lesson they want their childrcn to learn, Catherine Lewis (t988), in her excellent study of Japanese elementary schools, notes sirnilar findings. When asked what the most important lesson is for first graders to learn, the great majority of Japanese teachers answered group relationships (i.e,, making frknds, getting along well with others, and so on), Because of the fmportance placed on learning social skills, a wide range of activities and behavi,ors are perrjnitted to the extent that they promote social learning. Thus, kindergarten and elementary school classes are often characterized by a great deal of noiw and commotion (at least cvhcn empared with classes in the United States) (Peak [1989f), This is permitted because it is believed that chifdren, if given the freedom, will naturally form friel-tdships and develop social relations. It is important to remmber that fmm a Japanese teachcc's point of view running about and playing with the other children does not take time away from the lesscm plan; playing is the lesson plan. Japanese teachers firmly believe that the key to future success hiages on the child learnjng to enjoy school and especially social relations with the other students. Social rela-

26

The Edrrcaliorz System: Socinl Initiatiorz

tions are the foundation on which everything dse is built. The student who enjoys school and is a good gmup """be' will eventually do well in academics, m d more generally, in society Along these lines, RoMen notes, ""At the beg ing of each stage of schooling a great deaf is made cJf the closenessf fricndshipti, and happy togetherness . . . that children w i l l experience. Much effort and ingenuity (joes into establishing a strong identity between the child, the cllass as a whole, and the small group to which the child belongs" "(3989, 25-26). Furthermore, strong group identification will result in more-. effective use of peer pressure to maintain behavioraI conformity throughout the student" school life. Even fighting, a behavim that might be fiout;ht of as the antithesis of developing good social relations, is seen as an important aspect of socializing c h i l d ~ ninto the group. Peak (1989) quotes the following passage from a 1982 booklet presented to schools Zly fie Tokyo Board of Education: Rghts between children are an impartant experience in acquiring proper social attitudes and behavioc Thrc3ugh fights, children communicate their awn needs and desires to others, come to accept atherskeeds and desires, and Iearn the rules of child society. Tf from the time that children are small, parents involve themsel.rres too much saying "don%tight," "ppfay together nicety,'" and "take turns,',""children are deprived of natural clppa&unities to bump up against each other, In that case, children come running to tattle "Spmpriatc.rhehavior*In other w d s , s b dents are expected to monitor one mother's behavior throughout the day and report to the class any inappropriate behavior that they observed. The accused then usually stands and apologizes to the class. Obviously, such a daily practice is a direct and powerful way of inc~asing peer pressure to conform. Monitorir~gand sanctioning cmthues thmugbout middle school and high school. It is not musual, for example, ftsr teachers to keep a lookout to be sure students return directly to their homes after school. An even ctoser eye is kept on female high school studmts, who might he chastised for somethhg as minor as stopping at a convelnience store for a soda on the way home. The fact that a school" aauthority extends beyond school bomdaries is evidenced by the fact that many schocrls have rdes cmcerning what part-time or summer jobs their students are allowed to take. This exercise of authority beyond the boundaries of the school is seen as appropriate and, for the most part, acceptable to both school adminjstrators and studcnts because of the strong sense of group 3emtit-y fostered by the Japanese system. Students (and tcacbers) are nut merely

36

The Edrrcaliorz System: Socinl Initiatiorz

attending a school, they are mpresentatives of the school. It is, after all, their school. And students are often remi~~ded of this. For example, before vacations school assez~bliesare held m d the students are relninded that they have a social responsibility to the sckooi and that a y bad behavior not only rellects poorly cm themselves, but &so on t-he school and their fellow classmates (Rohlezz 119831). Given this ~lationship,it is not s u r p r i s e that the cost associated with delinpent behavicrr can be severc.. Severai years ago a televisim news program ran a story about a high school soccer team. The team had just won the national high school championship and was scheduled to represent Japan in t.he upcoming Asian High School Games to he held in South Korea, Unfnrtwnately for the tearn, dllrjng a celebration party after the championshipl many of the t e m members drank beer (the legal drinking age in Japan is twenty), and the local police were notified. If this had occurred in the United Sktes, every effort would have been m d e to identify the individuals who drank alcohol and punish them (perhaps by removing them from the team). This was not the course of action chmm by the school aut.horities in japan. Rather than punishing the individuals, or even the tearn, the school was prohibited from participating FR m y national sports events for two years. This type of story is not exceptional. Shilar incidmts occur regularly, often in connection wieh the biannual national high school baseball tournament. If a student from one of the participating high schools gets into tmuble (for example, is c a w t fighting or stealing), the high school is expected to withdraw from the tournament, even if the offending studcnt is not a member of the tearn. From an American pcrspectiwe, this might seem harsh and unfair. From a Japanese perspective, however, an individual's actions are ncvcr divorced from his OS her social context, People are almost always members of gmups, and their behavior is attribuf;edas much to the group as it is the indjvidual. Just as employees represent their colnpanjes in ail actions, both public and private, students represent their schools, Furthermore, the group is ~sponsiblefor controlling t-he behavior of its members. Xn the exmplc presented above concerning t k soccer tearn, the high schod failed to p ~ v e n the t students from pasticipating h inappropriate behavior. It is cmly natural, therefore, for t-he high school to be held responsible. This type of sanctioning is not only seen as appropriate, it is also, more importantly, extremely effective. Although a person contemplating commiCting a deli,nquent act nnight be willing to run the risk of being persmally caught and punished, it is quite mother issue to run the risk of having one's friertds or fmily pullished. Thus, a strong seme of group identity &so incrclases the effectiveness ol this form of monitoring and smctioning.

The Edrrctkliorz System: Socinl Inikialit?rz

It is important not to lose sight of the similarities that exist between Japan and other societies. Dependence, normative obligations, monitoring, and sancticming exist in all societies, and every societfs school system punishes noncom,pliance.The d i f k ~ n c is e not so much in the types of social controls that exist inJapan, but ratFter the degree to which they exist. Unforbnatelyf by focusing on the degree to which dependence, normative obligations, monitoring, and sanctio~~ing exist, m a h o s t Orwellim picture of the fapanese social struchre emerges. But such a caricatuse is very misleading. ?'he w a t majority of Japanese do not view this system of social, control. as overly oppressive and controlling, Although an overwhelming majority of people are appy with the cotfegcr examination process, they are generally happy with the hasic group strucme of social life, includi,ng school life. W h e ~ a it s is true that group dependence and normat* obligations arc high in Japan, the social rewards one can reap are dso high. From an h e r i c m perspective, many of the normative expetations described above seem excessive. However, there is a psychological comfort in h o w k g exactly how to behave and what behavior is expected. 'f'here is an imprcrssive amount of sociologicat titerature, m t e d originaily in Emile DtzrkheilM,'s concept of anoxnie, whjch details the many behavjosal problems that arise when social n o m s are not clearly defined.. Anomie is not a serious problem in Japan. It is instrwtive to think of a tight-hit chu,rch community as an analogy to group life in Japan. Such a communj.Q often operates in a fairly dosed social envircmment, with members encouraged to "fellawshipf" with other mennbers of the clnnrch. The explicit reason, is to support and encourap one mother to jive ""a good Christim life." In other words, it is an environment with strong normative obligations a d high visibitity, where jnappropriate behavior is monitored and sanctioned. But, of course, in return the members receive a great many social benefits, and most members befieve the benefits outweigh the costs. Judging the overall merib and demerits of the Japanese educational system is complex and subjective. tlcrwever, its cmtrihution to social order is less antbiguous. G o u p identity and dependence arc carel"ullyfostered through early socializatim practices, and later reinforced by a system that does not afford opportunities to succeed outside of estahiished channels. High visibility then allows group members to monitor one another" bbehavjor and.sanction inappropriate behavior. The result is high levels of behavioral conformity and, ultimately, high levels of social order. Whether the school system is equally adept at attaining its acadelnic goals is a topic we will leave to otlners,

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Work: A Continuation

Our intcntion in this chapter is not to assess Japanese work pattems or or quality of life successes managerial techiques in terms of eco~~ornic or failings. .A great many books have been published that attempt to make such assessmr-.nts. fndeed, a rash of books appear every couple of years on this topic, either crit.ical ol Japanese work practices or extolljng t k i r virtues, depending on the relative strength of the Japanese economy at the time of writing. Our purpose is rather to explore how the organization of work contributes to overalf slxjai order in Japancse society. As in the previous chapter, our discussion will focus on issues of dependence and visibility, and hcrw they lead to normative obligations and an effective mo~~itoring and sandionhg system. It would not be too much of an exaggeration to cllaim that Chapter 3 c o d d be inserted here changing only the word "school'" to the word ""work.'% many ways, work life, at least for males, is a dircd extension of school life. Or perhaps more accurately, school life is a precursor to wlrrk life. By s t ~ s s i n gsocial relatione;, individual responsibility, group loyatty and a strong sense of school alfegjance, schools arc essentially training children to become good workczrs. Further, the whole examination process, which has been soundly criticized for its emphasis on rote memrizatim over crit.ical thkking, is geared to dckrmhe who will best fit in to the current work structure. Both Fallows (1989) and van WoZferen (1989) make tbis point cogently: Few people in Japan contend that the tests are primarily measures of "abiltity" or ""itelligence,"Vnstead, the tests are straightforward measures of memorized information. No one seems interested in discussing whether the knowledge measured on the tests is related to skills that will later prove valuable an the job. That's sot what the tests are about: they are measul-es of determination and effort, pure and simple, so the pointlessness of their content actually chances their value as tests of will. QFallaws [1989,$51)

40

Work:A Co~t2"nuatio:orz That they absorb next to nothing after a couple of hours of cramming is immaterial: they show the tzrorld that they are in earnest and have the required endurance. (van VVuXferen [1989,8&1)

I'he point that both authors make is that schoot and the examhation system encourage students to display their determination, endurance, m d willingness to meet institutional obligations without questioning the value or meaning of those obligations. In short, people who perform well on e x m s will likely be hardworking, conforming, and loyal employees" The fact that they have not learned any real knowledge that wijl aid them in the future is irrelevant. 'l'hey have displayed the capacity to learn whatever it is the company teaches them and to faitl-rfdy adhere to whatever policies the company imposes, whether or nut the individual finds those policies r a t r i d or meanh~gful. C)nce a person is h i ~ by d a company, much of the s m e characteristies that led to hehavioral confmmity at the scbuoi, that is, dependence and visibility similarly operate at the compa"y level. Murakami and Rolzlen (1992) list a variety of charactesistics of large Japanese companies, including the following: lifetirne eznployment; seniority-based wage and promotion; elaborate welfare, bonus, and other benefits; small-group activities; and intensive training and sodalizati.on. We will now consider how these characteristics contribute to social order, m d also how smaller companies use similar techiques to create dependence and visibility an-tong employees" Dependence and Normative Obligations

Thomas Rohlen (1974) notes that although in the past the main social entity in Japan was the village, now it is the company. Althougl~hr wrote this qrxite a few years ago, his observation stj,ll rhgs true. A person's social identity and friends"nip netu.ork is largcrly dctemined by his or her place of employment. Company afSiliaticm also has a s t m influence ~ on issues such as marriage, credit, housing, and so on..In, that. the labor force is still largely male dominated (especially permanent, career-track positions), this sense of identity and the a c c o q m w depmdence is more true for rnales than for females. Nevertheless, kntales d s o develop a social identity and acquire social status based largely on their husband's occupation, so compmy dependence extcnds beyond the individual male employee to i,nciude his family (Brinton E29891). We might also reiterate that in terms of social order, males commit the overwhelming percentage of crirnes. 'Therefore, the degree to which males artr restrained by social control mechanisms is more important to overall sociaf,order than the degree to which females arc restrained.

Tn the previous chapter we conceptualized dependence as arisixlg from two different sources: a sense of dependence that is fostered through socialization practices and dependence that is the naturd result of a lack of alternatives far success. Although it might seem that socialization infiuewes are confined to early childhood, and therdort. less important Mthrn looking at work group dependcnce, this is not the case. Socialization still plays an important role in f o s t q work group dependcnce. merefore, we will begin with a djscussim (Jf: socialization.

First m d foremost, we should keep in m h d that socialization practices that took place inchildhood still have an effect on a d d t behavior. The intemive training in gmup behavior and gmup dynamics influence adult behavior by creating a pattern of social &eractions that is hard to break, Alsa, the internalization of sorrial values that support normative behavior continues to irtnumce behavioral decisions in adulthood. By the time a person enters the workforce, that person has already developed a social self as well as a self-image. merefore, behavioral patterns tend to be reIatively cclnsistent over time. In additio~~, companies tend to spend a great deal of time resocializing new employeest reinforcing some social norms, m d crating new values and loyalties. ias in education, it is instructive to look at how new employees are greeted and indu,cted into the company. The pardlels to the example given in Chapter 3 for entering first graders are obvious. In Rohlen" ((3974) ethnographic study of a bank, he detaiIs h w new mcruits are led into a large auditorium. \zrhero senior officials and fel%ow employees greet them. They then hear speeches and songs and. jointly take the cornpally pledge. Parents are also invited and at one point a .represe~~tative of the parelzts stands and makes a speecrih, thanking the cornpany for hiring their cbiMren, It is both a solemn and festive occasion that is taken quite seriously by all involved. The co itment, after all, is great. i-fhe company will invest a grea.t.deal of time and money inthe employee, providhg htensive trainbng as well as health and life insurance, retirement benefits, and oftentitnes l-rousing and even recreational facilities. It is also a great commitment for the employee who is expected to displq loyal9 to the company until retirement age (Abegglen and Stalk, Jr. [1985]), M e r the ceremony, the new employees are carefully socialized into the company, being taught the company ideology during a rigorous thrcemonth training session where they learn the history of the cmpany, hspiring stories from past employees, mernorize company snngs, &stento speeches by management, m d even clndure a variety of grueling physical

42

Work:A Co~t2"nuaCio:orz

endurance tests. The purpose is to build strong caxnarakrie among members of the fncoming cohort and also to develq in &em a smse of company identity Just as the school was Chought of as "their" "school, the company must now be thought of as ""their" company To this end, a great deal of effort is made. Not only do employees go through initial training sessions ((fie actual lelngth of time varies from company to c m pany), but also oificial ceremonies, sports days, and o t k r social events are scheduled throughout the year to reinfurce this sense of identity. Rafitlen notes that at the bank he studied, there were thirteen ofiicial ceremonies and anywhere horn six to twelve socid events a year. As we noted in the previous chapter, this is not c o n s i d e ~ dtime wasted, but body of rather an important part of training. It is believed that a "~~nified employees" is necessary for a company to be successful (Iwata 119921; Nishiy m a and Matsumoto 119831). Thus, as in school, one is socialized in such a way as ta develop a sense of identiy with the orfyanizatimand a sense of intimacy and dependence on me's group. Employees are constantly told of their company's history, replete with a full account of past struggles and successes, and encouraged to embrace the company and its goals as their own, In addition to ceremonks and social gatherings, most large companies have newsletters that attempt to encourage employees by recotmt&g inspiring stories of past employees. Also, all employees are encouraged to contribute their own writing to the newsletters on a rc_.grrl.afbasis, thus reinfortl% onefs sense of belonging. Do all of these quite blatmt attempts at socialization work, or are the employees sophisticated. (and cynical) enoutgh to view them as no m r e than self-serving company p r o p a p d a ? There is reason ta believe such socialization works, despite a relatively sophisticated m d cynical workforce. The reason is that it is in the emplqee's b e t interest to accept and internalize the company's norms and values. Assunling that a new employee might very well spend his elltire worEng life at this company, and is expected to both. work and sociaiize with his coworkers and even put the needs of the company above tbe needs of his family, to uot internalize the compmy's norms and values would. m& fas a very long and unhappy life. En short, employees likely Z I J Q ~to ~ . believe what the company tells them, since they have little choice but to act its if they rclally do believc it, Another arca where the sinri1arit.y with schod life is cibvious is in the creation of small, cohesive groups. As in school, workers form small groups, and nearly all work is performed by the group ralher thm the individuall. Furtkemore, a worker is likely to stay in this group for many years, so goad ~ l a t i o n artl s essential. Tt~ut;,t-he company not o d y assigns work to the group, but also encourages group me~abersta socialize tagether when they are not workirrg. Rohlen (1989) writes:

Small groups are rarely just instrumental. Through informal socializing a banding process occurs. Nowhere is this mare notable than in company work groups and in the fact that weekend trips, after-work meals, and drinking parties are a regular aspect of the overall pattern, one encouraged by management. Eating; bathing; drinking, and sleeping together imitate in a limited way those most intimate of family activities, Patentty, work grc~ups are not families and these efforts should not be misunderstood as making them alike, yet the degree of a t t a c h e n t that does occur is the foundatim of much soda1 ccmtrc~X.(47)

As discussed in the previous chapter, dependence arises not only through socialization, but also because of a lack of alternatives. This is no less true of the work e~zvironmentthan it was of the schoal e~zvironment, Just as it is difficult to change schools, it is also difficult to change jobs, This is especiatly true of Me-collar jobs at large companie" but it is also true of employment in ge~zeral.The reason it: is especially true of white-coll.ar positions at large companies is that they tend to hire mce a year, and exclusively new college graduates. Transfers from other comprinies are not normafly sought. Mter alf, a transfer person has been socialized by another company and has learned different skills, work habits, m d even ideologies. Elow wodd such a persm fit in? Lacking tbr specific t r a h h g program recyuired by the company; he could not merely '"take over" a ppusition, And being older, he would be out of place attcnding the training session with the new recruits. Furthermortr, such a person has aiready demnnstrated a lack of loHty to hjs previ,ous employer, so it would be seen as risky to invest too much in him. 'I'here is atso the issue of pay Most companies, large and smaLI, tend to adhere to a semioriq-based pay scale (Bbegglem and Stalk, 'Jr. [19REi]).Athough there has often been talk of chnging this system to reward mrit., Dore, Bounime-Cabale, and Topiola (2989) note that statistical evidtmce shows that, if anyfiing, seniority-based wages m d promotions are even more central now than in the past, and the practice is spreading to smaller companies. In such a system, a person is rewarded for stay% at the same compmy m d pu~zishedfor changing (by being made to begh again at the lowest position and salary), A comparison of job-changing in Japan and the United States fomd that dthough most Antericans who change jobs do so to accept a better job elsewhere, Japmese who chmge jobs e i t k r remain at the same level or accept a lower-level job (Hechter m d Kanazawa [1993]). Although one might think that a syste~sthat promates lifetime employment and seniority-based. promotions and raises mi&t not be able to

44

Work:A Co~t2"nuaCio:orz

effectively sanction inappropl-iatebehavior, this is not the case. First, it is important to note that while everyone a company can expect to be prsmated, merit is idso rewarded, After a l , only a smalI m h e r of any given cohort can become a section chief or mmager. Thus, management does have the ability to threaten and sanction inappropriate behavior. However, the more important m o ~ ~ i t o r band g sanctioning comes from one" coworkers rather than from management. Slnce work is often given to a gmup, and the group is evaluated by how w e l it performs tbe task, ail mern:bers of the group suffer if one person .Fails to do his or her share. This places a grcat deal of peer pressure on all group members to contribute eyudly*"The person who lets down the gmup will have to endure a negative relationship wif-;hhis or her coworkers, a situation that is very uncomfortable given the amount of time everyone spends together.

Nor~nnfive Obligafions Since levels of hpendence are high, nurturczd throu* socializatim practices m d reinIorced through a hiring and salary systent that rewards loyalty so are normative obligations, Thus, companies often have strict and specific rules governing drrss, behavior, and so on. The rules are cmained in new employee handbooks, and they contain such regulathns as governj.ng where an employee can eat lunch, wfirich elevators and bathrcloms he or she can use, and oftmtitnes d e s forbidding socializkg with customers or bringing personal belsnghgs to work. 'There are even long explanations of which phrases to use when spealcing to customers a d how to poSifim one's hands and feet: while speaking (Mowr and Sugimoto 119861). Of courx, there are informal types of normathe expectations associated with membership in any group, but they are especially high with work groups, where dependence is s s high. A somekvhat extreme exarmple of these types of informal rules is the painted footprints along a walkway at a Toshiba factory with a s i p telling employees how long it should take them to walk from one end to the other (Rohlen [l989]), A more common example is the social pressurc to make many personal. sacrifices for the good of the company, even when it means putting the company ahead of one's fmily Mso, there is the expectation that employees will participate in company social events, socidize after huurs with coworkers, and either refuse to take a vacation or vacation with coworkers. It is interesting to note that Japanese w o r k r ~despite , their reputation, do m t work an ullusually long day nor are they particularly productive (as rneaszlrcd by red GDP djvided by the nurnber of employed persons). See Tables 4.1 md. 4.2 for a cross-national comparison of these statistics.

TABLE 4.4 A Comparison of Annual Working Hours, 1995 Cotfntry

Germany France U.K. Japan Zlnl ted States

1,550 1,680 1,943 1,975 1,986

"Tbtal working hours inciudes overtime. "parate avertime haws not available for France. WURCE: Japanese Ministry of Labur (1996).

TABLE 4.2 A Comparison of tabor Prc>ductivity1994

United States France Germany Canada U.K. Japan Sweden South Karea MOTE: Intei-national comparison is computed at purchasing pawer parity. Figures far Germany are for former West Germany. WURCE: Japan Praductivity Center Ecx Sctcioecctnomic Development, as reported in the Japan Almanac (1998).

As can be seen in Table 4.1, Japanese workers work, on average, 1,975 ualZy (or about 247 eight-hour workclays a year). Although tRis figure is significantly higher than Germany and France, it is relatively comparable to the U.K. and the United States, Results from Table 4.2 are even more surprishg. In terms of productivity (gross domestic product djvided by the nuntbcr of workers), the United States has the most productive workforce, followed by France and.then Germany. Japan does not: fare well in this internaticmai ct,mparism, only outped~rmingSou& Korea. This is not meant ta belittle the ecmornic accomplisbents af the Japanese workforce. 15 merely illush-ates that although Japanese workers spend a great deal sf time at work or with their coworkers, much af the time is dedicated to extracurricular activities. 'This is not ta imply that the t h e is wasted. Again, horn management" perspective, time spent re&-

46

Work:A Co~t2"nuatio:orz

forcing company ideology, socializing with coworkers, or attending weekend retreats is time well spent since it contributes to the cohesiveness of the group and increases a worker% sense of group identity and loyalty, all of which dtimately pay dividends, Visibility, Munibring, and Sanctioning Depeneience, then, works much the same way in the work enviro as it does in the school envimmemt. M a t &out visjbility? Again, the parallels are obvious. Since much tinle is spent working in groups and since evenings arc. often also spent with one's ccowcrrkers, them is little privacy. Individual work assignments, like individual olfiees, are not nearly as c o m o n in Japan as they are in the United States. Goup" not individuals, arc. given most tasks, and offices are typicaily large rooms with mny desks, so that each person, even the section chiefs and managers, arc under the watchful eye of everyone else, as illustrated by the cower photograph (Womnoff 119831). Only 17 percent olAmericans work in this type of "clerical pool" war vironment., Moucr and Sugjrnoto f 1986)characterize this work envir Once employed, individuals are placed in a W C I C situation ~ c~nduciveto group p;rtlssures and group policing. White-calbr employees are not given private rcloms ar even partitioned tvorkspace, Rather, under the obqa (large stable) system, they are required to work under the watchful eyes of their workmates. . . . Rather than being given initiative, workers are often prodded to work- harder, with supervisors constantly circulating and looking over their shoulders. (252-253)

Beyond the i m e d i a t e work environment, as was mentioned above, larger companies often provide free or subsidized housing for its employees. These facilities am particularly appeding for younger, single employees since they do not require large accommodations and they are not yet m k i n g a large salary fRohie11 119741). C)f course, living under such arrangements provides the highest level of visibility, and for the group m s t in need of superwiGi"". Employees are encouraged to sgmd their off hows at the housing esta(7ilishme1,either contril_lutingto its upkeep or participating in, exercise programs or social events with other employees. Uating is discouraged and, of course, emflyees are not permitted to bring people of the opposite sex back to their rooms. Thus, as with so mmy of these social, anmgements, there is a give and take. The employer provilies a great many social benefits to the employee, and the employee reciprocates by following a variety of normative obligations. Both parties incur a cost, but both parties beneifit, as does socrial,order as a Mxhole.

When employees get older and marry, they often move into their own house or apartment (sometimes tbrough a loan f m the company). At this point., of course, visibility is decreased, but wiCh littk concern. Et is well known that aI1 forms of social deviance, especially crirninal behavior, decrease marked@ after about age twenty-five, especially for people who are married (Sampson and Laub [1991)]; SteMenmeier et al. [1989]). Anyway, as discussed earlier, even though employees might m lmger be living in company housing, they still spend the majority of their time, both duting and after work, with their coworkers, so visj.bility continues well into the evening. What about workers who do not work for large ccmlpanies, or women who are out of the wnrkforce? fn gemsal, workers at sma%lescompanies am less dependent on their jobs. Smaller c0mpani.e~provide fewer bmefits and less job security and workers have greater job mobility than their counterparts at large compmies. This does not mean, however, that these workers feel no sense of dependence, Changixrg jobs is still relatively difficult, and the chances of an uptr~ardchange are very slim. Also, as mmtioned earlier, many of the managerial techniques begun at larger companies have now trickled down to smaller ones, so it is not unusual to see smaller companies enccnaraging social actiwities and basing salaries m seniofity pore, Wwninc-Cabale, and Rpiota 11.9891).Nevertheless, these workers tend to be less dependent m their employers than are employees at large cmpanies. Howevcr, in terms of visibjlity, even workers in small coqanies live high visjbiIity lives. General patkms of workiRg in small groups, sharing work spaces, and socializing together afterward have become u2liquitout; characteristics of the Japanese workfnrco (Tasker [5,989]),Moreover, as with school life, employees at all. levels spend. so much time with their cworkers, either at work or socializing together after work, they have little time or opportunity to pursue a nonco~~ventional lifestyle. As briefly mntioned in the previous chapter, women are typicaUy exctueted from most career-track jobs. Women art. often hired to ternporary positions and are expected to quit when they m r r y (Brinton [1993I).tndeed, it has been argued. that the main reason Japanese companies hire so many ternporary krnale workers, often for jobs that require them to do little dse than smile m d greet customers, is to providc a pool of availhle women for the male employees to m e t and marry fillethauser [19401), mere hiwe even been reports of large companies keey>ing photo albums of l-heir k m l e emfloyees so that the mate employees can lonk through and select someone they want to meet. This, of course, prwides a very practical solution to an otherwise difficult problem. With men spending all of: tbcir time at work or in the colnpany of"coworkers, they have no t h e to actively search for a spouse, By hiring a large number of young, single females, the ccrmpany can provide their s i ~ ~ gmale l e employees

48

Work:A Co~t2"nuaCio:orz

with potmtial mates and can also exercise some control over the types of women their male employees meet and eventually marry. Even if a fes~aleemployee wanted to cmthue workhg after marriage, much of the social stmcture is constructed in such a way as to dlscourage that option (Rrinton [3993]). First, as mentimed above, compmies typically hire women d y in temporary positions as support staff. Femafes do not receive the types of trahing that male employees do, nor arc they promoted along with &eir male counterparts. Scond, even if a woman wanted to remah wi& a company after marriage, there are many incentives for her to quit. Many companies offer a type of severance pay to women to encourage them to quit after a certai~~ number of years of employment, and that amount: is often doubIed or eval tripled if the woman marries within three months of quitting her job, Of course, the reason is to encourage women to quit at the time of their marriage. Also, once a w o m n has a ehjld, it is very difficdt to eonti,nue worki.ng because of a lack of child care services, matemit-y leave, and a variety of other hstituticrnal barriers (see Kodera [1994]; Brinton 11993, 39891). This topiu will discussed in greater depth in Chapter 5. Returnbng to the issue of bchavioral conformity based on group dcpendence and visibility, the above discussion would imply that women artr far less depende~~t on jabs (as well as school) thm men, and once they are married m d out of the workforce, women are also far less visible, This is true. Ilowever, there are two impcrrtmt points to keep in mind when discllssing overall social order, First, the types of nonconve~~tional behavior participated in by women tend to have less of a direct impact on social order than the types of nonconventional behavior participated in by men. Or pu"t:ore simplll; men require soeial control more than women in order for a society to mahtain high social order. For example, men are far more likely than women to participate in violent or aggressive behavior (South and Messner [1"387];Stark lj1998J)"Studies of deviant behavior suggest that men are li,kely to bchave in socially destructive ways when social control mechanisms break down, whereas women are more likely to participate in sdf-destmctive behavior (Schur 119831). Thus, m l e deviant behavior includes thrill-seeking behavios such as speeding, taklng drugs, and so m, and aggressive behavior such as violent crimes. Fernale deviant behavior, on the other hand, telzds to disproportionately involve diet-related problems, abuse of prescriptive drugs, joining mligious cults, or srtffering from dit'ferent types of psychological problems, m s t of wh,ieh tend to be self-destructitre. Although suck self-destructive behavior is not desirhle in any society?it has less of a dircct impact on typical measures of social order than male deviant behavior, Further~~ore, as was mentioned with males, all forms of deviant behavior decreaise by the t i m a person is in his or her mid-tvventies. The

majority of women in japan work until this age. Indeed, among Japanese workers under the age of twenty-five, apprcrximately 48 percent are female Uapan Alnranac 119981)-Therefore, there are social control mechan i m s at work during the period when females are most likely to engage in nonconventionalbehavior. C)ne more aspect of the Japanese social system &odd be cliscu,ssed in relation to vlcrcased visibillly a m g all of its citizens, There is a national family wgister system (koseki) that ~ c c n d detailed s informdim about a pcsson and his or her family, Not only dues the b s e k i contain norm1 vital statistics such as births and. deaths for dl family members going back mny generations, but also records information regarding marriages, divorces, arrests, cause of deaths of relatives, m d so on. Also, a complete list of past addresses are avai1abk (through a part of the bseki called the hmseki) so fiat much information about the individual can be glcaned (Taylor [1983]).Although these records are not public, it is not: unusual for perspective employers or spouses to ask to see a p e r s d s family register before any decisions are made, It is, therefore, very difficultto hide one's past or the past of one" relatives. Conclusion Murakami and RohIe-t (1.992) and Kumon (1.992) d.escr.ibe Japanese society and especialty tbe Japanese workforce, as a complex web of personal relationships and networks that run through aX1 fevets ol society Althoutgh some art. dose, tight-knit groups, and others are m r e l y looseh i t comections, they all operatre similarly in terns of a hierarchical and systematic set of- gelreralized excl-canges. Tn such a systern, one must at t h e s subjugate one" sown personal inkrefits and desires for the good of the tjmup. In exchmge for this sacrike, one can expect a variety of hture rewards. This type of system, based on long-term generalized exchanges rather than short-term. reciprocity, mataixzs its legitimacy only as long as it is able to fulfil1 its long-term ololigations to its members. It cannot be mai,ntained mercly through a cuftural legacy ol collecti\rist thinkhg. The only way it can work, then, is in a society where relationships are Long-term (i.e., it is difficdt to change group afiFiiiaticms) and failure to m e t sncial olnligations are not tolerated (i.e., &ere is effective m d t o r i n g and sanctionhg). Thus, in order to mahtain this web of social networks and associations, a unique social structurat system exists in Japan. In this chaptel; we have discussed how the Japanese employment system is geared toward supyortjng this type of long-term generalized exchange. The system is set up to penalize workers who chmge jobs, and a high visibility environment, coupled with high dependence on the

50

Work:A Co~t2"nuatio:orz

group, makes mnitorlng and sanctionixlg easy and efiective. Although the expressed reason for such a system is not to produce and maintain social, order, but rather to produce and maintain a long-term social, exchange system that is able to achieve group gods and fulfill future obligaticms to its members, it unhtenticmalty also leads to high social order. In other words, social order in Japan is not primarily maintained through the enactment of laws, the presence of police, the actions of politicians, or even the internalization of prosmid morafs and values; rather, it is the by-prodwt of a web of social networks and small groups, each maintaining order in pursuit of its own long-term. objectives. In this regard, education and employment are the social institutions most respmsible for order. We will next turn our attention to family life FR Japan, and consider a somev\rhat different strucbral characteristic that also contributes to high social. order.

The Family

?"he previous chapter noted the strong gender-based diwision of labor that exists in Japan.f12 this chapter we will elaborate on Japan's genderbased division of labor, discuss typical fanlily patterns, especially for females, and then discuss how these patterns arc. relevant to our discussion of social order, The purpose is not to provide a detailed discussion of Japanese family patterns (many excellent books exist that discuss the ie, Jqmf"traditional family structure and its impact cm modern societysee, for example, Murakami, Kumon, and Sato [1,979]). Nor will we attempt to provide a detailed discussion of gendcr roles or gender discrimination (Brinton [D931 provides an excellent discussion of this topic). Our purpose, instead, is to provide m overview of current family patterns and assess how a gender-based division of labor impacts social order. Division of Labar

Despite modernization patterns similar to those in the West (i.e., the collapse of a feudal society followed. by rapid urbanization and industrialization), Japan remahs more traditional in tams of a gender-based division of labor than most other modern, industrialized societies.. There am prObably two reasons for this, First, traditional gender roles are still encouraged as part of the gmeral socialization process, and m a y Japanese/ both m k s and females, have adopted these social values. Second, the structure of modem Japanese society promotes a gender-based division of labor by effectively exchdhg femdes from long-term labor-force participation. In terms of the first reason, recall that socialization in Japan is far mnre uniform and systematic than it is in the United States or in many other countries*This is owing largely to the uniformity and importance of the formlal education system. The education system not only promotes a

specific curriculum that includes moral education, but also has a complex track system that guides stradents cmto difkrent career trajectories (see TsLtkabara, Noro, and Kobayashi D9901; Fujit-a 139851). AlPhough females are pemitted to follow a university preparatory track, they do not receive the same encouragement, either from their schools or from their families, as m l e students. S m e tell,ing statistics are presented by Brinton (1993) concernjng mothershaspirations for their sonshand. daughters' education as well as their attitudes toward socializing their children. These statistics arc reproducd in T d e 5.1. Clearly, Japanese mothers show the g ~ a t e sdisparity t between educational aspirations for their s m s and those for their daughters. Also, Japan has the highest percentage of mothers who bclieve boys and girls ought to be sociaiized differently, Despite these statistics, it would be unfair to memly characterize Japanese mathers as ""eraditional.'%s nnel~tionedin Chapter 3, patterns of socializatian take into account the current sociat structure. Japanese mothers krriow perfwely well how difficult it is for females to succeed in the Japmese labor market. fndeed, female university graduates are actuaily less likely to be hired by a major corporation than are female high school graduates (Brinton [l9931). The Easoan is simple. Femates are expected to marry and quit at about age twenty-five. University graduates are not o d y older than high school graduates, and therefore close to '"retirement'bge, they are also less content to accept a bwer-lwel temporary position. Clearly; Japanese mothers are aware of this situation. If the situation were different and there were m p l e career opportunities for women, mow mothers would likely encourage tbrir dautghters to go to college. In a sense, Japan is caught in a system that is self-perpetuating,The labor market contains a gender bias, wliicb leads to gender-biased socializdion pat-tesns. 'These socialization pat-tesns then reinforce the structure of the labor market, It is dlfiicult to break this pattern. Although it is possible to chmge the socialization process and create a generation of women able to spearhead a successful feminist moventemt, it is mnre common for structural conditions to change, thus allowing women entry into the labor force. Such a chatige might be occurring mw, although it is too early to be certain. The Japmese population is curre~~tly declining because of a low birthrate. When the baby boorners retire in the next ten or so years, there will be a lahor shortage. Such a shortage might create a situali.on cvhere women are able to gain i n e ~ a s e daccess into the labor m r ket. Nevertheless, the current situation in Japan is one where traditional gelzder roles persist. Other cross-national surveys cmsiste~~tly show that Japan is among the most traditional countries in terms of attitudes

The Family

53

TABLE 5.4 Mothers' Attitudes Taward Their Sons and Daughters

Country Japan % ~ u t hKorea Sweden United States Philippines West Germany England

Aspire fla University Eduwliotz for: Sons (96) L)nzlg!~ler.s. (%,l 73.0

88.3 87.3 68.9 $8.1 33 .l lli3.6

Believe Boys and Girls SI~UZIJL~! Be SocinEized D#ere~iIy (%l

27.7 81.2 84.5 65.8 4.1 30.8 14.3

WURCE: Office of the Prime Minister; Japan (1982); Korea Suwey by Gallup (1987 [as reported by Brinton 19931).

toward gmder roles. Table 5.2 p ~ s m t additional s examples of this. The first c d m reports reactions to the statement that "being a house* is just as Mfillillg as working for pay." The lower the mean response, the mom traditional the rttspmse (i.e., tlne greater the amount of agreement wif-;hthe stateme~~t). Japmese respondents were more likely to agree wit-;h that statement thm were respondents from other countries. The second =parts =actions to the stakment tkat '"hat most women really want is a home and child," Again, Japaslese respondews generally agreed with that statement, the d y country showing strmger agreement being South Korea. FinatZy, the third clzlurnn displays reaction to the statement that when jabs are S C ~ Cmeln C , have more of a right to jobs than women. Again, Japanese respondents generaay a g r ~ e dwith that statement, ranking secmd only to South Korea. An interesting side note concerning this table is that most countries cannot be accurately characterized as either traditional or nontraditionat vis-ii-vis other industrialized countries. For example, the LInited States is quite traditionnl in its attitudes toward housework being fulfilring, but relatiwly nontradltional concerning the allocation of scarce jobs. However, both Japan and South K o ~ are a cmsistmtly traditiond in tbrir attitudes toward gender roles, while the coun&y that is most consi,stent:ly nontraditional is Denmark. Further evidence of Japan's traciitional attitudes toward gmder roles comes from a 7,995 national survey- Table 5.3 presents results from that survey, broken down by sex, The first section asked people to respond to the statement that women are better than men at housework and raising children. As can be seen, a majority of both men and women agreed wit-;h that statement. About 78 percent of Ifne m n %reed, and about 67 percent

TABLE 5.2 Attitudes Toward Traditional Gender Roles Count~y

Hozasewqe Fu@filli~zg~

Woman WQP~ ts Home and Childa

Scarce ]t?bs Go ta Menb

Japan South Korea United States blgium Canada Sweden France Spain U.K. Netherlands Denmark West Germany Italy "Scale of 1-4, the lower number indicates agreement, b%aXe of 1-3, the lower number indicates agreement. WURC'E: W r l d Values Sumey (1992).

of the women agreed. The second part of the table states that housework is very important to society The response is similar, with a mi3j0rity of both men and women agreeing hvilh the stakment. Thus, there appears to be widespread acceptance of traditional gender rdes. Although, as mentioned above, this might reflect an attempt to rationalize social reality, it is also impartant to note that many women px.eier this arrangement. A point often lost when Westerners observe gender issues is that housewives in Japanhave considerable auf;cmomyand po'bver, With husbands spending little time at home, wives enjoy eonsiderable freedom m d controf. over most family affairs, It is common for the husband to turn over his paycheck to his wife, who t-hen allcrcates mcmey as she deelns appropriate (Watmabe 119951). Thus women make most: Hnancid decisions for a family. They also, of course, are in charge of raising t-he children and tbrwfortr make all decisions concerning t-he child's edmcatio~~. Thus, housewives in Japm enjoy a relatively high degree of power and status. It is also important to note that t-he male w r k m i r t ) not neccssarib attractive. S m i k o h a o (1,995) offers the foilobvin.g o b s e ~ vatian: Once it was women who were chained, respc~nsiblefor family and household, while men were free to pursue power, wealth, and adventure outside

The Family

55

TABLE 5.3 Japanese Attitudes Tc>warda Gender-Based Division of Labor

Percent Agree VVornen Are Better than Men at: Housework and Raising Children: Male Female

Pt~rcentDisagree

78.2. 67.4

A Housewife" Work Ts Very Important to Scietty: Male Female WURCE:

Japanese SociaX Stratrfkcatlion and Mt>bility(SSM) Survey (1";45).

the home. But now men have become increasingly chained to the institutions they have set up, with their commitment to long.-term employment and the promotional ladder rigged to seniority. Their wives, on the other hand, have been set free by the development of horne appliances and other conveniences, and now their ability and energy is being absorbed by a waiting labor market and a broad range of culturally enriching activities, Not only can they work outside the horne, but they have great freedom to decide how' where, and under what terms they will work. The female side of society has become extremely diversified, while the male side, trapped by inertia and peer pressure, has grc>wnmore homogeneous. (180)

Iwao goes on to suggest that society would be better served if, rather than women being ailowed to assume positior~sin the labor market c m parable to men, men were allowed to pursue posjticms c a p a r a b l e to women. The second reason stated above for the continuation of a traditional gender-based d l v i s i m of labor in Japan is the struclure of modern Japanese society which perpebates tradi-tionai gender roles. It was already stated that th.e education system tmds to emcourage male students, more so than female students, to preparc for college entrance exams. The result is a bifurcated higher education system. Half of the femates who go to college enter two-year juniar coleges and the other half enter universitics. However, of the males who enter college, over 90 percent enter universities Gapan AE~~anac 119981). Many companies promote the s a m type of bifurcat-ed system, with the existence of male md. female empluyment tracks. This was alrcady discussed briefly in the pmvious chapter. Although fie position of womm in the hvorkforee has innproved sonnecvhaE since Rodney Clark, in his influential 1979 book on Japanese companies, baldly declared that "Japa-

nese companies d.o not promote women," mmuch still remains the same. Companies still typically hire women onty in temporay positions as szxpport staff, and these women do not receive ben&ts or trilinhg c m parable to male employees, Although few companies have explicit rules that mandate retiwment upon marriage, that is still the expected nom. And as we have noted thoughout this book, norm expectations are usually adhered to in Japan, h a 1988 survey conducted by the Japanese Ministry of Labor, it was found that only 13.5 percmt of married h a l e workers who were E? their forties had worked continuously since they were in their twenties (Brhton Eli9931). Besides, there are financial incmtives to quit. As noted in Chapter 4, women are often given lump sums of money in the form of severance pay if thcy marry cvithin three rnonths of quitting their jobs, n e s e are also significant tax benefits that encourage married women to either not work at all or work at part-time jobs. If a spouse earns less than 1,000,080 yen (approximately $9,000 at the ct~rrent exehange rate), her earnings are tax free. However, if she earns morc than that, the tax rate for the couple increases dramatically. Reforming this gender-based tracking system has proven diffiedt and has led to a chicken or egg debate. Employers note that training procedures for new employees involve a sizable commitment of company resources*For m l e employees who will ~ m i with n the company for many years, this commitment makes sense, However, since many femalcs choose to quit their jobs either wbrn they marry or wbrn they have their first child, it m&es little selnse for companies to commit the same amount of tirne and money to training female empIoyees as they do male employees. Thus, employers clairn they c ot cl~angetbe system un:lcss attituctes among fcmales change so that thcy can feel confident that their investment will not be wasted, AlihougX7 this sounds reasonable, a recent survey of female employees revealed that 77 percent believed their company will request that they resign upon the bisth of their first child. (Watanabe [B%]). Furthermore, Brintm (1993) reports that many young women art? advised to tell their prospective employers that they plan to quit upon marriage since it increases Chcis chances of being h i d . This appears to contradict the claim by empIoyers that they are reluctant to invest: in w m e n because they might p i t . If thjs were really the case, they would be loolcing for career-oriented women who did not plan to quit u p m marriage rather than women who plm to quit. T h i s appears, instead, to support the clailns made earlier that employers are primarily interest-ed in hiring potem.t.ialbrides for their m l e employees.

Although there are obviously exceptions, the typical mndern Japanese family develops the following way. Both males and femaies, after eitbrr

The Family

57

graduating high school or college, enter the labor market. Males typically are hired to lmg-term jobs while females are hired to short-term jobs. During this time, males and females often cantinue livhg with their parents. There are two reasons for this. First, housing is very expensive in Japan, so living at hcrmc. makes good economi6 sense. Secmd, companies that do not provide housing encourage single entgloyees to live with their parents since they believe they will be less likely to get into trouble (i.e., living at home ensures a high visibility environment where parents can monitor and sanction their child's inappropriate behavior). In fact, many compmies make it a policy not to hire people who live alone, especially females who live alone (Brinton 119931). By their mid- to late twenties, the overwhelming majority of people marry. For nnales, the average age of marriage is twenty-nine and for kmales it is twenty-six (hao 119951).As dixussecl ahove, either upon marriage or u p m the birth of a child, the overwhehingly percentage of fcmales quit tbeir jobs. They then dedicate themselves to managixlg family affairs and raising the children. When the children reach high school or college age, about 70 perce11t of the wonten retum to the labor force, agajn working at.part-time or temporary jobs (Brhton [l9931). Japan has a birthrate of 1.5, meaning couples have, on a v e q e , one and a h& c h i l d ~ nT. h i s is among Ihe lokvest birthrates in the world (despite recent efforts by the Japanese government to encourage couplcdo have more c h i l d ~ n )aerefnrtr, . the typical family has only one or two children, and mothers spend a great deal of time and energy on child care, especially as it involves education, Since men are usudly required to s p e d long hours at their place of employment and then socialize afterward wi& coworkers, they are largely unhvolved in household decision makirtg or the chilclren" education. I'hus, there are clear roles designated for men and women, and the low inci.dence of djvorce in Japan &cts the fact that as long as husbands and wives fullfill their expected roles, the marriage will continue. fwao (4995) summarizes this arrangement by the fdloMting statement: "Women who spend little time with their husbands, communicate with them even less, and share with them only a long-term trust that the other person will always be there will, after twenty or thirty years of marriage, estabIish independe~~t life-sqles totalfy suited to their respective needs" (190).The idea of divorcing because the couyle is not in love or because their lives have grown apart is uncclmmon in bpm. 'T"hese are rarely a couple's eexpctati~nswhesz enterhg a marriage, Expectations with marriage, as with other social institutions in Japan, are for all participants to act responsibly and to conform to social norms. Of course, as in any country, people marry for a variety of reasons and h d d a variety of expectations for their marriage, However, t:he pattern described, above is still extrtzmely c o m m in Japan, and divorce is relatively rare.

KeZationship to Social Cantral 'The type of traditional family pattern m d gender-based division of labor described above, alfiough a d d t e d l y restrictive, appears to contribute to the high level of social order in Japan. As with other aspects of life in Japan, &ere is a price to pay for increased social orde~;and that price usually entails behavioral restrictions on the individual. Wthout condoning such restrictions, it is important to understand the relationship of behaviord restrictions to overall social order. In past chapters we observed how the education and.eznployment systems restrict hdividual choice and in so doing majntain high levefs of social clmtrol anci ultimdely hjgh levels of social order. li-adit.ional family and gender pdterns appear to do the same. Promoting a traditionat gender-based &vision of tabor tikely cmtributes to high Levels of soci,al order in several distinct ways. First, consider the low incidence of divorce inJapan, The majority of social science studies of divorce show that it has a s t r q negative impact on children. There is near ul-ranimous agxemernt that children whose parents divorce have a variety of prciblems, including higher rates of delinquency, lower self-esteem, increased prclblems with interpersonal relationskps, and so on (Amdo [1993]; Wllerstein and Blakeslee [1989]), It is useful, in addition, to note that past research also suggests that the actual event of divorce is related to fie mom psychological issues of interpersonal relationships and self-est-eem, Behavioral problem, such as delinquency, are more d a t e d to the decrease inparental supe~visimthat usually accompanies a divortle. Consistent with those observations, past research by criminologists and criminological sociologists show that parental supervision is closely associated with rates of juvenile delinquency (Kodauser [19w;Sampson Ef9871; Patterson and Djshion E198q). This, of course, makes good intuitive sense. We have discussed throughout this book that social control is best maintained in high visibiity environments where inappropriate behavior can be observed and sanctioned. Obviously, Ihe jbscnce of parents will greatly reduce t:he amount of control parents can exercise w e r a child's behavior. Divorced couples, alcmg with single-parent househdds and even dual-earner hous&olds, are all falnily structures where there is less pamntal supervision than in households where one partrnt is always home. Japan not only has one of the lowest divorce rates of any m d e m indzastriaiized country, but it &so has the lowest rate of shgle-parent households. Whercas around 25 percent of all bjrths in the United States are to u arried women, only about 1 percent are to unmarried w o m n in Japm (btro E19911). Furthermore, Japm also has more multigenerational families than any other modem industrialized country

'TheFamily

59

(Kamo 119901). Of adults over the age of sixty, 70 percent live with their c h i l d ~ n2,11 percent live with their spouse, anci only the remaining 10 percent live done (Long 11,9871).Thus, the high percentage of intact families and multigenerational families, as well as the high percentage of stay-at-home mothers, provides a family environment with high levels of adult and parental supervisinn. This, in turn, contributes to the relatively low rates of juvmile delinyuency inJapan. Tkis specific topic will be considered in gwater detail in Chapter 6 when we discuss crime. There is yet another way that a gendcr-based division of labor, or morc specifically, gender discrimixlatim in the workplace, contributes to high social order in Japan, It is a well-hown fact that the overvtihelming majority of"criminals, especially those participating in violent crintcs, are young males. Although we wiIl go into more detail on this topic in the next chapter, suffice it to say that emgloyc;d p u n g males are far less likely to participate in criminal activities than are unemployed young males. By relegating females to temporary support staff who can be hired and fired as eccrnclmic trends dictate, jobs and job security for young males can be mairrtahed. Clearly, this practice that unfairly exploits the female workfome and assures high employment rates for young males has positive effects on social order. Compare this situation with the United States, which tends to discrhinate against young people, especially young black males, Lahor market statistics for 1998 provided by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics show that altl.lough the overail U.S. u~~employment rate is curre~~tly quite low (about 4.6 percent), it rises to 10.8percent for people ages sixteen to twenty-four who are actively seeking employment. It is even higher, 31.2 pereent, for male youths, and 24.8 percent for black youths (i,nformationfor black males was not available, but since males tend to have higJner tlnemplrzyment rates than females, the actual unemployment: rate for black males is likely higher than 25 percent), Conclusion As with other amas of Japanese society, attitudes toward traditional gender roles and the structure of the family provide an interesting cmtrast with other modern industrialized societies.,Although it is tempting to characterize these differences in strictly negative terms, not because they are traditional, per se,but because they involve discriminatory practices, the topic is complex, Tlze labor market not only discriminates against females, but it also discriminates against males who p ~ f e not r to dedicate their lives to their companies. In this sense, rather than charactcrizing the Japmese lalclor market as g e ~ ~ dbiased, er it might be more-. accurate to describe it as monolithic in that its miform structure restricts the

lives of both males and. femdes. Yet this structure, although it clearly constricts the hdividual, is not without its merits. Furthermore, these merits are recoglnized by a good mmy Japanest3, as is evidenced by the surveys cited earlier that support traditional gender roles. We have already discussed various topics where individuality and kedorn of choice ,?re sacrificed, not wholJy volu~ztarily,became Ihe social stmcture and social norms dictate such a sacrifice, Such sacrifices are not necessarily antithetical to one" own self-hterests. Benefits from conformkg to these normati.ve expectatio~zsare twofold. First and nnnst directlyf the individual benefits by entering into a relationship characterized by long-term security and a high level of predictability. Indirectly the indjvidual bencfits by increases in overall social order. The gender and iamily patterns discussed above appear to be yet another example of this type of exchange. Of course, the above discussion is not meant to co~zdonediscriminatory hiring practices or suggest that the Japanese pattern is the only one capable of maintainhg swid order. There art- many examples of countries that have nontraditional attitudes toward gender roles, nondiscriminatory hiring practices, and relatively high divorce rates that stil maintain relatively high levels of social order, at least as measured by crime stati.sti.cs.Social control can be produced in. a variety of ways. Ckzr purpose throughout this book is merely to dcscr.ibe how it is produced in Japm. Finally; we note that quite rece~~tly there has been a rise h disciplhe problems in elementary and.junior high school classes. %achers report that their classrooms have "'collapsed," meaning that disruptive behavior has increased to the point where norm,& classroom activities are affected. Althoutgh such behavior is still LOW compared to other countries, it is intcresti~~g to note that mally Japanese social scientists blame recent changes in Che family structure as Che mot cause. Specifically, recent hcreases in dkorce, dual-income couples, and a d e c ~ a s ein multigenerational families have been blamed for this increase. Also, the low birthrate, rclsulting in families spoiling their only chilci, is being b h e d for these pmblems. Whether t h s e problems truly are related to recent changes in the family structure, and whether they will result h more serious disruptions to overall social order are dearly questiorzs Ihat smial sdentists will be add~ssingin p a r s to come.

Crime

The relevmce of uneierstandhg smatl-pup social control mechanisms to Che study of crime is obvious. Since behwior is so well controlled through informal socrial controls (e.g.f mmitorQ and sanctioning) at the group level, and therefore bebavioral confomity is high, crime rates are naturally law in Japan. Because social stig~aais strong, and one's actions not only reflect on the person but also affect his or her group, the consequences of inappropriate behavior arc. severe. Thus, the price one pays for m y type of deviant behavior, especially crimhal devimt behavior, is very high., Xndeed, the police have the luxury of taking a relatively leisurely approach tcr apprehrnding criminals, often waiting long periods of time for the accused to turn hirn or hersdf in.Mter all, since nnnst peoplc have some type of fixed group affiliation, it is very &&cult to run and hide. It would involve leavhg a fixed group and eit27er livh~gthe life of a loner or trying to enter a new group, both of which are extremely diMicLtlt to d o in faparz. Beforl, considering more systematicaliy how this type of social stmcture inhibits cri~ae,we first look more closely at some crass-national crime rates. Chapter 1. presented homicide rates far various countries, We now expand that table to cmsider a wider range of crimes, including robbery, assault, theft, and burglary But before reviewing these statistics, a variet)/ of definitions and caveats arc necessary Rohbeq is typically defined as forcibly taking something from someone (i.e., it inwolwes a faceto-face encomter), Assault: is defined as physicalb attacking someone with the intent of innicthg injury. Reft, which is somtimes referred to as larceny, hvolves stealing something fmm someone without a direct face-to-face threat of physicai violence (e.g.f shoplifthg, picking pockets, stealixng a bicycle, and so on), Note that this excludes car theft, which i s kept as a separate statistic in most countries. Finally, burglary involves el~teringsomeone else's property with the intention of stealkg something (Maguire, Pastom, and Flanagan [15343]).

These defini.tions are fairly straightforward, but comparing crime rates cross-nationalty is anything but straightforward. 'f'here are variations in these definitions that p r o d ~ ~ evariatio~~s e in the statistics, such as disthguishing between major and minor assaults and thefts, or even differences in defh~itionsof what constitutes a crime. Furthermore, crime statistics represent thc nzlmlcler of crimes reported to the police. 'There are wide variations in the reporting of crimes from country to country. A country that has an fneffective police force will receive fewer reports since the citizens do not believe reporting wil1 do any good. Thus' they will appear to have a lower crime rate than they actually have. More seriousiy, some crimes, such as rape, spouse abuse, and child abuse, are seriously uncterrepnrted, and the degrte to wljch they are ul-rderreported varies grclatly from society to society, Thus, all cross-national cornparisms should be viewed with some skepticism. Nevertheless, if treated carefully, they can provide a gelneral picture of relative crime rates. In Table 6.1 we report crime rates, limiting our anatysjs to modern industrialized countries and reporting onty cfimes that have relatively uniform defjnitions and reporting patterns. Caveats aside, it seems clear that in general the United States has a very high crimc. rate vis-8-vis other modern industrialized countries, particularly with regard to hornicide and robbery. It is even, clearer that Japan enjoys a uniquely low crime rate. In this table, we inchded crime statistics from thr &public of Korea and the Philippines, since these two countries are also part of Far East Asia and are geographically close to Japan, (Unfortunately, reliable crime data are not yet available f r m Clxina.) As can be seen, Japan's crime rate is uniyuely low, even when compmd to its Asim neighbors. .Atthough both neighbors rczport relatively low rubbeq rates, they are still significantly higher than in Japan. More important, homicide rates tend to be the most accurate crime statisundcrtic. Although other categories, such as robbery, tend to be grea.t.1~ reported (sinrtce objects stolen are sometimes of little value, and the victim often feels reporting the robbery to the police will not do any good), homicides are a h o s t always rcported falthougt-t obviously not by the victim). merefore, they are probahfy the best crime statistic to c o q a r e cross-nationally. As can be seen, Korea a d the I-"hilipy>inesboth report very high homicid,e rates, while fapan reports the lowest* Althougb the causes of crime might very weXX differ from country to country and from crime to crime, the distinctively low crime rate in Japan is likely l;inked to elernents oE the social structure that we have been describing in this book. We will now consider this more h depth by focusing first on general theories oE crime and then cm relevant aspects of the Japanese social structure.

TABLE 6.2 Cross-National Crime 13ates per 100,000 Population Coglzfry Republic of Korea Philippines United States Italy Denmark Australia Germany Austria Belgium Switzerland Scotland Canada U.K. &an

Homicide 10,1 9.4 9.0 5.3 5.3 4.9 3.9 3.5 3.4 3.4 2.2 2.0 1.4 3.4

Robbery 10.3 2 3.7 237.5 52.4 93.8 80.3 48.6 30.4 14.4 27.4 2 03.2 98.8 2 2 6.2 2.2

Assazr lt

m

427.4 36.5 389.8 m

T

Wurgla~

-

-

m

m

3613.7 2330,9 3963.1 m

1040.9 m

2043.0 2138,O

-

-

-

419.2 330.6 54.6 115.3 771.4 408.9 19.3

1582.3 2733.0 2n3.6 4641.8 3438.4 4863.6 1049.8

1422.7 1534.3 950.2 2 722.3 1326.2 2445-4 198.5

x>uncsH:United Nations World Crime Survey (1995).

Theories of Crime

Broadly speaking, we can conceive of criminological theories as falling into four categcrries: strucbrai thecrric?~,learning theories, control theories, and theories o( deterrence. Although thcse Ehcories cover a wide range of sociaf issues and behavior, they am all either direc2-l~or indirectly related to issues raised in this book. It is therefore useful to rt.wiew all four areas to gain a more complete understmdhg of why clrime rates arc?so low irzjapan.

5truch;lral theories ennphasize characteristics of society that either promote criminal behavior (as well as other forms of devimt behavior), or fail to discollrage such behavioa: Often the focus is m the relationship between increased social complexities and increased crime (see Laub 119831; Rursik. 119881; Sampson E1,987,1988]; Smpson and Groves [19891), As societies become more urbm, traditional means of social control become less effective. In smaller, more traditional commrmities, behavisr is more easily cantrolled since everyone b o w s everyone else, and a person's role in the cornmniw, as well as the norms governixrg appropriate behavior, are known by all. However, in urhan areas, characterized by mare complex living arrmgernents and increased community hetess-

geneity, social control mechanisms, as well as howledge of social norms, break down. The breakdom in social control mechmisms is often called ""socialdisorganization," while the breakdown in bowledge of social norms is called '*mamie." More ccmc~tely,in small towns local agents of socialization (e.g., family ehurch, neigt.lborhood, and community Leaders) tend to have a fair amnunt of influence on everyone, In a sense, small-town life is much like group life in Japan. Everyone h o w s everpne else, so people live in high visibility environments. And since, under such conditions, a person's reputation is of great kportance, the consequences of inappropriate behavior can be severe (see Braithwaite E19891 for an excellent discussion of the i~sportanceof protecting one's reputation in Japan). However, in large cities where the sheer size of the population increases an individual's anonymity a d trmsportation systems make it easy to move qraickly m d easily from one phce to another, the power of the comntunity to rclgulate behavior is largely tmdemined. Cities afford greater individual freedom, but along with that freedom comes potentially dmgerous unregulated behavior* There are also other structural characteristics of cities that influence crirne rates, Many neighborhoods have high levels of ~sidentialmobility. That is, people mow in and out of ncigbborboods frequezztty. U'nder such cmditims, communjty support groups are less likely to develop and it becomes more difficull: to spot strangers in the neighbarhood. Also, since it is inc~asinglyc o m o n in many cities in many modern industrializd countries for both parents to work, there is less parental supervision of children. This all leads to m ixlcreased likelilnood of crime in many urban areas. A second stralsl of structural theories focuses less on the characteristics of neigbborhoods and mom on tbe macro characteristics oE a society O f pasticdar impctrtrance is the relationship betwcen crime rates and unemployment rates. A variety of studies have shown that crime rates tend to be sensitive to eeoncrmic trends and gmerally increase as unemployment rates increase (Grant and Martinez 139971; Salnpson [1,487]). In general, then, structural theories bave much in common with issues raised in this book, Low crime (i.e., high social order) is closely ~ l a t e d to the degxe to which informl social control n e t w r h are able to regulate behavior. Restated using thrroretical conclepts emplayed in, this book, structural theorists claim that a main reason crirne is lower in rural than in urban areas is that rural areas are characteriz,ed bp fiigh visibility where social agents are able to monj.tor and sanction inappropriate behavior, and where the consequences of deviant behavior are more severe.

Learning theorists note that all humm behavior, whether normative or deviant, is learned. merefore, criminal behavior shoulld be approached in much the same way any other behavior is studied. In generai, these theories focus on social interaction, especially within intimate groups (e.g., close friends and family) (Sutherland 119471; Burgess and Akers [196cij; Akers 119851; Matsue& and Meimer 119871). 'Through these associations people learn not only the actual b e h i o r , but also suppctrting attitudes, values, and rationalizations. For example, people typically begin using illegal d r u g w h e n they become friends with drug users. From these friends t h y not only learn the behwinr (how to purchase and use the drug), but d s o supporting attitudes such as the rejection of mains t m m cctndemnaticm of drug use. In general, there are two ways people learn behaviar: by modeling (copyjng others) and by operant cunditimhg (having one" bbehavior shaped througf~a series of rewards and punishents). Studks focusing on modehg claim that the m r e time a person spelrds arou~ldcrintinals and devimts and the more he or she admires and respects these people, the more likely he or she is to begin copying their behavior (Sutherland 119471; Cressczy 21,9601; Glaser [1956])-Studies focushg on operant conditionhg cllab that in order to randerstand criminal and deviant behavior, it is necessary to focus on the rewards and punishments associated with it (Akers et d. [197(3]; Akers [1985]). Put: more simply, learning theories fcxrus on basic socializatim practices, since socialization involves watching and copying friends and family (modeling), and learning appropriate behavinr by being rebvardtd and punished by family and kiencls (operant conditioning). A varimt of learning theory, which is closely related to issues discussed in this bmk, is subclllture theory. Afthough learning theorists emphasize the need to understand crirninal and deviant behavior as learned human behavior, subculturt; theorists emphasize that most behavior is not only learned, but: actually cmforming i,n nature. The difesence between deviant and normative behavior is not that one persm accepts social norms and the other rejects them; rather, the difference involves conformjng to d j f f e ~ nsets t of social norms wanfield 119681; Wolfgmg and Fesracuti [1967j), Criminals and deviants often live in social environments where conforming to sacid norms involves participating in criminal or deviant behavior, An obvious exampk hvctdd be members of a Clearly, gang members are deviants, and ofkn participate in s t ~ egang, t criminal activities. Yet it would be misleading tc:,classify them as noncontend to live h m e n v i r o ~ ~ mthat e~~t formists. If mything, gang nrre~~bers

requires more behavioral conformity and mle following than m - g a n g m e d e r s . Thus, like learning theorists, subcdture theorists emphasize the situational nature of deviant behavi,or and the natural learnjng pmcesses that lead normal people to participate hcriminal activities.

Control theorists approach the study of crime and deviance from a very different angle. They begh by nothg .Crhat much devimt behavior is htrinsically =warding. Elaborate theories arc not necessary to explain why somecme steals m n e y or takes dmgs. People steal money because it is of value, and they take drugs becarnse it: is pkasurable. Although not all criminal m d deviant behavisr is directly rewading h this way, much of it is, and even those acts that are not can be rewarding si*nply because they are deviant. There is a certain jntrirnsic pleasure associated with breaking sociaX norms. Therefore, for the cmtrol theorist tbe interesting que"tion is not why 5 to 10 perc:mt of a population in any given country participates in, crimknal or devimt behavior, but rather why 90 percelnt:do not (Hirschi 119691; Wiatrowski, Griswold, and Roberts [l9811; Smpson m d Laub [19901; Cernkovich a d Gisrdano [1992]). The answer to this question was most clearly presented by Hirschi (19691, who suggested. four filctors that tend to inhibit a person's natural desire to commit a deviant act (Hirschi refers to these as four social bonds). They are attachments, investmnts, involvement, and beliefs. '"Attacfnments" ~ f e r to s ixrterpersonal relationships. The more one is invoked in strong relationships with others (&viously tbrse others must be nondeviants), the less likely orle is to commit a criminal or dcvi,a,nt act for fear of ixljuring that relationship. In support of this, control theorists note that people with strmg fmily ties tend to follow social norms, and virtually all, f o r m of crirninal and deviant betnavinr declixre wf-ten a person marries or has children (Liska [1987; Kornhaustsr [19i"81). ""Investments" ~ f e r to s the cltegree to which a person is fnvested in conventional society, or more simply, h a t a person stands to lose if caught committing a crirninai, act, For example, a person who has a good job is more strmgly invested in conventional society than a perscm who is unemployed. Similarly a college graduate is more strongly invested than a high school dropout, It would make little sense for a bank manager with a good salary to rob a cmenience store. He or she has too much to lose. The third sucial b m d is involvement, ""Xnvctlvement'"merely refcrs to the a m n t of time a person spends incmnvmtional activities. Obviously, the busier a person is, the less likely it is that he or she will be Lnvolved in criminal or cleviant acts, merely because of a lack of time. 'This is sintilar to the old adage "id2e hands are the devil" workshop." fi~~ally, '6beliefs"

refers to the socialization process, and specifically to the ixrtemalization of social norms and values. People are able to exhibit self-control because togbreak laws or commit other devimt acts. they believe that it is w r o ~ ~ h sum, control theorists believe that people are naturally inched to commft a variety of crirninal or deviant acts, but exhibit self-contd. The rclason they exhibit self-control is that they have tks to conve~~tional society The ties are in the form, of attachments, investments, involrement, and beliefs, The strmger these ties, the less likely they are to engage in nonconventional behavior, since they have a stake h conventional society, Or put more in terms of our theoreticlal perspective, ties to conventional society constitute an increase in dependence, as well as an increased likelihaod of being surrounded by people who will sanction inappropriate behravior.

Deterrmce is the means by M;hich criminal justice systems attempt to inhibit crimhal behavior (i.e., the prjfnary fimd social control mechanism used in most societies). It works on the basic assumption that if &ere is a serious price to be paid for criminal behavior (e.g.. a jail sentence, monetary h e , m d so on), people wilt think twice about breaEng the law. In. other words, the goal of deterrence is to make the potential cost of committing a crilninal act higher than the potential reward. Or put more sirnply, the crimhal justice system attempts to scare people into cmplimce with society" rules, This concept has a long history, and can be traced back to Plato, who said "the man who is puniskd, and t-he man who sees him punisbed, may be deterred from doing wrong again" (as quoted in Stark E1998j).This theoretical perspective obk~iouslydiffers Iram the others. The other theories are primarily irnterested in mderstantfing human behavior, whether deviant or normative behavior. Deterrence theory' however, is not so interested in understanding ruhy people act the way they do, but rather in creating a social environment MIhere people are compelled to obey the laws of the land. Modern deterrence theory is most often associated with Jack Gibbs (1975). Gibbs claimed that the relative effectiveness of laws a d law enforcement depends on the severi? and certainty of the punishment. XI: a person feels that there is a high. probability of being caught m d punished. for committing a crime (high certainty), and that the pmishment will be fairly severe, that person will be deterred. This, of cowse, makes good theoretical sense, and a variety of empirical studies have supported this claim (Gray and Martill [4969]; Bailey, Martill, and Gray 119747). Gibbs's theory is aXso consistem.t.with arguments presented by contrd Chcorists, who similarly clajm that people weigh the costs and benefits of their ac-

tions and will refrairr f r m committixlg a deviant act if the likely consequencew"~emto outwigh the likely ~warcls. Although the above list of sociological and crhhological theories is far from complete, itdoes provide a basic overview of the main theoretical schools and aids understanding why crime rates tend to be low in mader11 Japanese society. It is also worth noting that, although researchers often p ~ s e nthgir t awn theories as being superior to other theories, and sufficient to explain a given phenomenon, there is little inthese four theories that is cmtradidory; and much that is complelxentary. Indeed, it is clear that all four are useful and contribute to our understanding of criminal and deviant behawior. For example, the ~lationshipbetween control theory and dGterrclnce was briefly alluded to. Deterrence is effeclive to the degree that a person fears the consequences of his or her behawior, and as noted by ccrntrol theorists, people with strong attachmelnts m d investmelrts have more to lose and,therefore, are more likely to fear the consequences, Sirnilar ~lationshipscan be d r a m between all of the ahowe theories. Structural theories suggest that people who live h socially disorganized neighborhoods are m r e likely to commit crimes. This is consistent with learning theories since people who live irn these neighborhoods tend to spend less time with their parents m d rnore time with peers, m n y of whom are involved in nonconventional behavior. Thesef ore, they are mom likely to learn such behavior, Alsct, in wonomically d e p ~ s s e dareas where unemployment rates are high, people have lower hvestments in conventional society, and therefore less to lose if caught committing a crime. hdeed, in some depressed areas where j o b are scarce, puhlic schools are inadequate, and crime is rampant, peaplle are not only more likely to learn criminal.behavior and.supporting ratiodizations, but are unlikely to be deterred by the criminal justice system since prison life might not be any worse than street life. The main point is that these theories fit together nicely to provide us with a broad understanding cJf the factors that influence crime rates. Moreover, a unifying Chcme that runs through t?ll of the lheories is the importastee of dependence, visibility and monitoring and sanctioning. We will now consider aspects of tbe fapanescr socid stmcbre that artt wlevmt to this discussion.

The Japanese Social Structure and Its Relationship to Crime The simplest way to orgmize this discussion is to consider h w the Japanese swial strudurc.influa1ct.s crinte rates from the perspective of each of the criminological theories listed above, payin.g special attention to issues

of dependency and visibility, Although each t h e o i~n~and of itself, is insdicient for understanding why Japan has such a low crime. mte, taken as a whole they provide a reasonat?ly complete and convkcing explmt-ion.

Structural T!z(~ories Stmctural theories, especiaily those rooted in the Chicago school (for example, Shaw and McKay 119421; Park, Burgess, and McKenzie [1925]), tend to view urbaniza.t.ion as synonymotls with i;ncreases in social disorganization and anmie. That is, urban areas tend to be characterized as places where normat patterns of social support and social cmtml break down..This breakdown is often conceptualized as m atkmuation of interpersonal attachments and a weakening of explicit norms gwerning appropriate behavior, and has been linked to a wide range of deviant behavior, particularly crime. As discussed above, the theoretical explmation provided is that people tend to be mnrc transient in large cities: that is, they arc. less likely to live with or near their families, reside in stable neighborhoods, belong to local churches or other types of communitybased, organizations, and so forth. h general, then,there is less social integration and more anmymity so people have m m personal f~edczm and fewer behavioral constraiats in large cities. FIowever, several characteristics of urban Japan have served to attenuate social disorganization and anomie. First, Japan urkanized rapicdly in the late nineteenth m d early twentieth celzturies. Therefore, what exists now in Japan are very mature urban areas with stable neighborhoods and community organizations. Secmd, Japm has put in place a variety of social mechanism that both provid,e social support and &so discourage many iorrns of devimce in usban arcas Payley [1991]; Fishman and Dinitz [19K9]). 'This latter characteristic is directly refated to issues atready discussed in this book. Many companies in urban areas provide familylike envirmmnts for their empIoyees, i d u d i n g collective housing, Lrcal* c m , recreational facilities, and so on, Thus, the urban Japanese worker is likely to experience kss of a sense of social isolation than urbm workers in other comtries. Such an extensive work-based social support system mitigates many of the problems associated with living in a large urban area. Not only does it provide for the physical and emotionaf needs of the employees, but as discussed in Chapter 4, it does this in such a way as to increase workers2dependence and visibiliv. In additjnn, there are a variey of other characteristics of &an areas that serve to reduce levels of social disorganization. First, as already mentioned, the neighborhoods tend to be fairly stable. People do not move in m d out of neighborhoods with great frequency. Also, J a p m has a relatively even income distribution (as measured by the Gini coeffi-

cient) so that the majority of people enjoy a middle-class lifestyle (Murakami [147t5f). This means Japan has few areas that are characterized by widespread poverty. Also, a selnse of commmnity is e~*mced by a variety of commnity-based organizations and.neighborhood associations (clzmaikwi) which artr ubiquitous througl~outJapan* hexcellent example of how large urban arc-?asinJapan are able to produce a sense of cornmunit). is provided by the recent introduction of a festiwal in the city of Sapporo. Sapporo is a large city on the northern island of Hokkaido and has a pogullation of ncarly 2 million peope- Like all cities in Japan, there are seasonal festivals that a large pescmtage of the population takes part in, but recently a new festival was inf;roduced. Gaku Hasegawa was a student at Hokkaido University when he bracationed m e summer in Kochi prefecture on the island of Shikoku. That prtrfecbre celebrates a unique dance festival called Ynsak~i-Somlz.When Hasegawa returned to Sapporo, hc told hjs friends about the festival and began encouraging others to help him stage a similar festival in Sapporo. The concept is that people form a dmce team, and they must perfclrm an orighal dmce wearing original costumes"Thus, the festival requires the participants to commit a great deal of time and energy in terms oi preparation. ?'hey must compose the dance, find appopriate music, m d make the costumes. 'Then, of course, all members must rehearse. The first festival was staged in 1992, and Hasegawa managed to convhce about 1,000 people to participate, forming a total of 10 dance teams (the size of the teams varied from IQto 200 peaple). By 1997, after only five years, the festival boasted 183 teams and a total of 19,080 dmcers. The teams usually form around preertisting social groups, such as cubs, sport"eams, businesses, clas~lxates,and so on, m d people now spend mmy months preparing their teams. During the weekend of the festival, costumed. dmcers can be seen tbrtlughout the city Thus, in a very short period of time, a ncw "traditio~n"has been establjskd. The rapid gmwth of the festival was made possibk because of the extensive network of preexisting, small social groups. By pulling these gmups together into a c&esive citywide kstival, a sense of shared commmity has been acfiieved. Findly, recall that structural theories also note the relationship between unemployment rates and crime rates. Japan has, in the past forty years, had consistently locv memployment rates, m o n g the lowest in the world. Tabk 6.2 displays unemplrzyment rates in Japan, the Ulaited States, and the URited Kingdom for the past forty years. As can be seen, Japan has enjoyed very high levcls of mploymelnt urntil quite recently, and even th@n, the ranemployment rate is low by international standards, Both the United States and United Kingdom, on the other hand, began with very low unemployment rates, which then rose steadily until peaking in the mid-1980s before declining more recently. The general pattern

TABLE 6.2 Unemployment Rates far the United States, United Kingdom, and Japan, 1960-1 998 Unt'led Sfafes

Year

50URCE:

U.K.

Japan

Bureau of Labor Statistics (1998).

has some relationship to overail crirne rate patterns. In t-he United States, crime peaked in the 1980s and has been declkirrg hrecent years. It has been noted by several economists that the low unemployment rates in Japm are at feast partly the result of discriminatory hiring practices m d statistical manipula.t.ions (Bronfenbrenner and Yasuba 119871). Many people who are effectively shut out of the tabor market, particularly women and older men, tend to drop out of the labcrr force rather than join Che ranks of the unemgloyed. Thus, actual unenngloyment is higher than official statjstics suggest. Regardlfss of what the '"eat" unemployment rates are in Japan, unemployment among you% males is low. without- condonhg discrimhai-ory fnirhg practices that f avor these young men, this type of labor market bias likely contributes to the low crirne rate in Japan. By discriminating against females anrS older males, Japmforces a group of people out- of"the l&or market who are? unlikely to turn to crime as a resuft. The link between unemplopent and crime is primarily a lil~kbetwen unemployed yomg mdes and crime (Groves m d Frank 119871). Nevertheless, unemployment is d y m e factor influmckg crime, and more appropriate for uncferstandhg gradual changes in crime rates within societies than for understanding broader cross-national dlilfesences, To understand cross-societal differences, one needs to consider a variety of other theories as well.

Leanling Tlzmries We will discuss learlzing theories and subculture theories in greater depth in the next chapter, when we conside~wfiik-collar crimes. For our

current discussion, suffice it to say that if most behavior is learned in small, intimate groups, Japanese arrt constrained to learn primarily normative behavior. Since so much of their time is spezzt in conve~ztiorral groups, such as family, scbuoi, and work groups, learning and conforming to group norms typically means l e a m i ~ ~and g cmforming to conventiond social norms- Additionally, as discussed above, operant conditioning provides an effective mems of controlling and shaping behavior. Clearly, in a country like Japan, where there is high group dependence and h.igh visibility, operant condjtionhg (wlnicfi involves various forms of monitoring and sacrctiming) is highly effective. It is also worth noting that basic socialization practices are more uniformly performed in Japan than in many other countries, particularly the United %ates, since, as we discussed in the previous chapter, intact, traditional families as well, as multigenerational families are still fairly clrmmon in Japan. "Ilherefore, childrcn spend a great deal of time under Ihe dirt.& supervision of either their parmts or grmdparents. Of course, not all groups teach socially appropriate behavior. Subculturc t-heory deals with those closed social environments where nonconventional, behavior is learned as the group norm. These subcultuses exist in all, countries, includirtg Japan, where a variety of ~ l i g i o u and s crirninal subcultures flourish. In such situations, the closed social exrvirmments characterized by strmg dependence and normative obligations serve to prrrmcrte a wide range of devimt rather than conventional behavior. This topir, however, will be discussed in the following chapter.

Cantso1 theories are most directly rcllevant to the topics discussed in this book. fn fact, in the preface to the Japanese edition of his classic book, Hirscihi (1995) extensively djseusses Mechter m d Ka,lzaza~va~s solidaristic theory of social order, the theory that this book eznploys. He refers to this theoretical perspective as containing the same key theoretical ccrmponents as conrsol theory Rwall that control theorists bcfieve that most people rekain from committing dcviant acts for fear of the conseqtlences. Of particular importance are intergersond relatimships and fnvesments in cmvezztional society. To the extent that these ties to cmvezztional society are strong and could be damaged by committjrrg some devimt act, people will conclude that potential costs outweigh benefits and will refrain fmm participati.ng inthese acts. As discussed throughout this book, the consequences of nonconventional behavior in Japan can be extreme. A person with a crimhal recod will be untikely to find a spouse or a job. Indeed, onc need not even look at such an extrentc example to see the

cmseyumccs of nonconfomjng behavior. A person who merely fails to display sufficient group loyalty or fulfifl normatiwe expertationr; is mlikely to aehievc any dcgree o( sncial success, Conversely a person who is a good group mmber can expect to be rewarded for his or her behavior. A person who does well on college entrance emms will enter a good college, a person graduatkg from a good college will receive a good job, and a person who is a responsible and hardworking employee will receive prmotions and raises. Thus, investing in conventional sot-iety makes great sense in Japan, while participathg in deviant acts does not. This might all s e a commmsensical and true of all societies. But compare the social situatim in Japan with that of the United States. Xrnerican society is rcilplete with options, as well as secmd ehances, fos success. A person who divorces can remarry relatively easily; a person who is fired from one job can find another; a person who is unl-tappy at m e school can transfer to anotlner; a person who decides at age thirty or even hrty to return to school can do so; and a high school dropout with good entrepreneurial skills c m become rich alld successful. Even a person convkted crl a crime can rcenter society at some point. The rclative h e d n m to pursue m e % own goals one" sawn wa)i and to recover fpom past mistakes is usually seen as a positive social characteristic Iny Americans, But it:c m e s at a cost. The cost is that the consequence of committing a crimb nal or deviant act FR the United States is significantly less than it is in Tapm* Furthermre, unliEcc Japan, the benefits of confomtity are not as certain or ubiquitous. Une c ot be assured that graduating from a good college wilf lead to a good job, or more generally, that displaying group loyalty to any group will be rcwardcd h time. Indeed, conforming too p~ciselyto social or grczup norms carries a negative socid connotation ixr Amerkm society 'I'hus, although ties tc:,cmentional society do discourage nonconventional behavior in the United States as they do h Japan, h r i r a n s tend to have weaker ties since interpersonal relationships and employment tend to be more fluid. Once agafn, it is wident that il~creasecdoptions lead to greater personal freedom, but: mdermine mechanisms of social control. Finally recall fiat control theorists also consider '""involvement" hcmventionnl activities to be a key to low rates of criminal and devi,ant:behavior. That is, the less free t h e a person has, the less likely he or she is to become hvolved in n m o n v e n t i d activities, As menticmed in prtrwious chapters, Japanese studmts and workers have little free time. With schools and companies demanding a grcat time commihent that often extcmds well into tbe ewening, people have tittle time to participate in nonconventional activities.

Similar to control theories, theories of deterrence focus on the cost of comrnittjng a criminal or deviant act, Rather than studying hraman behavior, per se, these t-heorists study t-he relative effectiveness of the criminal justice systm. They are not intercskd in studying deviant behavior that does nut break any laws, and even less interested in studying conforming behawior. They arc. only intemsted in understanding how best to ensme that l w s are not broken. As metntioned above, basic research suggests that deterrence works to the extent that there is a high pescejved. chance of being caught committing a crime, anci further, that the punishmetnt will be severe. We cvill look briefly at the Japanese crirninal justice system, focusing primar-ily m these twa issues, Japan boasts not only the lowest crime rate of any modern industrialized corntry, hut also the hjghe" arrest rate (i.e., crlearmce rate). -Table 6.3 pxlesents a cross-natimd comparison of arrcst rates for homicide and assault. It is clear t-hat fapan enjoys a very high success rate in l o c a t a and arresthg crirninal suspects" Furthermore, once an arrest is made, conviction is likely. h most cases when the crime is not serious and it is a first offense, the pe~etratcrris treated lightly with a small fine if he or she cmklsses and expresses remorse (Haley 61.9861). However, if the person does not confess, or if the crime is rdatively serious, the criminal justice system can be very harsh. It is difficult to say with certainty how an kdividual will be treated since there is a grcat deal of discretionary power allotted to the police and the public prosecutor. Police will often turn their heads at certain crimes or merely issue a warning*Prosecutors, similarly, have a great deal of leeway in deciding who will and who will. not be pmsecuted. If th police decide to arrest a person, and the prosecutor decides to prosecute, a guilty verdict is dmnst assured. Actual cowt cases arc more ol a formality than a serious attempt to acljudge a person" guilt or innocence. Judges (there is effectively no jury vstem-all cases are decided by judges) essentially convi,ct ail, peopl" brought beforra thcm, Van Wolferen (1989) reports that 99.8 percent of afl criminal cases ever prosecuted in Japan have ended in convictim, The high arrest rate in Japan is probably owing to factors other than good police work (Smith [19851; Tasker 119891). Japanese police have the "luxury" of a very suppmtive cornunity that often =ports suspicious betnavinr or even turns in peope who have committed crimes. This exchange of in.formation is greatly enhanced by a newark of more than E,OW pdice boxes (FCoba11),WhiCh are small neighborhood police statiom (Reingold E19951). Most of these m manned twenty-fotxr hours a day and the police are accepted as members of the local community and perform

TABLE 6.3 Percent of Reported Homicides and Assaults Cleared by Arrest

Yapan Spain Canada N&herlands France Poland United Stakes Sweden SOURCE: Interpol (1992) and Japan""

National Police Agency (1993).

a variety of community services besides striet police work. Another obvious advmtage to tke extensive network of kuba-rz is the i n c ~ a s ein police visibility and an hereased ability to mcmitcrr citizmfsbehavior (although this is more perception than rcality since police at a kobar~more often read or watch television than patrol the streets). A more important factor contributing to the high arrest rate, which is often overloaked because it is so obvious, is the low crime rate itself, Japan has the added "luxury" of a very low crixne rate, which aflows police to cclncmtrate on solving crimes that do occur. It is often fie case in corntries such as the United SMes that police must perform a type of triage, having to rank a i m s by their seriousness and.then decidc which to investigate and which to ignore.. Tl~ernare simply too many crimes and too few poliCe. These statistics are important since, as stated earXier, deterrence is only efkctive when there is a high certainty of being caught. This is, after all, commonsensical, It is difficult to scare people ilnto compliance wiCh the law if they d o not believe they will, actually be caught and punshed. Thus, the hi$her the arrest rate, the higher the certainty of being caught committing a crime. The ahove statistics suggest that in general there is a higher certainty that a Japanese person committing a crime will he caught fian there is fnr a citizen of most other countries. Indeed, the ljkelhood that m Axncrican con?mitti,ng a c r i m will be caught is extremely low. Using estimates from victim.ization surveys, the U.S. Bureau of justice =ports that only a smatl fraction of crimes are ever reported to Che police in the first place. Even i f W concentrate on l.he most serious category of crimes, ielonies, only about half are ever reported to the police. merefore, a person comxnitthg a felony has a fiftyfifty chance that the airme will not even be reported. Furtherme, of those reported, less than haIf will rcsult h arrest and only a smdi per-

centage of those arrested will end inconviction, Thus, potential criminals can correctly befieve that it is quite unlikefy they wit1 pay a heavy price for their adions. The sikation described here suggests an interestirtg type of social dynan-tic. As long as the crime rate is low, police are able to arrest a high percentage of those people committing crimes. This, in turn, leads to a high certah~tyof being caught, whieh makes e k t s at deterrence more effective, thus keeping the crime rate low. Howevelr, if the crime rate beghs to rise (due to hcreased u ~ ~ e m p l o y mrates, e ~ ~ t a weakellkg of informal social control mchanjsms, or so on), the police are less ahle to apprtrhend the majority of perpetrators, which then lowers the certainty-of being caught, undermining the ability of a socicty to deter potential criminals. Or put more simyly, it is much easier to mainta& a low cri.me rate &an it is to bring down a high crime rate (something the Ul~itedStates and many other countries would r e a d y attest to). I:inaIly$recall that the second factor related to the effecthness of deterrence is severity of punishment. It would be misleadiz~gto think of this l yterms of sentenchg practices; in €-hat case, Japan would apfactor o ~ ~in pear to be a very lenient countfy. Table 6.4 compares a variety of countries in terms of the pertlent oE people cclnwicted of crimes who are smtenced to prison and the avccage length of a prison sentence. These statistics suggest that Japan, dong with the United Kingdonn, Finland, and perhaps Canada, are quite lenie&, whereas Mexico, the Uilited States, the Netherla~ds,m d the Russim Federation tend to be severe, Although there is s m e truth to these findjngs (certainly one would be well advised faof: to commit a crime in Mexico), these statistics do not tell the whole story. Firstl it shvuld be remembered that ""crtajnty" "ays a crucial roIe in deterrence. Despite severe sentences, if there is a low perceiwed chance of being carnght in the first place, potential criminals are unlikelly to be dcterred. Second, the actual cost of being caught cmmitting a crime extends beyond the sentence meted out. h n d tlne cost in Japan is very high. Regardiess of the length of p r i s o ~time, ~ a person with a criminal rcleord will find it almost impossible to reenter Japanese society &e"s grczup affiliations will have been severed, and establishing new affiliations, whether h terms of an occupation or even interyersonai relationst.rips, is extremely difficult. The cast can also be measured in psychological or emotional terms, fn the form of shame anci disgrace. Being caught committing a crime not ml,y disgraces the indjvidual, but also rcflects poorly on the persm" friends, family, and professional colleagues. Thus, one not: only feels persona embarrassment, but also must deal with having brought shame and embarrassment to others. fndced, it is this aspect of Japanese sociew that some researchers claim, is largely responsible for the low crime rate (Braithwaite 119891; Bayley [1991j).

TABLE 6.4 Severity of Sentencing Practices

Country

Percerz f Setzterzced to Prison

Average ki"zgtlzof Serlleszec (in weeks)

Yapan

U.K. Finland Switzerland Belgium Canada Russian Federation NcstherXands United States Mexico

scJurrcr7: United Natiom World Crime Survey (1995).

Conclusion Obviously, the study of crirne is complex and many factors contribute to a society's overall crime rate. In this chapter, we reviewed what most crhhologists would claim are the main factors, and related them to how they fit in with elements of the Japanese social structure that were discussed in prwious chapters. First, we reviekved structural theories and noted that Japan's low level of unemployment for young males contributes to its low crime rate. In Chapters 4 and 5 we noted some cJf the ways Japan maintains those low u~~erutployment rates. Here we see how criminological theories predict its relevmce to social order. Also, we noted how stmctural theorists claim that crime is related to a breakdown in social s q p o r t systems and the hcreased a~~onyrrrity that comes with urbmization. But, as we discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the extensive network of closed, tight-knit small gnrup"throughout Japanese society ensure that people have adequate social support networks and are? co~~stantly kept in hjgh visib2it.y envients. Thus, life in Japan, even in urban Japm, more closely minors rural life in other countries than it does urban life, and is subject to the benefits of rurd life (e.g., safety and security) mcf also its drawl?acks (e.g., a lack of personal freedom and opportunities). Second, we discussed leaming theories, which claim crime and devimt behavior are learned inprimry groups. Again, Chpters 3,4, and 5 show how socialization within Japanese groups is taught and maintained. High depende~zceand a lack of alternative m a n s for success ensure that most people will l e a n and exhibit normative behavhr. Further, learnhg theories stress tbe importance oi an effective reward, and punishment system (operant cmditioning). rr%lmughoutthis book we have

demonstrated how effective Japanese groups are at monitoring and sanctioning inappmpriate behavior* Third, we discussed co~~trol theories, which predids that peaple who have strong ties to conventional. society will rcfi.ah from participating in criminal or deviant acts because of a fear of hjuring those ties. A;ak~,the rcllevance of this crimhological theory to the topics discussed in previous chapters is clear. Most Japanese have strong ties to conventional society, and the damage done to those ties by acting inappropriately c m be irreparable- Moreover, control theorists also note the importance of timef claining that people who are busy in conventional. activities s i ~ t do y not: have time to participate in n m o n v e n t i d activities. This is a point we have made repeatedy t-hroug%loutthis book, Japanese people, especially youths, are kept very busy. Finally we djsctlssed deterrence t h e q , and the role cJf the crirninat justice systern in deterring potenkl criminals. The effectiveness of thjs system is also rclated, to issues discussed in this book. Since deterrence is most effective when the cost of being caught committing a crime is high, the fact that the slxjd structwrc is so ul-rforgiving allows the criminal justice system to effectively deter potential criminais, Reestablishing any type of n o r d life after being caught and convicted of a crime is a daunting task, daunting elrough to instilt in most people a strong desire to avoid that possibility. I'he above discussion highlightli the rote smail-group etependency and vi,sibility plays in keeping crime r&es low. Since many peope are highly dependent on conventional groups and must conform to the group's normative requirttments, virkally aZl foms of deviant behavior, Including crimhal belnaviar, are c~~rbed. The high visibility setting that most peaple live in ensures that clmdestine deviant behavior is kept to a mis.?iirnurn. Further, since being a good group member usually leads to future mwards, ties to conventio~~al society are strong, m a h g the cost of cornmitting an illegal act high,Rerefore, it is no wmdcr that the Japanese crlme rate remair~slow. However, it is important to =member that we have, thus far, only discussed street crimes. Other crimes, such as certain types of white-collar or professional crimes, do not necessarily follow the same pattern. Indeed, the same social stmcture that discourages street crimes might actually er-rcourageother types of crimes. We will now turn to that topk.

PART THREE

Nonintuitive Consequences

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Crime Revisited: White-Collar Crimes

The previous chapter focused exclusively on what could be termed ""street crimes" m d "violent c es." I-towever, although the social stmcturc described in this hook might attenuate these types of crime, it rnight actually foster other @pesof crirne. Dependence on any group, even conventimal groups, can easily lead to a situation where one is rrrquired. by the group to perfnrm some illegal or intmnrd act-Afer all, a comIlary of the type of group dynamics we have described throughout this book is that the interest of the group should supereede the interest of the individual. 'Thus, a %pica1 fedare oE tight-knit, small groups is that behavior is evaltuated in terms of whether it promotes group interests, not whether it is socially nornative. Obviously there is an inherent dmger in such a perspedive. As was pointed out in the previous chapter" discussion of subcultures, deviant behaviar can be thought of similarly to conve&imal betnavinr in terms of learning and socialization patterns, the ml,y dieerence being the social context. Peoyle who are socidized into a cmventional group will exbibit socially normative behavior whereas people group wilt exl-cibit socidy dewho are socialized into a nonconve~~tional viant behavior. Examples of conventional gmups might be sckool-related groups, conventional church groups, and so on. Nonconventional groups cdts. The m a h point is Ihat the might include street gangs or ~l,igious actual, process of acyuirir\g certain, behaviors does not differ for these groups. It involves basic socialization processes such as modeling, operant conditioning, internalizirtg group values, and so on. The more tightknit and closed the group is, the more likely a group member % bbehaior will confom to group norms, whatever those norms might be. Ch. put in terms of"the theo~ticalorientat.ion of this book, the greater a mennber's dependence is on the group, and the more visible he or she is to other

82

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group members, the mre likely it is that he or she will conform to group norms. Throughout this book we have assulned that the groups were all conventional groups: school, work, neighbohood, and family, However, there arc., of course, nmconventional groups in Japm.Attracting a fair amount of media attention are?various religious cults s~tchas Aum Shinrikyo, the yakzszn (organized crime syndicates), and even some youth gangs- And as one wodd expect, they too, tend to be tight-knit, closed groups that demand and command norlnative obligations and behavioral conformity. And also as one woulld. expect, m c h of the behavior nmonventicmal groups demand from their mernbers is socially deviant. However, these groups are not particularly unique to lapan. Virtually all modern societies have similar types of nonconventional gmups, and the social processes that operate withi21 these groups are similar f r m society to society. Thusl hvhatever country one is in, c d t hehavior or gang behavior tmds to be quite similar-people exhibit strong loyalty to their group and maintain a strong sense of identity, commitment, and behavioral conformity. Japan is not unique in this regard. What is unique inJapan is that the same pattern also applies to conventional groups. Furthemore, allhough conventional groups might inhibit certilin types of illegal behavior, they might encottrage other types of illegal behaviar, especially if the belnavjor is a h e d at furthering group goals. Remember that the goal of small groups is nei&er social order nor the promotion of social norms. Rather, social order is an unintelnded consequence since group conformity ofien infiibits various forms of socially inappropriate behavictr (specifically c m m o n street crimes m d violent crimirral behavior). However, it is not unusual for group goals to foster other types of socially inappropriate behavior. Given the closed social environment many groups operate in, the degree of group cohesiveness and loyalty they maintain, and the severe consequemccs of doing or sayjng anythhg that might put one at odds with other group members, there is little in the way of ""external checks.'%lZhough monitoring and sanctionhg is a commn feature oE small groups, it is dways i~tterrrulmonitoring and sanctioning. G o u p members%beavior is usually not subject to the scrutiny of people outside of the group. This ""secretivef%lementof many small grouys, c0mbi.nr.d with the connpetitive nature and prcsslrre to show profits that characterize many modern bushesses, likely creates an environment whrre certain subcultural n o m s can develop, norms wliere cerbirr types of illegal behavior become ""smdard operathg procedure-" Refining 011s Concept of White-Colfar Grime The term "whik-collar crirne," oorligixlaly coined by Edwin S u t h e r h d in 1939, quite literdly referred to crimes committed by people of higher so-

cial status in the courx of their occupation. However, its popular usage has expmded to include virtually all types of cri~nesother than cclmmm street crimes"This includes a broad array of illegal acts k m bribery and baud to environmental pollution and unsafe working conditions, These acts are so b r a d that tbry include crimes not directly ~ l a t e dto a person's work, such as cheating on one's incom taxes, to crimes not limited to middle- or upper-dass peoplc, such as writ.hg bad checks. Some distinctions and refinements artr necessary to highitjht white-collar crimes that are relevant to our current discussion. Past research in the field of white-collar crime has sometimes distinguished between white-collar crimes committed by an individual for personal gain m d those committed wi& the inte~~tion of advancing the goals of the organization (see Coicman 119851; Hamilton and Sanders 119961; Clinard and Qu ey [1923]). Such a distinction is particularly approp"ate to the czrrrcnt discussion of white-cdlar crimes. One wodd expect the former to be lower in Japan than in other countrics since blgh visibility prevmts people fmm ccmducting clandestine acts aimed at personal gain. Howver, the latter would be expected to be higher in Japan than elsewhere since group solidarity and loyalty are ubiquitous characteristics of Japanese social life, Unfortunately, empirical support for this proposition is hard to come by. White-collar crimes, almost by defi.nition, are hidden, Most wb-itecollar crime goes unrepol-ted to the pofice since there is o f en no clear victim (at least in the seIIse that there is a victinn in the case of a robbery or assault). Rather, victims of white-collar crimes tend to be rarge organizations (such as insurance companies, government itgencies, and so on) or the p.ublic in general (Goode [1.9""3]), Or put in crilninological terms, white-collar crimes require proactive rather than reactive law eniorcement (Hagan [19941). The police must try to actively uncover a crilne rather than merely respmd to the report of one. This makes it extrelncly difficult to quantify white-collar crimes, especially from a cross-national perspective. All of the caveats discussed in the previous chapter cmcerning comsnon street crimes are mltiptied. Uiffermces in the degree to which white-collar criminals are pursued, arrested, and convicted varq' grcatly from country to country, Also, i w s concerning a gwat many =late$ issues, such as environn?ental protection, c o n s u e r .Fraud, occupational safety laws, collusion, and so on d s o differ from country to country so what is illegal in ofie country might not be illegal in another. Despite these many litnitations, the topic is of great importance and worth considering, even with the empirical limitations, Two whit.e-collar crimes that are routinely rc-rported in international crime statistics are fraud and embezzlement, These two crimes typically fal, into the category of crimes committed for persona1 gain; thesefort., we would expect Japanto exhibit ~lativelylow rates. Table 7.1 pwsents rates for these two

C?-itlzeReztisited: White-Collar C F ~ ~ P ~ C S

84

TABLE 7.1

Sweden Seotf and Awtria Canada Finland Korea Hungary England Denmark France Japan WURCE:

Crc3ss-National Comparison of Fraud and Embezzlement Rates

568.76 1126.60 401.61 352.228 306.05 282.m 256.27 253.82 195,1;0 2 74.53 41.71

104.89 6.92 40.04,

7'2.54 45.59 44.70 m

20.06 m

1.50

United Nations W r l d Crime Suxvey (1995).

crimes for a variety nf corntries (note that the United States did not provide information on these crimes for the Unj-t.edNations survey), As expected, Japan appears to have relatively low rates oE fraud and embezzleme11t. Identifying the degrcle to which crimes committed to ben@&a company occur is much more difficult. Indeed, it is even difficult to accurately distingtlish those crimes comminE?d to benefit the individual and those committed to benefit the company. For owners, upper management, and stocichotders, oftentirnes vvbat bmefits the company bmefits the individual as well. Even for lowcr-level employees, aiding the company through i1lega.l acts, or loyaIly standkg by others who commit illegal acts might be individually ~warciedin the lmg run in t.he form of raises or promotions. Thus, the disthction made above is not nearly as clear as it appears. Neverrheless, it is a useful way to thjnk about how certain forms of social structurrs interact with certain types of criminal behav ior, It is interesting here to note that despite Japan's well-earned reputation as an erctremeiy safe artd ordaly society that positive =putation does not extend to cover images of corruption. A series of international surveys aimed at ascertainixrg images of corruption were cmducted in 1998 by a group known as Transparency International. 'They created a ""corruption perception index"" based on data fsom up to twlve separate sufveys of people from around the world who were invoked in internatimlal business. The index rates each country in terms of how "clean'" or "comptff the international business community perceives the country Results of this research for a variety of modern industridized countries are pres-

TABLE 7.2 International Comparison of Perceived Corruption

Country

Scorea

Denmark Sweden Canada Nether1ands Norway Australia U.K, Germany Hong Kong Austria United States France Spain lapan Italy Sou& Korea "The range is from Q (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean). WURCE: Ransparency International (1998).

ented in Table 7.2. As can be seen, U e m a r k ranks highest, followd by Sweden and Canada. Japan, however, does not fare well, with only Italy and South Korea being perceived as more corrupt. These results illustrate graphically the need to distinguish between and white-collar crirne. Na doubt people involved in intemas t ~ ecrime t tiond business know hcrw safe and orderly Japmese society is. Yet this bowledge has no particular relevance when assessing i s s ~ ~of e scorruption. Tndeed, the relationship between crime rates in general and perceptions of ccrrruytim appear to be unrelated. Furthermore, these resdts highligt-tt the importance of distinguishing betwee11 diff erent types of white-collar crimes, Crimes committed for personal gain appear to bave nt, relation to the more structural charge of corruption. This is most clearly evident in the case of Swede~~, which has the highest levels of fraud and embezzlement, but is still perccjved as one of the '6cleanest" societies in which to do business.

Companies as Subcultures It is not unusual among white-collar crime researchers to treat compmies as deviant subcultures. A typicd description of a subculture is a group of

86

C?-itlzeReztisited: White-Collar C F ~ ~ P ~ C S

people who bave close contact with me another, see themselves as belonging to a uniyue group, often characterized by a special way of dressing, and who learn a set of norms and values that di,fferentjate themselves from other groups. It is easy to see how this description can fit some companies as w l l as it does gangs or religious groups. It iw"ft"n the case that work groups definc very clearly what is acceptable and what is unacceptable behavior, and new empbcres are quickly socidized into this emironment and conform to behavioral expectations. Further, it seems self-evident that the more c l o s e b i t and interdepemdmt the eznployees are, the stronger the pressure to conform to group behavioral norms. A good example is pmvided by McCaghy and Caprm (1997) in their djscussion concerning the prevalence of potice corruptinn. They offer the followhg explanation: This indifference of police toward corruption in their own ranks is not slimply the result of misplaced loyalty. Rather, it indicates the solidarity of police that emerges as a necessary element of the job. . . . Police work in tight, informal groups and see themselves as operating alone against an uninfcjrmed and indifferent, if not hostile, world. Any iflegal practices that emerge within police groups can develop into secret standards for the groups. These standards are perpetuated by being passed on to recruits coming into the ranks. Should a recruit resist participation, group acceptance will be withheld, and the recruit will experience imtation because of his or her lack of group " ~ c ~ y a ~(245-246) ty"

Sirrtilar examplemabound. In a faschatint; study of national securities markets, Baker (1984) notes how traders in the pits organize themselves into tight-knit social groups that favor members of the same pit, refusing to hear or accept better bids made from traders from other pits. mese examples show how tight-k~itgroups develop a type of subculture, where group gods am placed above rules of proper behavior, ft is not hard to see how a sirnilar dparnic might operate in a great many group settings across Japan. Consider the results presented in Tables 7.3 and 7.4 from the 1991 Mrorld Values Survey. Table 7.3 present the percent of respondents who answered that ""they would have to be convi,ncedr'bbcfre obeyil~gquestionable orders from, superiors at work. AIthough in many countries nearly half the respondents replied. that they woufd not follow their superiors' orders unless they were con\tinced that doi,ng so was right, only &out 11 percent of the fapmese respondents responded similarly, Obviouslqi many Japanese feel they are not in a position to question their superiors at work Interestingly, the United States was second lowest, with o d y about 23 percent answering this way,

TABLE '7.3 Percent Who Must Be Convinced Befc~reFollc>wing Questionable Or4ers

Denmark Spain Korea France Netherlands Italy klgium U.K. Sweden Canada West Germany United States

Sapan WURCE:

World Values Survey (1994).

TABLE '7.4 How- Much Control Do You Have Over Ycfur Own Life (Q-lo)?

Caunfty

Mean

United States Canada Korea Swden Denmark U.K. West Germany Spain &Xgi urn Italy France Netherlands Japan

saunce: Wc~rldtValues Suwey (1991). Table 7.4 presents results of a question that asks respondents how much cmtroi they feel tbey bave over their lives. The responses were on a scale from one to ten, ten i~~dicating a great deal of personat cantrol. Chce again, Japan represe11t.s the extreme end of the cmthu~tm,with respondents claiming to have less control over their own Lives thm do re-

88

C?-itlzeReztisited: White-Collar C F ~ ~ P ~ C S

s p d e n t s from all other countries. This time the United St.ates and Japan r e p r e ~ npolar t opposites. Given this sitttatio~?,it is easy to see haw abuses are possible in Japan. Individuals often have no choice but to make a long-term cammit.m.ent to a very tight-knit group where they are dependent on group leaders m d have little autonmy Thus, John Rraithwaite (3989) notes that Japan provides m excellent example of not only a society with low street crime, but also a society with "white c d l a clirninai subcultures of unusud coe herence" (136). He goes m to note that "None of this shodd s ~ i s us. After all, Japanese communitarianism is also manifested in common crirninal gmgs that are more highly organized, more capable of exacting total loyalty from their members, to follow directions to engage incrime, than criminal gangs found in most of the rest of the world" (137). Other researchers familiar with crime patterns in Japan also claim that whitecollar c r i m is rmpant, despite the lack of empirical evidence fsce, for exarmple, van Wolferen [l9891; Wormoff 119801). Examples aE White-Collar Crime in f span As mentioned above, it is very hard to put one's finger m white-cola crimes or to quantify their occurrences. However, it is not m c h of an exaggeration to state that one can hardly open a newspaper in Japan without reading about the latest pditical or business-related scandal*Of course, there is no way to know whether Japan is unique in this regard. These types of crimes might be exceedjngly common in many countries, but do not c o w to light as Erequently as they do in Japm. However, even if Japan is not exceptional in this regard, this fact alone, given the exceptionally low rates of all other measurable forms of deviant behavior, is noteworthy, Whatever social stntctural processes serve to attenuate other forms of crimhal and deviant behavi,or do not appeas to significan* ifnpact certah types of white-collar crimes. Beforl, discussing specific examples, though, it is necessary to add one important elernent to the discaskon of the characteristics of wh,ite-collar crime, Although this chapter's focus is on crimes that benefit the group and on normative obligations that encourage such behavior, it is often the case that such actions necessarily involve collusion with other groups. Of course, one can act in a strictly psedatory fashion, but often a better strategy is to forge dliances with importmt business and political leaders. Thus, one sees the p~valemceof such cvhite-colfar crimes as insider trading, bribery and price fix,in.g. In this regard, the iqortance of the keiretszl is clear. The keiretsu is a fairly tight-knit group composed of the top e~"cutivedromvarious corporations. Thus, yet another group is made up of leaders of smaller groups. The advantages of this type of

'*cooperativefrarrmgernent are obvious, as are the temptations to misuse it. Consider, for exan-tple, that it has been estimated that 70 percent of all corporate stock in Japan is owned by other corporations rather Chan by individuals (Dore E2987J). A brief summary of some of the major news stories of the 1990s will serve to illustrate this point. 011the political front, the early 1990s were highlighted by several mgor scandals involving the then-ruling Liberal Democratic Party @UP). &ports begm circutating that many of the colnpanjcs that became successfrd after World War X did so through clandestine relations with the LDP. Among them was Sagawa Kyubin, Japan's ]largest parcel deliwery service. Sagawa Kyubin had evidently bribed several key CJDPpoliticians to gai,n favorable policies aiding its establishment. Sim.ilar atlegations cmcerning illegal poli.tical contributions to the LUP have been raised regularly In 1992,investigators Wcovered a host of illegal activities by Shin Kanemaru, the behind-thescenes leader of the LDP. H e was not mly implicated, in illegal activities involving inflwnce peddling, but was also tied to organized crime. 'This particular scandal contributed to the I:.,DP losing power in 1,993 and Morihim Hosokawa a s s u i n g the roIe of prime minister. h f o r t u nately, his tenure iasted mly until 1994, when he was forced to resign fsoan office becausc of his own scandal il~vol\~ing a series of dubious loans he was involved with in the 1980s. Ox~eof the few studies to adciress white-collar crime in Japan was conducted by Kerbo and lnoue (1990). Similar to our observations, the autbors find the route of such corruption in the social stnlcture, specifically strong group ties and toyatty comhir~edwith fierce competition. 'They claim lithe ilxtportance of srnalt group organization and its characteristjcs may at times provide social support for the rationalization of whjte collar crime in Japar.1, as well as carrying it out: in a way that is more difficult to detect" "42). They focus on the klrrrtsrr: and clajm that although competition thrives in Japan, success is still best achieved. through carefully fo?;teril^lgsocial relationships and entering into a network of long-term reciprocal exchanges, Athough these networks tend to hvolve elite from a variew of organizations, the elite themselves are not capable of single-handedly carrying out elaborate exchanges. They typically need l.he backkg of their respective organizations m d the cooperation of their subordinates, It is in this sense that the nature of org""izations, especially the high dependence of woritczrs leading to high normative obligations, plays an irnpllrtm role in m a h g such transactions viable. On the more recent business front, Japan has fared no better. ikfany of the economic problerns 'Japan has experianccd in the 1990s are related to the banking industry, whjrh has made a series of questionable invest-

90

C?-itlzeReztisited: White-Collar C F ~ ~ P ~ C S

mmts and bad loans and then tried to cover up its losses. By early 1998 the Fhawe MFnistry reported that Japamse bmks had hcurred $610 billion ol debt, Furthermore-., the Fhmce Ministry itself becam e h r o i k d in a scandal that eventually led to the resipation of several senior bureaucrats as well as the arrest of several employees. Evjdently, bank inspectors were being bribed, m d in r e k m they were tipping off the banks as to when the ministry would conduct surprise inspections, thus givlng banks time to conceal k~formationcmcerning bad loans. Even the Bank of Japan was eventually ifnplicded inthe scandal. None of these are isolated incidents. Nos do they exhaust even the major scandals of the decade, let alone smaller scandals. There have also been rclcew charges of insider trading, unSair government procwernent practices, and.influence peddling against such major agencies as the M h istry of Wealth and Welfare and t k fapanese Defttnse Ministry*It should also be noted that &ere is nothing exceptionnf &out the 1990s. kandals involving clandestine relationships a m g Japan" large power broicers have been a mainstay of contemporary bpmese society. What they have in c m o n is that they typicauy hvolve long-term, rclciprncal excl-cmges among people in power. Such acts seem mort3 commonplace in Japan &an the more individualistic white-collar crimes such as embezzlement m d fraud. Moreover, if the crime is committed primarily to benefit the organization rather thm an individual, it is often treated differently by the criminal justice sydem. A typical example involves the rash of bankhg seandals that have occurred. in the mid- to late 19YOs, Faced with a large n u n l k r of bad loans, many bank111g executives chose to ccrnced their banks' debts, &us protecti,ng both the investors and the banks-eputation. A particularly blatant illegal atteznpt to do this involved Hoklaoku Bank in Kmazwa. The president of the bank attempted to defraud the prefcctm's credit insurance association of &O miltion yen to cover the bank" debts, Although the president of the bank was found guil.ty, the judge suspmded the sentence on the grow& that he did not commit the crime for personal benefit but for the benefit. of the bank. Examples of white-collar crimes are not limited to business and politics. If closed, hierarchical socid g m u p a r e characterized by clmdestine activities, one would expect the sttma world to be a prime candidate for such abuses, People normally enter the sumo cornunity at a young age and stay in it for their entire lives. Sumo wrestlers live and train togelher, and rarely interact with thc nutside world. They represent an extmme form of a closed, hierarchical group, where members are completely dependent on the group and live in a high visibility, highly rrgdated environment, Even aller retiring from active competition, everyone is expected to stay in the orgar7ization in some capacity,

Indeed, if one opts to leave, m e is banned from the sumo communjty for life, As With many forms of Japanese life, the web of social retationships in sumo operates on two distinct levels. First, each wrestler is a member of a stable, and within the stable there is a strict hierarchy: lower-level members cater to the whims m d demands of Che higher-ranking mrnbers, who in turn arc strictly obedient to the eldcr head. of the stable. The members, besides training toget.her, live, eat, and sleep cclmmunally. Presumably to protect against fixing bouts, mennhers of the s m e stable do not fight one another durlng toumments (except on rare occasions when the tournament ends in a tie involving two members of the same stable). And gmerally speaking, each stable is in competition with the others to produce the highest-ranking wmstlers. However, as in business, a type of keiwtstl existtj among the heads of the stables, and also as in business, it makes sense to scrmetimes "agree" rather than compete. Given the closed nature of the organization, the strong interpersonal ties m o n g all of the participants, and the lack of any form of external monitoring of bouts, one would naturally assume there to be some abuses. Indeed, surno has long been suspected of occasionally fixing bouts. Althcrugh allegations have never been proven or admitted to by the Japan Sumo Association, rumors have persisted and the topic has even been discussed on a number of occasions by members of the Diet (Schilling ff"3441). The Slzttknlt f i s t , a weekty tabtoid, roukely wns stories claimiing that bouts are occasionally fixed, and although Cheir stories are not always credible, some wrestlers have come 'forward and admitted that tbry have thrown bouts in the past. Of course, given tbr lack of any external controls and the intense loyalty and close rdations among all of the participants, it would be surprising if there were no back m m politicking goint; on.

Conclusion

Americans are often pllzzled by the difficulty of doing business in Japan and the prevalence of what they feel artr unfair business practices and disrclgard fnr international law. 'The puzzlement comcs, inpart, by the strong perceptions of Japanese as law-abiding people, h this chapter we bave suggested why this paradox exists. We began by noting a likely irony cmcerning the relationship between the Japanese social structure m d crime. The same processes that sewe to discourage me type of crime might actually foster another type. Since most research in the field of criminology fowses on "street crime," "pan erlj.oys the reputalion of being a safe and orderly country characterized by unusually low crime rates, This reputa-

92

C?-itlzeReztisited: White-Collar C F ~ ~ P ~ C S

tion is well earned, and visitors to Japan often marvel at the d e g ~ of e safety they enjoy during their stay in the country. However, street c r i m is only one category of crkhal. activity; m d it appears Japm does not fare so well h other categories. Although intense group affiliations characterized by high dependence and high visibility tend to prevent most people from gohg out and robbing liquor stores or taLng drugs, it likely encotlrages certa-in types of white-collar crimes, particularly crimes committed in the course of me%work to benefit one's company. Mtfiotrgh whik-coiliar crime is hherently difiicult to study, a variety of factors suggest that, unlike stmet crime, Japan cannot boast of low levels of white-collar crime. Since only a fraction of actual white-collar crimes are ever uncovered and newspapers in Japan allaost daily report st~ch crimes, one can assume actual. levels are quite high. Fur.thermore, t h r e are good theoretical =awns to believe that these types of crime am high in Japan. AS shown in the World Values Survey, Japanese respondents claim to have little personal control over their lives and feel compelled to follow the orders of their superiors. Fur&er, given a social structure characterized by ir"i:ene g o u p loyalty amollg workers and lmg-term, reciprocal exchanges a m g the elite in politics and bushess, it would be surprising if white-collar crimes did zoi: exist in fapan. This chapter was not meant to provide an d-e~ncompassing-discussion of white-collar crime, The topic is far too broad. We chose to ignore a variety of related crirnes such as environmental issues and worker safety and aXso did not djscuss fapanese organized crime (the yakzrza). We also downplayed the degree to which white-collar crimes are committed for personal profit. The reason was not to domplay the importance of these issues, but rather to hjghlight the dual nat.ure of social order and social control. Once again, we see that social order is a two-edged sword., and the same social control me&ods that lead to positive social consequences also produce unhtended negative social collsequences.

The Religious Landscape of

We have &ready discussed some of the unintended consequences of a social, structure that produces high degrees of order and confnrmit-y through small-group social cmtml mechanisms. These consequences, dthough mi~~tended, are fairly obvious: low crime and delinquency, low levels of creativity, and so on.Flokvever, the e h e t s of this systern go well beyond the obvious, Because of the high level of grczup dependence and its accompmyirrg obligations, little in life is left unaffected. One lives in a relatively closed social, network where behavior is carefully monitored and, if necessary, sanctioned, :Inreturn for this commitment, group m m bers receive a great many social benefits, and it is in this =gad that wliginn m d rcligiolrs behvior are affected. To understand how primary group interactions have affccted the development of both the reZigious landscape of Japan and individual ~ligiosity,we will begia with a brief discussion of religion i,n rnodern Japan. The purpose of this djscussion is not to give a detailed account of religious beliefs or practices, but to highlight broad characteristics of ~ l i ginus life inJapan. As will he seen, the key to undesstmding religious Ijk in modern Japan lies in understanding primary group hteractions.

Religion in f apan Westerners often view Japan as a highly scrcu1arized society and the Japanese as a i7ighly nonreligious people. The reason for this is largely based on two observations: first, religious behavior is confined to spccific (and infrequent) life evmts, ra&er tban expresive in the course oE one's eeveryday life; second, cross-national survey research suggests that Japanese peopk rank among the lowest intematicznally on various measures of religicrsiw. A typical cross-national comparison can be seen in Table 8.1. It is easy to conclude from these types of iMernational surveys that Japan has a very low level of religiosity vis-8-vis other industriabzed

TABLE 8.1 13ercentAnswering "Yes'" to Typical Religion Questions f Aln Q Rel;igiolirus

Country

Pernon

P Attend Religious Sererices nl" Least Once n ICSonth

South Korea United States Italy Switzerland Canada bXgium Spain West Germany Netherlands Great Britain France Japan WURCE:

World Values Sul-vey (1991).

countries. However, ~garcllessof the statistics presented fn Tabte 8.1, it is not necessarily accurate to cmclude that Japm is a nonreligious corntry The reason is that the questions asked in n b l e 8.1 arc very much religirm-specific. If a religious tradition does not =*re certain behaviors, or even beliefs, it wodd be fooljsh to use them as a wasurc of religiosity withh that tradition. To do so would be tantamount to claiming Jews are less rc.lif;iftusthan Catholics because they do not: take communion. In actuality; Japanese religions do not require attendmce at services, nor do they even require a persm to express any beliefs. Furthermore, the first que"ticm asked in Table 8.1 is interp~teddifferently by Japanese than it is is a person by Westerners. A "religious person" by hpanese definitio~~ who is an actfie mmber of a religious organization. Table 8.1 shows approximately 26 percent oE Japanese people claim to be active mernbers of a religious group. Thus, a persol1 ntigbt hold a variety of '"religious" beliefs but still reply that be or she is '"not a religious person," Consider now the survey results presented fn 'IBble 8.2. These survey questions cover a wider range of beiiefs, t?ll of which could be t e m d '"religious" kbeliiefs. .A different picture emerges. From these survey msults, one cm see that a fairly large perilentage of Japanese people hold ""rligious" kbefs. hdeed, Japm no longer appears to be a religious outlier among the modern industrialized countries, If anything, Japan appears quite ~ligious,with a higher perilentage of Japmese beiieving in an dterlifc than their British, Frencl-c,German, Dutch, SpaniSh, or klgian counterparts. Sin\ilarly,belief in a soul is fairly high in Japm, higher than

TABLE 8.2 Percent Answering "Yes"

Country

"t-o

Other Questions on Religit>siq

n Cod

an Ajferlqe

n Soul

United States Italy Switzerf and Canada klgium Spain West Germany Netherlands Denmark Great Britain France Japan WURCE:

World Values Survey (1994).

it is in France, Great Britain, Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany Spain, or Belgiu~n.IS anything, it is more appropriate to claim that it is the United States, r a t k than Japan, that is the outlier, because of its unusually high level of religiosity There appears, then, to be a paradox. Oa the one hand a fairiy large percentage of Japanese peoplu express some form of religiosiw, while on the other hand, religjon has little influence in their day-to-day lives, and religious orgmizatio~~s do little to promote more active orgmizational hvolvement. To better understand this paradox, we will briefly describe when and how religion does manifest itself in the lives of most modern Japanese, Although religious life inJapan is a syncretism of several different religious traditions, includhg elements of Taoism a d Confucianism, the two main rclbgious traditions are Shhto and Buddhism. Shkto, the o ~ ~ l y ind-igenous religion of Japan, has historically consisted of loosely-held. folk beliefs, with little formal organizational structure. h~deed,it did not even have a name until the appearance of BudCIbism in the seventh century (Earhart 119821; Hori et al. [1972]).Associated with Shinto are a variety of animistic befiefs, that is, befiefs that spirits can be found throughout nature (Earhart [1984]; Clyde and Beers [1975]). Mistoricaily, there have been periodic attennpts to codify Shinto" bbeliefs and practices, and develop more of m organizational structure. This was usually attempted durjng times of political turmoil to add egitimacy to the ruling elite. A good exmple comes from the ei@th century when political authorities

introduced the crcation myth into Shinto teachings in order to bolster imperial rule. This myth t a w t that fapan was created by the sull goddess k a t e r a s u , who was the ancestxss of rhe Ymato clan, the Ijneage from which the emperors emrged (Ffori et al. 119721). This provided the rule of the Uamato clan (and all subsepent emperors in this lineage) with a e spiritual kgitimacy. C)f course, a more recent attempt to o ~ a n j z Shinto and use it as a political tool came in the early part of this century. Referred to by histcrrians as State-Shinto, it essentially involved a similar st..rateu to promole loyal% to the emperor (see Smith 11985Jfor an excellent discussion of this), In p"&-World War II Japan, however, there is little organization4 st.ructure to Shinto. It has esscnt.ially retllrned to its original fonn,: a syncretism of various folk beliefs and practkes. :It has little or no specific religious doctrines, nor is any specgic religious "ohavior required of Japanese people, other than normative moral expectations (Kitagawa 1198q; Ilshida 119711; Miller [1991]). Thus, there are no "members" h the sense that Westerners wodd use the tern, nor are there regular meetings where religious issucs are discussed. Indead, a colltection of rituals exist to be perfanned by Shinto priests on specific occasions, such as durlng weddings, after tbr birth of a child, tcr aid indiwiduals in tilnes of crisis, m d in. associatio~~ with ~rariouscalel~darfestivals. In other words, Shinto is a service industry, providing specific religiolls services to those who desire it (Milier [3992a]). Further, even for those who participate in the rituals, Shinto tewhes that the efficacy of a ritual is related only to the accuracy with which it is performed. Any addieional, theologiral knowledge or belief is umecessary even for the priests themselves wardacre 11")1)* Buddhism, of course, has a very different history, entering Japan with a firm organizational structure and devebped theological system of beliefs. Over time, it qawned many sects and gathered a significant following throughout Japan, dtimately being named the official state religion of the Tokugawa Shogunate in the seventeenth century (Murakami [1968]; Holtonn 119631). Xn nkugawa life, Buddhist teachings and beliefs domhated social life, leading to various rules of conduct and a social caste sptem that was strictly adhered tcr during the 2f)O-year 'lbkugawa reign. With the rise of State-Shinro durirzg the Meiji Restoration period of the late nineteenth cenbry Buddhism lost its pobtical backing m d much of its popular support. It became relegated to performing funeral services and overseeing dtuals involving the care of ancestral spirits. With the exceptbn of a variety of '"New :Religionsf"(primarily Bucidhist sectarian for most f a p a n e ~ e ~ groups), Buddhism remains largely in the backgro~~l~d only surfacing when individuds need the specific services it provides

(Niiler [1992a, 19951; Mori&a F197,sal). Thus, in modern Japanese society, Shinto and Buddhism do not typically compete with one another for adherents, as religious groups might do in most other cou~ztries,but instead provide various religious services such as overseeing rituals and ceremonies, prowiding prayers and good luck chams, and so on, that Japanese people avait themsetves of as the need arises (Miller 219924; Morioka [1975bf), What cwrrcllntly exists in Japan, then, is a religious landscape that looks quite different from the United States (or a ~rarietyof other Western and Eastern societies), Althougln U.S. reljgious organizaticms c o q e t e with one ancrther for a&erents and =*re acceptance of various beliefs and at least a minimum amotmt of personal commitment, Japanese religions operate quite differently, They are primarily nonmembership organizations that do not ask for, or require, individual acceptance or commitment, Japanese religions remain largely in the baekgromd and offer a host of spirihial services to people who reyrrest them. The staneiarcl rt?asons given to explai~~ thew differt-nces art? not convhcing*Same researchers have focused o~ztheological differences, ushg Max Weber" ccZassic work on religion to support their c1aim.s. Mleber (1968 [1922]), in an attempt to explah differences in Mrestern and Eastern rclligion' especidy as they arc rclated to understmding why capitalism arose in the W s t rather than the East, claimed that Western religions tended to be ""this-worldlyff in their orientation, whereas Eastern religinns were "other-worldly.'"If this were true, o~zernight conclde that it is only natural for Eastern religions to attract only a small following of strict adherents, those people willing to ahandon secular life fnr monastic life. Unfortunately; Weber's characterizatio~zof Western and Eastern religions was not very accurate. Buddhism on the pupulas level, especially the forms of Buddhism that flollrished in China and fapan (i.e., the Mahayana branch), has always been very "this-worldly;""emphasizing the use of Buddhist cbanting and rituals to Obtain very concrete practical results (such as a better job, success in marriage, good grades irt school, and so on). The only exception to this, oE course, is its overseeing of h e r d s , which is decided@other-worlbly, but no more so than Western religinns, Mxhich all aversee hnerals as well, It is also in~fficientto claim that: "fapanese rcligionsf%have some unique charactcristks that do not permit them to develop into competistg membership-based organizations. As mmticmed above, throu@crut much of Japanese history religious groups were very well organized and ext m m v competitive (see Anesaki 119301 for an extensive history of rcligirrus orga&ations in Japan).Thus, it is difficult to claim that it is the ""nature of fapanese religinn" that is respunsi,ble for understanding the lack of irnportancc religion curmtly plays in the daily lives of the bpanese, In-

deed, one need not go back too far into Japanese history to see religious commifsnent. It is h& to describe the fervent loyalty exhibited by Japanese soldiers in the early part of the twentkth century and their wil1in.gness to "'die fur the emperor"' in anything other than religjous terms. How, then, shoutd one uneierstand the development of the currmt Japanese religious landscape? Why have religions been relegated primarily to spiritual service industries, lacking the organizationd structure and social role they play in other modern industrialized atuntries? The difference does not appear to be d a t e d to a generd lack of rclgiosity, as was evidenced in 7Bble 8.2. What appears, instead, to be the case is that the social role rdigious orgmizations play in a great many comtries, including the Wded States and much of Western Europe, is ohviated in Japan by secular group affiliations, Thus we have returned to a discussion of small group hteractions,

The Japanese Social Structure and Its Impact on Religion :It is instructhe to note that m c h of the past and present literature in the sociology of religion emphasizes two diffewnt: benefits associated with religious organizational involvement: intrinsic and social, htrixlsic benefits are derived, directly from religious faith, Religious teachings pmvidc the believer with a variety of explmations concerning issues such as the meaning of life, the naturc of the supernatural, and the existancc of an.afterlife, as well as pmvide moral guidance (Spiro [1966];Stark and Bajnbridge E1985, 39871). Mowevcr, social belletits can also be obtained from religiion, since dfiliation with a religion typically involves participation in a supportive social network. Social benefits include opportunities t~ meet and form personal relationships, attend social gatherings, and receive cmutionai support during times of p e r s o d crisis. Furthermore, mmbership in a religious organization also provides the individual with an important sense of group identitypand a social setting where status can be achieved apart from m e % status in secular sorriet)i. Thus, religious organizations &ten occupy an important place in the individual's social envirf, and past studies conducted primarily in the United States have shown that it is this aspect of religion, mnre so than the actual tlneoliogy, that attracts and retains new members (Lofland and Stark [19155]; Stark and Bainbsid,ge 119801; Sheckat and Wilson 119951; Miller [l992b1). A4thougk.l specific teachings can differ greatly from religion to rclligion, most teachings provide a conception of the supernahtral and an explanation of eschatologkal issues. Theredore, m s t religions provide intrinsjc rewards for their adherents. This certainly appears to be the case h

Japan. Religions in Japan provide the people with a variety of eschatological teachings and guidance, especialiy concerning the existence of ancestral, spirjts and an dterlife. Howver, ~ l i g i n n sin Japan do not provide social rewads, at least not to the extent that they do in mmy other countries. The =ason should be obvious. In general, a wide range of social needs that are addressed by religious orgmizations in the United States and other countries either do not exist or are addressed by secular group affiliation in Japan. As has been emphasizccf throughout this book, a prominent feature of the Japanese social stmcturc is the encouragement of g m q attachmnts and group loyalty. From prtrschaol m, group involvement is systematically encouraged, and this type of behavior conthues in at least one primary g m p for nearly all Japanese people at least until the age of retil-emenf. "n-rrgroup repays this commitment and loyalty with social and ernotional support..For examplc, workers often socialize MIith coworkers after hours, live in company housing, vacation with cowarkess at cornpany-owned resorts, and even rely cm employers for low-interest bans, counseling, and sometimes matchmabg (3Vti.ller 1799261; Zioget, 119851). Thus, as we have seen, commitment to a secular group is often far strcmger and more all-encompawing for Japanese than it is for people in o&er coul-rtries.There is little time or wed for an dditional organizational affiliation. h o t h e r relevant issw discussed in Chapter 3 is that Jalpanese schools are active in providing moral guidance to their students. In general, schools have a much broader agenda in Japan than in the United St.ates, and are entmsted with socializing chjldren, an impclrtant part of which is moral education. 'Thus, lessons are taught as part of a school curriculum that emphasizes the importance of group membership and loyaIty filial piety and a smse of natinnal identity. k a i n , the result is that Japanese fmifies have no need to join a religjous (jroup in order to ernsurc that their child receives a moral education. These examples &IIWh w secular organizations and institutions in Japmprovide a variety of social services that are often relegated to religious organizations in the West. In other words, there am difierences in the social structure between Japan and fie Unjted States and these differences have led to clifferences i,n the role of rclligiotrs organizations in each society. Thus, primary group affiliation appears to nut onlly affect crixne, deviance, and overall social order, but also the development of religious organizatiolzs*Simply p u t Japanese people do not need social rewards fPom religious organizations, they mercly need intrhsic rewarbs. Social needs are taken care cJf through the h t m e affiliation Japanese have irt their secdar life. And m r e practically, even for those indjviduals who do not feel that secular affjliationsadequately address their social needs,

little time exists outside of those secular commitments to pursue additional group affiliaticms.

Empirical Suppo& 'The above discussion should not be understood to mem that no Japanese religious organizations providc social and emotional support, or that m Japmex people arc. in need of social and emotional support. It is merely the case that, in general, a sntallclls percentage of religious organizations pmvide social rewads and a smaller pescmtage of the Japanese population desire this service from religious orgmizations. We can therefore conduct some preliminary tests of this thesis by loofting at the relationship between social rewards provided by secular organizations and.the desire for social rwards from religious orgmizations, Put simply most Japanese rclceive social rewards &rough occupational affilidions. Even for women who do not work, social and emotional support is often provided by their hrasband's colleagws, supervisors, and their families (Rrinton E1989j; Nakane E1.9701). Mtbough these statemrnts rcprcswt somewhat of an overgeneraIization, it is clearly the case that Japanese workers spend a great deal oE tirne, both professionally and socially, with their cownrkrs, If it is true that cxcupational affiliation provides an ifnportant source of social rewards, then peoplc who lack these affiliations in Japan are m m likely than those with Eull-time jobs to turn to religious organizations for this support. (Note that past research s~tggeststhis relationship is not true inthe United States. Even people very committed and involved in their wwk still desire religious organizational involvement.) Table 8.3 tests this relationship. tlsing data from a I980 survey conducted by the Institute oi Statistical Mathematics in iTbkyo, we analyze the relationship between religicrus organizational participation and job involventcnt. The fist c o l ~ ~ ~ focuses n n on whether the respondent regularly visits a Buddhist temple or Shinto shrine, The second column focuses on individuals who claim to have faith in a specific ~ l i g i o u orgas nization. Z,ogistic regression is used to better understand the patterns, controlling for other characteristics that might inhence religious affiliation (i.e., age, maritai status, educational attainment, and sex). Coefficients with an asterisk are significanay related to thr! lir;elihood that a person will visit a templc regularly or claim to have faith in a religion. What we are interested in testing is the relatimship between job fnvolvement and these measures of individual religiosity, merefore, we construct a somewhat cmde masure of job involvement. This masure divides the respondents into those who have the types of occupations typically associated with a strong social involvement with coworkers (e.g., professionals or white-collar workers who w o k lull time in fairly

TABLE 8.3 The Relationship Beween Job TnvoXvement and Religioslv

Job Tnvofrrement

AR" Marital Status Education %X (male = I)

*p K .05 ""p K .01 ***p .Q01 WURC'E:

Committee far the Comparative Sumq of Values, Tokyo (1980).

large companies) and respmdcnts who likely do not have strong social involvement at work (e.g., self-employc.d, unemployed, part-tirne workers, m d so on). As can be seen in columns one and two of %ble 8.3, job involvement is strcmgly ~ l a t e d to both measurt.s of religiosity The negative sign in frcmt of the eoefficiellt means th& people who have strong social involvement with coworkers are far less likely than others to visit temples or be affjliated with a ~ l i g i o u organizatim s (even after removing the effects of differences based on age, marital status, education, m d sex). The adual coeffirients are hard, to interpret, but they can be transformed into a form that indicates the increase or decrease in fie likelihood of visiting a temple regulaly or being affiliated with a religious organization. In t k table above, the results indicate that people invoked with coworkers exhibit about a 50 percent decrease in the likelih~cldthat fiey will participate in er either of the religious activities u ~ ~ dcmsideratio~~. Tn addition, results indicate that older people and females exhibit an increased likelihood of participating in religious organizations. This is cmsistent wi& past research on religion in general that show females to be consistently more religious thm males (Miller and Hoff~nam[I995]) and older people more ~ l i g i o u tJ sRm younger people (Sasaki a d Srrzuki 119871).The wason typicdly cited for these differences is that females' socid role as carcgivers naturally involves therm more in religious activi.t.ies, and older people, s e n s i ~ ~their g own mortality, tend to develop an increasccf i n t e ~ s itn religion. Mowever, it- is also interesting to note that in general, older people and females have weaker social support networks and more free time. "Thus, even without care-taking responsibilities and cmcern over one's own death, these two social groups could be expected to exhibit hi@er levels of personal religiosity,

We can perform one rnorc test to expfore the relationship between secular group affiliations a d religiosity. It hvalves focusing on what are known in Japan as the "New Religions." Tfiese religious organiza.t.ions tend to be similar to sectarian gmups in the West and specialize in providing a variety of social rewards (see Miller [1992b]; Earhart [1970]; McFilrland [1970])*They are schismatic movements, derived prharily from Buddhism, that began in the latter part of the nineteenth century and have hecome increashgly popular since W r l d War If (Earhart 119821; Hacdacre [1984]). In general, they elnphasize a return to traditionnl f m ily values, moral education, and this-worldly benefits Cf-Tardacrc11984, 19861; K i t q w a 11987).It has been estimated that about 21) percent of the Japanese population is hvolved h these groups, and adherents te~ndto exhibit relatively high levels of personal religiosiw (Morioka F1975al). Id111ike conventional religious wganizations in Japan, New Religims tend to be membership-based and thc adlserents meet rclguiarly for both social and spiritual. activities, nerefore, they demand more from their adherents than mere nominal affiliation, and in r e b m they are able to offer a variety of social rewards (Miller p992b, 1998]), Since these organizations tmd to require more of a personal cornmitment, and in exchange offer w a t e r social rewards than are available through conventional religions, orne can test whether or not hdividuals who lack social support in their secular lives are disproportionately drawn to New Religions. Table 8.4 addresses this issue. This table addresses the relationship betcveern social suppmt and alliliation with a New Religion. 7b this end we constmct a more complex measure of overail social support. It uses information related to the indivic3ual" occupation, marital status, m d education level to produce a scale that runs from 1 to 5, 1 meaning the respondent has a very low level of social support and 5 meaning t.he respmdent has a high level of social support. Therefore, a rclspondcnt coded as 1, is likely to be m usfilled laborer who is not married and poorly educated. A respondent coded as 5 is likely to be a profession& or skilled white-cdlar worker who is married and college educated (see Mi(ler [1992b] for a more complete explanation of how this variable was constructed), Mote that the reason educational level is significant is that it is the large corporations that provide the most comprehensive farms of social support for their employees, and they hire almost exclusively college graduates. Once again we used bgistic ~gression,and inclueted age and sex as cmtrol variables in the equatio~~. Again one can see a strong relationship between secular social support and religiosity. 7'he negative coefficient means that people whcr receive social rewards through secular sources are far less Uely than othcrs to join a New Religion.

TABLE 8.4 The Relationship BeMeen Sc~dalSuppc~E"c and Affiliation in New Refigions

Mem bersjr ip: New Religion Social Suppod

Age

Sex (male = I)

"p K .05 ""p K .01 ***p .Q01 WURC'E: A Sumey of Customs and Traditionti, Tokyo: Institute of Statistical Mathematics (flayashi, Akut-c, and Hayashi 2997.

Conclusion

We have seen throughout this book the all-encompassing nature of primary g m p membership and how it leads to behavioral conformity and ultimately to low crime a d high social order. Less htuitive is its relationship to religiosity. Because modern Japanese society promotes strong group dependence throughout school and work life, the social role of:religion is obviated. Consider the wide rmge of social servkes typically provided to Americans by religious organizations: a place to make friends and meet potential spouses, a place to receive counseling and. other forms of general emotional support, a fmilylike setting to enjoy a wide variety of social activities, and a safe place to bring ehildren where they can ~.ecei.Jea good moral education. Past studies consistently show the importance of these serwices to Americans (Stark and Bainhridge 11985, 19871; Miller 119981; Sherht m d Wlso11 [1995]; Lofland m d Stark 119651; Glock, Ringer, and Bahbie [1967]). Yet these services are rendercld largely unnecessary because oE the nature of social groups in Japan, fn return for exclusive c~mmitmem.t. and loyalty to a primary group, many, if: not most, Japanese people recei.ve sociali benefits commensurate with those provided by ~ l i g i o u orl;mizatims in the United States. s Of course, not all people receive social and ernotionat. support from these secular sources. m u s New Religions fill an important social &he. Alfiough there are f w e r Japanese than Americans who look to ~ l i g i o u s organizations for social rewards, those who do appear to find that support in N!w Religions, It is worth noting that New Rejigions boomed dtlring two specific historical periods: just after thr Meiji Restmation (1,868),and following World War X I (McFarland D9701; Yin.ge"19701). The first was a period of rapid social change, when Japanese society was

being transformed irom a feudal to a modern society. This change involved rapid urlnanizatim and industrializiltion. During such a period, traditional social support networks become less effective. As people abandoned rural farm life and moved to urbm centers, a great many were likely in need of establishing new social suyport networks. T'hus the rise of New Reljgions. C)f course, W r l d War II: also produced a period of widespread unemployment m d a breakdown in various social support networks. Thus the second rise of New ReQions took place- In addition, there is currently specztlation that a third boom in New Religions has begun, which is sometimes referred to as the 'mew New IZeligions" (Numata 119951). This dso c m e s at a time when fie Japanese ecmomy is in deep recession, with mcmployment rates rising and lifetime employment opportunities declining, Still, modern Japan has relatively little tinre or need for voluntary mernbership organizations. Even during times of inl.ense social upheaval, the majority of people did not join a New Religion. In conclusion, what we are witnessing in modern Japanese society is a and behaviaraj canforsocial structure that. promotes group depende~~ce mity to the extent that many areas of social life are affected. The fact that religious organiz&icms are forced to specialize in providing spiritual servkes rather thm exist. as full-blo\vn. mernbership organizations has had a dramatic effect on the religious life of the Japanese people. If, for e x m pie, one were to r e m v e the membership element of Christianity, it might look very different. after a few gencrdions. Even if beliefs continued to be strong, hchavior would likely change significantly. Miithout the abilj.ty to assemble regdarly, one woufd expect less behaviorai commitment and less speeifk howledge of"the thcology In, short, over time it might look more and more like religion does hJapan.

Trust

Like religion, trust r e p ~ s m t another s m a where the consequences of the Japanese social structure are both unintentional and non-intuitive. A variety of empirical studies over the last ten years consistently show that Japanese are much less trusting of others than are Americans or Europems,.These results appear to be cou~zterintuitive. After all, Japmese live in a very safe, grczup-oriented society whereas Americans live in, a much more individualistic and often risky society. Shouldn? Americans be very cautious of others and Japanese "Custing?To better u~zderstandthe issues hvo2ved h this area of research, it is useful to trace the evolution of the empiricai work of Toshicr Yamqishi, a leader in this field of study. Are JapaneseGroup-Oriented?

When Varnagisk was a f a c d y member of the socinlow department at the University of Washjngton, he was interested in exploring stereotypical characteristics of Japanme and American societies to see how many could stand up to empirical testhg. Ch-te of his earliest social psychological wpesiments tested the notion that Japanese are group-oriented and Amerkans are individuatistic. After all, one can hardly open a book on Japan or America and not find a large section. dedicated to these concepts. Et is unclear what exactly is meant by the terms ""group-oriented" or '"~~diviciualistic,'"but they seem to go beyond the issues raised in this book. This book discusses aspects of the Japanese slxjal structure that cncourage group identity and dependence. However, discussions of Japan as a ""collectivistf"society and the Japanese as ""group-oriented""seem to imply more than just the e h c t s of the cwrent social environment. They seem to imply a long cdtctral tradition that is so h g r a h d in the society that social insti(utions reflect this orientation rather than produce it. h collectivist culture is typically defined as a culture where group hterest is pl"ced ahead of individual interest (e.g.. Triandis [1995, 19941) so that,

for example, workers are seen as dedicatirrg themselves to their company not because they are forced to, but: because they voluntarily place the campany's interest above their own. Yarnagishi, of course, knew that the modem Japanese social structurcl left i~~dividuals little choice but to participate in groups. He wondewd what would happen if that structwe were removed. Would Japanese people still prefer to act in groups, especially when compared to their American countery>arts?The & s i p of the experiment was fairly simple. an Using American and Japanese subjects, Uamagishi (1988a) desig~~ed experimental situation where suhjects were initially assigned to groups and given simple tasks to perform, with a monetary reward being distributed evenly among the group m e d e r s at the cnmpletion of each task. Also, after the completion of each task, subjects were given the choice of ctznti-nuingto work in gmups or opt to work indivicfuafly. Subjects who chose to work individudy were rccvarded based on their own performance, wbereas those who stayed in the group were rewarcfed based cm the perbrmance of the group. However, the amount of mcmey awarded for campletkg a task was less if the subject chose to work hdividually. In other words, the subjects were typically better off staying in the gmup. Readers not faxniliar with this type of research might not be fmiliar with the concept of "free riders,""Free riders are those hdividuals who do not contribute adequately to the group but still enjoy the rewards of group membership. Xn the case of this experiment, it m a n s that people who did not contribute at all, or who did not perform well, would still receive a reward idmtical to that wceived by other group members. The rclsearch question, then, can be thought of as involving tolerance of free riders. Who would be more l&ely to resent the free riders (either because they brought down the level of the grr,upfs performance or because they were being rewarded even though they were not contributkg their fair share)? Would the American subjects choose to leave the group and work individually? Wuld the Japanese subjects prefer to stay in the gmup? IMuitivety, two outcomes scented plausjble. -The Japanesc sdjects m i e t prefer to work h groups, even if there were some free riders, After all, the Japanese subjects were raised in a ""cllectivist" wculturt; where they were accm,sbmed to working in grwps. They havc been socialized to appmciate the value of cooperation, and therefom, might feel more comfortable being evaluated as a group member ratbrr than as an indivi,dual, especially given that the reward structure favored group loyalty Such an outcome would be consistent with much of the literature on Japan. However, it was also passible that behavior, whether it be in Japan or the United States, is determined primarily by the social structure, Shce both the Japanese m d American subjects were operating under the

same structural characteristics, they mi&t rcspmd similarly (regardless of wkat that response might be). The results, hwever, did not follow either of these intuitive p~dictions.The Japanese participants were actually less likely than their American counterparts to continue working in groups. American subjects chcrse to exit the gmup in mly slightty mom than one out of twenty trials, whereas their Japanese colmterparts exited the grczup in about eight out of tv\renty trials, even though it meant losing money M a t could explain these counterintuitive fhdbgs? If Japanese people p ~ f e to r be part of a group whereas Americans value independence, the results should b e been different. b a g i s h i explained these counterintllitive findings in terms of tderance for h e riders. As this book has demonstrated, Japanese groups have efficient monit.c)ring and sanctioning system, which greatly ~ d t t c e the s number of free riders. Ewryane must contribute to the group or face harsh sanctionhg. In Yamagishi's experiment, however, monitoring m d sanctiming of other group participants was not possible. He therefore concluded that the Japanese sulojects were unaccm,stomed to, and uncomf~rta:blewith, this type of group and we= more likely than their American counterpafts to opt out, Based on these initial fi~~dillgs, k'amagisbi and his colleagues begm exploring in more depth the nature of group affiliati,on iz? Japan. htthough Japanese often work in groups, those groups have certain characteristics. 'They tend to be fixed and long-tern, where all members share a high dependency on the group, and high visibility allows for constant monitoring and sanctioning of inappropriate behavior. Japanese are not accustomed tct foming temporary gmaps composed of strangers or loose acquaintmces, whose behavior camat be co~~trolled by the group. Americans are far more li.kely than Japanese to meet a person or a group of people and form a short-term alliance in order to perform a given task. merefore, the relevant issue in Yamagishi" study turned out not to be whether peoplc are ""group-oriented" or '"ind.ividuallstic," but rather how comfortable they were perfmming short-term tasks with people whom they do not. h o w well and could not mnitor and sanclion. This realization led to a new line of research concernjng the ability to m e t and work with people outside of one's group.

Based OII the above rest~lts,Uamagishi and his colleagues proposed that Japanese people wilI have lower levels of ""generalized trust'3han do Ameri:ans. Generalized trust refers to an '"expectation of goodwill and benign intent" ( W a g i s h i and Yarnagishj [1994,1,3f 1). It is the belief that sonneone wilf act fairly even when it might be to their advmtage not to

do so. Indeed., when one thinks about it, trust is really only possible when a person actually ca:ul.~ be cheated. 111 other words, tmst c m only octhere is no need cur when a persol1 is in a vuherable position. 0iher~it;c.~ for trust, Uarnagishi and Yarnagishi refer to a situation where a person cmnst be cheated as entailirrg ""assurmce" rather than trust. This disthction makes goad sellse shce it is obvious that a person need not ""tirust'" another person when that person has no choice but to act fairly For example, if one purchases a winning lottery ticket, there is no need to ""trust"that the iottery officials will honor the ticket. Laws require that they do, so one is assured of not being cheated. However, if one asks a friend to purtlhase a ticket m d it turns out to be the trYinning ticket, believing that your frierld will hand over the ticket involves trust, This distinction seems particufarly rcllevant when discusshg the Japanese social stmcture and the n a t m of p u p affiliations. Consistent wiP1.l the a r g u m e ~ ~presented b in this book, Ya~~agishi m d his colleagues note that Japmese live and work in group setthgs where long-term affiliation is assumed, and monitori~~g and sanctioning inappropriate bchavior is maintained* In short, Japanese are accustomed to a high-assurmce e11ent where there is little risk of being cheated (Uamagishi [1988a, 1988bl; Vamagishi and Yamagishi 119941; Hechter and Kanazawa 119931). As this book illustrates, high dependence on l-he group and high visibility in one" daily life allows the grwp to demand and enforce behavioral conformity Since these behavioral expectations apply to all group members, and most people live much of &is lives w i t h this semiclosed environment, these is little chasrce of being cheated either by other group members or by people outside of the gmup. Technically speaking, f31ts1-1,bust is not necessary Individuals are assztred by the very naturc of their social environment that others will behave h a predictable and responsible way. This distit~ctionbetween trust and assurance is routinety misunderstood. For example, in an otherwise excellent book, Rohl,em (1,9712) discusses how the strong sense of belonging among employees and a closed social network "produces great trust""when dealhg with other members wit-;hin the same campmy (15). Shilarly; Kumol~(1992) states that ""iformation sharing and consensus formation in networks can only take place effectively when based on long-standing and stable relations of mutual trust. And, col~verselyhvhen a network functions effectively, mutual tmst among its members will be minforced""(136). h both cases, it is ctear that the authors art- discussing assurance rather than trust. An imprcssive m o u n t of social psychological literature has studied the formation of long-term, stable relations as a risk-reduchg strategy (DiMaggio and Louch 119981; Kollock 119941; Uamagishi et al. [1995]; Cook and Emerson [1"32]). In such situations, it is not trust (i.e., a belief in the benign intentions of others), per se, that serves to reduce the risk of uncer-

tainty. hther, it is assurance, since aIl members have a vested interest in mahtainiq the refationship. It is hstructive to note here that Frmcis Fukuyama, in his highly influential book Trtrsf: The Svcinl Virtues and Creation of Pmsperify (19951, appears to contradict the work of Ymagishi and his cdleagues wben he descril_lesJapanese society as high in trust, However, a careful reading of Fukuyama's book suggests that his use of the word "trust" is basirally analogous to Yamagishi'pj use of thr word "assurance." He does not use the word "trust" to suggest that Japanese people have a (jc.mcral,ized trust in the b e n i p intentions of otkrs, but rather to describe '"safe environments." That is, he ctaims that Japanese c m ""trust" crone another because where there are strudural guarantees they are in a social e~~vironment that they will not be taken advantage of (i.e., ""h* assurance environments" i n the language adopted by Vamagishi et al.)* Is this distinction between trust and assurance merely a difference in semantics? According to Yamagishi and his colleagues, it is &finitely nut. Rather, i t has far-reaching and hportant: social conseyuences. The reason is that living in a closed social envira ent: dominated by long-term relations does not merely mean assurmce that other members will adhere to the gmupfmom"tive expedt"ims. It "1w means there is no =ason to trust people outsjde of:omfsgroup. Thus, '%ssurance" i s not only a more accurate term to describe what we normally call "trust of in.-gmup members," it its also, in a sense, the antithrsis of generalized trust,' That is, since Japanese people spend much of their time in tight-knit groups characterized by Long-term, reIations in a setting w h e they ~ can mnitor and sanction other mmbers for inappmpriate behavior, there is no reason to develop a sense of generalized trust (i.e., a belief that me can trust- a stranger to act in a beni.gn fashim even when it is to his or her advantage not. to do so). A wide range of swial scientific research supports this contention (Kiyonari and h a g i s h i [1;996]). After all, if one is always in a closed and safe environment, why would one need to develop trust in the b e n i p htentions of strangers? A variety of studies have confimed that Japanese have low levels of generalized trust, especially when compared to Americans. One of the earliest studies w a s a survey ccrnducted by the institute of Statistical Matrhmatics (Hayashi et al. 129821). Using natio~zallypresentative s m pIcs in both Japan and.the United States, they found that 47 percent of Americans said that in general "people can be trusted,'" while only 26 pcscrent of Japanese gave this response. Similasiy, about 47 p e r c e ~ of ~t h r i r a n s said that in general ""people try to be helpful," whereas only 19 percent Of Japanese chose this respmse. More systemically Yamagisfi and Yamagishi 0994) conducted a detailed, survey of generalized tmst in Japan and the Unikd States, Results

are reproduced in Table 9.1. The numbers represent mean respmses to the statements m the left, Respondents could choose from a five-point scale (with I indicating disageemnt and 5 indicating agreement). Thus, the higher the score, the hl@er the level of generalized trust. The last column shows t-scores. T ' l ~ ~t-scores se with asterisks indicate that the difference in the mem scores obtained in Japan and the United States are statistically significant, With the exception of the last w s t i o n , Japanese respmdents consistewly exhibited si,gnificantly lower levels of gemraked trust than their American counterparts. Social psychological experiments conducted with both American m d fapane" wbjects have yielded similar results (bmagishi 119981; k'amagishi 11988bl). Are these differences ixnportantf Since living in a high-assurmce environment obviates the need for generalized trust, why wlruld its absence be of any social importance?Just as high social order has both its positivc and negative social consequences, so does living in a high-assurance env i r o m n t . Although risk is reduced, so are opporbnities. In ecmomic terms, one can say that living in a high-assurance environment rcduces transaction costs but imposes opportunity costs. Or in more simple terms, the cost of maintaining a long-term, low-risk relationship is that m e is unablc to explore opportunities t-hat exist outsjde the relationship. To the extent that oatside opportunities are litnnited or very risky, staying in a closed, long-term rdationship would seem to be a good strategy. For the most part, this has been the case in Japan..Thc social strzlcture?,by encouragiscg group affiliation, also reduces opportunity costs. Et does this Zly p"nishing, rather than rewarding, changing groups. In fapan, loyalty to the group and seniority within the group arc rewarded. Tfierelme, there are few opportunities outside of established relations. I-lowever, even if opportunity costs werl, to rise im Japan and it would be to the person's advantage to abandon one group for another, studjel; suggest that Japanese people would be reiuctant to do so, The reason is related to generalized trust. A great deal of social psychological researtlh has shown that people with high gezzeralized trust are more willing than people with low trust to leave one relationship in pursuit of better opportunities elsewhere; conversely, people with low generalized trust tend to stay in a relations:fiip even when better outside opportunikies exist (Van?agishi and Yamagislni [1994]), Since many Japanese tend to live in clssed, high-assurmce enviro ents, they do not develop gmeralized trust. The result is that t h y prefer the secu,riv provided by the committed ~ l a t i o n ship to potential rewards available elsewhere, As the world, and.especially world ecmamies, become more. and m m global, opporh;lnity costs will likely rise, and the cost of rclmahing in closed, long-term relations wilt also rise,

TABLE 9.1 A Japan-U.S. Comparison of Generalized Trust

1. Mast people are basically hcmest. 2. Mcwt peaple are basically good artfa kind. 3. Most pclopte are trusworthy

4. Mcwt peaple respond in kind when they are trusted by others. S., 1 am trustful. 6. Most people are trustful of others. 7. Trusting o>therswill more often result

in a happy rather than tragic ending. Standard deviations are in parentheses. "p .05 *"p .04 """p .e .Q01 WURCE: Yamagishi and hrnagishi f1994), T-scores did not appear in the original. MOTE:

For better or worse, opportu~~ity costs have always been high in the United St.ates, A person who does not pursue outside opportunities as they arise tends to lose out in the long m. Because Americm society is fairly fluid, with, people forming new relatio~~ships and changhg gmup affiliations regularly, generalized trust tends to be hi*, It is an adqtive strategy to deal with a social envircmment where contact with strangers and short-term relationships often lead to ncw opportwl~itiesand hjgher rewards, Thus, Amricans appear to be better suited for livirrg in a global marketplace where, to remain competitive, one must constantly search for better products, prices, suppliers, new clients, and so on. Of course, not all Japanese Eve in cliosed envir ents and have low levels of gewralized trust, nor do all Americans live in open envirmments and have hjgh levels of generalized trust. 'The above exmple is merely a broad characterization of the two countries. Tndeed, it might be interest-hgto see if Americans who live in fairly closed, high-assurmce enviroments also have rektively low levels of gemralized trust. It is difficult to find. examples of this, since in general Americans are not highly

dependent and committed to one specific group. However, we can conduct some tentative tests of this hypothesis. fn Chapter 3 it was proposed that a tight-knit church community might be somewhat analogous to group life in Japan, since it is a fairly closed social environment with s t r q nornative obligations and high visibility. In short, it is an envirtmmelnt characterized by high msurance. A person will not likely be cheated by other church members since that might afkct that person" reputation m d stmdh~gwithin the church. Of coursef it is difficult to know how closed an environment actuatly is, :In order for peoplc to not develop high levels of generalized trust, they must not mly be members of a gmup characterized by high assurance, but they hould dso have fairly limit-cld contxt with peoplc outside of that grczup. One rough way of testing for this relationhip is to look at differences in generalized trust between ~ l i g i o u sdenominations. Specscall; studies of religjous denominat-ions i,n the United States show that fundamentalist Christian denominations are characterrzed by fairly tir;ht-knit socid networks (Stark and Bainbridge p980, 19871; Sherkat and Wlson 119951; Miller Ef 992bl). These types of denominations often require a strong commitment in terns of time, as well as specific behavioral expectations, and in return offer a very supportive enwironment. 81though hdaxnelntalist Christians are udikely to spend as mwh time in their groups as Japanese spend in theirs, and. are likely to have jobs that repire them to interact with people outsie3ie of their group, their social enviro~nme~nt is probably more closed than other Americans' ssoeial environment, and their friendship network probably has higher levels of assurance against mistreatment than do other Americans' networks. merefore, using data 'som the American Cenmal Social Survey (Davis and Smith [199S]), we compare levels of gmeralized trust betwem people who are affiliated with fundamntalist Christian denominations, those who are affiliated with moderate denominations, and those who are affiliated with liberal denomhations, Results are p ~ s e n t e din Tables 9.21, 9.22, and 9.2~.Three different westions were asked. The first asked respondelrts i f they believe that in general most people can be tmsted, The second question asks if most people try to be fair, or if given the chance they will take advmtage of you. The third quest-ion asks whether nnnst of the time peoplc try to be helpfu.1or if they just look out for themselves. I'he patthat appears in these tabtes clearly supports the fiwwticd argument advanced by Uamagishi and his colleagues. The more tighth i t the denomination, the lower the levels of generalized trust. Like Yamqishi's study of Japan. these msdts have a counterintuitive element to them. Fundamentalist Chislians tyI""j-1ly live in a very close, supportive socrial environment, where they can expect to be t ~ a t e dfairly by

TABLE 9.2a Belief that People Are Rusluvorthy by Religious Denomination

Be~.zomi~zn t iorz

~ a l atlst z

Ga1~~101. Trz~sf:

Ftmdamentalist Muderate Liberal

TABLE 9.2b Belief that People Are Fair by Religious Denomination

Dentlm2'12ntion

Fair

Tak Adz1atztage

Fundamentalist Mojderate Liberal

TABLE 9 . 2 ~ Belief that 13eopXeAre Helpful by Religious Denomination

Derzomilzn t iorz

Hefp$ll

Out fir Tb~msclves

Fundamentalist Mc~derate 1,iberal

WuRce: American General Social Survey (29'72-2 996).

their kiends and helped durjng times of need. mus, one might expect that fundamentalist Christians wouM develop a very positive view of other people" trustworthiness a d helpfulness. Clearly this is not the case, Rather, because their friendship network is composed primarily of other church members, there is no need to trust outsiders. The pattern is the same as the one observed irr Japan. Refox ending &is djseussion of generalzed trust, it is il~tereslingto note that high generalized trust does not necessarily mean high vulnerability. Ir-t a fascinating study of gulljbility, Kikuchi, Watanabe, and Uamagisfii (1997) tested how accurately respondents are able to predict a person" trustworthiness, fn a cmtrolled, experiment, subjects were allowed to talk together for thirty minutes before particiyating in a type of Prisoner's Dilemma g m wfiere a person's phying parlner, if he or she chose, could try to cheat him or her, Rcspondentmilh high gmeralked trust were able to discern their partner's trustworthiness (i.e., guess whether or not their playing partner would try to cheat them) with 69 percent accuracy, Low trusters achieved only a 43 percent accu-

racy rate. Kikuchi and her cofieagues hypothesized that people who have high generalized trust develop social skills that allow them to more accurately gauge the trustworthiness of strangers. Thus, it would appear that Americans not only have higher levels of generalized trust than Japanese, but are also better able to assess the trustwcrrthiness of strangers, thus reducing some of the risk involved in forming new relationships, Redefining a Culture of Collectivism

Reseaxh in this field implies that not only is the tern '"rust" often misunderstood and misused, but d s o the concept of a "'collectivist culturc" is misleading, since it is not the culture, per se, that is "colfectivist," Instead, it is groupwithin a coliectivist culture that are cobctivist in nature. It is not that people put the interests of others within thejr s h a d culkre above theis own inte~sts.Rather, they put the interests of those within a specific group above their own inte~sts.'This is quite a bit differew from what we normally think of as the deIInin.g chmacteristics of a colilectivist culture. Given this difference, we can reformulate what a collec-tivistculture actually is. Based on the above research, we proposc that a col:lectivist culhre exists when there is an adaptive advmtage to maintajning chse in-group ties. That is, collectivist cultures are sustai~~ed by an environme11t h which opportu~~ity costs are low, and loyalty to o ~ ~ egroup " pays in the long mn. Vamagishi, Jin, and Miller (1998) state that '"the defining feabre of colZectivism is thr group heuristic or expectation of generalized reciprocity among, but not extendjng beyond, memtuers of the s m e group." h other words, collectivism rcfers to stable, long-term g r o q affiliations characterized by reciprocai exchanges so that over the long run, one's loyalty and commitment to the group is to one" advantage. Much of this book has shown how the Japanese social structure promotes the formation of these types of gmups..Long-term group affiliations are necessary in order to achieve success in many areas of Japanese society Furthermore, seni.orit)l within the group, loyalty to other group members, and sacrifice for the good of the group, ail characteristics associated with collectivism, are ratio~~al behavioral decisio~~s in the context of Japanese society. Since group affjliationsare long-term, dependence on the group is high, and chmging groups is difficult and costly being a good group mennber is the hest skatcgy available. 'This is, of course, a very different perspective of colilectivist cultures. Rather than clahing that people horn into a specific culture come to internalize norms and values that support sell-sacrifice, it rather c l a h s that the social strudure creates m environ-

mmt where loyalty to specific gmups is a rational adaptive strategy for success. Consiste~~t with the above discussion, Uannagishi, Jh,and Miller also redefine "individualistic" culturcsfwhich they claim are characterized by more diffuse relations that go beyond the confines of a single, closed group. In other words, if the defIn;in.gcharacteristic of a colfectivist cub ture is its strong in-group menta.lity, the defining characteristic of an individudistic culture is its lack of a strong in-group, out-group distinction. Ya,magisl?i and his collengues explain Chc differellcc this way: We use the term ""universalistic" instead of the usual term ""individualistic" to make a cmtrast with "c011ecti~ist,"because we believe that the contrast between collectivism and individualism is based on the premise that the defining feature of collectivism is priority given to group interests as compared to individual interests. Tf we abandon this feature as the core of col1ectivism and adopt expectations of generalized reciprocity within group boundaries as the defining feature of collectivism, then the contrast is not beween groups and individuals but rather b e w e n generalized reciprcjcity being limited within group boundaries and being diffwed beyond boundaries. In other tvords, how important group boundaries are in estimating behaviors of o>therslies in the core of co~Iectivism.Tf people expect totalIy different behaviors fmm in-group members than fram out-group members, they live in a cultuw of collectivism. If they expect similar behavicjrs from in-group and out-grc>upmembers, then they live in a culture of universalism, nut of individualism." "23)

An important implication of this r e d h i t i o n i s Chat, contrary to prior definitions, individuals in collectivist cultures are no more altruistic toward fdw group members and no less egoistic than individuals in universalistic cultures. If the price ol a loaf of bread is the s m e in Ihe neighborhoocl s t m as it is in a store across t w n (malogous to a universalistic culture), then one would buy bread at either stare, and constantly price compare, ready to efiibit a preference hould one or l.he other store oifer a better deal. But if the price is always markedly higher in the stom across town (analogous to tbe collectivist cdture), then one would buy exclusively from the neighborhood store, and not even bother to price c o q a r e since the effort would nearly always be futile, In this analogy, one needs to recognize that: the cost of doing business kept high b y the neighborhood store by eiacross town is intemtio~~ally ther punjshjltg or withholding rewards from people who do business with other stores. In other words, people in clrllectivist cdtures are not more altruistic toward one another than people in universalistic cul-

tures, h both cases, people merely behave rationally glven the nature of the social environment.

'The results of the studies reviewed here concerning trust in Japan are both intuitive and comtesintuitive, It makes intuitive sense that when people live in a relatively safe, closed envirrmment, they will be ~ l u c t a n t to dcvelop trust in outsi&rs. However, there is &so a counterin.tuiti\redimension to this discussion. In the United States, with its high crirne rate and rdatively open, high-risk emimnment where it is easy to be cheated, m e would expect people to be \.vary of strangers and somewhat cynical concerning their intentions, Alternative, in Japan where crime is low them is a shared collectivist culture, and supportive interperwnal relations abound, one might expect high Levels of generalized trust and more optinnism concerning the b e n i p intentions of others, This is not the case. 'fhe apparent counterintuitive naturt? of these ~ s u l t likely s skms from both a misunderstmdhg of what the term "trust" means and also a misundcrstandjng of what a collectivist culture actually is, Tmst does not apply to situations where one is secure in the knowledge that one c cheated. That is assurance. Trust entails vulnerability, and the belief that, despite being in a vulnerable position, one will be treated fairly. Most Japanese people, by virtue of living in a h$h-assurance environment, have no need for trust (i.e., generalized trust). They live much of their lives enmeshed in social networks that both demand and reward their loyaity. And it is this characteristic that is the defh~ingfeature of a collettivist culture, Throughout this book we have described ways in which the Japanese social structure is designed to encourage group affiliations. VVt? d s o showed how those groups provide environments where morritarhg m d sanctioning of inappropriate behavim leads to hi@ levels of behavioral conformity. We have further shown how this conformity at the group level leads to a wide range of posi.tive and negative, as well as intuitive and nmintuitive, social consequences. Generalized trust can now be added to this list. a c e again, it is clear that there is a price to be paid for living in a highly secure social enviro~~ment. There are some ambiguities in the theoretical argument by Yamagishi and his colleagues. 'They clahn that long-tern co relationships produce high-assurance environments that tend to Inhibit Ihe development of generdizd trust, Wjthout generalized, trust, peopk are unwillinf; or unable to ercplore outside opportunities, However, they also claim that it is the existence of outside opportunities (i.e,, opportunity costs) that foster the development of gcrneralized tmst, since increases in

outside opportunities render coxnrrritment to a long-term, relationship disadvantageous. Of course, there is a problem with this argument since it does not state clearly how, when opportu~~ity costs increase, a persol1 in a high-assurance envim ent develops enough generalized trust to explore those opportmities. Nevertheless, despite the incomplete nature of the theoretical argument, it is dear that there is a relationship between the type of all-encmpassing group affiliations one sees in Japan and the reiatively l w levels of generalized trust- exhibited b y the Japanese. M a t past researchers often described as "trust" among Japanese is really a sense of security, As long as that security exists, there is no problem. However, once that security is removed, Jayanese are? ill at ease and dist.rustful of others. Che of Wagishi" ( D a b ) experiments graphically displays this concept. When sanctions were in place, Japanese participants cooperated with m e another at a hjgh Level, higher lhan their American counterparts. However, once the sanctioning system was removed the fapanefie participants were far less cooperative Lhan their American colanterparts. With no experience w o r b g h open environments where agreements between relative strangers entail gmeralized trust rather than monitoring and sanctiming, Japanese are ill p ~ p a r e dand ill at ease. 'This characteristic has likely contributed to some of the negative images other people have had taward. Japanese people in the past, and mi@t be jnc~asinglyproblematic in a world that is growing more and more "uni~ersalistic*~'

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PART FOUR

Speculations and Conclusions

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The Emergence of Coo~erativeSocial Institutions

:In this book we have exglajned huw unique social institutions in Japan, which foster the dependence and visit7ility of members of various groups (schools, work organizations, and farniks) increase the sol,idarity of tl-tese groups, and, as their ranintended consequence, also produce social order ill Japanese society We have also described how the same social institutions encourage white-collar a i m , obviate the need for organized religion, and prevent the devellopment of generalized trust in. Japan. Given how pervasive the intended and unintended consequences of these social institutions arel the readcr might ask how they c m e to he in Japan. Why is it that Japan has these unique social institutions? We atternpt to answer this question in two steps. First, we present a theory of the emergence of cooperative social institutions. The unique institutions that foster dependence and visibility in Japanese groups arc examples of cooperatiw social i~~stitutiont;, a d thus a general theory of such institutions should be able to account for their emergellee in Japm. Then, in the second part of this chapter, we will discuss a set of historical initial conditions that might have led to the emergence of higbly effective coopemtive social institutions inJapan and nowhere else in the world (act least not to the same extent). But first we will begin with a brief discussion af cooperative social insl;ibl;ions.

What. Are Cooperative Social Instihnlions? .hcooperative social institution is a set of rules that p ~ s c r i b eindividuals to behave in ways that benefit other members of a group or the g r w p as a whole at the cost of i11dividuals3self-interest (Hechter [1990]). These rulcs are necessary when there is a codict of interest between individ,ual.s and gmups, when what benefits the individuals does not necessarily

benefit the group, m d vice versa. WI-ren there is no such conflict, cooperative social hstibtions are not necessary A brief discussion of the Prisoner's Dilemma $ m e might be usefui. to illuminate the concept of cooperative social instiltution. Figure 10.1 presents a payoff matrix of a typical Prisoner" Dilemma game. The matrix, wif-;hthese parficzdar numbers, is carefully constructed to create a situation where hdividual self-interest leads to collective disaster. (The numbers do not necessarily have to be the particulaf ones we have chosen in this iilust..rati.on,hut they do have to satisfy certain mlhernaticat requirements,) Prisoner's Dilemma and other related games have been used to anatyze these situations for the past half-century because they capture important aspects of real-lj_fesituations that concern social theorists (Kollock 119981). I'here are two players in this g m e (A and B), each of whom can make one of two choices: co0pera.t.eor dekct. The two players m k e their decisiclns on their own, without consultation with each other, and pkyers cmnst influence each other's decision. The numbers inside each cell in Figure 10.1 =present the payoffs eaeh player ~ c e i v c out s of a given joint outcome. The first number in each cell repsesents the payoff to Player A, the second number the payoff to nayer B. For instance, if Player A cooperates m d Player B defects, the11 Player A receives -18 points m d Player B receives 10 points. There are four possibk joint outcomes. It is apparent that, left to themselves, phyers will choose to defect, because doing so will always bring larger payoffs regardless of Mll?at Ihe other player chooses, For instance, from Player B's perspective, there are two possible states of the world: 1) Player B cooperates; or 2) Player B defects. E'layer A must make a decision in complete ignorance of kvhich state of the world prevails. In the fist state of the world, Player A can either cooperate and receive 5 points, or defect a d receive 10 points. Player h is better off defecting in this state of the wnrld. In the second state of the world (in which Player B defects), Player A can either cooperate and receiwe -10 points, or defect and ~ c e i v -5 e points. Player X is better off defecting in this state of the world. Piayer A is better off defectjng in eit.her state of the world. And since the payoif rnatrh is symmetrical, the situaticm is identical for Player B. 'Thusboth players are better off defecting, and, left to themselves, will crihsase to do so. However, the joint outcome of the two decisions (-5, -5) is not as good as if both players decided to cooperate (S, 5). As a gmup, the first joint outcme produces -10, whereas the second joint outcome produces 10. The group is much bemr off if individuals cooperated than if they defected, even thoutgh it is individually rational tcr defect (because defection leads to a l a s e r payoft in either state of the world). Hence the d i l e m a : Individually rational behavior, if everyone chooses it, leads to a collective

Player B Couperate

Defect

Cooperate

1% yer A

Defect

FIGURE 10.1 13ayoff Matrix of Prisoner 'S Dilemma

disaster. Although our example uses a two-person game, the essence of the game is easily generalizahle to a gmater number of players. The Prisoner's Dilemnta game is m illstance of a large class of plienomella called social dilemmas, FR which individuaIXy ratjonal decisions lead to a cot2wtively irrational and disastrous sihtatim (Kollsck (19485). 11%Prisoner's D j l e m a g w s (as well as in other social dilemas), it js individually rational to defect, but the coilective outcome is a disaster if everybody behaved rationalty. Social d i l e m a s encompass a large class of ~al-lifephenomena, from contribution to public radio stations to recycling to air pollution. Think of the presidential elections in the United States, for example, In a typical presid,e.x\iialelection, millions of"voters cast their ballots, and the ejection is decided by a margh of at kast tens of thousands of votes (usually mmy more). Thus, a persm's one vote makes absolutely no difference to the electoral outcome. His or her favorite candidate eit.her wins or loses the election whether or not that person votes. Furthermore, voting involves a cost. A persm must use his or her personal time and energy, even though there is no chance that the single vote will inSluence the elrrrtion results. This example is rollghly andogous to the Prisoner's CZitemma game decision matrix. There are two possible outcomes: The persods candidate will either win or lose the election, But in either case, the rational

strategy is not to vote since the cost of voting will always exceed the payo f f .Thus, an individud should always choose to defect (i.e., not vote). However, as with the Prisoner's Dilemma g m e , if: everyone acted rationally, the resub would be very costly for everyone, much more costly than if every person chose the opposite strategy. This is obvious since if everyone acted in their own sejl-htescst, no one would vote and the democracy would collapse (which nolbody wants). Thus, the total collapse of democracy is the ccrllective disaster to which individually ratioLead. nal decisio~~s Because the cooperative choice (such as voting) benefits the other playc.r(s) and the group as a whole, even thcrugh it is costly for any indivi,dual to cooperate (becarnse each player forgoes a lager payoff by cooperating), m y social institution (a set of norns) that dictates that individuals cooperate rather than defect is an example of a cooperative social institution. (Democratic institutims that prescribe voting are Cherefore cooperative institutions.) In the absence of such institutions, we expect all individuals to choose to defect and a collective disaster to ensue. If p e m e need to avoid such cdleclve disasters, if they want to increase the solidarity of the group (by m h g sure that group members cooperate), then they need coopemtiive social institutions.

Haw Do Cooperative Social Instit-txlionsEmerge? 'The emmgence of coopemtive social inslitutions is a formidable theoretical pltoblem precisely because it dictates that individuals behave in an individually irrational (albeit ccrllectiwely rational) m er. How can such institutions emerge? There are two disthct approaches to the explanation of the origin of institutions (Hechter [199Q,151; Kmazawa and Still [1999]). I~~stibtions can be imposed on society top-down by its political leaders or they can spontaneously emerge hiltfam-up from the aggregation of individual behavior. Because ccrcrperatrive social institutiom dictate that indiviciuals behave in ways that hurt their self-interest-,their emergence bottom-up is theoretically more challenging thm their emergence top-down. Itis not difficult to explain how social institutions that benefit groups and society can emerge i f one assunes the existence of political leaders ~lrhocan impose institutions on the individuals (because the politicaI leaders might very well benefit persmally from such social institutions). Given the wideof cooperative institutions, however, it is clear that not spread existe~~ce all emerge because they are imposed by political leaders top-down. merefore, W wifI attempt to expiaill the emergence of cooperative social instjtutions without assuming the existence of political leaders.

In order to explain the spontaneous emergence of cooperatke social institutions, one must begin with the state of nah;lre. This is the state that. assumes the prior existence of nothing, except far sel,f-interestedindividuals. There are no laws, no police, and no government. fn th state of nature, individuals behave as they wish, completely anconstrained by institutions. Under such conditions, individual behavior can vary: Some people do X, other people do Y. It is the fundamental assumption of the bottom-up theory of institutional emergence that the i~~stitution prescribing X emerges when m n y or nnnst people drcady do X inthe absence of any rules regarding such behavior (Homans 11950, 265-2681; Knight 119921; K m z a w a and Still 119991). If most people do Y,then the emerge11t institution would prescribe Y' In the state of nature, neither X nor Y is normative; neither is prescriZled nor proscribed. Neitker carries any moral or social sipificance. Under such cmditions, it is reasonable to assume that m institution prescribing the morc common behavior migfnt emerge, purely as a matter of statistical exgectatim (Knight 119921). Owe the institution is in place, however, it will have a further effect on hdividual behavior, If the emergent instiktion dictates X, then those who were incl4ned to do Y before are now forced to do X (in order to avoid the negative sanctions) and those who mostly but not always did X are now required to do X all the t h e (for the s m e reason), It therefoe follws that cooperative social instikticms, which dktate cooperatio~~ and altruism, emerge when many or most people already cooperate m d behave altruistically. The evolution of cooperation is a tremendous theoretical problem because cooperation is individually irrational and maladaptivc. .As the payofis h Figure 10.1 sfiocv, defection is a h a y s an individuallly rational strategy In the language oi evolutionary biology, defectors have higher fitness, in the sense that they (and their offspring) will do better than cooperators (and their oMsprirrg). Urnless coopmators change their ways and start defecting, they will soon be wiped out by defectors, who thrive at fie cost of cocrperators, How then can cooperation emage? Mow can coopemtors susvive and outperform defectors when the latter have higher fitness &an the former? This question was once consietered ""tbe central theoretical problem of sociokliologf"Wilson 11980, 31). A recent theory calSed mdtilevel selection theory (Sober and Wlsm 129981) offers a novel and very prmis-ing solution to this fc-tmidableproblem. Sober and Wison propose one way to solve ""Phe cenkal theoreticd problem of sociobiology'3y rreintroducing a sophisticated version of g r w p selection into evohtionasy tl-teory. Since cooperative social instihations are assumed to emerge when most p e m e alxady cooperate in the absence of SLICEI, institutions, lfie theoreti-

cal prObllcrn has the same solution as "the centsal theoretical problem of sociobiology." How does cooperation evolve? A s s ~ ~ ma esociety that consists of 280 individuals (Figure 10.2). One hundred of these people arc cooperators, and thus the proportion of cooperators in this society is .50O. The 200 individuals in this society belong to two groups: Gmup 1, with twenty cooperators and eighty defectors; and Group 2, with eighty cooperators and twenty defectors, Thus Group 2 has far more cooperators than Group 1.Members of each grouQ cmly interact with other members of the same group. 'This is how this hypothetical society looks at the beg ing of ollr observation (Generation 1). By dehition, defectors do better than cooperators wif.kir.t eaciz gmuy, and they leave a larger number of offspring on average than cooperators, :In Group 1, for instance, cooperators leave 9.96 offspring on average, whemas defectors leave 11.09 offspring on average,"efectors clearly outperforln cooperators. As a resdt, the proportion of cooperators in Group 1 d e c h e s slight@ at the end of our observation (Generation 2). Group 3 now consists of 1,080 individuals, mly 199 (23 * 9-96)of w h m arc cooperators m d the other 883 (80 " 11.0f) of whom are defectors. 'The pmportion of cooperators in Group 1declines slightb (from .200 to .184). I'he situatim is essmtially the same for Group 2. Witrhin this gmup, as in Group 1, defectors outperform cooperators and leave a larger number of offspring. In Gfoup 2, cooperators leave 12.94 ofispr-ing on average, whereas defectors leave 14.04 offsprillg on average. As a resdt, at the end 2), there are 1,320 individuals in Group of our observation (in Ge~~eration 2,3,039 (80 '12.99)of whom arc cooperators and the other 281 (20 " 14.04) of whom arc. defectors. 'The proportion of cooperatms in G r o q 2 also declines slightly (from ,800 to .787). Although the proportion of cooperators in each group decreases, their proportion the global popziluticn? ir.tcreases. At tbr end ol our dservation (Ce~leration2), there are 2,400 individuals in this society 1,238 099 + 3,039) of whom are cooperators, The proportion of cooperators in the papdaticm increases (from .S00 to .S16). This is because mom cooperatrive groups (groups that contain more cooperators, such as Group 2) grow faster than less cooperative groups (groups that contain fewer cooperators, such as Group 3). Cooperatim and altruism by definition benefit the group as a whole, and thus groups grow in direct proportion to the numT11e n m b e r s of sIfsp1-ir1g that cnaperators and defectors leave in the two groups are arbitrarily chosen [by %her and Wilson) so that t-he size of the population in Generation 2 will be a nice mtmd number (2,400).There is no other meaning to these numbers. The only theoretical requirements far these nurnbea are that defectors leave mure offspring than coc>peratc>c,rs zuit-Fzin ~ a c group h and that the avemge fitness (across both ccwperators and defectors) is proportionate to the relative share of cmperators in the grc~up.

Generation 4 Population size = 200 Number of cc9operators = 100 Prvortion of cooperators =z ,500 Group 1 Croup size = 180 Number of cooperators = 20 Propc~rtionof cooperators = .20Q

Croup 2 Group size =z 100 Number of cc9operators = 80 Proportion of cooperators =z ,800

Average number of offspring Crtoperators = 9.96 Defectors = 11.01

Average number of offspring Cooperators =r 42.99 Defectors = 14.04

Group 1 Croup size = 1,080 Number of cooperators = 199 ProparZim of coc~perators= .l84

Group 2. Group size = 1,320 Number of coopera tors = 1,039 PrcJportion of cooperators = .787

Generation 2 Population size = 2,480 Number of cooperators = 1,238 Proport.ion of coc~perators= .516

FIGURE 10.2 How Cooperation Evolves Through Multilevel 9tection (Sc>ber and Wilwn 1998, Figul-e 1.1)

ber of cooperators in them. Endividuals (both cooperators and defectors) in mom cooperative groups do better m d leave more offspring than individuals (both cooperators and defectors) in, less cooperative groups, Through this multikvel selection process, cooperators grow in number at the tjlobai population level, Mlhereas they lose gmund ~ l a t i v eto defectors in each grottp, There are Enur necessar). conditions for cooperation to evolve through multilevel selection (Sober m d Wilson [1998,26-301). First, fiere must be more thm one group in the society; there must be a population of groups. Second, groups must vary in their propodion of cooperiltors so that some groups are more coopemtiive thm others. Third, there must be a direct relationshjp between the proportion of cooperators in a group and its level of solidarity; groups with higher proportions of cooperators must "do better'hand thrive more than groups with lower proportions of cooperators. Fowfh, individuals from differctnt groups must occasionally migrate between grwps or form new ones. OZherwise, if the membership ineach group is permmmt, then cooperation will eventuaily die down ill every group. None of these conditions is difficult to meet. There are always more than one group in every society (Condition 3). For a hunting m d gathering society, for inshnce, each band can function as a group, not a society, since these bands compete qalnst each other for local resources. The third condition (the d i ~ crelationship t between the proportim of cooperators and its success) is true by definition. Shce cooperation always benefits the group (albejt at a cost to individuals), groups with more cooperators must by definition do better and have higher levels of solidarity. And the prjnciplc ol homophilyf cvhcre indkiduals wl-io are alike are more likely to form a group and associate with each other, can sirnultmeousiy satisfy cortditicms two and four. ?"hmugh homopbily, cooperators are more likely to associate with other cooperators (becarnse they don't want to be taken advantage of by the defectors), and defectors are more likely to associate with other defectors (if not by choice, then because they are shunned by cooperators). This will ensure the heterogeneity of groups, wbere some groups are more cooperative than others. FIamopbily will also ensure that cooperators from groups that consist mostly of defectors wodd want to leave their groups and rnigrate to nthers where there are more cooperators. It will also ensure that defectors from groups that consist mostly of cooperators am likely tcr be expellcd from their groups and rnust form groups of their own.. Through t h i s process of multileve) xXection, the average level of cooperation in the global populatim (as well as the average level of cooperation m o n g Chc groups after migration and formation of nccv groups) will gradually imrease. More cooperative groups will eventually take over

less cooperative groups. When m s t hdividuals in each group cooperate anytzray, the emergmt ine;tih;rticmwill dictate coopem"ton. Thus cooperative social institutions emerge. It is extremely important to nate that, for the multilevel selection theory (or any other evolutionary theory, for that matter) to work, it makes abd u t e l y no diffe~mcewhether the process occurs genetjcally or cLtlturall,y (Boyd and Richerson E14185f). What is necessary for evolutjon to occur is the herikabitifyitf'plzetzofypcvs:Offspring must r e s d l e their parents. The resemblance can happen because genes Mucnce the phenotypes (SU&as cooperation or dcfcrctiosl) or because the parents socialize their offspring to behave like them. Both processes work e p l l y well for the ewlution cJf cooperation..ln fact, ""pmnts" m a n d ""offspring"in Che process of cmlbral evolution med not be gcneticaliy related at all. Culhral evolution works just as well when phenotypes are kansmitted between mrelated individuats &rough teaching or irnitatim (Sober 11994).e)ne &esefore need not assume that genes inauence behavior at dZ,only that offsprirrg (or students) ~ s e m b l their e parents (or teachrrs) and behave like them.

Haw Did the Unique Ca~peratitreInstitutions Emerge Only in Japan? We now apply the general theory of the emergence of cooperative social institutions (derived from Sober and Wilson" multilevel selection theory) to explain why Japan has the mique hstitutions that foster dependence and visibi1il.y of group mexnbers, However, the particular forms that the i~~stitutions take are not as important: as their effectiveness. Their particzxlar forms (the mechanisms of depetndmce and visibility) can be quite accidental and msult from historiral path-dependence, What is important for us to ercplain instead is t-he fact that fapanese social i~~stitutions (whatever they are) seem to be most effective at inducing cooperation a r n o q groups and thereby producing group solidarity and thus social order, Why are Japanese social institutions mcrre effective in produchg group solidarity than institutions in other societies? Tn order to answer this question, we begin with two observations. The first observation is that China is the only one of the six ancient civilizations (Mesopotmia, Egypt; the lndus Valley, North China, Mesoamerica, and Peru) that was never conquered and.overtaken by fureign powers (until the Japanese occupation of Manchufia in the twentieth century). The other five ancie~~t civikations wcre eventuab overrun by poumger, European civilizations. When foreign powers invade and conquer a society they usuaily introduce their own sociat fnstitutions and supplant the native institutions, Thus, when Europeans invaded and colonized the five other civiliz;ations, the native (old) hstitutions of these civiliz;ations

were largely replaced by the (younger) European hstitutions. China is the only ancient civilization where this supplanting of native htihttions by foreiw ones did not take place. Chha has kept its ncvn social institutions. Shce all the other societies of the world (and their social institutions) are by definition yomger than the six ancient civilizations, it follows &at China has the oldest survivhg social institutions in the world. The evolution of cooperation by d t i l e v e l selection occurs very slowly, as the proportion of cooperators in the population grows slowly @meration after gemration. It therefore takes a long time for cooperation, and thus cooperati~~e social institutions, to eznerge. Because the evolution of cooperation and cooperative institution takes a long time, it follows that dder sodeties, on average, shod$ have more cooperative sodal institutions than younger societies do or that oider social institutions are, on average, mow cooperative than younger ones. Although the multilevel selection thcory predicts that the level of cooperation can sometinnes reach an equilibrium, ceteris paribus, older institutions (which have had more time to ewlve) are expected to be more cclcrperative than younger institutions (which have had less time to evolve). Then the question is: Why hpm, not China? In order to mswer this que"ion, we make another observation. Mmy elements of culbre in East Asia, fmm reljgion to the wr2ten language to the system of lacv m d government, appear to have originated in Chha and were then trmsmitted. to Korea and then finally to Japan (Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig 119731).Many cMlfural elemelnts Chat can be obscrved in Japan today were borrowed from China through Korea. n e r e is no reasm to believe that cooperative social imtitutions art?an exception to this rule. Assume that- cooperation and, along with it, cooperative sociat institutions, began to evolve in China s0metim.e in the early history. mrough the process of multilevel selection described in the previous section, cooperation ev&ed in China m d Chinese groups become m r e and more cooperutive. As we argue above, this happens because more cooperative groups gmw faster than less cooperative groups. Because they are mom adaptive and have @her solidarities, more cooperative groups thrive at the cost of less cooperative grczups, and in the process replace them and their lcss coclperative social institutions. fn the process of multilevel selection by which cooperation evolves, more cooperative groups are more ascendant and dominant than less cooperative groups. If some groups in China were then to fnfluence K o ~ ait, is reasmable to assume that it is the more ascelzdant groups in the process of takng over the society, rather than the less ascendant ones h the process of being eliminated, that are m m likely to influence other societies. Scl we Korea (besuspect that more cooperative groups in China infl~~elnced cause they were simultmeousfy more ascmdmt and dominant groups), and triinsmitted their cooperative social instihttions to the Koreans. 'That

mems that, to the extent that this process of cultural transmission was miform and widespread, the socid instihticms that the K o ~ a n inhers ited from the Chinese were more cooperative than the merage scxjal institutions in China, because some groups in the latter, still h the process oE being repkced, had less cooperathe social ine;tituticms. As with other cdtural clements impctrted hln China, such as religion and the written language, we expect that the Chinese social institutions completely took over native Korean instibticms and supplanted them. The s m e process of multilevel seledion could begin in Korea as soon as the instibtions were inherited from China, as the same institutions continued to evolve in China. Eventually;, given time, social insl;ihl;ions in both Chha and Korea will attah the maximum (or the equilibrium) leveX of cooperativeness. However, af a-rzygive12 yoifzf in history, b ~ a sun ciaE instr'tutions should be slightly more cooperafive flzan their cozltnlterparfs in Chirza, because of the head start they had at the time of the culturd transmission, These social institutions were later transmitted horn Korea to Japan by the ascend& and dominant group"n Korea. Then, by the sarnc token, fipunese social instilufictlzs sI117uIdhe sligftlly more cooperatz'm fhalz Komn socicrl instifzrfio~s at a r ~ ygjliiert point in history. Mic? d o not expect the head start that Korea enjoyed w e r China and that Japan en~ayedover Korea to be large, and the evidence seel%sto indicate that both China and. Korea have high levels of group solidariv and social order similar to (but not w t e as high as) Japan (Hechter and Kanazacva 12993, tab. 4).However, as Iorng as it is always the ascendant and dominant groups that infiuence other societies, and the social institutions imported from a neighboring nation completely supplant the native ones (in the early history of East: Asia), then the smiS head start enjoyed by nations later in the chain of cultural hfluence should foster more coc~perativesocial instituticms in these societies. MIC3 speculate that this might be why Japanese social institutions are more cooperative thm those found elsewhere in the world. First, China is the only ancient civilization that was not cmyuered by younger, European civiiizations, and thus it retained its ancient, highly cooperathe social institutions. Second, the unique history of c u h r a l transmission from China to Korea fhen to Japan makes it likely that cooperati\le socid institutions that Japan inherited frnm Korea are more effective than the ones that Korea inherited horn China, which in turn are more effective than the ones evolving in China.

In this chapter, we first prese~nteda general theory of the emergence of cooperative social institutions by drawhg on the new theory of mdtiIeveI selection (Sober and Wlson E19981). We t-hm explained why 'Japan

mi@t have some of the most cooperative social, institutions h the world, We emphasize that our ideas in this chapter are far m m speculative than those presented in earlier chapters"Our theory of institutional,e ~ ~ e r g e ~ ~ c is new and has not been tested empirically (except in Kanazawa and Still [19997), and our account of why Japan is unique in the strength of its cooperative social institutions is largely speculative.

Conclusion

Past studies of social order have tended to either focus on informal social cmtrol mechanisms in terms of internalized social norms and values, or formal socid cmtrd in terms of the effectivmess of laws, police, and the crirninal justice systern. The fncus of this hook differczd significantly f r m ail of"t h e siudies. Although we acknowledge the irnportmce of both internalized social norms and. the criminal justice system, our focus has been on the role of small-group interactions and the production oE social order. Since, unlike the socialization process and t-he criminal justice system, small-group interactions do not bave the explicit purpose of promoting werall social order, we have referred to social order as an unintended consequence. In searching for what is unique about Japanese society, several, researchers have argued persuasively that it is not culture, per se, but rather the web of personal relationships and networks that exist at virtually all levels of society that is unique (Murakami and Rolnlen Ef9921; Kum m 114921). These networks consist of both the tight-knit small gmups that people belnl~gto, and Ihe loose-knit connections that exist between. these groups. Past studies that have focused on t:he loose-knit connections, especially those involv* the infomal links between private crrganizatjons, government agencies, and f nansiat institutions, were intcrested primarily in macro social structures and their effects on political and economic outcomes. Studies that focused on small-group interactions were typically limited in scope to explaining specific areas of society such as school life or work life. Ffe>wever,we have joined these two areas by showing how small-group interactions have macro-level consequences,.Sinec the strwture of group life c1rea.t.e~m atrnnsphcre where normative obligations are high and inappropriate behavior is quickly sanctimed, social order is produced and maintained. 111 other words, social order is not primarily maintained through the enactment of laws, the pxlesence of police, or the actions of politicims or even religjous leaders,

as is the case in many countries. Rather, it is a by-product of a web of social networks and smafl groups, each maintaining order in pursuit of its own long-term objectives. It is difficult to open a book on Japan that does not emphasiz how it is uniquely "group-oriented." Unfortunately the majority of these books then go on to misinterpret what is meant by "group-oriented.'Tather than recognizing that participation in gmups is necessary for achieving personal goals, they attribute this behavior to cultural values such as the desire fnr social harmony or social solidarity. Although these mitr;ht, indeed, be cdtural values (as they are in many societies), empirical studies have failed to mower mything unique about Japan in this regard (see Mouer and Sugimoto 119861). Thus there seems to be a hndamental, misunderstanding of why it is that Japanese people participate in, groups. A good example of this type of misunderstanding comes from discussicms of the Japanese term, giri, typicalfy translated as "a sense of obligation."" This is often associatctd with the Japanese "group-oricnted'kvalue system. that places obligation to others above self-interests. Yet this is a misunderstanding of the term. As Moucr and Sugirnoto (1986) point o u t giri is more similar to a contractual relationship than a moral kperative. It is based on the concept of a rr.cir>rocalsocial exchange, where the person displaying a selnse of obligati011 expects to benefit in the long run from that behavios. Furthermore, as Yamagishi and his cdleagues have demonstrated, once fapanese are removed from a structural enviro ent that promotes group-o'iented behavior, Japanese do not prefer groups. Indeed., it is interesting to note that when Japanese have free t h e , they typically prefer solitary activities such as waf-ching television, reading, photography, going to movies, or playing pachinko, Preferences in ts tend to fern to more individualistir: activities as wefl @.g., gotf, SW g, and distance running/ as welf as traditional Japanese martial arts). This has led a variety of researchers to reject the "group-orientedf' model of Japanese society But such a rejection is, we b&eve, also mfstaken. Understanding the importance of small-gmup affiliations is the key to understmding much of modern Japanese society, What is necessary is to discard nebulous cultural explanations and conwntrate on understanding the actual conditions under which most people in modern Japanese society now live. We organized this book into four sections, The first section presented our theoretical perspective. This perspective is quite unique for studies of social ordcr and also for studies of Japmese socjety in that it focuses exclusively on smalf-gmup interactions. The model we developed from this perspective was ~lativelysimple, focusing primarily cm just a few basic concepts such as group dependence and visibility. Nevertheless, it proved, useful for understanding a great d e d about modern Japanese

society. Withuut invokirrg broad, nonspecific terms such as culturc, idcology, and values, W were able to ercplain how social order in fapan is created and maintained, as w& as a wide range of other macso-level social characteristics, The second section followed the individual as he or she is introduced into Japancse slxjety, and more specifically, into a variety of small-group settings. In each setting, begiming in, preschool or kindergarten and. mwing through higher levels of education and then on to work and family life, the individual navigates through a network of relatio~zshipsconsisthg of long-term, reciprocal exchanges. The benefits of these relationships are considerable and range from long-tern secllrity to a dependhlc source of scxial and emotional support as well as mderial success. The price one pays for entry into these relationships is alsa considerable and includes a willingness to conform to a rigid set of normative obligations and also a willingness to defer receipt of those bencfits to some later t h e . 'I'he third section of this book sou$t to go beyond describing typirat patterns of social life in Japan to exploring some of the nonhtuitive consequences of this type of social structure, There are, no doubt, many such consequences (both positirie and negative) but we chose to focus on three: white-collar crime, religion, md trust. Virtually everyone h i l i a r with Japan is aware of the country" low crirne rates. A number of researchers have also noted the prevalence of white-collar cri~ses.However, it is not generally understood that the same social stmctural conditions responsible for one are also respunsible for the other. hlthoutjh intense small-group interactions and pressure to cmform to cmvezztional behavioral norms might attenuate certain types of street crlmes, it appears to actually foster other types of crimes. Shce white-cdlar crimes arc. ofien committed to increase the profits of onefs company or to help imprtant clients or colkagtres, stmng group loyalty and comitment might actually foster these types of crimes, In such cases, the s m e model that predicts behavioral conformity and high social order also predicts white-collar crime. Tct the d e g ~ that e a person is dependent on the group and that the group participates in illegal activities, one would expect presswe to both participate in crilnes and protect the group when those activities are u~zcovered. Even less intuitive is the mlationship between social structure and religion. ialthough fapm stands out among modern industrialized countrks in terms of low crime rates, it alsa stands out in terms of the relative unimportance of organized. religions. It would appear that these two characteristics art- mrelated, but that is not the case. Rotb appear to be consequences of producing and maintaining social order through primary grmp affiliations and closed social networks. Not unly does this

structure reduce street crimes m d hcrease white-collar crimes, but it also obviates the need for religious organizational affiliations. Tl~eJapanesee social structure redLtces Che need for religious affiliation in two ways. First, by encouraging strong group affiliations, the need, for social and emtlticmal support from other somes, such as ~ l i g i o u organizations, s is unnecessary. %cond, secular group affiliations in fapan collsulne all of a person's free time, so there is no time to participate in other organizations. This does not mean that religim is unimportant in Japan, merely that medership-based orgmizations are not necessary. 9cular affjfiations, particularly work group affiliations, leave no room for additional lofities. As Lincoln and Kalleberg (1990) state, kpanese companies artr cmmitment-maxhizkg orgmizatims. F h a l l ~recent research h a s rancovered anotlnes aspect of modem Japanese society that, m the surface, is puzzling. Japanescr consiskntly exhibit low levels of "generalized trust," that. is, tmst in thEJ belnign intentions of others, As Yarnagishi and his colleagues have pointed out, generalized trust is important in terms of freeing people from an overreliance m established relations, so that they can pursue better opporttrnities elsewhere. Once again, Japan" slow level of generalized trust appears to be related to the same social strucbral conditions that affect crime rates and religious behavior, Because o( thc heavy reliance on group affiliation in Japm and the abiliq of the group to monitor and sanc_t.ioninappropl-iate behavior, Japanese people live in a highly secure. emir ers cmnot &eat or takc advantage of them. Because &ere is this ""asszlr.. mce" "at one will not be cheated, there is no need to ""tstfsl."" others (in the sense that tmst entails putting oneself in a vulnerable position where others might take advantage of one). "I%usf another unintended consequence of the Japanese style of prodwing and mintaining social order is the creatim of a society characterized by low levels oE generaIized trust. 'This, in t m , could have important consequences in m a s o.f international relations and busixless practices, where generalized tmst is oftcn an asset. finally, in Part Four we specdated as to why Japan deweloped the u17jque types of social institutions that it did. Wcz did this by first developing a theory of the emergence of cooperative social institutions, Then we conside~dthe unique historical sibation by which ancient Chinese social institutions were introduced into Japanese society- The fact that these hstitutions have been preserved better inJapanthan h China itself comes as no surprise. First, as we speculated in Chapter If),it is likely that only the most evolved social institutions (i.e., the most cooperative) we= transmitted to Japan in the first place. And, second, Japan has had a very stal.lle and isolated history, and many cultural elements originaily imporkd b n ? China, such as wearing kimonos m d using tatarni m&s, have been well preserved despite the fact that they have long sinre disappeared from Cl-rina.

We began this book by noting an ironic relationship between crime rates and Nobel Prize winners. Japan is exceptionally 3ow in both categories, whereas the United States is exceptionally high. At t-hat time, we noted that underlying this unusud statistic was the concept of social order. The Japanese social stmcture rewards cmformity and punishes nonconformity. merefore, Japanese sodety has achieved a very high level of social order, Unfortunately,criminals are not the only nonconiormists in a society. Geni-uses are also nonconformists. The United States, with its emphasis on individual freedom, has created a society with a relathety low degree of social: order. Unfortunately, a society that affords its citizen free rein is mable to control where that freedom will lead. Americms are free to make scientific discoveries, and arc also free to hold up a liquor store. In the cllassic work Levinthan, sevmteenth-century English philosopher mamas Hohbes notes that life in its natural state is "ssQlitary poor, nasty brutish, and short." h order to avoid this, he conthues, hulnans developed societies where people voluntarily relinquished some of their personal freedoms in rebrn for a safe and secure living environment. Thus, social order arose. E-fokvever,the degree to which social order exists differs greatly from society to society, and finding the proper balance between order and perscmal freedom is no simple task. The authors of this book are, pehaps, a good cxamfle oE the eomplexiv of the situation. Both of us have spent a great deal of time living in both Japan and the Idnited States, the two c0untric.s that arguably exhibit the two extremes in this area, One of us has chosen to live in Japan, fhding the orderliness and safely well, worth sacrifces in personal. freedom. The other prefers to live in the LInited States, finding the Japanese social structurt. too cclnfining m d oppressive. There appears, then,to be no clear answer to the questions posed at the outset of this book. How much social order is appropriate? HOM,much is too much? Evert the authors carnot q r e e on answers to these questiom. Moreover, fiere is pmcious little here in terms of ""lessons" for other societies. fn reatity, most Americms are happy living in America and eta not want to live any\Yhere else. Most Japanese e e l the san?e way &out their country. Furthermore, if Americans were asked if they were willing to sacrifice a great deal of their personal f ~ e d o min order to increase their safcty m d secmrity, they kvould likely mcver no. Similarly, if Japanese we= asked if they would like to increase their personal freedom, but the result wouid be a decrease in social order, they too wodd likely answer no. Perhaps it is best, then, not to try and resolve this issue, but instead to appreciate the variety of social systems that exist in the world, and.be thankful to live in an international era where choice of one's home country is possjible.

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Index

American General Social Survey, 112-113 Anomie, 37,644,653 Attachments, social band of, 66 Aum Sknrikyor, 82 Banking industry, 89-90 Behavior deviant, 4[7,48,6,81 learning, ways of, 65 normative, 9-1 0 role of, 513 Beliefs, social bond of, 66-67 Benedict, Ruth, 10 Birthate 57,etO Bounded generalized exchanges, 333 Bounine-Cabale, Jean, 43 Brinton, Mar)5 56 Buddhism, 95,536,537 See also Reitigicm ChiZdren, socialization of, 24-26 See also Swialization China, 130-131,236 Clzon~ikzli,'70 Clzrysnntfiemum n ~ the d Szuo-rd, The (Benedict), 1Q Clark, Rodney, 55-56 Collectivism, 105-106, 114-1 16 See also Craup(s) Collecti\rist versus universalistic, 115 Confc>rmistsversus noncmfc~rmisls, 137 Conformiq, 35 Confucianism, 7,95 See also Religion

Cr~rruptinnperceptinn index, 84 Crime, 61-78 arrest rates, 74, 75, 75(tabIe), 7% in cities! 64 cr~rruption,84,85(table), 86 definitions, 61 homicide rates, S(tabte 1.2) international comparisons of, 5ftable 1.2), 6,fil-63,63(table) juvenile, 23-24,25(tabIe), 31,36,58, 59 kobnlz, 74-75 by men, 40 organizd crime, 82,92 police stations, neighbarhood, 74-75 punishment, 76-77, ??(tab14 rates, 4,6,6l-63,63(tabIe), 69, 71, 135 social cc3ntrol of, 8-9, 61 sacial disarganization in, 64,652 Sce also B&avior; Crime, theories of; Crime, white-collar Crime! theories of, 6%8 controf, 6-7,172-73 deterrence, 67-68,74--77 learning, 65-46, 71-72 sbuctural, 63-64,653-71 subcultur~65,66,72 See also Crime; Crime, white-collar Crime! white-collar, 81-92 benefitkg organization versus individual, 90 categories of, 83 company subcuftures in, 85-88 concept of, 82-85

defined, 82-83 embezzlement, 8 3 4 , M(tiz61e) examples of, 88-91 fraud, 8%84,84(table) gangs in, 88 hirefsu, 89, 91 pc~liticalscandals, 889 rates, 135 scandals, 89,90 stock trading, illegal, 89 subcultures in, 88 types of, 85,823 See also Crime; Crime, theories of Criminal justice system, 9 Criminolc>gy;8 Cultural explana"tiom, of sacial order, 7 Cultural lags, 7 Dependence in education system, 2.4-27,28,29, 33,34 in employment, 19,4042,42, 43-44, 46,47,48 in groups, 28,29, 22-28,78,84,107 normative obligations from, 33-34 in white-collar crime, 81 Divorce, 57,58 &>re, RanaXd, 43 Durkheim, Ernile, 37 Economics, 89-90 Educat.ic>nsystem, 2>37 alter-natives in, lack of, 28-31 authority in, 35 college in, 30,32,55 conformity in, 35 curricula in, 26 dependence in, 24-27', 28,29,33,34 discipline prc>btems,60 examination process in, 30,40 free time for students in, 31,33,34 gender roles in, 55 group identity in, 28 jukt~in, rc~leof, 31-32, 32(table), 34 materials, 7 monitoring in, 34-36 normative obligations in, 3S34

religion, impact on, 99 sanctioning in, 34-36 socializatian in, 24-28 visibility in, 34-36 Employment, 39-50 alternatives in, lack of, 43-43 characteristics of large Japanese companies, 40 crime, relationship to, 64,70 dependence in, 19,40-41,42,3M4, 45,47; 48 discridnatian, hiring, 59,71 employee handbooks, 44 examination process in, 39-40 gender discrimination in, 59 gender roles in, 55-56,59 generalized exchange in, 49 group identity in, M,45 housing, 4546,47 identification with, 42 job-changing, 43 loyalty in, 41,44,45 mamiages throu$, 47-48 monitoring in, 45-49 newsletters in, 42 normative o>btigations,44-45 obeying orders, 8687,871table 7.3) pay xafef 43 pmductivitiv; 44-45,45(table 4.2) sanctioning in, 45-49 for small companies, 47 social identity h m , $0 sociitlization in, 41-43 for students, 30, 32-32, 35 visibility in, 45-39 white-collar, 47,18, 43 for women, 31,56, 57 work hours, 45(tabfe 41) Sce also Crimef white-collar; Unemplo>yment Exchange systems, 33-34,39,89,90 Fallows, Jameg 39-40 Family; 51-60 discipline prc~blerns, gender roles in, 53(table), 54, 54(table), 55, EiSCtable), 56 Xabor, divisic>nof, 31-56

Index normative dligations, benefits of, 60 patterns, 56-57 register, national, 49 social control, relationship to, 58-59 structure, 58-59 FemaXes, role of. See Women, foie of Festivals, seasonal, 70 Finance Mirristry, 90 Free riders, 186107 Free time, 31,33, 34,73, 234 Friedman, Debra, 8 F-trkuyarna, Francis, 109 Gangs, 6546,82,88 Gender roles. See Women, role of Gibbs, jack, 67' Giri, 134 Group(s), 87-88 afBfliations, 110, 2 36 colledivist culture of, 105-106, 219-116 as compared to small-town life, 64 conventional, 84,82 counterprc>ductive,15 dependence, 18, 49,2&28,81 in educatian system, 24-25? 26,32, 35-36 in employment, 42, M, 45

free riders, 1015--107 hierarchical social, 90-91 identity 26,217, 37

keirefsu, 88 loyalty tc., 110 mismderstandings abolut 134 munibring, 8, 2 0 neworks, 133-13 nonconventianal,81,82 norms, 81-82 peer pressure, 35 prc3duct-ive, 15 religion, impact on, 99 securities market, 86 smaIl, 4243, 64, 70, 78, 434-435 tempora ry, 107 trust, 105-107 visibility, 17, 18, 2 9, 2 07 See also Group solidarity; Institutions, cooperative social

153 Group solidarity 13-20,129 development of, 16-19 social order as consequence of, 2 4-16 See nfsu Group(s)

Hanseilli, 35 Hasegawa, Gaku, 70 Hechter, MichaeX, 8, 113,17, 18, 72 Hendry, Joy, 35 Heritability of phenotypes, 2 29 Hirschi, Travis, "72 Hobbes, Thomas, 2 37 HokTcoku Bank, 90 Homophily, 128 F;Tolzs~ki,49 Hosokatva, Morihiro, 89 Hyogo, 31 1e, 51 Income distribution, 69-78 Individual control, 87-88,87Qtable 7.4) Individualistic cultures, 115 Inoue, Mariko, 89 Institute of Statistical Mathematics, 1017,189 Institutions, cooperative soda], 121-132,136 cooperators versus defectors, 125-129 defined, 121-124 development of, 324129, 127Cfigure) in Japan ITersus other so>cieties, 129-1 31 multilevel sefedion theory 325-2 29, 130-4 31 origins of, I25 Priwner" Dilemma game, 422-424, 2 23(fiigurtr.) top-down ?Tersus fi)c)tt~)m-up, 124 unique to Japan, 129-1 31 See also Group(s) Institutions, social, 11 International comparisons on crime, 5(table 1.2),25ftable), 61-63,63(tables), 74,75(tabIte), 76, 77(table), %(table), 84-85, 85Qtable)

on employment, 45(tables), 63ttabXes) on family, 53Qtable), 54(table) for individual control, 8"7"877(tabte 7-41 of Noibel Prizes, 5(table 1.1) for obeying orders, 886-87,87(table '7.3) on religion, 93-95,94(table), 95qtable) of unemployment rates, 70-71, '71(table) See also United States, Japan compared with Investments, soxial bond of, 66 Involvementf scxial bond of, 66 Iwao, Sumiko, 5455,57

Miller, Alan S., 114, 115 Ministry of Health and Welfare, 90 Modeling, 65 Monltc3ring in educatic~nsystem, 34-36 in employment, 44,46-49 group, small, 82 as social control, 8, 2 0 visibility, relationship to, 1'7,18 Mores, See Norms Mcjuer, Ross, 29,46 Multilevel selection theory, 125-1 29, 130-1 31 Murakami, Yasusuke, 40'49

Kanazawa, Satoshi, 5,8,'72 Kanemaru, Shin, 89 F(et'retsu,88,239, 91 Kerbbbes),137 Lewis, Catherine, 25,3445 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), 89 Loyalty; 41,44,45,86,110,141;

Obeytz, 46 Olson, Mancur, 16 Operant conditioning, 9,65, '72 ""Order in Japanese Scxiety: Attachment, Authc)riv, and Routiine""Rc~hlen), 8

Marriage, 47-48, 57 Meiji Restoratian, 96

Peak, Lois, 26 Peer pressure, 35,444

Japanese Befcmse Ministry, 90 Japanese Ministv of Education, 26,128 Japanese Ministry of tabor, 56 Japan Sumc:,Assodation, 91 Jin, NNClbuhifa, 114,115 Juku, 31-32,32(table), 34 Juvenile delinquency, 23-24,24(table), 31, 36,58, 59

Plato, 67 Pc?litics,89 Prisoner" Dilemma game, 122-124, I 23(table) Privacy, 34,46 Productivity 45(table 4.2) Reciprocity 33,89,9O, 2 2 5 Records#family, 49 Religion, 93-1 04 anin-tisticbeliefs, 95 benefits of, 98-99 Buddhism, 95,96,97 Confucianism, "it, 95 cults, 82 education system impact on, 99 group structure impact on, 99 interna tional comparisom on, 93--95, 94(table), 95Ctable) job involven~entversus religitjus participation, 100-101, I Ol (table) New New Religions, 104 New Religions, 96,102-103, 1 O t ftable), 104 secubr versus religious social rewards, 400-403 Shinto, 95,96,97 sociaX structure on, impact of, 98-100 soda1 suppc~rtand, relationship between, 103(table),135-136 Taoism, 95 traditions in japm, 95-98 trust levels based on, 112-12 3, 113(tables) United States versus Japan on, 9%95p 97, 99 Weber, Max on, 97 Rc>blen,Thornas P. on characteristics of japanese companies, 40 on education system 26 on employment system, 49,1 Q8 on entrance exams, 30 ethnographic study of bank, 41 on maturation, 28 on small work groups, 42-43

on social order, 8 Rules, 5-6,M See also Norms Safety, 4 See nfsu Securiv Sanctioning in educatian system, 34-36 in employment, 44,46-49 group norm, 18 groupbsmaXI, 82 as social control, 8, 2 0 visibility, relaticm~hipto, 17, 18 Sapporo, 70 kandals, 89,9Q Scurities markets, 84 SCM 4,18, T2~ I7 ~ , Shinto, 95,9& 97' Sce also Religion Sfzrak-art Posk, 91 Social bonds, 66 %>cialcontrol, 8-10, 67 family in relationship to, 58-59 See nfsa Social order Social disorganization, 64,652 SociaXizatictn, 24-28,41-43 Social order defined, 3,5-6,14 l-heoretical approaclhes to, 7-8 Sce also Social control; SoXidaristic thec~ryof social order %>cishio,33, 105,106, 109, 213, 114, 115 Vosakc?i-Soran,17Q Uuki, Masaki, 33